1. The petitioner has filed this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to initiate proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30 of 2013), which came into force on 01.01.2014 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’), by publishing a preliminary notification for acquisition of land admeasuring Ac.1-14 guntas in Sy.Nos.1166/A and 1168 of Jyothinagar locality, Karimnagar Revenue Village, Karimnagar District (for short, ‘the subject land’), in terms of the order dated 14.11.2007 passed by this Court in W.P.No.6845 of 2000, and thereafter to pass an award and pay compensation.

2. Heard Sri Mirza Safiulla Baig, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned AGP for Municipal Administration appearing for respondent No.1, Sri K. Siddhartha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Karimnagar and Ramagundam Municipal Corporations, appearing for the respondent No.2 and Sri K. Venu Madhav, learned counsel for respondent No.4. Perused the record.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. The case of the petitioner is that he and his late father, Sri Salabath Khan, were the owners and possessors of the subject land. The petitioner, his late father and another person had earlier filed W.P.No.6845 of 2000 before this Court, contending that the subject land had been utilised by the municipal authorities for laying a road, and that the land had neither been acquired nor had compensation been paid for it. By order dated 14.11.2007, this Court allowed the said writ petition and directed the authorities to initiate proceedings for acquisition of the subject land and to pay compensation, within the time stipulated in the order. The said order has not been set aside or modified and has attained finality.

4. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 24.04.2008 to respondent No.3, with a copy to respondent No.1, enclosing a copy of the order and requesting that the acquisition proceedings be initiated and completed within the time stipulated by this Court. Thereafter, respondent No.3 addressed letters dated 31.10.2011, 05.12.2011, 16.05.2012 and 26.06.2012 to respondent No.2, requesting it to submit the necessary requisition to the competent Revenue Divisional Officer for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of the subject land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894), which came into force on 01.03.1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1894’). In the meantime, the Government, in the Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, issued Memo No.23235/J1/2012 dated 05.10.2012 directing the authorities concerned to take necessary action.

5. As no effective steps followed, the petitioner issued legal notices dated 03.02.2014 and 15.11.2014 calling upon the respondents to comply with the order dated 14.11.2007. By a further letter dated 31.12.2014, respondent No.3 once again requested respondent No.2 to initiate the acquisition proceedings and to submit a detailed proposal to the Government. Even so, no acquisition proceedings were commenced and no compensation was paid. According to the petitioner, the continued inaction of the respondents, despite the binding directions of this Court and his repeated requests, is illegal and arbitrary and violates his right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. He states that he has no other effective remedy and has therefore invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226.

6. Respondent No.2 Corporation has filed a counter-affidavit through its Commissioner. It is stated that the subject land was never taken over or acquired by the Corporation for formation of any road. According to respondent No.2, the petitioner’s father and family members, over several decades, developed the land into house plots and sold them under registered sale deeds, including Sale Deed Nos.3759/1987, 3769/1996, 522/1987, 523/1987 and 552/1987, besides several other conveyances executed from 1976 onwards. In each of these documents, the boundaries in the schedule describe abutting roads of 30 feet and 40 feet width. It is contended that these roads were left by the vendors themselves while forming the layout, and were not taken over by the Corporation.

7. Respondent No.2 further relies on the Master Plan for Karimnagar, confirmed in G.O.Ms.No.555 dated 16.10.1988, and on the subsequent Master Plan of 1998. Both plans show the 30 feet and 40 feet roads in the subject survey numbers as already existing, without any proposal for formation of new roads or for widening of the existing roads. Reliance is also placed on the regularisation of the layout under the Layout Regularisation Scheme in Proceedings No.LRS/432/2012/KNR, and on two registered Relinquishment of Disputed Right Deeds of the year 2012, bearing Document Nos.7837/2012 and 7323/2012, executed by the petitioner and one Najmunnisa Begum respectively in favour of members of the Yegurla family, in respect of land in Sy.Nos.1166/A, 1171 and 1172. The schedules to these deeds also describe the surrounding roads.

8. It is further contended that under Sections 184 and 185 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 (Act 6 of 1965), (for short, ‘the Act of 1965’), an owner who develops land into house sites is himself obliged to form the streets and roads giving access to the sites, and that the Corporation is not liable to pay compensation for roads so left by a private layout owner. Respondent No.2 also alleges that the petitioner suppressed the registered sale deeds, the layout regularisation proceedings and the relinquishment deeds, both in the present proceedings and in the earlier round of litigation, and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground as well, with exemplary costs.

