(Prayer: This Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Section 115 of the CPC, to set aside the fair and decretal order in I.A. No.177 of 2023 in O.S. No.82 of 2015, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Dharmapuri, dated 08.11.2023, as incompetent, illegal and without jurisdiction.)

1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No.82 of 2015, are the revision petitioners, aggrieved by the dismissal of an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 604 days in filing the application to restore the suit to file.

2. Heard Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel for Mrs.V.Srimathi, learned counsel for the revision petitioners, Mr.C.Palanisamy, learned counsel for the first respondent and Mr.N.Manoharan, learned counsel for the 7th respondent.

3. The revision petitioners filed a suit for declaration of title and also to declare a settlement deed, executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant on 29.03.2010 as null and void and for consequential permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed for default on 25.01.2021. With a delay of 604 days, an application was filed to restore the suit to file. The said application was resisted by the defendants and ultimately, the Trial Court dismissed the condone delay application on 08.11.2023, as against which, the present revision petition has been filed.

4. Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel would firstly contend that the suit was dismissed for default admittedly during the Covid pandemic exemption period, viz., on 25.01.2021, and the Trial Court should have liberally construed the application especially when the petitioners had made out sufficient cause, explaining the delay, which only appeared to be inordinate. He would further state that if the exemption of limitation, as granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of suomotu 3 case viz., In Re. Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 117, the delay would be much lesser. He would however contend that the plaintiff’s cannot be left high and dry, since their valuable rights in immovable property are seriously affected by the high-handed and arbitrary acts of the respondents/defendants. He would therefore state that when the substantial rights of the parties are involved in the lis, then the Courts have to adopt a more liberal approach while dealing with a Section 5 application arising under the Limitation Act.

5. In support of his submission, Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel has relied on the decisions of this Court in M.Kumaravel Vs. Elangovai, in CRP. No.1552 of 2024, dated 20.11.2024, which is also affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the dismissal of SLP preferred against the said orders, besides also relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamoorthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 and in Pathapathi Subbaredit (died) by LRs Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in (2024) 12 SCC page 336.

6. Per contra, Mr.N.Manoharan, learned counsel whose arguments are adopted by the learned counsel Mr.C.Palanisamy, as well would contend that the Court while adjudicating a Section 5 application cannot go into the merits and demerits of the main case and should only decide whether sufficient and satisfactory cause has been shown by the applicant seeking condonation of delay. In this regard, he would take me through the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay application and state that there is absolutely no acceptable reason assigned by the petitioners, explaining the huge and inordinate delay of 604 days in seeking restoration of the suit which has been dismissed for default.

7. It is also the submission of Mr.N.Manoharan, that during the relevant period of time, when the petitioner claims that he was sick and not able to attend the Court proceedings, which resulted in the suit being dismissed for default and the application for restoration also not being filed in time, was appearing before the Criminal Court in connection with two other matters. He would therefore state that the petitioner has in fact, sworn to a false affidavit and deserves no indulgence, much less, discretionary relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In support of his submission, Mr.N.Manoharan, learned counsel has relied on an order passed by me in CRP. No.328 of 2025 in P. Avudai Ammal (died) and others Vs. P.Narayanan and others, dated 13.02.2026, besides an additional typed set of papers, showing the case status of C.C. Nos.314 of 2019 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Dharamapuri and C.C. No.136 of 2018, on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Penngagaram.

8. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Ragavachari and Mr.N.Manoharan, learned counsel for the 7th respondent.

9. The petitioners as plaintiffs filed a suit for declaring their title and also to declare a settlement deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant as null and void and for consequential relief of permanent injunction. The suit property was admittedly, belonging to one Veerasamy Chettiar and on his demise, his legal heirs entered into a partition on 22.10.1984 and the property was allotted to one of his heirs by name, Rajan. On the death of the said Rajan, in the year 1993, the property devolved on his wife and son. The wife of the said Rajan settled her share in favour of his son, Saravanan, who is the husband of the third plaintiff. Despite lawful and valid title at the hands of the plaintiffs, according to the plaintiffs, the first defendant executed a settlement deed in favour of the second defendant, as if the first defendant had valid right and title to the suit property. Challenging the said settlement deed and also to declare the title of the plaintiffs, as already stated herein above, the suit came to be instituted.

10. On 25.01.2021, the suit was dismissed for non prosecution. I.A. No.177 of 2023, was filed under Section 5 seeking condonation of delay of 604 days. In the said affidavit in support of the condone delay application, the first plaintiff stated that on 25.01.2021, when the suit was listed for the appearance of the plaintiffs, for trial, he was unable to appear because he was suffering from common cold and fever and that he apprehended that it might by the Corona virus which has caused the said cold and fever. The first plaintiff therefore contended that he isolated himself voluntarily and was not in a position to attend to the suit which resulted in the dismissal of the suit for non prosecution. The application to restore the suit to file, along with a Section 5 application was filed on 21.09.2022. There is not even a whisper about why the second and third plaintiffs were not in a position to attend to the suit. In fact, the first plaintiff does not even state in his affidavit that he was taking care of the case on behalf of the petitioners 2 and 3. This relevant and significant factor will have to be kept in mind as well.

11. Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently contended that without any iota or semblance of right, the first defendant was treating the suit property belonging to the plaintiffs as his property and had brought about a fraudulent settlement deed in favour of the second defendant and based on the same, attempted to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs and when the petitioners have a very good case on merits and the defendants have virtually no case, then even while deciding a condone delay application, the Court should give due weightage to the merits of the suit claim and consider it as a relevant factor for allowing/disallowing the condone delay application.

