1. The present revision petition has been filed questioning the order dated 11.11.2025, passed in Appeal No. FA/477/2025 by the SCDRC, Delhi.

2. The appeal had been dismissed on the ground of delay of 96 days. We entertained the revision petition and the following interim order was passed on 30.12.2025.

The State Commission has dismissed the Appeal of the Insurer along with the Application for condonation of delay of 96 days in filing the Appeal. While doing so, the State Commission extracted respective principles enunciated in various decisions of the Apex Court. It is the factual finding that sufficient cause as contemplated in proviso to Section 15 has not been shown by the Insurer. Additionally, as per the State Commission the reason for delay shown in the delay condonation application is internal procedural delays and therefore the same does not qualify to be a sufficient reason so as to condone the delay.

I have perused the entire order of the State Commission. It is needless to mention that condonation of delay and the sufficiency of reasons therefore essentially are within the discretion of the authority to be judiciously exercised after considering all the relevant facts including the prima facie merits of the case. It has been held by the Apex Court in Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878 and Central Bank of India versus Jagbir Singh (2015) 14 SCC 788 that a substantial merit is pitted against the delay, a practical and liberal view in light of administrative realities, as urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, need to be adopted, and therefore, as per him, the State Commission has erred in dismissing the Appeal along with the delay condonation application.

Relying on the above mentioned two decisions, it has been urged further by the learned Counsel that the Appeal was dismissed by the State Commission at the preliminary stage without issuing any notice and therefore if the prayer for restoring the matter is accepted so far the State Commission to proceed with the merits of the matter, no prejudice is likely to be caused to the other side. After considering the totality of facts and circumstances, there appears to be prima facie merit in the Appeal.

Admit. Issue notice. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner undertakes to serve the Respondent dasti. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner shall also place a copy of this Order in the records of the District Commission in Execution Application if any filed by the Respondent.

Subject to the deposit of the entire decretal amount before the District Commission, including interest, the operation of the Impugned Orders shall remain in abeyance. The proof of deposit shall be filed within four weeks along with the computation of the decretal amount. The District Commission shall invest the amount in the interest bearing fixed deposits and shall not release the amount without further direction from this Commission.

List on 22.04.2026.

3. In compliance of the said order, the deposit already made was explained through IA No. 557 of 2026 with a prayer to modify the order as the petitioners had deposited 50% of the decretal amount together with interest. Accordingly we modified the interim order on 22.01.2026 by the following order:

IA/557/2026

The petition was admitted vide order dated 30.12.2025 and an interim order was passed subject to the deposit of the entire decrial amount.

Mr. Singh submits that on the date when the said order was passed he was not in possession of the complete instruction with regard to the deposit of the decretal amount which he states that 50% of the decretal amount already stands deposited with the State Commission. In such circumstances he prays for a modification of the order dated 30.12.2025.

Having considered the submissions raised we find that the complaint was filed under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appeal preferred against the order of the State Commission required a pre-deposit of only Rs.25,000/- whereas according to Mr. Singh 50% of the decrial amount together with interest had already been deposited. In such circumstances the interim order dated 30.12.2025 shall stand modified and in view of the deposit already made before the State Commission, no further deposit is required to be made as directed vide order dated 30.12.2025. The order stands modified accordingly. The interim order passed shall continue.

List on the date already fixed i.e. 22.04.2026.

4. Notices had been issued to the respondents and the service was effected on both the respondents, on whose behalf learned counsel appeared on 22.04.2026, who was granted time to file a response to this revision petition. The order dated 22.04.2026 is extracted hereinunder:

Mr. Sunil Mutreja, learned counsel has put in appearance on behalf of both the respondents and he pray for two weeks' time to file response in relation to the issue raised and recorded in the order dated 30.12.2025. Time prayed for is granted.

List on 17.09.2026.

5. Both the respondents have filed a response on 11.05.2026, taking the same plea that there was no sufficient cause given explaining the delay before the State Commission and therefore there is no error in the impugned order dismissing the appeal being barred by time.

6. It has also been urged that on merits also the petitioner has not been able to carve out any ground for challenging the said orders, inasmuch as, the District Commission has very appropriately interpreted the provisions of the policy and has arrived at a correct conclusion that the Insurance Company has erred by applying Section D without having discharged the burden of proving its ingredients. The complainant had suffered blindness and loss of sight of one of his eyes, which disabled him completely at the age of 60 years to acquire any alternative occupation. Consequently, it was Section C which was applicable, and accordingly 100% of the maximum sum insured was indemnifiable that has been correctly assessed by the District Commission. It is therefore submitted that there is no error even on merits, and as such, apart from there being no appropriate sufficient cause having been demonstrated for the delay, the State Commission has rightly dismissed the appeal, which does not call for any interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (as this is a case arising out of the old Act).

