Common Order:

P. Sam Koshy, J.

1. Heard Mr. B. Narsimha Sarma, learned Additional Solicitor General of India representing Mr. N. Bhujanga Rao, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.126 of 2026; Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. S. Sahil Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.127 of 2026, and Mr. Srinivas Chamarthy, learned counsel of the respondent No.1 in both the Writ Petitions.

2. Since the instant Writ Petitions are filed challenging the same order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad (for short the ‘Tribunal’) and the question of law involved therefore being the same, we proceed to decide them by this Common Order.

3. For convenience, the facts in Writ Petition No.126 of 2026 are discussed hereunder.

4. Writ Petition No.126 of 2026 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order by the Tribunal, in OA No.021/02253 of 2024, decided on 29.12.2025, and to quash and set aside the same as it is contrary to law and perverse.

5. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (for short ‘DRDO’), a premier agency functioning under the Department of Defence Research and Development, Ministry of Defence (for short ‘DDR&D’) was headed by the Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, and assisted by Director Generals heading seven technology clusters located across the country and five corporate clusters at its headquarters each formulating policy in its respective domain. Among the corporate clusters, the Director General (BrahMos) stationed at DRDO Headquarters, headed BrahMos Aerospace, a joint venture between DRDO, India and a Joint Stock Company of Russia, responsible for the designing, developing, producing and marketing of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile undertaken with the active participation of a consortium of Indian and Russian industries. The scientist appointed as Director General (BrahMos) from DRDO, Ministry of Defence, correspondingly functioned as the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of BrahMos Aerospace Pvt. Ltd.

6. The post of Director General (BrahMos) fell vacant w.e.f. 01.12.2024 upon superannuation of the incumbent then holding the post, pursuant to which the selection process for the said post was initiated by issuance of in-house Advertisement No.03/2024(1) inviting applications from desirous candidates for the post of Director General (BrahMos) / Corporate Cluster. The essential qualifications as per the said notification are:

               (a) A Scientist in the Grade of “Scientist H” or above.

               (b) A Scientist who has served tenure as Director of a Laboratory/Programme Director/Corporate Director.

               (c) Should have at least 12 months of residual service; and the desirable qualification is M. Tech/Ph. D in the relevant field.

7. The notification further stipulated a two-tier selection mechanism: a two-member Screening Committee comprising the Director of Personnel (DoP), and the Staff Officer to Director General (HR) who was to scrutinise all applications received and exclude those not meeting the prescribed eligibility criteria, following which the list of eligible candidates was to be forwarded to a Selection Committee and the Selection Committee, in turn, was empowered to hold interaction meetings with the eligible candidates before finalising a panel of a maximum of three recommended candidates to be placed before the Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, for the final decision.

8. Rule 10 of the Defence Research and Development Service Rules, 2023 (SRO No.72 dated 25.05.2023) framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, designated the Chairperson, DRDO, as the Head of the Service, vesting in him the responsibility for deployment of officers of the service to the best advantage of the Organisation and the Government, including deployment of senior Scientists in their present grade as Director General or Director or any such designated position within the Organisation so as to meet its functional requirements. Rule 10 of the Defence Research and Development Service Rules, 2023 reads as under:

               “10. Head of Service

               The Chairperson, Defence Research and Development Organisation shall be the Head of the Service and shall be responsible for deployment of officers of the service to the best advantage of the Organisation and the Government, including deployment of senior Scientist in his present grade as Director General, or Director, or any such designated position in the Organisation to meet its functional requirements.”

9. In terms of the said Rule, read with the in-house advertisement, the Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, were the competent authority empowered to take the final decision as to the suitable candidate best serving the functional requirements of the post of Director General. Given that the post of Director General (BrahMos) was highly sensitive, strategic in nature, and techno-managerial, the entire selection process was maintained in strict confidentiality and the scientist finally selected by the competent authority was to be appointed to the post of Director General (BrahMos) by transfer from his existing laboratory to the Office of Director General (BrahMos), New Delhi.

10. The closing date for the said in-house advertisement was 12.09.2024. Upon scrutiny of the applications received, the screening committee excluded those not meeting the advertised eligibility criteria and forwarded the list of eligible candidates including respondent Nos.1 and 2 to the selection committee. The selection committee interviewed the screened-in candidates, including respondent Nos.1 and 2 on 22.10.2024, and after conducting a discreet review of the profiles of each eligible candidate and interacting with them, the selection committee recommended a panel of three candidates including respondent Nos.1 and 2 in alphabetical order to the Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, who was the competent authority for making the final appointment.

11. The Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, upon due consideration of the three scientists recommended in the panel forwarded by the selection committee, selected respondent No.2 as the most suitable scientist for the post and passed orders accordingly to that effect on 22.11.2024 for appointment of respondent No.2 as Director General (BrahMos), New Delhi, on transfer from DRDL, Hyderabad. Office order dated 25.11.2024 was accordingly issued transferring respondent No.2 from DRDL, Hyderabad to the Office of Director General (BrahMos), New Delhi in public interest.

12. A Scientist of the grade “Scientist H” or above, upon appointment as Director General (BrahMos) continued to draw pay and allowances corresponding to the post held by him as Scientist H or above in terms of the DRDS Rules. The said selection and appointment was effected purely by way of transfer of the scientist concerned from his laboratory, upon due selection, to the post of DG (BrahMos) at Headquarters, without any change in emoluments or other financial implications and without constituting an upgradation or promotion, the exercise being, in substance, a selection made to meet the functional requirement of the post. Respondent No.2 was accordingly relieved from DRDL, Hyderabad, and assumed charge as Director General (BrahMos) in terms of the office order dated 25.11.2024.

