1. Petitioner, a High Tension consumer of the respondent Distribution Company, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the levy of charges towards excess consumption beyond the Permitted Demand Limit (PDL) and Permitted Consumption Limit (PCL) for the months of October and November, 2012. The principal contention of petitioner is that, in view of the subsequent proceedings of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (“TGERC”) granting exemption to certain seasonal industries from the Restriction and Control (“R&C”) measures for the period from 24.11.2012 to 24.12.2012, they are not liable for PDL/PCL charges reflected in the bills. Petitioner also contends that continuation of the said charges is contrary to the orders of the TGERC and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

2. Petitioner is a rice mill situated at Thimmapur, Karimnagar District. It obtained electricity supply under an HT agreement with the Distribution Company, initially with a contracted maximum demand of 180 KVA. The record further shows that the petitioner had been an HT consumer under Category-I. The HT agreement specifically contemplated payment of charges in accordance with the applicable tariff, General Terms and Conditions of Supply and the orders issued by the Regulatory Commission. The agreement also required the consumer to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements governing electricity consumption. During 2012, the State was facing shortage of electricity. The Distribution Companies approached the APERC seeking permission to impose restrictions upon consumption and use of electricity. The TGERC, exercising powers under Section 23 read with Section 86(1)(k) of the Electricity Act, 2003, issued orders prescribing Restriction and Control measures. The orders stipulated limits upon the demand and consumption of electricity by different categories of HT consumers.

               2.1. Respondents issued bills dated 26.10.2012 and 26.11.2012 containing PDL/PCL charges. According to the counter-affidavit, the October bill covered consumption recorded between 22.09.2012 and 20.10.2012, while the November bill covered consumption recorded between 20.10.2012 and 22.11.2012. The total PDL/PCL charges were stated to be Rs.4,31,120/-. The APERC subsequently passed proceedings dated 24.11.2012 granting exemption to certain industries, including rice mills, cotton ginning and pressing mills and ice manufacturing units, from R&C measures for the period 24.11.2012 to 24.12.2012.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner Sri Kamatham Govardhan Reddy submits that petitioner is a rice mill and therefore, falls within the category of industries which were subsequently, exempted by the TGERC from R&C measures. It was argued that once the Commission reconsidered the matter and exempted rice mills from the R&C measures, respondents could not continue to demand PDL/PCL charges. According to learned counsel, the levy of such charges after the exemption was granted is contrary to the order of the Commission.

               3.1. It is further contended that petitioner had been regularly paying its electricity bills and had no history of default. The continued demand of Rs.4,31,120/- was therefore, alleged to be arbitrary and illegal. Petitioner also apprehended disconnection of electricity supply and pleaded that such disconnection would cause serious prejudice to its business and employees. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment in Sriramagiri Spinning Mills Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, contending that seasonal industries require separate consideration because imposition of restrictions during their operating season could seriously affect them.

4. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the Distribution Company Sri A. Chandra Shaker submitted that Writ Petition proceeds upon an erroneous understanding of the TGERC exemption order. It is specifically contended that October bill dated 26.10.2012 covered consumption ending on 20.10.2012, and November bill dated 26.11.2012 covered consumption ending on 22.11.2012. The exemption, however, commenced only from 24.11.2012. Therefore, neither of the disputed billing periods fell within the exemption period.

               4.1. It is further submitted that petitioner was not classified as a “Seasonal Industry” under the applicable tariff. They specifically refer to the tariff provisions governing seasonal industries and petitioner’s service connection did not fall within the category of seasonal industries entitled to the special R&C exemption. Respondents further submitted that TGERC had statutory authority under Section 23 of the Electricity Act, 2003 to regulate supply, distribution, consumption and use of electricity and that the Distribution Company was bound to implement the Commission’s orders. It was therefore, argued that charges were neither arbitrary nor illegal but were raised strictly in accordance with the applicable R&C measures, tariff orders and the HT agreement.