7. It is therefore urged that the Revision petition having a limited scope, and there being no illegality or material irregularity pointed out by the petitioner, the impugned order does not call for any interference.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Singh, on the other hand urged that the delay had been appropriately explained, and the same was only of a nominal period of 95 days that had been sufficiently explained, and consequently the State Commission should not have taken such a strict view of the matter to have dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. Learned counsel submits that a liberal approach ought to have been employed, as a meritorious issue had been raised in the appeal regarding the applicability of the provisions as the complainant had failed to establish that he was permanently disabled. The document produced by him, namely the Medical Assessment Certificate of June 2013, only declared him to be unfit for flying and not for any alternative occupation. Mr. Singh therefore urged that the impugned order has proceeded on an incorrect appreciation of evidence, as a result whereof the order of the District Commission is perverse, and consequently the appeal ought to have been entertained and heard on merits, both on facts and on law.

9. We have considered the submissions raised, and during the course of submissions it was pointed out that the impugned order passed by the State Commission is by a Bench presided over by a single Member. We find this to be clearly in teeth of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Kamal Travels Kokks International & Ors. (SLP No. 4969 of 2020) decided on 30.09.2021. The law has once again been revisited by us in the decision rendered in the case of Globe Ecologistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s. GE India Industrial Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. connected with Kataria Carriers vs. SEPR Refractories India Ltd. & Anr., First Appeals Nos. 741 and 742 of 2021 decided on 03.03.2025. Applying the ratio of the said decisions there is no doubt that the impugned order of the State Commission dismissing the appeal as being barred by time has been delivered by a single Member and therefore stands vitiated on account of the legal position referred to above. The impugned order dated 11.11.2025 therefore cannot be sustained on this ground as the order is coram non judice.

Apart from this, we also find that the delay of 95 days had been explained in paragraph 2 to 4 of the delay condonation application indicating the administrative exigencies that took time for the processing of the file and filing of the first appeal that resulted in a delay of 88 days. We find that the petitioner is one of the oldest Insurance Companies extending the benefits of Insurance facilities for long and it has attempted to explain the delay on the ground of its administrative processing which we find to have been sufficiently explained. The delay therefore on the facts of the present case had been sufficiently explained and we therefore find that the discretion for condoning the delay of 95 days or 88 days as indicated ought to have been exercised for considering the case on merits. We find support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare & Bros., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151. Paragraphs 21 and 22 are extracted hereunder:

"21. The questions of law purported to be raised in this Special Leave Petition are misconceived. The right of appeal is a statutory right, subject to the laws of limitation. The law of limitation is valid substantive law, which extinguishes the right to sue, and/or the right to appeal. Once an appeal is found to be barred by limitation, there can be no question of any obligation of the Court to consider the merits of the case of the Appellant.

22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning."

10. This is followed by Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India & Anr. (supra), wherein the observation in paragraph 20 is extracted hereinunder:

"20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law, yet another O.A. No. 2066 of 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more than one year after the impugned order came to be passed. No litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of "sufficient cause", irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned."

11. In the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531, it has been observed in paragraphs 30 to 32 as under:

"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". Αn "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".

Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

12. The explanation for the delay does not appear to be an excuse and therefore could have been considered as an explanation as held by the Apex Court. In our opinion, the State Commission ought to have exercised this discretion for condoning the delay instead of dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation. We therefore accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner Insurance Company that the delay in filing of the appeal before the State Commission had been sufficiently explained.

13. That apart, the question as to whether the burden of proving the extent of disability of the complainant had been appropriately discharged or not by either of the parties was a question of fact in order to apply the correct provision of the policy. The issue as to whether Section C or Section D of the policy would apply therefore was a matter for assessment on merits in the appeal. The State Commission therefore could have appropriately condoned the delay and decided the issue after giving an opportunity to the parties.

14. We therefore find that the order of the State Commission for all the reasons stated above cannot be sustained. The impugned order dated 11.11.2025 is therefore set aside. The delay in filing of the appeal stands condoned and the revision petition is accordingly allowed.

15. The appeal F.A. No. 477/2025 shall therefore stand restored before the SCDRC, Delhi. Learned counsel for the parties have agreed to appear before the State Commission on 16.10.2026. The State Commission shall accordingly proceed with the appeal and decide it on merits after giving an opportunity to the parties in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have interfered with the matter as there was an illegality in the appeal having been decided only by a single Member and even otherwise, we found an irregularity in the delay not having been condoned by the State Commission for hearing the matter on merits.

16. We clarify that we have not touched upon the merits of the matter which the State Commission will decide in accordance with law. As the complaint itself is of the year 2015, the State Commission is requested to dispose off the appeal as expeditiously as possible.