1. The instant Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioners under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 11.06.2026 in E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad (for short, ‘the impugned order’) .
2. Heard Mr. Vadeendra Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners .
3. Vide the impugned order, the Trial Court rejected the application filed by the petitioners herein under Order XLVII Rule 1 and Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, praying the Trial Court to set aside the order dated 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025, passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad .
4. The brief facts relevant for disposal of the instant Civil Revision Petition are that petitioners had filed E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 for execution of the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 passed by the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Protection) Act, 1982 (for short, ‘the Act of 1982). Vide the said judgment, the respondents were declared to be land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) and (e) of Act of 1982. While passing the said judgment, the concerned Court had directed the Judgment-Debtors (respondents) to hand over vacant possession of the schedule property to the Decree-Holders (petitioners) within three (03) months. Thereafter, the said judgment and decree was put to execution by the Decree-Holders (petitioners) by filing E.P., viz., E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. However, the Office of the City Civil Court, at Hyderabad raised an objection as to the execution petition being barred by limitation since the same was filed beyond twelve years from the date of passing of the judgment and decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009. The objection raised by the Office of the City Civil Court, at Hyderabad was upheld by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad vide order dated 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025, and the said petition was dismissed holding that the execution petition to be barred by limitation .
5. Aggrieved, the petitioners herein filed a fresh application before the Trial Court, viz., E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 under Order XLVII Rule 1 and Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, seeking review of the order 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025. It is this application which stood rejected by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad, and which has led to filing of the instant Civil Revision Petition .
6. The explanation provided by the petitioners explaining the delay that had caused was that of the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 was subjected to challenge by the respondents (Judgment-Debtors) by filing writ petition before this Court, viz., Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013. Vide order dated 06.08.2024 in Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013, a learned Division Bench of this Court dismissed the said writ petition for non-prosecution. It is only after dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition that limitation for filing the execution petition would start afresh. Thus, the finding given by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad vide order dated 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 is erroneous and is liable to be set aside .
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the Executing Court had in fact wrongly appreciated the decision cited by the petitioners before the Trial Court, viz., in the case of Kunjammal v. Krishna Chettiar ([AIR 1954 Mad 170]). According to him, the aforesaid decision very specifically envisages the aspect of limitation to commence from the date of disposal of the appellate proceedings. He further contended that the Executing Court had not properly considered the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963; provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the facts of the instant case on the ground that the so-called writ petition that was pending consideration before this Court since 2013 to 2014 was not at the behest of petitioners. He further contended that provisions of Land Grabbing Act do not provide for any provision for execution of the order, neither does the said Act has any provision for an appeal against an order passed by the Land Grabbing Court. Since there is no remedy of appeal, the writ remedy is the only option available to the aggrieved person, and the Writ Petition filed by the petitioners before this Court where there was a challenge to the order passed by the Land Grabbing Court stood decided only on 06.08.2024. He, therefore, contended that applying the doctrine of merger, the limitation would start only from the date of decision passed by the Writ Court, which in the instant case is 06.08.2024 .
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that since the challenge to the order passed by the Land Grabbing Court was sub judice before the Writ Court, and during pendency of the Writ Petition the judgment passed by the Land Grabbing Court was unenforceable; and therefore contended that it was for the said pendency of the writ petition the judgment of the Land Grabbing Court remained unimplemented or unexecuted .
9. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date of order passed by the Appellate Forum; even if there was no interim stay in the Appellate jurisdiction, the judgment and decree that can be enforced is that of the Appellate Forum, and the judgment of the Trial Court gets merged with the Judgment of the Appellate Court. Hence, the limitation would start from the date of order passed by the Appellate Forum. Therefore, to that extent, the finding arrived by the Executing Court is erroneous.
10. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on a perusal of the record, what stands admitted is that there being a Judgment and Decree from the Land Grabbing Court, dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009, in favour of petitioners (Decree- Holders); and when the said Judgment and Decree was subjected to challenge by the respondents (Judgment-Debtors) vide Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013, the said Writ Petition finally got dismissed on 06.08.2024; and subsequently, E.P.S.R. was filed by the petitioners in 2025, viz., E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025, for executing the order passed by the Land Grabbing court; however, the said E.P.S.R. stood rejected and returned by the Executing Court holding it to be barred by limitation, vide order dated 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025. Thereafter, the said order was put to review by filing E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 which also stood rejected vide the impugned order dated 11.06.2026 in E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025.
11. Though the challenge in the instant Civil Revision Petition is to the order dated 11.06.2026 in E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025, the substantive challenge is also to the order dated 09.01.2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 whereby the E.P. filed by the petitioners stood rejected on the ground of being barred by limitation.
12. The core issue to be decided in the instant Civil Revision Petition is whether for the purpose of reckoning limitation would the date of the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 is to be taken; or whether it is to be reckoned from the date the writ petition (wherein the order dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 was under challenge) stood dismissed on 06.08.2024”.