13. Respondent No.1, being one of the eligible candidates under the said in-house advertisement, filed O.A. No.021/02253 of 2024 before the Tribunal assailing the appointment order dated 25.11.2024 in favour of respondent No.2 principally on the ground that he being a Distinguished Scientist (Level 16) and senior to respondent No.2 who held the grade of Outstanding Scientist (Level 15) was entitled to be appointed as Director General (BrahMos) in preference to respondent No.2, and accordingly sought setting aside of the said appointment order together with a consequential direction to appoint him to the post.

14. The petitioners herein, being respondents before the Tribunal in the said O.A., filed a detailed reply statement as well as an additional reply statement contending that although Rule 10 of the DRDS Rules, 2023 empowered the Chairman, DRDO as head of the service to deploy any senior scientist as Director General (BrahMos) to meet the functional requirement, a due selection process had, in fact, been followed by issuance of the in-house advertisement so as to select the eligible, willing, and most suitable senior scientist for the post. It was pointed out that the selection committee headed by the Chairman, Recruitment and Assessment Centre and comprising as its other members the Director, Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Visakhapatnam, the Vice Chancellor, Defence Institute of Advanced Technology (DIAT), and the Director General (Human Resources), DRDO Headquarters, had undertaken thorough scrutiny of the profiles of each candidate as reflected in their biodata and other relevant factors before recommending a panel of three candidates in alphabetical order to the competent authority, who, upon thorough consideration of the material on record selected respondent No.2 as the most suitable scientist for the post, having regard, in particular, to his experience in handling joint venture projects with foreign countries — a consideration directly relevant to the functional requirement of Director General (BrahMos) which entailed active participation in a consortium of Indian and Russian industries for the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile programme.

15. It was accordingly contended that the entire selection process from the stage of issuance of the in-house advertisement till the appointment of respondent No.2 was strictly in conformity with the terms of the advertisement and the rules in force, legal, valid, and undertaken by the competent authority. Respondent No.1 filed a rejoinder before the Tribunal, the authorities thereafter again filed an additional reply, and respondent No.2 was arrayed as respondent No.5 before the Tribunal, filed his own pleadings.

16. During the course of hearing before the Tribunal, orders were passed on 23.06.2025 directing production of the records pertaining to the selection and appointment of respondent No.2 herein, together with the minutes of the selection process, which record was duly submitted for the Tribunal’s perusal. Further, in compliance with the Tribunal’s directions, the record relating to the promotion of respondent No.1 herein from Outstanding Scientist to Distinguished scientist was also placed before it. At the stage of submission of the said records, it was reiterated that the selection in question, made pursuant to the in-house advertisement did not constitute a promotion, but was, rather a selection of the most suitable senior scientist for appointment by way of transfer from the laboratory to the post of Director General (BrahMos), a post of a strategic and high-profile nature requiring suitability and qualification in business management, specialised experience in manufacturing, and desirable experience in foreign collaboration, among other relevant factors such as experience and national role in the concerned field, and that the competent authority upon due consideration of the entire file, had selected and appointed respondent No.2 as the most suitable senior scientist, having regard to his experience in handling joint venture projects with foreign countries.

17. The Tribunal, without due appreciation of the material on record and pleadings, and upon what was contended to be an erroneous consideration thereof, allowed the O.A. vide the impugned order dated 29.12.2025, thereby setting aside the appointment of respondent No.2 herein as Director General (BrahMos) under office letter dated 25.11.2024 and directed the authority concerned to reconsider the case of the respondent No.1 herein for appointment as Director General (BrahMos) within a stipulated time, and further directed that no in-charge arrangement be made by respondent No.2 in the interregnum.

18. It was contended that the said order of the Tribunal was illegal, suffered from material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, was vitiated by having exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review and was contrary to the material on record as well as the law and on these grounds was liable to be set aside.

19. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India firstly argued that the Tribunal failed to note that as per the advertisement, the Scientists “H” or above, who were serving as Project Director / Director of Lab / Programme Director were eligible and that there was no provision of any additional weightage either to the seniority or the higher level holding in the subject selection and hence, its observations against the said selection either on the ground of seniority of the applicant in O.A. or the fact of getting promotion subsequent to the closing date of the notification as a Distinguished Scientist, are totally erroneous, perverse and liable to be set aside.

20. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India then argued that the Tribunal exceeded its scope of judicial review by holding that higher qualification, higher experience, awards, etc. must be the criteria for selection, which is totally contrary to the rule position relied upon as well as the terms and conditions of the in-house advertisement and hence such findings are again perverse and bad in law.

21. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India contended that the observation of the Tribunal in paragraph No.19 of impugned order are contrary to the records produced before it by respondent No.1 herein, as much as all the three shortlisted scientists were awarded equal marks by selection committee. Therefore, there was no wrong in recommending names of three shortlisted scientists in alphabetical order and that the Tribunal ignored the submission of the Union of India of their written submissions that respondent No.1 herein had tried to mislead the Tribunal by alleging in O.A. that he was top most among shortlisted candidates, however, such allegation was refuted by the Union of India by proving that in fact selection committee recommended the names of shortlisted candidates in alphabetical order without indicating any merit or seniority. The respondent No.1 further tried to mislead Tribunal by alleging in his rejoinder that there is no provision to appoint any scientist as Director General (BrahMos) under the pleasure of Chairman, DRDO whereas Rule 10 of the DRDS Rules, 2023 specifically empowers the Chairman, DRDO in this regard. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India further contended that the Tribunal erred in ‘reassessing the comparative merits of candidates’ and virtually substituted its own opinion, which is in contravention of statutory rules, SOP and in house advertisement’s criteria for selection which vitiates entire findings.

22. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India relied upon various judgments and submitted that the Tribunal erred in setting aside the appointment of the respondent No.2 as Director General (BrahMos) vide office order dated 25.11.2024 after due selection process, recommendations of the selection committee and final appointment by the competent authority, which is beyond the scope of judicial review as held in catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court listed below.

               i. Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and others vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and others ((1990) 1 SCC 305)

               ii. Union of India vs. Samar Singh and others ((1996) 10 SCC 555)

               iii. M.V. Thimmaiah and others vs. Union Public Service Commission and others ((2008) 2 SCC 119)

               iv. National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences Vs. Dr. K. Kalyana Raman ((1992) 2 SCC 481)

               v. Tajvir Singh Sodhi and others vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others ((2023) 17 SCC 147)

23. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.127 of 2026 contended that the Tribunal or Court cannot be replaced as an appellate authority in such sensitive matters where otherwise interference can only be made if there is proven mala fide or gross arbitrariness.

24. He further relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam vs. Arabinda Rabha ((2025) 7 SCC 705) wherein it was held that where a selection process is challenged by an unsuccessful candidate merely on the grounds of the absence of recruitment rules or upon nebulous or un-particularised allegations of bias, favouritism or nepotism, a Court ought not to interfere in the absence of factors vitiating the process.

25. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Rai vs. Dinesh Kumar Pandey ((2015) 11 SCC 493) wherein it was held that where a candidate who had participated in a selection process without demur cannot, upon being declared unsuccessful, turn around and challenge the very process in which he freely participated.

26. Lastly, it was submitted that the BrahMos Aerospace is a strategic Indo-Russian Joint Venture of national importance. The selection committee and the appointing authority having duly considered the petitioner’s experience and qualifications in handling international joint venture projects as a decisive factor for the post of Director General (BrahMos) and selected the petitioner on independent and substantial merit. Therefore, there was no scope of interference left for the Tribunal to set aside the appointment of Dr. Jaiteerth Joshi and direct the selection committee to reconsider Dr. Sivasubramaniam Nambi Naidu for the position of Director General (BrahMos).

27. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondent No.1 argued that the Union of India failed to justify the selection of respondent No.2 as the most suitable scientist for the post of Director General (BrahMos) even after perusing the SOPs and the confidential report provided to the Tribunal and that admittedly the selection committee without merit gradation sent the final list in an ‘alphabetical order’ to the Chairman, DRDO clearly reflecting the manifest arbitrariness and lack of application of mind in the selection process.

28. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further argued that the Tribunal was justified in the judicial interference due to manifest arbitrariness and that it did not step into the shoes of the selection process, but analysed the manifest arbitrariness in selection of the Director General (BrahMos) by discussing the gaps in the selection process and the same cannot be termed as ‘stepping into the shoes of selection committee’.

29. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that the Tribunal was right in appointing respondent No.1 as the Director General (BrahMos) and relied upon the below listed judgments to buttress his arguments.

               i. Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor ((1973) 2 SCC 836)

               ii. E.P. Royappa vs. State of T.N. ((1974) 4 SCC 3)

               iii. Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India ((1979) 3 SCC 489)

               iv. K. Manjusree vs. State of A.P. ((2008) 3 SCC 512)

               v. Bedanga Talukdar vs. Saifudaullah Khan ((2011) 12 SCC 85)

30. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, the question of law which falls for our consideration is “whether the Tribunal, in setting aside the appointment of respondent No.2 as Director General (BrahMos) and directing reconsideration of respondent No.1’s candidature, exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review by re-appreciating the comparative merit, seniority, and grade of the candidates recommended by a duly constituted selection committee in a selection process concerning a highly sensitive, strategic, and technical post of national importance, where the advertisement and the governing Rules prescribed no criterion of seniority or higher grade as a determinative or weighted factor, and where the exercise of discretion by the competent authority was not shown to be vitiated by mala fides, illegality, or a patent violation of the prescribed procedure?”

31. At the outset it is necessary to remind ourselves of the nature and gravity of the subject matter before us. The post of Director General (BrahMos) is not an ordinary administrative or managerial post; it is the apex position overseeing the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile programme, which is a strategic asset of the Indian State, developed and produced through a sensitive joint venture between the DRDO and a Russian counterpart, involving matters of national security, defence preparedness, and international collaboration of the highest sensitivity. The very confidentiality maintained around the selection process as borne out by the record is itself a reflection of the strategic character of the post. It is in this context, a context far removed from the ordinary run of service disputes that the scope and limits of judicial (and Tribunal) review of the selection in question must be examined.

