(Prayer: Writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the fourth respondent passed in his No.50496/Kaval-5/2023-4 dated 19.11.2023 communicated to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Sivagangai in his Memo No.F5/30351/2021 dated 18.01.2024 and quash the same and consequently direct the first and fourth respondents to implement the two advance increments (higher start of pay) already sanctioned by the Deputy Inspector of Police, Technical Service, Chennai as per R.C.No.C1/5216/2013 dated 08.06.2013 within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Court. [prayer amended vide Court order dated 06.02.2025 ]

1. This writ petition has been filed seeking for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order passed by the fourth respondent vide his proceedings dated 19.11.2023 communicated to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Sivagangai in his Memo No.F5/30351/2021 dated 18.01.2024 and consequently direct the first and fourth respondents to implement the two advance increments (higher start of pay) already sanctioned by the Deputy Inspector of Police, Technical Service, Chennai as per R.C.No.C1/5216/2013 dated 08.06.2013 within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Court.

2(i). The brief facts as stated in the affidavit filed by the petitioner are as follows:

The petitioner is presently serving as an Assistant in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Sivagangai. He was recruited through the TNPSC Group IV Examination for the year 2012–2013 and allotted to the Police Department as Junior Assistant vide Memorandum No.7027/PSD-B2/2010 dated 17.12.2012 issued by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. Pursuant to the counselling held on 01.03.2013, he was directed to report before the Appointing Authority on 15.03.2013 and accordingly reported for duty to the office of the 2nd respondent. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued Memorandum No.009184/NGB II(2)/2012 dated 03.04.2013, pursuant to which the petitioner was assigned as Junior Assistant in the Police Telecommunication Branch and joined duty on 29.04.2013. Since the petitioner possessed a B.Sc. degree in Chemistry even prior to his recruitment, he was sanctioned two advance increments by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Technical Services, vide R.C.No.C1/5216/2013 dated 08.06.2013.

                     2(ii). However, the said increments were not implemented in view of G.O.(Ms.) No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22.07.2013, whereby the higher start of pay for Junior Assistants/Typists/Record Clerks possessing degree qualification was dispensed retrospectively with effect from 01.04.2013. The petitioner contends that the delay in issuing the posting order was attributable to the Department and, therefore, he cannot be denied the benefit of higher start of pay, particularly in view of the clarification issued by the Government in Letter No.2608/PC/2018-5 dated 19.09.2018. Based on the petitioner’s representation dated 07.05.2022, the 3rd respondent forwarded a report dated 15.06.2022 to the 2nd respondent recommending grant of higher start of pay, acknowledging the delay on the part of the Department. However, the Government, vide Letter dated 19.11.2023, rejected the claim on the ground that higher start of pay cannot be granted merely based on the delay between 03.04.2013 and 22.04.2013. The said Government letter was communicated to the petitioner by the 3rd respondent, vide Memo No.F5/30351/2021 dated 18.01.2024. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the aforesaid Government letter and consequential memorandum, seeking implementation of the two advance increments already sanctioned to him.

                     2(iii). The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in The State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Chamundeeswari, W.A.(MD).No 520/2023, wherein it was held that employees recruited before 01.06.2009 but appointed after that date due to administrative delay, through no fault of their own, are entitled to the fitment benefit under G.O.Ms.No.340 on the principle of parity, irrespective of the specific post mentioned in the G.O.; however, the benefit is notional from the date of appointment and carries monetary benefit only from 01.08.2010.

3. It is stated in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the two advance increments/higher start of pay sanctioned vide R.C.No.C1/5216/2013 dated 08.06.2013, since the concession of higher start of pay to Junior Assistants/Typists possessing degree qualification had been dispensed with by G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22.07.2013, with retrospective effect from 01.04.2013. According to the respondents, though the petitioner was provisionally selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and allotted to the Police Department vide Memorandum No.7027/PSD-B2/2010 dated 17.12.2012, the selection list was received only on 13.03.2013 and, after verification of certificates and finalisation of vacancies, allotment orders were issued by the Director General of Police only on 03.04.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant in the Police Telecommunication Branch and joined duty only on 29.04.2013. Thus, according to the respondents, the petitioner entered Government service only after the cut-off date of 01.04.2013 and, consequently, could not claim the discontinued benefit of higher start of pay.

4. It is further stated that the higher start of pay was originally introduced to incentivise Junior Assistants/Typists to acquire higher educational qualifications. However, the Pay Grievance Redressal Cell found that, as most new recruits were already graduates or possessed higher qualifications, the concession was no longer warranted and had resulted in a pay anomaly between Graduate Junior Assistants/Typists and directly recruited Assistants/Accountants. Accordingly, the Government, by G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22.07.2013, dispensed with the higher start of pay for future recruits possessing a degree, with effect from 01.04.2013.