5. Heard Sri P.N. Arun Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for TGERC.

6. Section 23 of the Electricity Act, 2003 empowers the Appropriate Commission, where it considers it necessary or expedient for maintaining efficient supply, securing equitable distribution of electricity and promoting competition, to regulate the supply, distribution, consumption or use of electricity. The power is regulatory in character and has to be understood in the context of the object sought to be achieved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1985) 2 SCC 116), explained that the expression “regulate” is of wide import and includes the power to control, direct and prescribe rules governing the subject matter of regulation. The Supreme Court’s formulation has subsequently been repeatedly applied in regulatory matters. The principle is particularly relevant in the electricity sector, where availability of electricity and equitable distribution of limited supply are matters involving technical and regulatory considerations. Respondents have placed substantial reliance upon the Constitutionally-binding principle in Adoni Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board ((1976) 4 SCC 68). In that case, during acute shortage of electricity, restrictions were imposed upon consumption and higher charges were prescribed for consumption beyond the quota. The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the regulatory scheme and recognised the power of the electricity authority to impose restrictions and enhanced charges where there was shortage of electricity. The principle subsequently received direct consideration by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sriramagiri Spinning Mills Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2013) 3 ALD 298). In that case, the High Court considered the very question whether the ratio of Adoni Cotton Mills continued to apply under the Electricity Act, 2003. The Court held that Section 23 of the 2003 Act is substantially analogous to the earlier power under Section 22-B of the 1910 Act and Section 62 of the 2003 Act corresponds in relevant respects with Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The Court further held that the regulatory power under the 2003 Act could sustain higher charges designed to enforce restrictions on consumption. This Court finds the reasoning in Sriramagiri Spinning Mills particularly apposite.

7, Petitioner’s attempt to characterise the PDL/PCL charges merely as an unauthorised “penalty” cannot be accepted. The charges form part of the regulatory mechanism adopted by the APERC for enforcing the restrictions imposed during a period of power shortage. The TGERC did not merely impose an independent punitive liability unrelated to electricity consumption. It prescribed permissible levels of demand and consumption and provided for enhanced charges where a consumer exceeded those limits. This mechanism was intended to ensure compliance with the R&C measures and equitable distribution of available electricity. The Supreme Court in Adoni Cotton Mills recognised precisely this regulatory rationale. The Court held that where electricity is in short supply, restrictions may be imposed and higher rates may be utilised to enforce the rationing mechanism. The same principle was expressly applied to the Electricity Act, 2003 regime in Sriramagiri Spinning Mills. The High Court held that the similarity between the statutory provisions meant that the reasoning in Adoni Cotton Mills continued to have precedential force. Therefore, the contention that the respondents lacked authority to levy the PDL/PCL charges cannot be accepted.

8. The most important aspect of the controversy is that October bill dated 26.10.2012 related to consumption ending on 20.10.2012, November bill dated 26.11.2012 related to consumption ending on 22.11.2012 and exemption granted by the TGERC commenced only on 24.11.2012. Therefore, both the disputed billing periods had concluded before the exemption commenced. Petitioner seeks, in substance, to apply the exemption to liabilities which had already accrued under the R&C regime. There is no material in the record demonstrating that TGERC intended its exemption order dated 24.11.2012 to retrospectively annul charges which had accrued before 24.11.2012.A subsequent exemption cannot automatically wipe out an accrued liability. The normal rule governing delegated orders and exemptions is that they operate according to their express terms.

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised the distinction between prospective and retrospective operation of notifications and subordinate legislation. In State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd. ((2004) 7 SCC 673), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the operation of amendments to exemption schemes and recognised that such changes ordinarily operate prospectively unless the relevant provision or notification indicates otherwise. Applying that principle here, the exemption commencing on 24.11.2012 cannot be extended backwards to bills relating to periods which had already concluded on 20.10.2012 and 22.11.2012, particularly when the order itself has not been shown to contain any retrospective clause.

