Common Order:
1. Since these CRPs arose out of the common order passed in respect of the very same schedule property and since the parties are common, they are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Heard Sri M.S.N.Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P.No.278 of 2025, respondent No.3 in C.R.P.No.3905 of 2024 and respondent No.4 in C.R.P.No.4195 of 2024, Smt.B.Neeraja S.Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C.R.P.No.3905 of 2024, respondent Nos.2, 3 and 12 to 15 in C.R.P.No.278 of 2025 and respondent Nos.2, 3 and 11 to 14 in C.R.P.No.4195 of 20147, and Sri R.Rama Brahmma, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in C.R.P.No.4195 of 2024, respondent Nos.4 & 5 in C.R.P.No.278 of 2025 and respondent No.3 in C.R.P.No.3905 of 2024.
3. All the three Civil Revision Petitions are filed assailing the common judgment dated 28.03.2024 passed in C.M.A.Nos.16 and 27 of 2023 by the learned I Additional District Judge, Medchal- Malkajgiri District at Kushaiguda.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as they stand before the learned Trial Court i.e., 'the petitioners/plaintiffs' and 'the respondents/defendants'.
5. The plaintiffs i.e. A.Yadagiri Reddy, A.Dharma Reddy and A.Anji Reddy originally filed O.S.No.89 of 2022 before the learned Trial Court against the defendants seeking to declare the gift deed executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 and consequent sale deeds executed by defendant No.2 in favour of other defendants as null and void, with other ancillary reliefs.
6. The sum and substance of the case pleaded by the plaintiffs is that originally, the land in Sy.No.130 of Nagole Village, Uppal Mandal, Medchal-Malkajgiri belonged to late A.Gopal Reddy, the father of plaintiffs and the defendant No.1. During his lifetime, a layout consisting of 43 plots were carved out from a part of the land and out of the same, several plots were sold out jointly by late A.Gopal Reddy and his sons. Thereafter Sri A.Gopal Reddy passed away. Consequent upon the death of Sri A.Gopal Reddy, the plaintiffs and defendant No.1, who are brothers jointly succeeded to the property as co-owners with equal rights. As on the date of death of Sri A.Gopal Reddy, there remained 16 plots i.e. Plot Nos.7 to 13, 19 to 22, 24 to 26, 28 and 29, which are the schedule properties in the suit. The plaintiffs contend that the suit plots remained joint family property and the same was never partitioned by metes and bounds.
7. Subsequently, the defendant No.1 executed a registered gift deed in the year 2016 in favour of his son i.e. defendant No.2 in respect of the suit plots and in turn, the defendant No.2 executed several registered sale deeds in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 8 in the year 2021.
8. The plaintiffs contend that since the defendant No.1 had no absolute or exclusive title over the suit plots, he could not have executed the registered Gift Settlement Deed in favour of his son i.e. defendant No.2 and thus, all subsequent transfers made by defendant No.2 including sale of 150 sq. yards in Plot No.26 in favour of defendant No.3, the sale of Plot No.29 in favour of defendant Nos.4 to 8, and the Development Agreement for multi- storied construction over Plot Nos.24, 25, 28 and 29 are illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs.
9. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed two interlocutory applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) , one in I.A.No.29 of 2022 seeking temporary injunction restraining the defendant Nos.2 to 8 from changing the nature of the suit plots or making any sort of constructions over the suit plots; and the other in I.A.No.30 of 2022 seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining the defendants from alienating or creating any third-party interest over the suit plots, pending disposal of the suit.
10. The defendant No.1 filed counter-affidavits in the said I.As., on behalf of defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.3 to 8 had adopted the same, denying all the allegations made by the plaintiffs and admitting the relationship between the plaintiffs. It was stated in the counters that the suit plots are no longer joint family plots, by virtue of a partition that took place among the brothers by a registered partition deed i.e. Ex.R-85, under which, the suit plots were allotted exclusively to the defendant No.1, whereas the other plots were allotted to the plaintiffs. It is the further case of defendants that the plaintiffs suppressed the prior partition and the fact that they had already alienated their respective allotted shares to third parties through multiple sale deeds.