5. It is further stated that the respondents specifically dispute the petitioner’s contention that there was administrative delay in his case and contend that the delay in issuing the allotment/appointment orders was not attributable to the Department. They further distinguish the case of B. Raghu and two others, who were granted higher start of pay pursuant to Government Letter No.2680/PC/2018-5 dated 19.09.2018, on the ground that in their cases the TNPSC allotment orders had been issued well before 01.04.2013, but the appointment orders were served only on 05.04.2013 due to administrative delay, and therefore they would have joined service before the cut-off date but for the delay on the part of the administration.

6. Per Contra, the respondents submit that in the petitioner’s case, his selection was finalised only subsequently and the allotment orders themselves were issued after the relevant cut-off date, and hence the petitioner cannot claim parity as in the case of B. Raghu and others. The respondents further rely upon the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016, particularly the concept of “appointment to a service”, to contend that the petitioner acquired service status only upon his actual appointment and assumption of duties and not merely upon his provisional selection by the TNPSC.

7. The respondents further rely upon Rule 17 of the Fundamental Rules of Tamil Nadu Government Servant (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016, submitting that a Government servant is entitled to draw the pay and allowances attached to a post only from the date on which he assumes the duties of that post. Since the petitioner assumed charge as Junior Assistant only on 29.04.2013, he could not claim higher start of pay with reference to the position prevailing on 01.04.2013. In support of the distinction between selection/recruitment and appointment, the respondents rely upon the decision of this Court in V. Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 2177 dated 19.06.2014 W.A. (MD) No.217/2011 and W.P. (MD) No. 8732/2007 and 4 others, wherein it was observed that “Till a person is actually appointed to a service, he cannot acquire any status and no promise is held out to such a person”. They also rely upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prafulla Kumar Swain v. Prakash Chandra Misra, 1993 (Sup) 3 SCC 181, wherein it was held as follows:

                     .....

                     “The term recruitment connotes and clearly signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment. Certainly, this is not actual appointment or posting in service. In contra distinction, the word "appointment" means an actual act of posting a person to a particular office."

8. On these grounds, the respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal entitlement to the higher start of pay after its discontinuance with effect from 01.04.2013 and that the earlier sanction of two advance increments cannot override the subsequent Government policy. Accordingly, they seek dismissal of the writ petition as devoid of merits.

9. It is pertinent to note that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, namely, V. Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 2177 (referred supra), has subsequently been set aside in P. Ranjitharaj v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2024) 17 SCC 729, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, where the delay in appointment was not attributable to the candidates, their subsequent appointment at a later point of time could not, by itself, deprive them of their right to claim the benefit of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978. The Court further held that merely because they were appointed after 01.04.2003, they could not be denied the benefit of the 1978 Rules, since they formed part of the same selection pursuant to the earlier recruitment and the delay in their appointment was attributable to the authorities. Accordingly, the respondents were directed to treat the appellants as members of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 and extend to them all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. The relevant extracts are as follows:

                     “.... 9. After we have heard counsel for the parties and with their as sistance perused the material available on record, in our considered view, the premise on which the High Court has proceeded is not sustainable for the reason that the appellants along with other applicants had participated in the selfsame selection process pur suant to advertisement dated 9th September, 2001 held for the post of APP Grade II and verification was made by the Commission in the case of the present appellants on 3rd September, 2002.

                     10. In the given circumstances, when those who are lower in order of merit to the appellants were appointed by an order dated 24 th September, 2002, the appellants have no right of say in the matter of appointment and no justification has been tendered by the State respondent as to why their names were withheld for two/three years, when their names were cleared by the Commission on 3 rd September, 2002 and sent to the State Government and finally ap pointments were made of the appellants on 23rd August, 2005 and 23rd April, 2004 respectively and the delay indeed in making ap pointments in the case of the present appellants in no manner could be attributable to them.

                     11. In the given circumstances, when all other candidates who had participated along with the appellants pursuant to advertise ment dated 9th November, 2001, on the recommendations made by the Commission were appointed on 24th September, 2002 including those who are lower in the order of merit, there appears no reason for withholding the names of the present appellants and merely be cause they were appointed at a later point of time, would not de prive them from claiming to become a member of Tamil Nadu Pen sion Rules, 1978, which is applicable to the employees who were appointed on or before 1st April, 2003.

                     12. In the facts and circumstances, the finding recorded by the High Court qua the present appellants is not sustainable and de serves to be set aside.

                     13. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the judgment and order dated 19th June, 2014 and 2nd November, 2018 of the High Court qua the appellants are set aside. The respondents are directed to treat the present appellants to be a member of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 for all practical purposes and benefits as member of the Rules, 1978 to which the appellants are entitled, including retiral benefits, be made available to them.”