32. We may usefully recall at this stage the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. S.L. Dutta ((1991) 1 SCC 505), wherein in the context of a policy concerning promotional avenues in a technical and specialised branch of the Armed Forces, it was held as follows:

               “18. It was next submitted by learned counsel that no minutes of what transpired at the meeting of the Air Marshals which approved the change of policy, were produced before the court and hence, the court was not in a position to decide whether the change of policy was justified. He contended that it was significant that one Air Marshal from the Navigation Branch had opposed the change in the policy. It was also pointed out by him that, at one stage, the Government of India was not willing to adopt the change of policy but had changed its mind later on and the reasons for this change were not on record. It was submitted by him that these circumstances showed that the change of policy was arbitrary. It was urged by him that the impugned judgment of the High Court was correct, as it was based on these considerations. He, however, made it clear that he was not pressing any allegation of mala fide which might be contained in the petition. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in making the impugned order. As has been laid down more than once by this Court, the court should rarely interfere where the question of validity of a particular policy is in question and all the more so where considerable material in the fixing of policy are of a highly technical or scientific nature. A consideration of a policy followed in the Indian Air Force regarding the promotional chances of officers in the Navigation Stream of the Flying Branch in the Air Force qua the other branches would necessarily involve scrutiny of the desirability of such a change which would require considerable knowledge of modern aircraft, scientific and technical equipment available in such aircraft to guide in navigating the same, tactics to be followed by the Indian Air Force and so on. These are matters regarding which judges and the lawyers of courts can hardly be expected to have much knowledge by reasons of their training and experience. In the present case there is no question of arbitrary departure from the policy duly adopted because before the decision not to promote respondent 1 was taken, the policy had already been changed. The question is, therefore, whether this change can be said to be arbitrary or mala fide. As we have already pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that this change of policy was not warranted by the circumstances prevailing. As the matter was considered at some length by as many as 12 Air Marshals and the Chief of Air Staff of Indian Air Force, it is not possible to say that the question of change of policy was not duly considered. Mere non-availability of the minutes setting out the discussion, is of no relevance. In fact, it would perhaps be detrimental to the interest of the country if these matters were not kept confidential. We cannot assume that what was discussed at this meeting was not relevant to the decision regarding the change of policy. It may be that at one time the Ministry of Defence was not agreeable to accept the proposal for this change of policy but on further consideration accepted it. However, this could well show that before accepting the change of policy the Ministry of Defence and the experts attached to it gave full consideration to the requirements of the change. We cannot on the basis of this circumstance alone hold that the change of policy was arbitrary.”

The ratio of the above pronouncement applies to the present case with singular force. The selection to the post of Director General (BrahMos), a post requiring, as the record itself discloses, business management acumen, specialised manufacturing experience, and experience in handling foreign collaborations in a highly technical missile programme is quintessentially a matter requiring specialised, technical, and strategic judgment of precisely the kind that Courts and Tribunals by reason of their training and experience, are ill-equipped to second-guess. The assessment of which among several qualified scientists possesses the requisite blend of technical depth, managerial capability and experience of foreign collaboration to head so sensitive a programme is a matter falling squarely within the domain of the selection committee constituted of the Chairman, Recruitment and Assessment Centre, the Director of the Indian Institute of Management, Visakhapatnam, the Vice Chancellor of the Defence Institute of Advanced Technology, and the Director General (Human Resources), DRDO and thereafter of the competent authority, namely the Secretary, DDR&D and Chairman, DRDO, who bears constitutional and statutory responsibility for deployment of the scientific personnel to the best advantage of the Organisation and the Nation under Rule 10 of the DRDS Rules, 2023. For a Tribunal, however well-intentioned, to substitute its own assessment of relative technical and managerial suitability for that of such a committee and such an authority is precisely the kind of judicial overreach that S.L. Dutta (supra) counsels against.

33. Equally apposite is the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the case of T.N. Education Deptt. Ministerial & General Subordinate Services Assn. vs. State of T.N. ((1980) 3 SCC 97) wherein it was held as follows:

               “7. In Service Jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative problem where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to a few cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints, even some wobbling, must be left to government without fussy forensic monitoring, since the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the executive, not to the court. All life, including administrative life, involves experiment, trial and error, but within the leading strings of fundamental rights, and, absent unconstitutional “excesses”, judicial correction is not right. Under Article 32, this Court is the constitutional sentinel, not the national ombudsman. We need an ombudsman but the court cannot makedo.”

34. In the case of UPSC vs. M. Sathiya Priya ((2018) 15 SCC 796) it was held that it is not open for the Tribunal or the Court to sit in appeal over the assessment for the post of Director General (BrahMos) and that interference is only warranted wherein it was shown that the process was vitiated by mala fides or arbitrariness. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder: “17. The Selection Committee consists of experts in the field. It is presided over by the Chairman or a Member of UPSC and is duly represented by the officers of the Central Government and the State Government who have expertise in the matter. In our considered opinion, when a High-Level Committee or an expert body has considered the merit of each of the candidates, assessed the grading and considered their cases for promotion, it is not open to CAT and the High Court to sit over the assessment made by the Selection Committee as an appellate authority. The question as to how the categories are assessed in light of the relevant records and as to what norms apply in making the assessment, is exclusively to be determined by the Selection Committee. Since the jurisdiction to make selection as per law is vested in the Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee members have got expertise in the matter, it is not open for the courts generally to interfere in such matters except in cases where the process of assessment is vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides or arbitrariness. It is not the function of the court to hear the matters before it treating them as appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committee and to scrutinise the relative merit of the candidates. The question as to whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted expert body i.e. the Selection Committee. The courts have very limited scope of judicial review in such matters.