11. It is the further case of defendants that defendant No.1 validly acquired title under the partition, and validly gifted the property to defendant No.2, and that the defendant No.2, exercising his ownership and title over the subject property, lawfully sold portions of the suit plots and executed a registered Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 25.02.2022 with the builder/defendant No.4. Thereafter the defendant No.3 obtained building permission from the GHMC and completed substantial portion of the construction laying three slabs out of six slabs, prior to the filing of the injunction petitions and that the plaintiffs filed the suit belatedly with a mala fide intention to extract money and harass the defendants.
12. The defendants further contended that the suit is not maintainable as it is not a comprehensive suit for general partition or declaration of title and passing an injunction order in the subject suit restraining alienation or construction causes severe irreparable financial hardship, breaches third-party flat-buyer agreements, and ruins the building materials procured.
13. Before the learned Trial Court, no witnesses were examined, however, Exs.P-1 to P-8 were marked on behalf of the plaintiffs and Exs.R-1 to R-88 were marked.
14. Upon considering the rival submissions made by both parties, in I.A.No.29 of 2022, the learned Trial Court observed that the defendants had already obtained valid permission and finished slabs of the structure and halting the construction midway would cause immense waste of materials and severe financial injury. It was further observed that although the rights over the suit schedule property are in dispute, the construction need not be stopped as it is not going to cause any prejudice to the plaintiffs, if the construction is made. It was also observed that if the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiffs, the portion of construction may be pro- rate adjusted among the parties. The learned Trial Court thereby held that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the defendants and accordingly, vide its order dated 09.03.2023 dismissed I.A.No.29 of 2022.
15. Similarly, in I.A.No.30 of 2022, the learned Trial Court, basing on the submissions made by the parties and upon perusal of the documents, in particular, Ex.R.85, observed that the defendant No.1 has failed to establish prima facie that he has absolute right over suit plots and that he has a right to alienate the same. It was further observed that no prejudice would be caused to the defendants if the relief of not to alienate is granted to the plaintiffs and that if the subject plots were not protected, there is every chance that the plaintiffs would be put to an irreparable loss as there is prima facie case which shows that the suit plots are in joint possession earlier. It was further observed that since the defendant Nos.1 and 2 executed the gift deed and sale deeds in favour of third parties, it is essential to protect the subject matter from being further alienated. Therefore, the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief sought and accordingly, allowed I.A.No.30 of 2022 vide its order dated 13.03.2023.
16. Aggrieved by the dismissal of I.A.No.29 of 2022, the plaintiffs filed C.M.A.No.27 of 2023, whereas defendant Nos.1 to 3, being aggrieved by the orders passed in I.A.No.30 of 2022 filed C.M.A.NO.16 of 2023 before the learned Lower Appellate Court i.e. I Additional District Judge, Medchal-Malkajgiri District at Kushaiguda.
17. The learned Lower Appellate Court independently examined the facts of the case and documents filed before the learned Trial Court, framing the following points for determination :
"1. Whether the petitioners/plaintiffs (appellants in CMA No.27 of 2023 and the respondent Nos.1 to 3 in CMA No.16 of 2023) are entitled for temporary injunction as claimed in I.A.No.29 of 2022?
2. Whether the petitioners/plaintiffs (respondents in CMA No.16 of 2023 and the appellants in CMA No.27 of 2023) are entitled for temporary injunction as claimed in I.A.No.30 of 2022?
3. To what relief?"
18. Considering the submissions made before it and the material on record, the Lower Appellate Court held that the learned Trial Court rightly observed that if the defendants were restrained from making further construction at this stage, it would cause much financial loss and injury to them and however, the construction undertaken by them would be subject to the result of the suit and accordingly, answered the point No.1 against the plaintiffs. The Lower Appellate Court further observed that the learned Trial Court appreciated the factual situation in right perspective and held that the defendants were restrained from alienating the suit plots and accordingly, answered point No.2 in favour of the plaintiffs.
19. Thereby, the learned Lower Appellate Court, by common judgment dated 28.03.2024, dismissed both the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals.
20. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed C.R.P.No.3905 of 2024 against the dismissal of C.M.ANo.27 of 2023, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed C.R.P.No.4185 of 2024 and defendant No.3 filed C.R.P.No.278 of 2025 against the dismissal of C.M.A.No.16 of 2023.
21. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the lower Appellate Court, having come to the conclusion that the property has to be protected as it is, till the disposal of the suit, had dismissed the CMA by confirming the orders of the Trial Court without restraining the respondents from raising further construction, which completely changes the nature of the suit plots.
22. Learned counsel further contends that the lower Appellate Court erred in not restraining the respondents from raising construction, as the permission was approved on 15.08.2022 and the suit was filed on 13.07.2022.
23. Learned counsel further submitted that though the lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that there is a cloud on the title of the defendant No.2 as there is no proof that the defendant No.1 had exclusive title or title to convey the same to the defendant No.2 through gift settlement deed, had erred in permitting the construction pending disposal of the suit.
24. Learned counsel finally contended that the lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate the citations of the Apex Court in proper perspective and dismissed the appeal under revision.
25. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the defendant Nos.1 and 2 strenuously opposed the grant of injunction restraining the defendants from alienation of the suit plots pending lis on the ground that the suit itself is not maintainable and the same is in contravention of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short '1963 Act').
26. Leaned counsel contended that the Courts below ought to have seen the prayer and the averments made and ought to have allowed the Builder to sell his share of super built-up area to the third parties. It is further stated that the lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate the details of the plots mentioned in Annexure-I to IV fallen to the share of the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 and simply dismissed the appeal by confirming the order of the learned Trial Court.
27. Learned counsel further contended that the Courts below failed to appreciate the contentions of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 as the suit itself is not maintainable, since the proper relief was not prayed for and on the other hand, the lower Appellate Court wrongly held that the issue of maintainability will be adjudicated at the time of trial, and hence, the said finding is erroneous.
28. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant No.3 contended that the Courts below ought to have considered the submission as to maintainability of the suit, which was filed to declare the gift deed and sale deeds as null and void, without seeking the relief of partition.
29. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Trial Court ought to have dismissed I.A.No.30 of 2022 by looking into the recitals of the sale deeds filed by defendant Nos.1 and 2, which clearly show that the plaintiffs sold their respective share of properties to the third parties for their personal necessities.
30. It is further submitted that the reliefs prayed in the suit are in the form of ancillary reliefs of the main relief of declaration, and that when the suit itself is not maintainable; the Court should desist from granting any interim injunction.
31. The defendants also relied on certain annexures showing the alienation of plots made by plaintiffs in favour of third parties as evidence of prior partition.
32. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants relied upon the decisions in Ananthula Sudhakar Reddy Vs. P.Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs. And another ((2008) 4 SCC 594), Ram Saran and another Vs. Smt.Ganga Devi ((AIR) 1972 (SC) 2685), Vinay Krishna Vs. Keshav Chandra and another ((AIR) 1993 (SC) 957) and Prem Singh and others Vs. Birbal and others ((2006) 5 SCC 353).
33. I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.
34. Admittedly, the relationship among the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 and 2 is not in dispute. The dispute is mainly with regard to the nature and ownership of the suit plots, i.e., whether the suit plots continue to remain joint family property after the death of their late father, as contended by the plaintiffs or whether they have fallen to the exclusive share of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 under the alleged partition deed, as contended by the defendants.
35. The defendants mainly allege that the plaintiffs' suit seeking the present reliefs without seeking a prayer for partition or declaration of their right over the suit plots is not maintainable under Section 34 of the 1963 Act.
36. The plaintiffs filed the suit O.S.No.89 of 2022 seeking the following reliefs:
"1) To declare the gift deed date 01-10-2016 executed by 1st defendant in faovur of the 2nd defendant vide doc.No.12129/2016 dated 01-10-2016 registered in the office of SRO Uppal, as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs, thereby communicate to S.R.O. Uppal.
2) Consequently to declare the sale deed executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the defendant No.3 vide document No.4660/2021 dated 03-03-2021 registered in the office of SRO Uppal, as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs, thereby communicate to S.R.O. Uppal.