9. The issue for determination is whether the petitioner had been appointed prior to the issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 241 dated 22.07.2013, which was brought into effect from 01.04.2013. There is no dispute that the petitioner was indeed selected through the recruitment process conducted for the Group-IV examinations for the year 2012-2013 and was allotted to the Police Department as a Junior Assistant vide memo dated 17.12.2012. He was directed to report for duty on or before 15.03.2013, prior to the issuance of his appointment order. It is the case of the second respondent that a memorandum dated 03.04.2013 was issued, pursuant to which the petitioner was assigned as a Junior Assistant in the Police Telecommunication Branch and joined duty on 29.04.2013.

10. It is not denied by the respondents that the petitioner had indeed reported for duty on 15.03.2013 itself and that the assignment of duty to a particular branch was made at the level of the second respondent. The process of assigning a particular branch was undertaken at the instance of the second respondent.

11. Therefore, as on the date of his selection as well as the date of his allotment to the Police Department, i.e., on 17.12.2012, the petitioner was already in possession of the higher qualification. Indeed, pursuant to the common order Rc.No.C1/5216/2023 dated 08.06.2013, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Technical Services, had granted advance increments to the petitioner.

12. It was only upon the issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 241 dated 22-07-2013, with retrospective effect from 01.04.2013, that the issue relating to the actual disbursement of the benefit arose.

13. The aforesaid issue is squarely covered by a judgement in a Division Bench of this Court in The Secretary to Government and 2 Others v. M. Praveena, W.A.(MD) No.51 of 2025, dated 25.06.2025, wherein the Division Bench considered the applicability of G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22.07.2013. In the said case also, the Government relied upon the aforesaid Government Order to contend that the concession of higher start of pay stood dispensed with for Junior Assistants/Typists with effect from 01.04.2013.

14. The Division Bench, upon a consideration of paragraph Nos. 4 and 5 of G.O.Ms.No.241, held that paragraph No.4 of the Government Order was intended to operate in respect of Junior Assistants/Typists to be recruited in future, and that the Government Order could not be applied to a person who had already been selected prior to the cut-off date. The Division Bench further noticed that persons who had been appointed immediately after 01.04.2013 on account of administrative delay had been extended the benefit of higher start of pay and held that the Government could not adopt a different yardstick in respect of the writ petitioner whose case stood on the same footing. The relevant extracts are as follows:

                     7. A careful reading of paragraph No.4 of the aforesaid Government Order leads to the conclusion that it was meant to apply to those Junior Assistants / Typists to be recruited in future to avoid the pay anomaly. In the case on hand, the writ petitioner was selected in the year 2012 itself and therefore, the aforesaid G.O.Ms.No.241 dated 22.07.2013 may not really have any application. …

                     8. One Raghu and two others filed W.P.No.30012 of 2013 questioning the validity of G.O.Ms.No.241 dated 22.07.2013. During the pendency of the GO, the aforesaid letter came to be issued. The Government chose to exempt those persons though they were appointed after the cut-off date (ie.) on 01.04.2013. In that case, the three individuals were appointed on 05.04.2013, 08.04.2013 and 10.04.2013 respectively. The writ petitioner herein came to be appointed on 12.04.2013. The case of the writ petitioner is on par with that of the petitioners in W.P.No.30012 of 2013.

                     9. We are of the view that the Government need not apply a different yardstick in the case of the writ petitioner. In this view of the matter, we confirm the order of the learned single Judge. This writ appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

In the present case, the petitioner had reported for duty on 15.03.2013 itself, and the internal memorandum dated 03.04.2013 issued by the second respondent was only for the purpose of assigning him to a particular branch among the various branches functioning under the second respondent, i.e., the Director General of Police/Head of Police Force.

15. Therefore, the date of joining duty in the present case has to be taken as 15.03.2013 and not 03.04.2013, the date on which the memorandum was issued directing the petitioner to the Police Telecommunication Branch or assigning him to the said branch. Consequently, the petitioner has established that his appointment has to be reckoned from the date on which he reported for duty, i.e., 15.03.2013. Accordingly, he will be entitled to the benefit of the incentive of two advance increments applicable to persons who possess the higher qualification at the inception of their service.

16. Since G.O. Ms. No. 241 dated 22.07.2013 is not applicable to the present case, the order of rejection via Letter No. 50496/kaval-5/2023-4 dated 19.11.2023 issued by the fourth respondent and communicated to the petitioner by the third respondent vide memo F5/30351/2021 dated 18.01.2024 is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to grant two advance increments (higher start-up pay), which had already been sanctioned vide order dated 08.06.2013 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Technical Services, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

17. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. No costs.