1. This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, aggrieved by the docket order dated 17.12.2025 passed in O.S.No.46 of 2024 (Old O.S.No.119 of 2016) by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad, whereby and whereunder the learned trial Court refused to receive and mark the simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995 sought to be produced by the petitioner/defendant on the ground that the same is an unregistered document and therefore inadmissible in evidence for want of registration.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed before the Trial Court.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

               i) The respondents/plaintiffs instituted a suit vide O.S.No.119 of 2016 (renumbered as O.S.No.46 of 2024) seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession, and correction/rectification of entries in the revenue records in respect of agricultural land admeasuring Ac.1-16 gts in Sy.No.698/7 (old Sy.No.698) situated at Borgaon (Kalan) Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit land originally belonged to late Doddi Bakkanna, who possessed Ac.1-35 gts. Out of the said extent, an extent of Ac.0-19 gts was acquired by the Government in the year 1976 for the construction of a check dam across a stream, leaving an extent of Ac.1-16 gts. After the demise of Doddi Bakkanna, his two sons, namely Doddi Rajalingam and Doddi Narsaiah (plaintiff No.1), succeeded to the property in equal shares. Plaintiff No.2 is the daughter and sole legal heir of late Doddi Rajalingam. It is the case of the plaintiffs that out of the total extent, Ac.0-20 gts was cultivable and was leased out to the defendant on batai (crop-sharing) basis in the year 1995 for 8 bags of paddy per crop. The said lease arrangement continued up to the second crop of 2013, whereafter the defendant surrendered possession in May 2014 due to water shortage. It is alleged that on 25.06.2016, the defendant unlawfully encroached into the suit land, leveled the same with a tractor, set up a claim of purchase, and got his name mutated in the revenue records behind their back. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiff No.1 died and his legal representatives were brought on record as plaintiff Nos.3 to 7.

               ii) The petitioner/defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement, specifically denying the plea of tenancy/batai and dispossession. It is the specific case of the defendant that he purchased the subject land admeasuring Ac.1-16 gts in Sy.No.698 from plaintiff No.1 and the mother of plaintiff No.2 on 04.02.1995 for a total sale consideration of Rs.42,500/- under a simple sale deed and that pursuant thereto, possession of the property was delivered to him. He further pleaded that pursuant to the said transaction, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Makloor, mutated his name in the revenue records, issued title deeds/patta passbooks, and he has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof as absolute owner.

               iii) During the course of trial, when the petitioner/defendant intended to mark the said simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995 during his evidence as DW.1, an objection was taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. It is not in dispute that prior to tendering the document in evidence, the petitioner had filed I.A. No.184 of 2025 under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which was allowed on 07.04.2025 directing the document to be impounded. Pursuant thereto, the District Registrar, Nizamabad collected the deficit stamp duty of Rs.4,675/- and penalty of Rs.14,025/-, totaling Rs.18,700/-, through Challan dated 10.09.2025. However, the learned trial Judge, vide impugned order dated 17.12.2025, sustained the objection of the plaintiffs and held that since the suit is one for declaration of title and the defendant also claims title under the unregistered sale deed dated 04.02.1995, the document compulsorily requires registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore, under Section 49 of the said Act, it cannot be received in evidence even after payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner/defendant has preferred the present revision petition.

4. Heard the submissions of Sri Kondadi Ajay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Smt. K. Sarala Mahender Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, and perused the record.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the trial Court committed grave error in holding that the unregistered sale deed dated 04.02.1995 is wholly inadmissible in evidence. He submitted that once the document had already been impounded pursuant to orders passed in I.A. No.184 of 2025 and the competent authority had collected the requisite deficit stamp duty along with penalty, the objection regarding insufficiency of stamp duty ceased to survive. The trial Court failed to distinguish between an objection relating to stamp duty and an objection relating to registration. Learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court failed to appreciate the statutory purport of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, which specifically enables an unregistered document affecting immovable property to be received as evidence of a collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. It is contended that the petitioner seeks to rely upon the document not merely to prove title, but essentially to establish the origin, nature, character, and commencement of his possession, the circumstances under which he was inducted into possession in the year 1995. Learned counsel further argued that the trial Court committed serious irregularity by prematurely shutting out the document at the threshold instead of following the established practice of receiving the document subject to objection and deciding its probative worth and admissibility at the final stage. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:

               i) Bondar Singh and others v. Nihal Singh and others ((2003) 4 SCC 161)

               ii) S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram and others ((2010) 5 SCC 401)

               iii) Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat and another ((2001) 3 SCC 1) and

               iv) Narayanaswamy Suresh Kumar v. Khaja Afzaluddin (Order dated 16.12.2024 passed in CRP No.3979 of 2024 passed by this Court).

6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/ plaintiffs submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or legal infirmity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the document dated 04.02.1995 is an unregistered simple sale deed purporting to convey title in immovable property for a consideration of Rs.42,500/-, which compulsorily requires registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. The learned counsel submitted that under Section 49(c) of the Act, an unregistered document affecting immovable property cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner kept silent for over thirty years from 1995 without getting the document registered or filing a suit for specific performance within the period of limitation, and cannot now seek to validate a legally void and unenforceable transaction. It is submitted that mere collection of deficit stamp duty and penalty under the Indian Stamp Act does not cure the fatal defect of non-registration under the Registration Act. It is further urged that when the main relief in the suit is for declaration of title and recovery of possession, and the defendant sets up absolute ownership under an unregistered sale deed, permitting the document to be marked under the guise of "collateral purpose" would amount to admitting an unregistered conveyance directly to defeat the title of the lawful owners, which is impermissible in law. In support of her submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in M. Panduranga Reddy v. Smt. N. Narsamma (Order dated 29.11.2023 in CRP No.2124 of 2023 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court.).