3) Consequently to declare the sale deeds executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the defendant Nos.4 to 8th defendants vide document No.16350/2021 dated 20-10-2021 registered in the office of SRO Uppal, as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs, thereby communicate to S.R.O. Uppal.
4) to restrain the defendant Nos.2 to 8 from alienating and creating third party charges over the suit schedule property or part of the suit schedule property.
5) Grant mandatory injunction directing the 9th defendant to cancel the permit sanction order dated 28-04-2022 vide permit No.2542/GHMC/LBN/2022-BP accorded to 4th defendant and others.
6) to restrain the defendants from changing the nature of the suit schedule property in any manner
7) and to award the costs of the suit, and
8) and to grant any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled."
37. A plain reading of the plaint would disclose that the plaintiffs are challenging the legality of the registered documents executed by the defendant Nos.1 and 2 on the ground that they continue to have share and interest in the suit plots and that the defendant No.1 did not acquire exclusive title.
38. With regards to the maintainability of the suit, the decisions relied upon by the defendants, including Ananthula Sudhakar Reddy (supra), Ram Saran (supra), Vinay Krishna (supra) and Prem Singh (supra), undoubtedly lay down important principles regarding the necessity of seeking appropriate declaratory and consequential reliefs, the effect of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the distinction between void and voidable documents and the presumption attached to registered documents. However, the said principles cannot be mechanically applied at the interlocutory stage so as to non-suit the plaintiffs without examining the nature of the dispute and the documentary material placed before the Court.
39. The case of Ananthula Sudhakar Reddy (supra), deals with the maintainability and the scope of suits for injunction simplicitor versus suits for declaration of title and possession. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a systematical manner categorized certain scenarios illustrating the maintainability of an injunction suit simplicitor and the mandatory requirement to file a suit for declaration with consequential injunctions.
40. In Ram Saran (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering Section 34 of the 1963 Act (corresponding to Section 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877) held that a court cannot pass a decree for bare declaration of title, if plaintiff omits to claim consequential relief of recovery of possession, partition and joint possession.
41. No doubt, the contentions raised by the defendants in correlation to Section 34 of the 1963 Act and the relief sought by the plaintiffs appears to have some force touching the maintainability of the suit, however, the same may not be invoked in the Interlocutory Application as maintainability of a suit is a mixed questions of fact and law which cannot be decided in a summary manner without recording oral and documentary evidence. The maintainability of the suit has to be dealt with in a separate application or by requesting the trial Court to decide the maintainability as a preliminary issue.
42. Regarding partition deed, the learned Trial Court observed that the partition deed relied upon by the defendants did not conclusively establish that the suit plots had fallen exclusively to the share of defendant No.1 and treated the same as a triable issue. The said finding assumes significance because the entire defence of defendant Nos.1 and 2 rests substantially upon the alleged prior partition. If the plaintiffs' assertion that the suit plots continued to remain joint is ultimately established, the very foundation of the title claimed by defendant No.1 and consequently the title conveyed by him to defendant No.2 would require examination. At the same time, if the defendants establish the alleged partition and their exclusive title, the plaintiffs' claim would necessarily fail. Therefore, at this stage, the Court cannot conclusively accept either version.
43. It is relevant to note that at the interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to finally determine the title of the parties. It is trite law that for obtaining an interim injunction, the Court is required to ascertain the three well settled and mandatory ingredients i.e.,
(i) prima facie case;
(ii) balance of convenience; and
(iii) irreparable loss.
44. In the decision in Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh ((1992) 1 SCC 719), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"Order XXXIX Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing.... Or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders."
45. It is further observed that "the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that :
(1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant;
(2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensure before the legal right would be established at trial; and
(3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it."
46. Applying the above principles, this Court is of the opinion that both the learned Trial Court and learned Lower Appellate Court have rightly held that the plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case requiring protection of the suit plots from further alienation. It was observed that since the rights of the plaintiffs by way of inheritance of the plots flow from their late father and any pendent lite transfers would create third party interests leading to multiplicity of litigation and complicating the adjudication of title, the balance of convenience is with the plaintiffs. Therefore, the orders of both the learned Trial Court and learned Lower Appellate Court restraining alienation, preserves the status quo without causing any prejudice to the defendants. This Court finds no perversity or patent illegality in the concurrent findings of the Courts below.