               18. We are conscious of the fact that the expert body's opinion may not deserve acceptance in all circumstances and hence it may not be proper to say that the expert body's opinion is not subject to judicial review in all circumstances. In our constitutional scheme, the decision of the Selection Committee/Board of Appointment cannot be said to be final and absolute. Any other view will have a very dangerous consequence and one must remind oneself of the famous words of Lord Acton “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. The aforementioned principle has to be kept in mind while deciding such cases. However, in the matter on hand, it is abundantly clear from the affidavit filed by UPSC that the Selection Committee which is nothing but an expert body had carefully examined and scrutinised the experience, Annual Confidential Reports and other relevant factors which were required to be considered before selecting the eligible candidates for IPS. The Selection Committee had in fact scrutinised the merits and demerits of each candidate taking into consideration the various factors as required, and its recommendations were sent to UPSC. It is the settled legal position that the courts have to show deference and consideration to the recommendations of an Expert Committee consisting of members with expertise in the field, if malice or arbitrariness in the Committee's decision is not forthcoming. The doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law, was not supposed to convert tribunals and courts into appellate authorities over the decision of experts. The constraints—self-imposed, undoubtedly—of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless.

               20. This Court has repeatedly observed and concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an appellate authority or an umpire to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like a court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only, and the courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of a candidate; nor is it the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion. Since the Selection Committee constituted by UPSC is manned by experts in the field, we have to trust their assessment unless it is actuated with malice or bristles with mala fides or arbitrariness.”

35. In the case of Arabinda Rabha (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

               “29. It has not escaped our notice that the decision in Jitendra Kumar [Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 161 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 428] has been doubted in All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar [All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 293] on the point as to whether Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. The facts in K. Shyam Kumar [All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 293] bear close resemblance to the facts of the present appeal and, thus, may be noticed. Therein, the Railway Recruitment Board (RRB) had called for applications for appointments on Group D posts in the South-Central Railway Zone, Secunderabad. Consequently, in excess of three lakh candidates appeared for the written examination. Of them, ten short of two thousand seven hundred candidates having achieved the minimum qualifying marks in the written examination, were called for a PET. Candidates who qualified in the PET were called for verification, during which certain malpractices were detected in the written examination. Additionally, there was a deluge of allegations of mass copying, question paper leakage, and impersonation committed during the written examination. A vigilance enquiry was conducted and the report prima facie revealed these abovementioned illegalities. Relying on the vigilance report, the RRB decided to conduct a re-test of the candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks in the written examination. This decision was challenged by some candidates before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad. The Tribunal did not find any irregularity or illegality with the decision of the RRB, due to which the candidates were constrained to move the High Court. Before the High Court, the candidates termed the decision of the RRB as arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court agreed with the candidates and set aside the order directing the re-test as, in the High Court's opinion, the decision was unreasonable and violative of the Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles. The RRB approached this Court in appeal.

               40. Be that as it may, drawing from our joint experience on the Bench, we can say with some degree of conviction and authority that conducting recruitment processes in terms of executive orders and in the absence of statutorily prescribed standards, more often than not, invite avoidable litigation producing undesirable results. Left to us, if any process of selection was challenged by unsuccessful candidates on the ground of absence of recruitment rules, or on the grounds of absence of a written examination, or on the allegations of bias or favouritism or nepotism which are nebulous, we would certainly not interfere in the absence of other apparent vitiating factors. However, the situation in the present case has taken a completely different turn. It is the successor Government which nullified the select list. Hence, the considerations for interference which ordinarily weigh in the minds of the court, having regard to the peculiar fact situation, are not exactly the same here. This aspect of the matter, discussed in some more depth hereafter, seems to have escaped the notice of the High Court.

36. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Rai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.17, has held as under:

               “17. Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on one more point that the appellants had participated in the process of interview and not challenged it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost four months between the interview and declaration of result. However, the appellants did not challenge it at that time. Thus, it appears that only when the appellants found themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the candidates should not have participated in the interview and challenged the procedure or they should have challenged immediately after the interviews were conducted. (See Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission [Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, (2011) 1 SCC 150 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 21] and K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala [K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 395 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1345] .)”

37. This Bench is in respectful agreement with the above exposition. Administration, particularly of a specialised scientific organisation such as DRDO, necessarily involves an element of “play in the joints” i.e. a margin of judgment and discretion that must be left to the Executive, subject to only correction where constitutional limits are transgressed. The Tribunal, in the present case, appears to have proceeded on the premise that it was for it to determine what ought to have weighed with the selection committee and the competent authority - the seniority, grade, number of awards, residency period as Distinguished Scientist, and the like and to fault the selection because these considerations did not, in the Tribunal’s own assessment, receive what it considered their due weight. This is, with respect, precisely the kind of “fussy forensic monitoring” that T.N. Education Deptt. (supra) cautions against. The Tribunal is a sentinel against unconstitutional excess; it is not an ombudsman empowered to conduct a fresh de novo assessment of comparative suitability for a post of this technical and strategic character.

38. Tested against this settled framework, we find considerable merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the Union of India. The advertisement dated 12.09.2024 prescribed three essential qualifications:

               (i) That the candidate be a Scientist in the grade of Scientist “H” or above;

               (ii) That he has served a tenure as Director of a Laboratory, Programme Director, or Corporate Director; and

               (iii) That he possess at least 12 months of residual service (as reduced by the Corrigendum dated 28.02.2023 from the earlier 18 months), with an M.Tech / Ph.D being merely desirable.

