(Prayer: Writ Appeal has been filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set aside the order dated 19.03.2025 made in W.P.No.12820 of 2023 and allow this Writ Appeal.
Writ Appeal has been filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set aside the order dated 19.03.2025 made in W.P.No.1710 of 2025 and allow this Writ Appeal. WA No. 949 of 2026
Writ Appeal has been filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set aside the order dated 19.03.2025 made in W.P.No.12823 of 2023 and allow this Writ Appeal.)
Common Judgment
G. Arul Murugan, J.
1. These Intra-Court Appeals have been preferred assailing the common order dated 19.03.2025 made in W.P.No.12820, 12823 of 2023 and 1710 of 2025 respectively, whereby the Writ Court allowed the writ petitions, quashed the awards and directed the appellants to fix compensation in terms of Section 7(3) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’] as fixed in the matter of the writ petitioner’s brother viz., Mr.M.Kaviarasu.
2. Since the appeals arise out of the common order passed in the writ petitions, they are heard and disposed of by this Common judgment.
3. The brief facts are that the father of the 1st respondent in the appeals, namely K.Mukunthan, was the owner of the property comprised in several survey numbers, measuring a total extent of 19 acres and 8 cents in Vallam-A Village of Sripurumbudur Taluk, Changalpattu District, presently Kancheepuram District. The 1st respondent’s father died intestate on 02.04.2007, leaving behind two sons and two daughters, as his legal heirs. The 1st respondents/writ petitioners and one M.Kaviarasu, being the four legal heirs, inherited the properties and became entitled to 1/4th share each of the said property.
4. The appellants/State intending to set up industrial complex through SIPCOT, issued G.O.Ms.No.3, Industries (SIPCOT-LA) Department Date 06.01.2009, granting administrative sanction and pursuant to the same, notices under Section 3(2) of the Act were issued on 16.11.2009 and 30.11.2009. After overruling the objections recieved, notifications under Section 3(1) of the Act came to be issued on 13.12.2011 and 16.12.2011 and the same were published in the Government Gazette.
5. The 2nd appellant/District Collector, Kacheepuram District issued notices under Section 4(2) of the Act dated 25.01.2012, 22.02.2012 and 02.03.2012, calling upon the 1st respondents/landowners to surrender the possession of the lands. Thereafter, respondents/landowners were called upon for an award enquiry through a notice dated 14.08.2012. The respondents did not agree with regard to the compensation suggested, but had asked for higher compensation by indicating that even guideline value of the property was Rs.80 Lakhs per acre. Subsequently, 4th appellant/the Special Tahsildar (LA), Oragadam called upon the 1st respondents/landowners to produce relevant documents to prove their identity. The 1st respondents/landowners also submitted representations on various dates seeking fixation of compensation at the prevailing market rate.
6. Notices under Sections 7(5) and 7(7) of the Act were issued on 01.08.2014, 18.08.2014 and 21.10.2014, calling upon the 1st respondents/landowners for determining the compensation amount. However, thereafter there was no communication from the 1st respondents/landowners till March 2016 and award was passed vide Award No.24 of 2016 dated 18.04.2016, Award No.30 of 2016 dated 21.03.2016, Award No.6 of 2016 dated 28.04.2016 fixing the total compensation of Rs.4,50,30,000/- for the entire extent of 19 acres and 8 cents of land, which was apportioned into four equal shares among the 1st respondents and M.Kaviarasu. The respective compensation amounts were paid to the 1st respondents on 30.05.2016. Immediately, on 06.06.2016, the 1st respondents had protested for the inadequate compensation, for which the 4th appellant by communication dated 26.07.2016 intimated that since no orders with respect to paying higher compensation had been passed by the Government, the authority was not in a position to pay the same and instructed that the same will be paid as and when the Government orders are passed. The said position was also reiterated by the 4th appellant by communication dated 30.06.2017. Ultimately, the objections of the 1st respondents/landowners claiming higher compensation were rejected by the 4th appellant vide orders dated 23.11.2022, which was assailed by each of the respondents by separate writ petitions.