9. Against this factual background, the learned counsel on either side advanced the following submissions.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, reiterating the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, submits that the defence now raised by respondent No.2, namely, that no new road was formed and that an existing road was only developed, is the very defence that was considered and rejected by this Court in the order dated 14.11.2007 in W.P.No.6845 of 2000. He points out that this Court rejected that defence after taking into account the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Karimnagar, and the admission of the Municipal Commissioner that adjoining land in Sy.No.1115/A, forming part of the same Town Planning Scheme No.11 of 1970, had been acquired for the very same road. He submits that the said order, having attained finality, binds the respondents, and that their failure to act upon it for over seven years has left the petitioner without his land and without compensation, in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Dega Homes v. Dega Dayakar Reddy (2022 (6) ALT 200 (SB)) , S. Varalakshmi v. M. Dilli Bai (2022 (6) ALT 103 (SB)), Inspector General of Registration and Stamps v. Tayyaba Begum (AIR 1962 AP 199), Chota Uddandu Sahib v. Masthan Bi (AIR 1975 AP 271), Mir Muzafaruddin Khan v. Syed Arifuddin Khan (1971(3) SCC 810), Kairam Laxminarsaiah v. Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Mancherial (2008 (6) ALD 44) and Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (AIR 2013 SC 565).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

12. Learned Standing Counsel, reiterating the averments in the counter-affidavit, contends that the subject land was never acquired or occupied by the Municipal Corporation for laying any new road. It is the specific case of the respondents that the roads were already in existence and that the Corporation only undertook their development and improvement, without using any portion of the petitioner’s land for that purpose. He submits that in the absence of any acquisition or use of the petitioner’s land by the Corporation, the question of initiating acquisition proceedings, or of determining and paying compensation, does not arise, and the petitioner has no right to claim compensation from the Corporation. He further submits that the documents referred to in the counter-affidavit show that the roads were left by the petitioner’s family as part of a private layout, and that the petitioner, having suppressed those documents, is not entitled to any relief.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

13. Having regard to the pleadings, the rival submissions and the material on record, the following points arise for consideration:

               (i) Whether respondent No.2 is precluded from reopening, in the present proceedings, the question whether the subject land was utilised for formation of the road, that question having been decided by this Court in the order dated 14.11.2007 in W.P.No.6845 of 2000?

               (ii) Whether the registered sale deeds, the Master Plans of 1988 and 1998, the layout regularisation proceedings, the relinquishment deeds of 2012 and Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965, relied upon by respondent No.2, disentitle the petitioner to acquisition of the subject land and payment of compensation?

               (iii) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, with exemplary costs, for the alleged suppression of material facts?

               (iv) Whether the writ petition, filed in the year 2015 for implementation of the order dated 14.11.2007, is barred by delay and laches?

               (v) Whether, after the repeal of the Act of 1894, the petitioner is entitled to a mandamus directing the respondents to acquire the subject land under the Act of 2013 and pay compensation?

               (vi) To what relief?

14. The objection of suppression, raised in point (iii), turns on whether the documents said to have been suppressed are material to the controversy. That, in turn, depends on the effect of the order dated 14.11.2007. Points (i) and (ii) are therefore taken up first, followed by points (iii) and (iv), which concern objections to the grant of relief, and point (v), which concerns the manner in which the earlier order is now to be implemented.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Point (i): Whether respondent No.2 can reopen the question decided in W.P.No.6845 of 2000

15. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, his late father and another person had earlier approached this Court in respect of the subject land by filing W.P.No.6845 of 2000. Their claim was that an extent of Ac.1-14 guntas in Sy.Nos.1166/A and 1168 of Jyothinagar locality had been utilised by the municipal authorities for laying a road, and that despite such use for a public purpose, the land had not been acquired and compensation had not been paid. The dispute is, therefore, not of recent origin, and the present writ petition has to be considered in the backdrop of that litigation and the findings recorded in it.