39. It is not in dispute indeed it is the Tribunal’s own finding that both respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 satisfied each of these essential and desirable qualifications. Nowhere does the advertisement, the SOP, or Rule 10 of the DRDS Rules, 2023 prescribe seniority, higher pay-level, or the status of ‘Distinguished Scientist’ as opposed to ‘Outstanding Scientist’ as a criterion carrying any weightage, leave alone a determinative one, in the selection to the post of Director General (BrahMos). The Tribunal’s finding that respondent No.1, being senior and holding a higher grade, ought to have been preferred, in the teeth of an advertisement that draws no such distinction. In our considered view it amounts to the Tribunal reading into the Rules and the advertisement, a criterion that the rule making and appointing authority never intended to prescribe, a course impermissible in the exercise of judicial review, as authoritatively laid down in the case of Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke (supra) wherein it was held that, in terms we consider squarely applicable, that it is not the function of a Court to sit in an appeal over the decision of a selection committee and to scrutinise the relative merits of candidates. That function being the exclusive province of the duly constituted committee possessed of the requisite expertise, interference being permissible only on the limited grounds of illegality, patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or its procedure, or proved mala fides, none of which we find has been established on the record before us. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder:

               12. It will thus appear that apart from the fact that the High Court has rolled the cases of the two appointees in one, though their appointments are not assailable on the same grounds, the court has also found it necessary to sit in appeal over the decision of the Selection Committee and to embark upon deciding the relative merits of the candidates. It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.”

40. We are equally unable to sustain the Tribunal’s finding that the alphabetical ordering of the panel of three names sent to the competent authority betrayed manifest arbitrariness or a predetermined selection. The record which the Tribunal itself extracted discloses that respondent No.1, respondent No.2, and a third Scientist ‘H’ (Dr. Manickavasagam M.) were all awarded equal marks of 80 by the selection committee upon interaction and discreet review of their respective profiles. Where three candidates are found upon the very assessment conducted by the expert body constituted for the purpose to be equally meritorious, the sequence in which their names are placed in the recommendatory panel, whether alphabetical or otherwise is a matter of form, not substance, and cannot be elevated into a badge of arbitrariness, particularly when the final choice among the three equally-ranked names was admittedly left to the considered discretion of the competent authority under the SOP and Rule 10. This position finds full support in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Samar Singh (supra) wherein it was held that mere absence of recorded reasons for non-selection of a candidate from a panel does not, by itself, vitiate the selection, so long as the committee has taken into account the criteria properly applicable to the exercise. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereunder:

               11. This would show that the Committee, keeping in view the record and experience including the conceptual and leadership abilities, achievements and potential for general management positions, had recommended 19 IAS officers for holding the post of Secretaries and 7 IAS officers for holding a non-secretarial post. Merely because the minutes of the Committee do not contain the reason for non-selection of the respondent does not mean that there has been no proper consideration of the merits and suitability of the respondent and as a result the selection is vitiated. From the minutes of the Special Committee it is evident that in the matter of empanelment of officers the Special Committee has taken into account the criteria that are laid down for holding such selection in para 14 of the Central Staffing Scheme and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said selection is vitiated on account of non-inclusion of the name of the respondent in the panel.

               12. Shri Ashok Grover, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, has laid emphasis on the remarks in ACRs about appraisal of the performance of the respondent subsequent to his promotion on the post of Additional Secretary to which reference has been made by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment. The learned counsel has submitted that since the performance has been rated as outstanding and excellent, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there is no proper consideration of the case of the respondent by the Special Committee. We are unable to agree. As is evident from para 14 of the Central Staffing Scheme record is one of the matters which has to be taken into consideration by the Special Committee while making the selection. Apart from the record there are other matters that have to be considered, namely, merit, competence, leadership and flair for participating in the policy-making process and the need of the Central Government which is the paramount consideration. We are unable to hold that since the performance of the respondent after his promotion as Additional Secretary had been found to be excellent and outstanding, the non-inclusion of his name from the panel by the Special Committee must lead to the inference that there was no proper consideration of the merit and suitability of the respondent for empanelment by the Special Committee.”

41. Further in the case of Dr. K. Kalyana Raman (supra) wherein it was authoritatively held that a selection committee exercising a purely administrative (as opposed to quasi-judicial) function, is under no legal obligation to record reasons for preferring one equally placed candidate over another, in the absence of a specific statutory requirement to that effect, a requirement conspicuously absent from the SOP and the DRDS Rules, 2023, governing the present selection. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:

               7. We will first consider the second point. In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. The selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] . That decision proceeded on a statutory requirement. Regulation 5(5) which was considered in that case required the Selection Committee to record its reasons for superseding a senior member in the State Civil Service. The decision in Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] was rendered on September 26, 1973. In June 1977, Regulation 5(5) was amended deleting the requirement of recording reasons for the supersession of senior officers of the State Civil Services. The Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] cannot, therefore, be construed as an authority for the proposition that there should be reason formulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision. Indeed, even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement. This principle has been stated by this Court in R.S. Dass v. Union of India [1986 Supp SCC 617 : (1987) 2 ATC 628] in which Capoor Case [(1973) 2 Page 39 of 49 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] was also distinguished.