7. The learned Single Judge noted that in respect of one of the brothers, M.Kaviarasu, who had 1/4th share in the property, the writ petition filed by him in W.P.No.26213 of 2017 challenging the proceedings of the Special Tahsildar (LA), Sripermbudur dated 11.09.2017 came to be allowed and the proceedings were quashed directing the District Collector to determine the compensation in terms of Section 7(3) of the Act. It was noticed that the said order was subsequently confirmed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 31.10.2023 passed in W.A.No.3088 of 2021 and, therefore, held that a different stand could not be taken in respect of the 1st respondents/co-sharers. Furthermore, since no agreement had been entered into prior to passing of the award and that even in the agreement relied upon, there was no consensus ad idem to form a valid contract, the Writ Court allowed the writ petitions by quashing the awards and held that the respondents would also be entitled to similar relief as that of their brother/ Mr.M.Kaviarasu regarding compensation. Aggrieved, the State has preferred the above appeals.
8. Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State, argued that once the 1st respondents had given their consent and agreed with the compensation determined, which also has been received by them, the 1st respondents cannot be allowed to retract their stance and seek for higher compensation, which would amount to complete breach of a concluded contract. He further submitted that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the orders passed in respect of Mr.M.Kaviarasu may not be applicable to the facts of the present cases, as there he had received the compensation under the protest, but, in the instance case, the 1st respondents had received the compensation without any protest and they have also signed the agreement. Once the 1st respondents chose to enter into an agreement with the appellants and receive the compensation as per the agreement, there is a concluded contract and the 1st respondents are estopped from claiming any further benefits by invoking the provisions of the Act, as the agreement attained finality.
9. In support of his contentions, learned Additional Advocate General relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Tamil Nadu, Represented by its Secretary, Transport Department and Others vs. P.R.Jaganathan and Others(2025 SCC Online SC 2496).
10. Contending contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondents in the appeals, would submit that there was absolutely no consent or agreement entered into by the landowners regarding the determination of compensation. He contended that any valid agreement has to precede the passing of the award. Since it is admitted that there was no consent or agreement entered into prior to passing of the award, the so-called agreement relied on by the State cannot be construed as an agreement under Section 7(2) of the Act. Consequently, the rights of the writ petitioners to object the award and seek for higher compensation cannot be taken away.
11. He would further submit that the case of the 1st respondents is no way different from the facts covered by the judgment of the Division Bench in respect of their brother, M.Kaviarasu, where all these issues have been gone into and the claim of the appellants was negatived. In such circumstances, the benefits extended to co-owners, i.e., the 1st respondent’s brother, would also enure to the benefit of the other coowners, namely, the writ petitioners. This aspect has been rightly considered by the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, which needs no interference and sought dismissal of the writ appeals.
12. We gave our anxious considerations to the rival submissions and considered the materials available on record.
13. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is apposite to refer to Section 7 of the Act, that deals with determining the compensation, which reads as under:
“7. Determination of amount.
(1) Where any land is acquired by the Government under this Act, the Government shall pay an amount for such acquisition which shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) Where the amount has been determined by agreement between the Government and the person to whom the amount has to be paid, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.
(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the Government shall refer the case to the Collector for determination of the amount to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such amount shall be paid: Provided that no amount exceeding such amount as the Government may, by general order, specify to be paid for such acquisition shall be determined by the Collector without the previous approval of the Government officer as the Government may appoint in this behalf.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), after the case is referred to the Collector under that subsection, but before he has finally determined the amount, if the amount is determined by agreement between the Government and the person to whom the amount has to be paid, such amount shall be paid by the Collector in accordance with such agreement.
(5) Before finally determining the amount, the Collector shall give an opportunity to every person to whom the amount has to be paid to state his case as to the amount.