47. In respect of the construction of the suit plots, it is not in dispute that, prior to the consideration of the interlocutory applications, construction had already commenced pursuant to the building permission obtained from the competent authority. The material on record, as noticed by the Courts below, indicates that substantial construction had already been undertaken and three slabs out of the proposed six slabs had been completed.
48. The plaintiffs contend that the permission was obtained on 15.08.2022, whereas the suit itself was filed on 13.07.2022, and therefore the construction could not be relied upon to defeat their prayer for injunction. However, the relevant consideration for the interlocutory application is not merely the date of the building permission, but the factual position existing when the Court considered the application, including the extent of construction already undertaken and the consequences of stopping the same midway.
49. The learned Trial Court observed that stopping the construction at that stage would result in substantial wastage of construction material and financial hardship to the defendants. The Lower Appellate Court also considered the same and concurred with the said decision. Such consideration is consistent with the settled principle that the Court, while exercising discretionary jurisdiction for temporary injunction, must weigh the comparative hardship and inconvenience likely to result from granting or refusing the injunction.
50. It is important to note that restraining construction stands on a different footing from restraining alienation. An order restraining alienation preserves the legal status of the property and prevents the creation of further third-party rights. Whereas, an order directing to stop an already commenced construction, particularly when substantial construction has taken place, would cause immediate and potentially irreversible financial consequences to the defendants. The Court is therefore required to strike a balance between protecting the plaintiffs' claimed proprietary rights and avoiding unnecessary destruction or wastage of the defendants' investment.
51. It is also significant that permitting the construction to continue does not, by itself, confer or create any title in favour of the defendants. Any construction raised by the defendants during the pendency of the suit would necessarily remain subject to the ultimate result of the suit. If the plaintiffs ultimately establish their right and succeed in the suit, the rights and equities arising out of such construction can be appropriately worked out in accordance with law. Thus, the continuance of construction, subject to the result of the suit, does not render the plaintiffs remediless.
52. At the same time, the protection granted by restraining further alienation adequately safeguards the plaintiffs from the more serious consequence of creation of additional third-party rights. The defendants cannot take advantage of the pendency of the suit to further complicate the title dispute by transferring the suit property or creating additional interests therein. Any construction or development undertaken by them shall remain subject to the result of O.S.No.89 of 2022 and the rights of the parties shall ultimately be governed by the decree passed therein.
53. It is pertinent to note the present Civil Revision Petitions are filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the scope of the High Court is limited to the extent of exercising supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that subordinate courts act within their bounds. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not appellate in nature. The High Court does not sit as a court of appeal to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the subordinate courts. The jurisdiction is confined to ensuring that the courts below have acted within their authority, followed due process, and have not committed any patent illegality or perversity. Unless the orders suffer from error apparent on the face of the record or result in grave injustice, interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is unwarranted.
54. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent case in Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and another Vs. B.Gurappa Naidu and others (Order dated 30.04.2026 passed in Civil Appeal No.1388 of 2013) reiterated the said principle and held :
"31. The scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been the subject matter of consideration before this Court in several judgments, and the law governing the exercise of such power now stands well settled. In exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as an appellate court, nor can it sit in appeal over the correctness of the orders passed by courts and tribunals over which it exercises the power of superintendence under Article 227."
55. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no patent illegality, perversity, or grave injustice appearing in the orders of the learned Trial Court or the learned Lower Appellate Court, and they both have exercised discretion judiciously, striking a fair balance between the competing interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiffs' ownership rights have been safeguarded by restraining alienation, and the defendants' investments and construction activity have not been disrupted. The concurrent findings of the learned Trial Court and the learned Lower Appellate Court require no interference by this Court.
56. In view of the above, these three Civil Revision Petitions are disposed of, granting liberty to the defendants to raise all the objections including the maintainability of the suit before the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.
57. It is made clear that the observations made herein are confined strictly to the adjudication of the interlocutory applications and shall not prejudice the learned Trial Court while adjudicating the suit on merits.
58. Interim orders granted, if any stand vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed. No costs.