               8. As to the first point we may state at the outset that giving of reasons for decision is different from, and in principle distinct from, the requirements of procedural fairness. The procedural fairness is the main requirement in the administrative action. The ‘fairness’ or ‘fair procedure’ in the administrative action ought to be observed. The Selection Committee cannot be an exception to this principle. It must take a decision reasonably without being guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. But there is nothing on record to suggest that the Selection Committee did anything to the contrary. The High Court however, observed, that Dr Kalyana Raman did not receive a fair and reasonable consideration by the Selection Committee. The inference in this regard has been drawn by the High Court from the statement of objections dated February 18, 1980 filed on behalf of the Selection Committee. It appears that the Selection Committee took the stand that Dr Kalyana Raman did not satisfy the minimum requirement of experience and was not eligible for selection. The High Court went on to state that it was somewhat extraordinary for the Selection Committee after calling him for the interview and selecting him for the post by placing him second, to have stated that he did not satisfy the minimum qualifications prescribed for eligibility. According to the High Court the stand taken by the Selection Committee raises serious doubts as to whether the deliberations of the Selection Committee were such as to inspire confidence and reassurance as to the related equality and justness of an effective consideration of this case. It is true that selection of the petitioner and the stand taken by the Selection Committee before the High Court that he was not eligible at all, are, indeed, antithetical and cannot co-exist. But the fact remains that the case of Dr Kalyana Raman was considered and he was placed second in the panel of names. It is not shown that the selection was arbitrary or whimsical or the Selection Committee did not act fairly towards Dr Kalyana Raman. The fact that he was placed second in the panel, itself indicates that there was proper consideration of his case and he has been treated fairly. It should not be lost sight of that the Selection Committee consisted of experts in the subject for selection. They were men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality. The Court should be slow to interfere with their opinion.”

42. As regards the finding of the Tribunal founded upon the Confidential Note dated 20.05.2024, approved by the Hon’ble Defence Minister, recording the Peer Committee’s observation that DRDO had, at the relevant time, only 12 Distinguished Scientists as against a historical strength of about 20, and that several Director General level posts were consequently being manned by Scientists ‘H’, we are of the view that the Tribunal has drawn an inference from the material that the material itself does not bear. The observation in the Confidential Note is on a plain reading an institutional concern regarding the numerical adequacy of Distinguished Scientists to discharge functions statutorily or administratively by officers of that rank, such as chairing certain Committees or Boards and a passing observation that Director General posts are, for want of numbers, ‘being occupied by’ Scientists ‘H’. It is a considerable leap unsupported by the text of the Note itself to construe this administrative observation as laying down a policy preference for Distinguished Scientists over Scientists ‘H’ in selection to posts such as Director General (BrahMos), still less as conferring upon a Distinguished Scientist a right to preference over an equally marked Scientist ‘H’ candidate. The Note at best reflects an aspiration that Director General posts ideally be manned by Distinguished Scientists where available and suitable; it does not and cannot override the express terms of the advertisement and the SOP which prescribe Scientist ‘H’ as the minimum eligible grade without any further gradation or weightage.

43. We further find support for our conclusion in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tajvir Singh Sodhi (supra) wherein it was authoritatively held that ‘Courts in exercising the power of judicial review cannot step into the shoes of the selection committee to re-assess the marks or evaluation of candidates, that being a matter best left to the members of the committee possessed of the relevant expertise’ and further that a candidate who has participated in a selection process without demur cannot upon being found unsuccessful, turn around and question the very same process. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment, for ready reference, are reproduced hereunder:

               37. Thus, courts while exercising the power of judicial review cannot step into the shoes of the Selection Committee or assume an appellate role to examine whether the marks awarded by the Selection Committee in the viva voce are excessive and not corresponding to their performance in such test. The assessment and evaluation of the performance of candidates appearing before the Selection Committee/Interview Board should be best left to the members of the committee. In light of the position that a Court cannot sit in appeal against the decision taken pursuant to a reasonably sound selection process, the following grounds raised by the writ petitioners, which are based on an attack of subjective criteria employed by the Selection Board/interview panel in assessing the suitability of candidates, namely, (i) that the candidates who had done their postgraduation had been awarded 10 marks and in the viva voce, such PG candidates had been granted either 18 marks or 20 marks out of 20; (ii) that although the writ petitioners had performed exceptionally well in the interview, the authorities had acted in an arbitrary manner while carrying out the selection process, would not hold any water.

               39. It is therefore trite that candidates, having taken part in the selection process without any demur or protest, cannot challenge the same after having been declared unsuccessful. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. In other words, simply because the result of the selection process is not palatable to a candidate, he cannot allege that the process of interview was unfair or that there was some lacuna in the process. Therefore, we find that the writ petitioners in these cases, could not have questioned before a court of law, the rationale behind recasting the selection criteria, as they willingly took part in the selection process even after the criteria had been so recast. Their candidature was not withdrawn in light of the amended criteria. A challenge was thrown against the same only after they had been declared unsuccessful in the selection process, at which stage, the challenge ought not to have been entertained in light of the principle of waiver and acquiescence.”

44. It bears mention that respondent No.1 participated in the selection process including the interaction on 22.10.2024 without protest or demur as to the criteria, the composition of the selection committee or the marking methodology and it was only upon his nonselection that these very features of the process came to be characterised as arbitrary.