(6) In determining the amount, the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24 and other relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Central Act I of 1894) subject to modifications that-
(a) in the said section 23, the references to the date of publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and the time of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the said Act shall be construed as references to the date of publication of notice under sub-sections (2) and (1), respectively, of section 3 oi this Act; and
(b) in the said section 24, the references to the date of publication of notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the said Act shall be construed as references to the date of publication of notice under sub-sections (2) and (1), respectively, of section 3 of this Act.
(7) For the purpose of determining the amount-
(a) the Collector shall have power to require any person to deliver to him such returns and assessments as he considers necessary;
(b) the Collector shall also have power to require any person known or believed to be interested in the land to deliver to him a statement containing as far as may be practicable, the name of every other person interested in the land as co-owner, mortgagee, tenant or otherwise, and the nature of such interest, and of the rents and profits, if any, received or receivable on account thereof for three years next preceding the date of the statement.
(8) Every person required to deliver a return, assessment or statement under sub-section (7) shall be deemed to be legally bound to do so within the meaning of section 175 and section 176 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860).
(9) The Collector may hear expert witnesses if it be necessary to do so in any particular case.
(10) The Collector or any officer authorized by him in this behalf shall be entitled to enter in and inspect any land which is subject to proceedings before him.
(11) The Collector shall dispose of every case referred to him under sub-section (3) for determination of amount as expeditiously as possible and in any case [within six months from the date of such reference]
(12) Where any case is referred to any Collector under sub-section (3), the Government may, at any stage by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded therein, transfer it to any other officer, and upon such transfer, unless some special directions are given in the order, the officer to whom the case is transferred, may hear and dispose of the case from the stage at which it was transferred or the case may be heard and disposed of by him de novo.
14. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the compensation for the lands acquired, could be determined by an agreement between the parties under Section 7(2) of the Act. Where no such agreement could be reached, the Government shall refer the case to the District Collector for determination of the amount. Even after a reference to the Collector under Section 7(3) of the Act, one more opportunity is given to arrive at an amicable settlement under Section 7(4) of the Act, wherein the agreement could be entered into determining the compensation, but it should be before the final determination of compensation amount by the District Collector. In the absence of any determination of the compensation by agreement, the District Collector shall issue notice, giving an opportunity to the landowners under Section 7(5) and thereafter determine the compensation as provided under Sections 7(6) to 7(12).
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.R.Jaganathan’s case (supra) considered the aforesaid provision, particularly Section 7(2) to 7(4) of the Act and the scope of the settlement arrived at by negotiation. The relevant portions of the decision are extracted hereunder:
“5. Section 7 of the 1997 Act is an exhaustive provision dealing with the determination of amount of compensation to be paid to the landowner or person interested over an acquired land. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act encourages and facilitates the determination of the amount payable to the owner or person interested through an agreement with the Government. It further stipulates that upon such an agreement, the resultant amount will have to be paid only as per the terms agreed, thereunder. Under subsection (3) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act, a reference would be warranted to the Collector, only on the failure to reach such an agreement.
6. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act gives one more opportunity towards an amicable settlement between the parties. Thus, even after the issue pertaining to the determination of compensation is referred to the Collector under sub-section (3), an agreement can be entered into between the Government and the concerned individual. Upon such an agreement, the Collector shall make due compliance.
7. Therefore, after an agreement is entered into, the terms and conditions mentioned thereunder, along with the amount duly arrived at, alone would govern the parties. In other words, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, leading to the termination of the umbilical cord which connects the agreement to the other provisions pertaining to the passing of the award under the 1997 Act. The object of these provisions is to arrive at a settlement by negotiation, while ensuring timely payment, by avoiding the circuitous route involving the procedure for passing of the award, reference and appeal.
8. Section 12 of the 1997 Act speaks of payment of interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum, from the time of taking possession until the compensation is either paid or deposited. Therefore, this provision gets triggered only after possession is taken and, thereafter, continues to be in force till the amount is paid or deposited. To make the aforesaid position clear, Section 12 of the 1997 Act has no application to a case where an agreement has been entered into between the parties. This is for the reason that a concluded contract under Section 7 of the 1997 Act, voluntarily entered into between the parties, would exclude itself from purview of the 1997 Act, thereafter.