16. In that round, this Court considered the rival contentions and the material on record, including the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Karimnagar, and the stand of the municipal authorities. The material before this Court included the admission of the Municipal Commissioner that adjoining land in Sy.No.1115/A, forming part of the same Town Planning Scheme No.11 of 1970, had been acquired for the very same road. Upon such consideration, this Court allowed the writ petition by order dated 14.11.2007 and directed the authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land and to pay compensation. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:

               “From the facts narrated hereinabove, it could be seen that when the petitioners approached this Court by filing Writ Petition 8596 of 1992, a categorical finding was recorded by this court in its order dated 16.02.1993 to the effect that report of the Assistant Director of Survey and Settlement shows that the road is passing through the petitioners’ land. After disposal of the said writ petition, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Karimnagar, conducted a spot inspection along with the Deputy Survey Inspector to verify whether the claim of the petitioners’ that the road was laid on the land belonging to them in Sy.Nos.1166 and 1168 or not and after such inspection he addressed letter dated 13.08.1993 to respondent No.3, wherein he has reported in unequivocal terms that the Karimnagar Municipality has laid road over an extent of Ac.1.14 guntas of land in Sy.Nos.1166 and 1168. He made a request in the said letter to the Collector to provide necessary funds to initiate proposals for acquisition, but respondent No.3 having referred to the said report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, however, rejected the claim of the petitioners. A reading of the impugned memo discloses that the petitioners’ request for initiation of land acquisition proceedings was rejected on two grounds, namely, that as per partition deed dated 01.04.1976 executed among the brothers, petitioners are not the owners and that no new road was formed as stated by the petitioners, but the existing road was developed by metalling.

               On a careful consideration of the impugned memo and the material on record, I am of the view that both the reasons given by respondent No.3 are wholly unsustainable. In the earlier writ petition, namely, Writ Petition No.8596 of 1992, respondent No.3 did not appear to have taken any objection regarding the lack of title in the petitioners. The order under challenge does not disclose that who produced the partition deed before respondent No.3 and whether he had put the petitioners to notice about the alleged partition deed. He has not discussed in his order who are the parties to the alleged partition deed dated 01.04.1976 and the property in dispute fell to the share of which of the parties to the alleged partition deed. Though his order is specifically under challenge, respondent No.3, for the reasons best known to him, has not filed any counter affidavit to substantiate what he has mentioned in his order dated 23.11.1993. Therefore, this reason given in the order appears to me to be specious and unsustainable.

               As regards the second reason, namely, that no new road was formed, but the existing road was developed by metalling, the same is in the teeth of the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer in which he categorically mentioned that over an extent of Ac.1-14 guntas of land in Sy.Nos.1166 and 1168, road has been laid by the Karimnagar Municipality. Apart from the same, as already noted, in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the Karimnagar Municipality, the Commissioner categorically admitted that road in Sy.Nos.1166/A, 1168 and 1115/A was laid and that on the directions issued by this Court in Writ Petition No.5630 of 1980, land acquisition proceedings were initiated in respect of the land comprised in Sy.No.1115/A, which includes enhanced compensation was paid to its owner by name Md. Dulekhan. In the face of these admissions, the reason given by respondent No.3 that no road was laid, but the existing road was developed by metalling looks to be a travesty of truth and at any rate it is in direct conflict with the admission made by the Commissioner, Karimnagar Municipality in his counter-affidavit.

               For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition is allowed and memo dated 23.11.1993, impugned in this writ petition, is set aside. Respondent Nos.1 and 3 are directed to take immediate steps for initiating the proceedings under the Act and complete the same within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”

17. The principal contention of respondent No.2 now is that the Corporation never acquired or took over the subject land, that it only developed roads which were already in existence, and that those roads formed part of a private layout and were left by the owners themselves while forming house plots. The question whether the subject land was actually used by the municipal authorities for laying the road, or whether the road was an existing private road which the municipality later developed, is the very question that fell for decision in W.P.No.6845 of 2000. The defence now raised is, in substance and effect, the same defence that was available to the authorities and was considered in the earlier round. It has only been given a different description.

18. The principle of res judicata rests on the public policy that there must be an end to litigation and that no party should be vexed twice over the same cause. It applies to writ proceedings as well. In Daryao v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1457), the Honourable Supreme Court held that the rule of res judicata applies to writ petitions, and that a decision rendered on merits in a writ petition under Article 226 binds the parties in a later petition founded on the same facts. In State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain ((1977) 2 SCC 806), the Honourable Supreme Court held that the principle of constructive res judicata, embodied in Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), also applies to writ proceedings. A party is thus bound not only by what was actually decided in the earlier proceeding, but also by every plea which might and ought to have been raised in it.