45. We are equally guided by the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Thimmaiah (supra) which has been relied upon in the case of M. Sathiya Priya (supra) and Tajvir Singh Sodhi (supra) which have been dealt with at length in the present Common Order. Further, in the case of Samar Singh (supra) it was cautioned against speculative allegations of favouritism or predetermination unsupported by cogent material precisely the infirmity that afflicts the finding of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ recorded by the Tribunal on the strength of an unproduced and unverified WhatsApp message, the contents of which were never placed on record either before the Tribunal or before us. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of M.V. Thimmaiah (supra) are reproduced hereunder:

               17. We gave our thoughtful consideration to this allegation. There is no correlation with this selection. It is too far-fetched to connect with this case that Shri Subir Dutta who was given the residential site in lieu of his service rendered to the State of Karnataka, would necessarily favour the candidates. The shortlisting was done by the Screening Committee headed by the Chief Secretary along with four Secretaries of the State and there was no mala fide intention in shortlisting of these persons; now to think that just because Shri Dutta was allotted some land so that necessarily he would favour these selected candidates only is nothing but a figment of imagination of the appellants. To connect the selection with the previous allotment of land to Shri Subir Dutta has hardly any connection between the two.

               18. In the selection process Shri Subir Dutta was one of the members along with others. All the officers who were to be selected belonged to Karnataka State and it is not specific that any of the selected candidates has in any manner actively associated with the allotment of land to Shri Subir Dutta. It is too remote to connect the selection of these candidates with the allotment of the site to Shri Subir Dutta. We do not find any connection that any of the selected candidates has in any manner directly or indirectly associated himself in the allotment of the site in favour of Shri Subir Dutta. As it appears from the file which was summoned by the High Court that the proposal was mooted out by the Chief Secretary and it was approved by the Chief Minister. Therefore, there appears no direct or indirect connection with the selection of candidates and allotment of residential site in favour of Shri Subir Dutta. As such, the allegations are too far-fetched to render the entire selection invalid on the ground of so-called mala fides. This is purely a flight of imagination and we strongly reject the allegation of mala fide against Shri Subir Dutta, the Chairman of the Selection Committee.”

46. We do not doubt that the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as elucidated in the case of E.P. Royappa (supra) and in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) applies with full rigour to selections for public appointment and that State action which is arbitrary or which departs from self-imposed standards to the prejudice of some while favouring others, falls foul of these guarantees. But arbitrariness, within the meaning of these authorities, connotes action without any principle or without any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It does not connote a bona fide, structured selection among equally qualified candidates made by an expert committee and ratified by a statutorily empowered competent authority, merely because a Court or Tribunal applying its own yardstick of what ought to have mattered, would have made a different choice. On the material before us, respondent No.2 was not shown to have been favoured through any deviation from the eligibility criteria published in the advertisement, any departure from the SOP, or any material extraneous to the selection process. On the contrary, he satisfied every prescribed criterion, was found, upon the very assessment conducted by the selection committee, to be equally meritorious with respondent No.1 and was thereafter selected by the competent authority in the bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in it under Rule 10 of the DRDS Rules, 2023 and the SOP.

47. Governance is not a science of exactitude, nor is administration arithmetic of ranks where the topmost figure alone may claim the crown. Between the letter of a rule and the life of an institution there must always remain what the law, in its wisdom, has called the play in the joints that small but indispensable margin of movement without which the machinery of the State would seize and stand still. When three equals stand before the appointing authority, each having crossed every threshold the rules prescribe and each having been weighed in the same scales by the same expert hands, the choice of one among them is not the exercise of caprice but the exercise of trust & compatibility, a trust which the Constitution has reposed in the executive and not in the Courts and compatibility which should be left with the Government / Executive. To insist that every such choice be justified afresh before a judicial forum, sifted syllable by syllable and measured against the private yardstick of the reviewing body, is to convert administration into perpetual litigation and the administrator into a defendant in his own office.

48. The Courts are sentinels upon the wall, vigilant against the transgression of constitutional limits; but they are not inspectors within the chamber auditing each ordinary act of judgment that falls squarely within the executive's own domain. Where no rule is broken, no bias is shown, and no extraneous consideration is proved, the decision of the executive must be allowed to stand, not because it is beyond question, but because the Constitution has entrusted that question to another, and judicial restraint in such a case is not abdication but fidelity to the separation of powers. In order for the government to provide for good governance, there is always an element of flexibility left in the hands of the government. particularly when matters of selection and more particularly when the selection is in between two or more equals. This is what is meant by "play in the joints" in the earlier paragraphs..

49. In light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal exceeded the legitimate bounds of judicial review in setting aside the appointment of respondent No.2 as Director General (BrahMos). The Tribunal substituted its own subjective assessment of the comparative worth of seniority, grade, awards, and residency period for the collective, expert judgment of the selection committee and the considered decision of the competent authority, which is impermissible in law, more so in respect of a selection to a post of such technical complexity and strategic sensitivity. Touching as it, does upon a matter of national security and defence preparedness, where the restraint counselled in the cases of S.L. Dutta (supra) and T.N. Education Deptt. (supra) applies with its fullest force. The question of law framed is therefore answered in favour of the Union of India.

50. Writ Petition No.126 of 2026 accordingly stands allowed. The order dated 29.12.2025, passed by the Tribunal in OA No.021/02253 of 2024, is set aside. Consequently, Writ Petition No.127 of 2026 also stands allowed on similar lines.

51. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.