7. The point that arises for consideration is:

               “Whether the trial Court is justified in refusing to receive and mark the unregistered simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995 in evidence on behalf of the petitioner/defendant, notwithstanding that it had been duly impounded and the deficit stamp duty and penalty had been paid?”

8. POINT: Having considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record, it is not in dispute that the document sought to be marked by the petitioner/defendant is an unregistered simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995. The record establishes that the petitioner filed I.A.No.184 of 2025 under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which was allowed on 07.04.2025 directing the document to be impounded. The competent authority assessed the deficit stamp duty and penalty, and the petitioner remitted a sum of Rs.18,700/- (Rs.4,675/- towards deficit stamp duty and Rs.14,025/- towards penalty) vide Challan dated 10.09.2025. Thus, the statutory bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, which prohibits the admission of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument in evidence for any purpose, ceased to operate.

9. The issue that survives is the effect of non-registration under Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act mandates that non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish any right, title, or interest of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards to or in immovable property must be registered. Section 49 of the Act provides the consequence of non-registration, stating that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall affect any immovable property comprised therein or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. However, the proviso to Section 49 engrafts an exception:

               “Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.”

10. A “collateral transaction” or “collateral purpose” is any purpose other than that of establishing title or creating, declaring, assigning, limiting, or extinguishing a right to the immovable property. The nature, commencement, and character of possession are well-settled collateral purposes. In Bondar Singh’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

               “The main question for consideration is whether the unregistered sale deed dated 19-3-1956 could be admitted in evidence. ... The document, being unregistered, could not be looked into for the purpose of proving title to the property. But it could be looked into for the collateral purpose of showing the nature of possession. A document requires to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, but if it is not registered, it can still be looked into for a collateral purpose. What is a collateral purpose is well settled. It is a purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. ... If the document is looked into for the purpose of showing the nature of possession of the plaintiffs, it clearly establishes that the plaintiffs entered into possession of the land on the basis of the sale deed. Such possession was hostile to the real owners and would, therefore, be adverse.”

11. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Kaladevi’s case (supra). Further, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Maheshwaram Subhash Reddy v. Smt. Muccha (Maheshwaram) Swetha (Order dated 08.06.2026 in CRP No.2333 of 2023 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court) relied upon the aforesaid principle and held that an unregistered document, once regularized under the Stamp Act, can be admitted for limited collateral purposes. In the present case, the respondents/plaintiffs specifically pleaded that the defendant was inducted into possession of Ac.0-20 gts in the year 1995 purely as a tenant on batai and that he subsequently encroached upon the land in 2016. As against this, the defendant asserted that he was inducted into possession under the document dated 04.02.1995 and has continued in open, independent possession ever since. Therefore, the simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995 is relevant and material to explain the origin, nature, and character of his possession. Shutting out the document altogether at the threshold deprives the petitioner of establishing the character of his possession.

12. Insofar as the decision in M. Panduranga Reddy’s case (supra) cited by the respondents is concerned, the facts therein reveal that the defendant was not in actual possession of the suit property and sought to introduce an unregistered document styled as an agreement of sale to establish absolute conveyance of title. It was in those specific circumstances that the Court held the document could not be admitted to prove the main transaction of sale. In the case on hand, the petitioner is not only seeking to use the unregistered sale deed as an instrument of title, but also to show the origin and character of his possession since 1995. The ratio in M. Panduranga Reddy’s case (supra) cannot be construed as overriding the binding law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bondar Singh’s case (supra) and S.Kaladevi’s case (supra) that an unregistered document can be received for the collateral purpose of explaining the nature of possession.

13. Furthermore, with respect to the procedural course adopted by trial Courts when objections are raised during the recording of evidence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal’s case (supra) observed as follows:

               "14. When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence-taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the Judge or Magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed.)"

14. The procedural course laid down in Bipin Shantilal Panchal’s case (supra) has been recently reiterated and applied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramratan (Dead) thr. LRs. v. Ramkali Bai & Others (Civil Appeal No.3593 of 2025 (@ SLP (C) No.31014 of 2016), dated 04.03.2025). In the said case, the Trial Court had rejected the objection raised against marking an unregistered document, but the High Court interfered under Article 227 holding that the document, being compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, could neither be received in evidence nor looked into for collateral purposes. The Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the document be tentatively marked as an exhibit subject to the objections being decided at the final stage of the suit. Similarly, in Narayanaswamy Suresh Kumar’s case (supra), this Court observed that admissibility, marking, and proof are distinct aspects, and mere marking of an impounded unregistered document for collateral purposes does not prejudice the rights of the parties, as its legal validity and probative value remain subject to final adjudication.

15. In the instant case, the trial Court failed to appreciate the distinction between the admissibility of a document and its probative value or evidentiary worth. While the unregistered sale deed dated 04.02.1995 cannot be looked into to prove conveyance of title or ownership over the suit property in the absence of registration as mandated under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, it can certainly be received and marked in evidence for the limited collateral purpose of establishing the nature, character, and commencement of possession. In refusing to receive and mark the document even for collateral purposes after it had been duly impounded and stamp duty/penalty paid, the trial Court committed a material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned order dated 17.12.2025 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

16. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned docket order dated 17.12.2025 passed in O.S. No.46 of 2024 (Old O.S. No.119 of 2016) by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad, is set aside. The trial Court shall receive and mark the simple sale deed dated 04.02.1995 in evidence on behalf of the petitioner/defendant, subject to the limitations contained in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, and the same shall be looked into strictly for collateral purposes, including the origin, nature, character, and commencement of possession. It is made clear that the trial Court shall assess the evidentiary value and probative worth of the said document in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.