12. Per contra, it has been contended by Mr.N.Manoharan, learned counsel that the liberal construction approach that was adopted in the late 1990s by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other Courts has taken a sea turn with the Courts now requiring sufficient cause to be compulsorily shown as a condition precedent even for exercising equity in favour of the applicant seeking condonation of delay, before going into the merits and demerits of the main suit claim.

13. Firstly, as already indicated there are three plaintiffs and excepting for the first plaintiff there is nothing brought on record, as to why, the plaintiffs 2 and 3 were incapacitated from appearing on the date on which the suit was dismissed for default or atleast taken out the application for restoring the suit in time, even assuming that the first petitioner has self isolated himself, apprehending attack of Corona virus. However, it is also brought to my notice that during the very same point of time, the first petitioner appeared as an accused before two Criminal Courts in connection with C.C. Nos.314 of 2019 on the file the Judicial Magistrate No.II, Dharmapuri and C.C. No.136 of 2018 on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Pennagaram. The three plaintiffs were all arrayed as accused in C.C. No.314 of 2019 and they have personally appeared on 23.02.2021, when the plaintiffs 1 and 2 have surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate and the NBW issued against them was recalled and thereafter, they were again present on 31.03.2021 and on which date, a non bailable warrant was issued against the third plaintiff. However, on 17.05.2021, the third plaintiff appeared and the NBW issued against her was recalled. Subsequently, on 05.08.2021, all the three plaintiffs appeared before the Judicial Magistrate and again on 13.09.2021, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 were present, thereafter on 23.10.2021, all the plaintiffs were present.

14. Similarly, on 28.12.2021 also all the plaintiffs appeared before the Judicial Magistrate. Again on 28.12.2021, they appeared in person. They have also appeared on 01.04.2022, 19.05.2022, 23.06.2022 (plaintiffs 1 and 2 were present), 08.09.2022, 12.12.2022, 20.01.2023, 22.02.2023 (plaintiffs 1 and 2 were present), 11.04.2023, 19.05.2023 (plaintiffs 1 and 2 were present), 14.06.2023, (Plaintiffs 1 and 3 were present) and 28.07.2023 (all plaintiffs appeared), 26.09.2023 (all plaintiffs appeared). Similarly, in the other case as well, viz., C.C. No.136 of 2018, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 were accused and they have physically appeared before the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Pennagaram on various dates between 31.10.2019 and 04.11.2019, the relevance to the present facts, they appeared before the Magistrate at Pennagaram on 26.11.2020, 08.03.2021, 31.08.2021, 01.11.2021, 20.12.2021, 07.03.2022, 06.05.2022, 08.07.2022 (the 2nd plaintiff alone appeared), 27.09.2022, 11.01.2023, 27.03.222, etc.,.

15. Thus, it can be seen that on the one hand, the first plaintiff claims that he was isolating himself, apprehending that he was suffering from Corona virus, on noticing symptoms of common cold and fever and therefore, he did not attend the trial of the suit, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit for non prosecution. However, on the other hand, not only the first petitioner but also his brother and sister had been regularly appearing before the Criminal Courts during the same period of time, in fact before as well as after the dismissal of the suit. In such circumstances, I can only find that the reasons assigned by the first petitioner for seeking condonation of delay to be a consciously false statement.

16. Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel placing strong reliance on the order of this Court in Kumaravel’s case (referred herein supra), which was also confirmed with the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition as against the said revision would contend that negligence or mistakes on the party is an order of the day and filing a false affidavit has become a routine affair of an irresponsible Counsel and therefore, when pitted against substantive rights of the parties, such negligence, mistake or false reasons should not be put against the applicants seeking condonation of delay.

17. This Court followed the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in Arun Alexander Lakshman Vs. A.P.Vedavalli, reported in 2007 (4) CTC 449 and held that while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court can also examine whether the petitioner has arguable points on facts and law. However, I am unable to rely on the ratio laid down in the said case, since subsequently, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, reported in 2025 INSC 1104, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after discussing the entire gamut of case law on the point of limitation, held that the scope of enquiry in a Section 5 Application for condonation of delay can be restricted only to whether the applicant has shown sufficient cause or not and the Court cannot deal with merits of the claim at that stage.

18. In Aavudaiyammal’s case (referred herein supra), I followed the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma’s case (referred herein supra) as well as in Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2025) 1 SCC 625, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though the length of delay is immaterial, if cause shown is insufficient, then the same cannot be condoned. Applying the above ratio and the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma’s case, having found that the affidavit sworn to by the first petitioner is a false affidavit, especially when the first petitioner, during the very same period when he claims to have isolated himself, has appeared before the Criminal Courts and there has also been no explanation as to why the remaining two plaintiffs did not diligently pursue the suit before the Trial Court, I am unable to find any infirmity or perversity in the findings of the Trial Court, dismissing the condone delay application.

19. Further with regard to the substantive rights of the plaintiffs being at stake as contended by Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel, in the light of the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, the delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground that substantive rights of the parties are at stake. Sufficient cause has to be necessarily made out as a precondition before a Section 5 application can be considered favourably. It is only when the Court finds that the explanation offered is satisfactory, that it can even go into the merits of the claim to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant seeking condonation of delay. However, when the explanation or cause shown is found to be unsatisfactory or insufficient, then the Court cannot look into the merits and demerits of the suit claim. Therefore, I am unable to countenance the arguments of Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned Senior Counsel that when substantive rights of the petitioners in immovable property are involved and are at stake, the Court should take a liberal view while deciding a condone delay application.

20. For all the above reasons, I do not see any merits in the revision. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.