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21. Sections 7(2) and 7(4) of the 1997 Act exhibit a laudable objective. They facilitate land owners or interested persons to negotiate and arrive at an agreement on the amount of compensation to be paid. Once such an agreement is arrived at, it becomes a concluded contract under Section 3 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract. Hence, a contract voluntarily entered into between the parties, shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions, which are sought to be excluded by such contract. A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes, especially after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest. It is not open to either of the parties to resile from the terms of the agreement arrived at. We may note that the issues of rent and compensation were raised even earlier. These issues were put to an end through the agreement. Therefore, the private respondents are totally estopped from seeking any relief beyond the terms of the contract.
22. In our considered view, the High Court, after having correctly considered the contract along with the rights and liabilities of the parties arising under it, has wrongly pressed into service Section 12 of the 1997 Act, which is a provision for the payment of interest from the date of taking possession till the date of payment or deposit of the amount. Under the contract, no room is given to any of the parties to seek any remedy available under the Act. Once there is a final agreement, all disputes with respect to determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself. Any interpretation to the contrary, would be violative of Section 7(2) and Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act.
23. It is not as if the agreement has been entered into by force or deceit. There is no suppression of fact or any element of fraud. Therefore, it can be seen that the private respondents were initially inclined to accept the amount determined by way of a final agreement. It is only thereafter, wisdom dawned upon them to seek interest. Thus, it is a clear case of approbation and reprobation. ……………..”
16. As per the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, once the parties have entered into an agreement either under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the Act, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, whereby the parties are bound by the agreement and cannot seek to rely on any other provisions pertaining to passing of the award. The compensation having been determined by an agreement reached finality and the parties cannot be allowed to reopen the settled issue seeking any other benefits.
17. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the lands originally belonged to the 1st respondent’s father late K.Mukunthan and the 1st respondents along with one of their brother/M.Kaviarasu had inherited the properties and were entitled to 1/4th share each. From the records, it is evident that the notice for the award enquiry was issued to the landowners, who subsequently appeared for the enquiry on 31.08.2012, where they have objected to the compensation suggested. The landowners have also submitted individual representations with regard to the rate of determination of the compensation and sought compensation at the prevailing market rate.
18. As no agreement was entered into between the parties as per Section 7(2) of the Act, the Government has referred the case to the Collector for determination of the compensation amount. Even thereafter, no agreement was entered into under Section 7(4) of the Act prior to the determination of compensation by the Collector. Since no agreement was entered into either under Section 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act, the Collector issued notice under Section 7(5) and 7(7) of the Act, to the landowners through notices dated 01.08.2014, 28.08.2014, 21.08.2014. Even though Section 7(11) of the Act contemplates that the Collector shall determine the compensation within a period of six months from the date of reference, the District Collector in the absence of any agreement entered into either under Sections 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act, by issuing notice under Section 7(5) of the Act had followed the procedure contemplated thereunder and passed Award No.24 of 2016 dated 18.04.2016, Award No.30 of 2016 dated 21.03.2016, Award No.6 of 2016 dated 28.04.2016, fixing the compensation in a sum of Rs.4,50,30,000/- in respect of the entire extent of 19 acres and 8 cents of land. This compensation was apportioned into four shares and cheques were issued to the individual four co-owners on 30.05.2016. The objections have also been submitted by the land owners on 06.12.2016, protesting inadequate compensation.
19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to Section 10 of the Act, which deals with the payment of the compensation amount determined, which reads as under:
“10. Payment of amount.
(1)Where the amount is determined by agreement, the Government shall pay such amount to the person or persons entitled thereto.
(2)Where the amount is determined by the Collector or by any other officer under the provisions of section 7, the Government shall tender payment of the amount determined to the persons entitled thereto according to such determination and shall pay to them unless prevented by someone or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (3).
(3)If the persons entitled to amount according to the decision of the Collector do not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land or if there be any disputes as to the title to receive the amount, the Government shall deposit the amount so determined in the Court: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided further that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any amount determined under this Chapter, to pay the same to the persons lawfully entitled thereto.”