19. The order dated 14.11.2007 was passed after considering the material then placed before this Court. It has not been challenged by the respondents in the manner known to law, has not been set aside or modified, and has attained finality. It binds the parties. Once this Court examined the controversy and decided it in favour of the petitioner, the respondents cannot, in a later proceeding for implementation of the same order, reopen the same factual and legal controversy by reformulating the earlier defence. The substance of the plea remains the same, namely, that the land was not acquired or used by the municipality and that the road was already in existence. Nor can the respondents avoid the effect of the order by raising grounds which were considered in it, or which arise from the same factual foundation.

20. Point (i) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No.2 is precluded from reopening, in these proceedings, the question whether the subject land was utilised for formation of the road. That question stands concluded by the order dated 14.11.2007 in W.P.No.6845 of 2000.

Point (ii): Whether the documents and Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965 disentitle the petitioner

21. The material now relied upon by respondent No.2 falls into two groups. The first group consists of the registered sale deeds executed from 1976 onwards, including those of 1987 and 1996, and the Master Plans of 1988 and 1998. All of these were in existence long before W.P.No.6845 of 2000 was filed and decided. The Master Plans are the Corporation’s own planning documents, and the sale deeds are registered documents. The plea based on Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965 was equally available to the authorities at that stage. Whether or not these documents and this plea were placed before this Court in the earlier round, the result is the same. If they were placed, they stand considered. If they were not, they were matters which might and ought to have been made grounds of defence in that proceeding, and they are barred by the principle of constructive res judicata stated in Nawab Hussain’s case (supra).

22. Even on their own terms, these documents do not assist respondent No.2. A Master Plan depicts the existing and proposed use of land. It does not confer or extinguish title, and the depiction of a road as existing says nothing about how the land came to be used as a road, or whether compensation was paid for it. Likewise, the description of abutting roads in the boundaries of the sale deeds shows, at best, that roads existed on the dates of those sales. It does not answer the question whether the road was a layout road left by the vendors or a road formed under Town Planning Scheme No.11 of 1970, for which adjoining land in Sy.No.1115/A had been acquired. That question was answered in the earlier round.

23. The second group consists of the layout regularisation proceedings in No.LRS/432/2012/KNR and the relinquishment deeds bearing Document Nos.7837/2012 and 7323/2012. These came into existence about five years after the order dated 14.11.2007. The rights and obligations determined by a final order of this Court cannot be undone by later administrative proceedings of one of the parties, or by transactions between the petitioner and third parties. On the counter-affidavit’s own showing, the relinquishment deeds were executed in favour of members of the Yegurla family and not in favour of the Corporation, and they concern land in Sy.Nos.1166/A, 1171 and 1172. A description of the surrounding roads in the schedule of such a deed does not transfer the road land to the Corporation. As regards the regularisation proceedings, the counter-affidavit does not state that the subject land was surrendered to the Corporation in the course of those proceedings.

24. It is also significant that during the very period in which these documents came into existence, the authorities of the State themselves treated the acquisition of the subject land as a pending obligation. Respondent No.3 repeatedly called upon respondent No.2, by letters dated 31.10.2011, 05.12.2011, 16.05.2012, 26.06.2012 and 31.12.2014, to take steps for acquisition of the subject land, and the Government issued Memo No.23235/J1/2012 dated 05.10.2012 directing the authorities concerned to take necessary action. The matter was thus not treated by the authorities as one closed by any layout regularisation or relinquishment.

25. The plea based on Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965 stands on the premise that the road is a private layout road formed by the owner of the land. That premise was negated in the earlier round, where this Court proceeded on the footing that the road formed part of the road under Town Planning Scheme No.11 of 1970, for which adjoining land had been acquired. Once the premise fails, these provisions have no application. Apart from the regularisation proceedings of 2012, the counter-affidavit also does not refer to any layout sanctioned before 14.11.2007 in which the subject land was earmarked for roads and handed over to the municipality.

26. At the same time, the sale deeds and the relinquishment deeds may have a bearing on a different question, namely, who are the persons interested in the subject land and entitled to compensation, and in what shares. The subject land stood in the names of the petitioner and his late father, the earlier writ petition was filed by three persons, and one of the relinquishment deeds was executed by the petitioner himself in respect of land which includes a portion of Sy.No.1166/A. These are matters for enquiry by the competent authority while making the award under the Act of 2013. They do not bear on the question whether the subject land has to be acquired, which stands concluded.