10. There is an additional and independent reason why petitioner’s challenge cannot succeed. Respondents have specifically pleaded that petitioner’s HT service connection was classified under HT Category-I and they had not made the requisite declaration/opted for the special seasonal tariff in the manner contemplated under the tariff provisions. The tariff provisions placed on record prescribe specific conditions for consumers seeking classification as seasonal industries. They contemplate declaration of the seasonal period and compliance with prescribed requirements. The respondents’ case is that petitioner did not satisfy those requirements. Consequently, merely because petitioner’s industrial activity happens to be a rice mill, it cannot automatically follow that every bill raised upon it during the R&C period is retrospectively converted into a bill relating to an exempted seasonal industry. An exemption must be established with reference to the terms of the order granting it.

11. The TGERC is a specialised statutory regulator entrusted with technical and economic functions concerning generation, transmission, distribution, supply, tariff and equitable distribution of electricity. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that regulatory authorities possessing technical expertise are entitled to considerable institutional deference in matters falling within their specialised domain. In Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. v. Rain Calcining Ltd. ((2021) 13 SCC 674) the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the regulatory authority’s determination concerning Grid Support Charges and emphasised the statutory and regulatory basis of such charges. The decision reflects the principle that courts should not substitute their own technical or economic assessment for that of the expert regulatory body where the determination is founded upon the statutory framework. Similarly, PTC India Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission ((2010) 4 SCC 603) recognises the special statutory position occupied by electricity regulatory commissions under the Electricity Act. In the present case, there is no material demonstrating that the TGERC acted outside the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Electricity Act.

12. Petitioner contends that the levy and threatened disconnection affect its business. There can be no dispute that electricity is an important input for an industrial undertaking. However, that circumstance, by itself, does not invalidate a regulatory measure which has statutory authority. Petitioner voluntarily entered into an HT supply arrangement subject to the applicable tariff and regulatory conditions. The record also shows that HT agreement required compliance with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. Where restriction is imposed pursuant to statutory authority for maintaining equitable distribution of scarce electricity and the charges are levied pursuant to an approved regulatory framework, mere economic inconvenience cannot by itself establish violation of Article 19(1)(g).

13. Further, respondents have relied upon Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the applicable Electricity Supply Code concerning disconnection for non-payment. The record reproduces the statutory provision under which, subject to the prescribed notice and safeguards, a licensee may discontinue supply where a person neglects to pay electricity charges or other sums due. The Electricity Supply Code similarly provides for disconnection for non-payment after the prescribed notice. Therefore, so long as the amount demanded remains legally recoverable, the petitioner cannot obtain a blanket injunction restraining the Distribution Company from taking action in accordance with law.

14. The principal submission of petitioner rests upon a fundamental chronological error. The exemption relied upon by petitioner commenced on 24.11.2012, whereas the liabilities under challenge had already accrued in respect of consumption periods ending on 20.10.2012 and 22.11.2012. A subsequent regulatory concession cannot, in the absence of express retrospective operation, be employed to extinguish a liability which had already arisen under a valid regulatory order. Petitioner was bound by the R&C measures applicable during the relevant billing periods. Respondents, having calculated the charges in accordance with the applicable PDL/PCL mechanism, cannot be said to have acted without authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Adoni Cotton Mills and the subsequent application of that principle by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sriramagiri Spinning Mills provide substantial support for the respondents’ position on the validity of restrictions and enhanced charges.

15. The demand raised by respondents towards PDL/PCL charges for the relevant billing periods, including the amount of Rs.4,31,120/-, is upheld, subject to verification of the arithmetical correctness of the bills in accordance with the applicable tariff and R&C orders. Petitioner shall be liable to pay the legally-recoverable outstanding amount together with applicable belated-payment charges in accordance with the tariff and applicable regulations.

16. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.

17. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.