13. The fact which needs to be appreciated is that under the Land Grabbing Act, 1982, there is no remedy of appeal against an order passed by the Court which decides a land grabbing case. In the absence of any statutory remedy of appeal, the only recourse to challenge under the Land Grabbing Act is by way of a writ petition. Admittedly, the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 passed by the Special Court under the Land Grabbing Act was put to test by the respondents (Judgment-Debtors) in Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013. Therefore, for all practical purposes the said writ petition would have to be considered to be in the form of an appeal against the Judgment and Decree passed by the Court hearing land grabbing cases. The said Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013 finally stood dismissed on 06.08.2024.
14. True it is that there was no interim stay operating from 2013 onwards in Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013 insofar as the order passed by the Land Grabbing Court which decided Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 dated 22.03.2013. Nonetheless, the said Judgment and Decree was put to challenge in the aforesaid writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No.14625 of 2013.
15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to take not of couple of judicial precedents which have also been referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as one among them has also been referred to in the impugned order under challenge, viz., Kunjammal (1 supra), wherein a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Madras has held as under, viz.,
“3. The law is well settled that when a decree is taken in appeal to a higher Court the decree passed in appeal supersedes that of the Court below and becomes the decree in the suit itself and that thereafter that is the only decree which is capable of execution and that the period of limitation for execution would run from the date of that decree. In --'Krishtama Chariar v. Mangammal', 26 Mad 91 (FB) (A), the question arose how far this doctrine would be applicable in a case where the appeal was in respect of a portion of the subject matter of the suit. The contention that was urged was that as regards the un-appealed portion there was no impediment to execution and therefore as to that limitation should be reckoned from the date of the decree of the first Court, and that as that portion was not the subject matter of the appeal the period of limitation should not be calculated from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. This contention was rejected by this Court. Bhashyam Ayyangar J. stated the principle applicable to the case in these terms:
"In my opinion, this is sound from a juridical point of view. When an appeal is preferred from a decree of a Court of first instance, the suit is continued in the Court of appeal and reheard either in whole or in part, according as the whole suit is litigated again in the Court of appeal or only a part of it. The final decree in the appeal will thus be the final decree in the suit, whether that be one confirming, varying or reversing the decree of the Court of first instance. The mere fact that a matter is litigated both in the Court of first instance and again, though only in part in the Court of appeal, cannot convert or split the suit into two and there can be only one final decree in that suit, viz., the decree of the Court of appeal. There cannot be two final decrees in such a suit, one by the Court of first instance and the other by the Court of appeal."
16. Coming to the doctrine of merger the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another ([(2000) 6 SCC 359]), held at paragraph No.12 as under, viz.,
“12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.”
17. Recently, the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in one of its judgments dealing with the aspect of limitation in the case of Gajanan v. Pralhad (Civil Appeal No.3524 of 2026, decided on 18.03.2026) held at paragraph Nos.21 and 22 as under, viz.,
“21. The upshot of this discussion is that an appeal is intrinsically a continuation of the suit and thus, even if an appeal against an order or decree of the Trial Court is dismissed on any preliminary or technical ground, such as limitation or non-prosecution, rather than the merits of the case, it still gives rise to a fresh starting point for the limitation period for execution of such order or decree. The original decree of the Trial Court cannot be deemed as "final" as long as the appeal against the same remains pending. Thus, the order of dismissal of the appeal finally disposes of the matter and confirms the decree of the Trial Court, even if such dismissal is for reason of non-prosecution.
22. The order dated 25.11.2004, which dismissed the appeal in default, was thus a "final order" as it finally confirmed the decree of the Trial Court and disposed of the appeal. Therefore, the limitation period for execution of the decree dated 03.12.1999 accrued on the date of dismissal of the appeal i.e. 25.11.2004 and the execution. application filed on 04.12.2015 was within time, if we compute-the period of 12 years from 25.11.2004.”
18. A plain reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents both on the aspect of limitation as also on the aspect of doctrine of merger, when applied to the facts of the instant case would go to establish that the original Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 was subjected to challenge by way of remedy of appeal by filing Writ Petition No.14635 of 2013, and which stood dismissed on 06.08.2024. The dismissal of the said writ petition even if it is on technicalities leads to conclusion of the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 being affirmed on 06.08.2024 in Writ Petition No.14635 of 2013. Thereafter, from 2013 to 06.08.2024, the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 was sub judice. As long as the matter was sub judice, the said Judgment and Decree is unenforceable and could not had been implemented. So, for all practical purposes it is beyond 06.08.2024 that the petitioners would have got a chance of filing execution proceedings. Merely, because there was no interim order in operation in Writ Petition No.14635 of 2013, that by itself cannot be considered to be a strong ground to hold that during the intervening period the petitioners’ right to move the Execution Court got expired when substantively the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2013 in Land Grabbing Case No.23 of 2009 was still under challenge in the above writ petition which got finally dismissed on 06.08.2024.
19. In view of the same, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the teeth of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to in the preceeding paragraphs the rejection of E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 by the Executing Court holding it to be barred by limitation is therefore unsustainable. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the order dated 11.06.2026 in E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the order dated 11.06.2026 in E.A.No.25 of 2026 in E.P.S.R.No.18189 of 2025 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, at Hyderabad, is set aside. The matter stands remitted to the Trial Court with a direction to register and number the E.P. on its file. The Trial Court is further directed to decide the E.P. in accordance with law ignoring the aspect of limitation.
20. With these observations, the Civil Revision Petition stands allowed. No costs.
21. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.