20. As per the scheme of the Act, Section 10(1) stipulates that the moment the amount is determined by agreement under Section 7(2) of the Act, the Government shall pay such amount to the person or persons entitled thereto. In case, the amount is determined by the Collector by passing an award under Section 7(3) of the Act, the Government shall tender payment of the amount to the persons entitled thereto and shall pay them unless prevented by any of the contingencies mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. Sub Section (3) to Section 10 of the Act stipulates that if the persons entitled to amount according to the decision arrived at by the Collector do not consent to receive it or if there is any dispute, the Government shall deposit the amount determined in the Court.
21. The aforesaid provision makes it explicitly clear that under both the circumstances i.e., either when the amount is determined as per the agreement under Section 7(2), 7(4) of the Act or the amount is determined by passing the award by the Collector under Section 7(3) of the Act, the Government shall tender the payments to the entitled persons immediately. Only if the person entitled does not consent to receive it, then the Government shall deposit the compensation arrived at before the Court.
22. In the instant case, it leaves no manner of doubt that since no amount was determined by the agreement thereto, the Government did not tender the payment and only after the amount was determined by the Collector under Section 7(3) of the Act, in the absence of an agreement, the Government tendered the compensation amount to the landowners and consent extended by landowners is only to receive the compensation arrived at, as contemplated under Section 10(2) of the Act in the absence of which the compensation would have been deposited in the Court under Section 10(3) of the Act. The consent to receive the compensation by the landowners under Section 10(2) of the Act cannot be construed or substituted as consent or agreement for determining the compensation under Section 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act.
23. As such, the contentions raised by the appellants by relying on the consent given by the landowners to receive the compensation as a consent/agreement for fixation the compensation is totally misplaced. Further, Section 8 of the Act allows the person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector to seek reference to the Court for higher compensation within 60 days, where the landowners had in fact immediately after the award has raised objections towards inadequate compensation. The learned Single Judge finding that the award itself having been set aside in respect of the co-owner had held that, the amount arrived at in respect of the co-owner as compensation would also be applicable to the 1st respondents and they would be entitled to the same benefit.
24. The main plank of the appellants contention is that since the landowners/ 1st respondents have given consent and thereby entered into an agreement, they are bound by the agreement and since they have received the compensation without recording protest, they cannot be allowed to seek any higher compensation. The aforesaid contention is liable to be rejected, since, as referred to earlier, any agreement as contemplated under the Act must be executed either under Sections 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act, prior to passing of the award by the Collector.
25. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no such agreement entered into under Sections 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act. In case, any such agreement had been entered into, there was no occasion for the District Collector to issue notice under Section 7(5) and Section 7(7) and to proceed to determine the compensation and ultimately pass an award. Only in the absence of arriving at any agreement between the parties, the District Collector proceeded to determine the compensation by following the procedures as contemplated under Sections 7(5) to 7(12) of the Act. The compensation determined through an award cannot, by any means, be a compensation determined through an agreement under Sections 7(2) or 7(4), so as to preclude a challenge to the award seeking higher compensation.
26. The agreement which is heavily relied on by the appellants was signed on 30.05.2016, whereas the award was passed on 17.03.2016, 18.04.2016 and 28.04.2016 itself. When the acquisition proceedings were initiated as early as in the year 2009, the awards came to be passed only in the year 2016 for which the compensation was paid on 30.05.2016. The landowners had submitted their objections protesting the inadequate compensation immediately on 06.06.2016. The consent/agreement, if any entered by the landowners would not take away any of their rights available under the Act when no agreement proceeding award was entered into either under Sections 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act, which alone would bind the parties, as it becomes sacrosanct as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.R.Jaganathan’s case (supra). However, an Agreement signed to receive the compensation cannot be construed as an agreement towards determining the compensation as it has to be prior to the award.