27. Point (ii) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner. The sale deeds, the Master Plans, the layout regularisation proceedings, the relinquishment deeds and Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965 do not disentitle the petitioner to acquisition of the subject land and payment of compensation. Their bearing, if any, on the identity of the persons interested and their shares is left to be examined by the competent authority.

Point (iii): Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts

28. A person who invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 must come with clean hands and disclose all material facts. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited ((2008) 12 SCC 481), the Honourable Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and equitable, and that a petitioner who suppresses material facts may be refused relief without the Court going into the merits of the case. The fact suppressed must, however, be material. In Arunima Baruah v. Union of India ((2007) 6 SCC 120), the Honourable Supreme Court held that suppression disentitles a party to discretionary relief only when it is of a material fact, that is, a fact material for the determination of the lis.

29. The case of the petitioner rests on the order dated 14.11.2007, which he has placed before this Court. For the reasons recorded on points (i) and (ii), the documents said to have been suppressed do not bear on the question concluded by that order. Further, the Master Plans and the regularisation proceedings are the Corporation’s own records, and the sale deeds are registered documents available to it. As regards the allegation of suppression in the earlier round, the municipal authorities were before this Court in W.P.No.6845 of 2000 and placed their stand on record. If they were of the view that the order was obtained by suppression, the remedy lay in seeking its review or in carrying it in appeal. The order has not been challenged in the manner known to law, and it cannot be questioned collaterally in a proceeding for its implementation.

30. The relinquishment deed bearing Document No.7837/2012 stands on a slightly different footing, since it was executed by the petitioner himself. Its disclosure would have been the proper course. However, the deed was executed in favour of third parties and not in favour of the Corporation, and its effect, if any, is on the petitioner’s share in the compensation, which is a matter left open for the competent authority under point (ii). Its non-disclosure does not touch the foundation of the claim, and does not justify refusal of relief or the imposition of costs.

31. Point (iii) is accordingly answered against respondent No.2. The writ petition is not liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts, and the prayer for exemplary costs is rejected.

Point (iv): Whether the writ petition is barred by delay and laches

32. This Court cannot overlook the fact that the order dated 14.11.2007 prescribed a time frame for compliance, and that the petitioner did not initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Central Act 70 of 1971), which came into force on 24.12.1971 (for short, ‘the Act of 1971’), on expiry of that period. There has admittedly been a considerable lapse of time between the passing of the earlier order and the filing of the present writ petition.

33. The mere fact that the petitioner did not invoke the contempt jurisdiction within the period stipulated cannot, however, be construed as extinguishing the right that flows from the order. Section 20 of the Act of 1971 bars the initiation of contempt proceedings after one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. That jurisdiction is concerned primarily with punishing wilful disobedience of the orders of Court. Its non-invocation neither extinguishes the right declared by the order nor relieves the respondents of their obligation to comply with it. Where that remedy is no longer available, the party is not left without a remedy to secure implementation of the order.

34. The subsequent conduct of the parties is also relevant. The petitioner submitted a representation on 24.04.2008, within a few months of the order. The authorities themselves continued to correspond on the initiation of acquisition proceedings, through the letters of respondent No.3 dated 31.10.2011, 05.12.2011, 16.05.2012, 26.06.2012 and 31.12.2014, and the Government issued Memo No.23235/J1/2012 dated 05.10.2012. The petitioner issued legal notices dated 03.02.2014 and 15.11.2014, and filed the present writ petition in the year 2015, following the last of these letters. The matter was, therefore, not treated as closed either by the petitioner or by the respondents.

35. There is a further reason. The claim of the petitioner is that his land has been used for a public road without acquisition and without payment of compensation. Such deprivation is a continuing wrong. In Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2020) 2 SCC 569), where the land of the appellant had been used for construction of a road without acquisition, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the plea of delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or where the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. The same view was taken in Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2022) 7 SCC 5080), which also concerned land used for a road without acquisition. The relevant passage in Vidya Devi’s case (supra) reads as under:

               “12.12. …..Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.”

36. Point (iv) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner. The writ petition is not barred by delay and laches.