27. The writ petition filed by one co-owner brother of the 1st respondent/ Mr.M.Kaviarasu was allowed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 12.02.2018 in W.P.No.26213 of 2017 and the award passed in respect of very same lands came to be quashed and the order is extracted hereunder:
“5. Apparently there is no consensus at idem to support the respondents' theory that the petitioner has consented to the amount offered by the third respondent to bring the case under Section 7(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act. However, if there is no agreement within the meaning of Section 7(2) of the Act, necessarily the Land Acquisition Authority shall initiate proceedings for fixation of compensation under Section 7(3) of the Industrial Purposes Act.
6. This Court, therefore allows the present petition, quashes the impugned award dated 11.09.2017, and directs the third respondent to initiate steps to hold an enquiry and determine the compensation payable in terms of Section 7(3) of Industrial Purposes Act, for which purpose, notices are directed to be issued to the petitioner at the address given in the writ petition, and it is further directed that the whole exercise of passing the award in terms of Sec.7(3) shall conclude within four months from today. It is also made clear that whatever amount the petitioner has now received is liable to be adjusted against such amount as may be determined by the authority while exercising its power under Section 7(3) of the Industrial Purposes Act. Accordingly the petition is disposed of. No costs.”
28. The aforesaid order was assailed by the State before this Court in W.A.No.3088 of 2021 and this Court by judgment dated 31.10.2023 rejecting the claim of the appellants that an agreement has been executed based on which the amounts were credited to landowners and holding that if the acquisition is by consent then the agreement would precede the award and not the other way around and that any subsequent agreement after the award would not negate the right of the landowners, had dismissed the writ appeal. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:
“4. Learned Special Government Pleader submits that the respondent had agreed to receive the compensation amount determined. An agreement has been executed by the present respondent on 24.01.2017 and, subsequently, the amount is credited to his bank account. All these aspects clearly demonstrate that the compensation amount has been received by the respondent without any demur. Only after the withdrawal of the amount, the respondent has said that he is withdrawing the amount under protest. However, no such protest is recorded in the agreement or any other document. It was an error on the part of the learned Single Judge to observe that the signature was obtained on a blank document.
5. The agreement relied by the State is dated 24.01.2017, whereas the award is already passed on 30.06.2016. If the acquisition is by consent, then the agreement would precede the award and not the other way round. Here, the award is already passed on 30.6.2016 and, after lapse of seven months, the agreement is executed. The copy of the agreement is also placed on record. If the said agreement is perused, it is clear that on behalf of the appellants none has signed that agreement and on behalf of the first party as well as the other party, the present respondent signature appears. The learned Single Judge has also observed about the signature being obtained on Form-64, Acquittance as also the relevant disbursement register. The present respondent has received the amount under protest.
6. As the amount was determined under an award and the award was never consent award, a subsequent agreement would not negate the right of the present respondent, more particularly, after the learned Single Judge observed about the manner in which the agreement was executed.”
29. Learned Additional Advocate General sought to distinguish the aforesaid order, contending that it would not enure to the benefit of the 1st respondents, since the brother/co-owner had received the compensation under protest, but the 1st respondents had received the compensation without protest. We are unable to accept such a contention. As observed earlier, when no agreement was entered into under Sections 7(2) or 7(4) of the Act prior to the award, the agreement signed by the 1st respondents to receive the compensation cannot be construed as an agreement towards determining the compensation. Once the Collector passes an award and determines the compensation, any signature received subsequently from the landowners would be only an agreement to receive the compensation under Section 10(3) of the Act, which will not take away their rights for claiming the benefits under other provisions of the Act.
30. When the award passed in respect of the very subject property regarding 1/4th share of the co-owner has been quashed and the compensation is redetermined, the learned Single Judge by referring to the orders passed by this Court has rightly held that the rights of the landowners/other co-owner cannot be defeated by paying different compensation, particularly when it is found that there was no agreement in terms of the provisions of the Act prior to the award. In such circumstances, we do not find any error or infirmity in the orders of the learned Single Judge warranting interference.
31. Accordingly, the Writ Appeals are dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. There shall be no order as to costs.