Point (v): Whether the petitioner is entitled to a mandamus for acquisition under the Act of 2013

37. Article 300-A of the Constitution of India provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a constitutional right. In Tukaram Kana Joshi’s case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right, and that the State cannot deprive a person of his land for a public purpose without following the procedure established by law and paying compensation. The relevant passage reads as under:

               “9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right to property is considered very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram [(2007) 10 SCC 448] , Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(2010) 10 SCC 43 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 29] , State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [(2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769 : AIR 2012 SC 559] and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : AIR 2012 SC 573] )”

38. The order dated 14.11.2007 was passed when the Act of 1894 was in force. That Act has since been repealed by Section 114(1) of the Act of 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 deals only with land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894. In the present case, no such proceedings were ever initiated. The record shows that even the requisition, which was the first step towards acquisition, was not submitted by respondent No.2, and no notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 therefore has no application, and the respondents cannot now be directed to proceed under the repealed enactment. The only law under which the subject land can now be acquired is the Act of 2013.

39. At the same time, the repeal of the Act of 1894 cannot be construed as obliterating the rights of the petitioner recognised by this Court in the order dated 14.11.2007. The obligation of the respondents to acquire the subject land and pay compensation flows from that order and from Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, and not from the repealed enactment. Since the failure to acquire the land while the Act of 1894 was in force is attributable to the respondents alone, the petitioner cannot be denied the benefit of the law now in force. The earlier direction of this Court has, therefore, to be given effect by following the procedure prescribed under the Act of 2013, as applicable to the State of Telangana. It may also be noticed that respondent No.3, by the letter dated 31.12.2014, issued after the Act of 2013 came into force, itself called upon respondent No.2 to initiate acquisition proceedings and submit a detailed proposal to the Government.

40. In view of the conclusions reached above, it is not necessary to examine in detail the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

41. Point (v) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to a mandamus directing the respondents to acquire the subject land under the Act of 2013 and to pay compensation to the persons entitled thereto.

Point (vi): To what relief

42. In view of the findings on points (i) to (v), the petitioner is entitled to the relief set out under the heading ‘Result’ below.

CONCLUSION

43. In the light of the above analysis, the points for consideration are answered as follows:

               (i) The order dated 14.11.2007 in W.P.No.6845 of 2000 has attained finality and binds the parties. Respondent No.2 is precluded from reopening, in these proceedings, the question whether the subject land was utilised for formation of the road.

               (ii) The registered sale deeds, the Master Plans of 1988 and 1998, the layout regularisation proceedings, the relinquishment deeds of 2012 and Sections 184 and 185 of the Act of 1965 do not disentitle the petitioner to acquisition of the subject land and payment of compensation. Their bearing, if any, on the persons interested and their shares is for the competent authority to examine.

               (iii) The writ petition is not liable to be dismissed for the alleged suppression of material facts, and the prayer for exemplary costs is rejected.

               (iv) The writ petition is not barred by delay and laches. The petitioner pursued the matter throughout, the authorities themselves treated the acquisition as pending, and the deprivation complained of is a continuing wrong.

               (v) The Act of 1894 having been repealed, and no proceedings having been initiated under it, the order dated 14.11.2007 is to be implemented by acquisition of the subject land under the Act of 2013.

               (vi) The petitioner is entitled to the directions set out below.

RESULT

44. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed in the following terms:

               (a) Respondent No.2 shall submit the requisition for acquisition of the subject land, namely, Ac.1-14 guntas in Sy.Nos.1166/A and 1168 of Jyothinagar locality, Karimnagar Revenue Village, Karimnagar District, to the competent authority under the Act of 2013, within a period of Four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

               (b) The respondents shall initiate proceedings for acquisition of the subject land under the Act of 2013, as applicable to the State of Telangana, and shall publish the preliminary notification under Section 11 of the Act of 2013 within a period of Two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

               (c) The respondents shall thereafter complete the proceedings, pass an award under Section 23 of the Act of 2013, and pay or deposit the compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013, within a further period of Three (3) months from the date of publication of the preliminary notification.

               (d) The identification and measurement of the land on the ground, the persons interested including claims made by the petitioner and respondent No.4 and their respective shares, and the quantum of compensation shall be determined by the competent authority in accordance with the Act of 2013. Any claim or objection relating to the persons interested and their shares, including any arising from the sale deeds and relinquishment deeds referred to in the counteraffidavit, shall be considered by the competent authority in that enquiry. It shall not, however, be open to the respondents to reopen the question whether the subject land was utilised for formation of the road.

               (e) This Court has not expressed any opinion on the quantum of compensation payable, which shall be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013.

               (f) There shall be no order as to costs.

45. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed.