(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to set aside the judgment and decree dated 19.12.2022 in O.S.No.4522 of 2019 on the file of the XVIII Additional City Civil Court, Chennai.

1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed challenging the judgment and decree dated 19.12.2022 in O.S.No.4522 of 2019 on the file of the XVIII Additional City Civil Court, Chennai, wherein the Trial Court has allowed the suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for the relief of mandatory injunction, directing the 1st defendant to redeliver the possession of the shop described in the suit schedule to the plaintiff and also permanent injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from opening and doing business or any other commercial activities in the suit property.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred herein according to their litigative status before the Trial Court. The brief facts leading to filing of this civil revision petition are as follows:

                     2.1 The first defendant is the absolute owner of the building situated at No.283, Mint Street, Chennai – 600 003 and he had leased out the ground floor shop of the aforesaid building to the plaintiff in the year 2004. The leased out portion is approximately to the extent 720 sq.ft., and from 2004 onwards, the plaintiff was running a business in the name and style of ‘Rajshree Handicrafts’ in the said portion of the first defendant’s building, without any interruption. In December 2018, the first defendant approached the plaintiff and informed him that he has decided to demolish the building and reconstruct a new super structure and sought the plaintiff to vacate the shop and handover the possession within a period of eight months, in order to demolish and reconstruct the building. The first defendant also assured to redelivery the portion for lease to the plaintiff after reconstruction and both parties have entered into an agreement dated 20.12.2018. Accordingly on 28.01.2019, the plaintiff vacated and handed over the vacant physical possession of the leased premises.

                     2.2 The first defendant, after obtaining the physical possession of the leased premises from the plaintiff had let out the ground floor shop portion to the second defendant and only thereafter, the plaintiff came to know that the first defendant has no idea to demolish and reconstruct the building, further only with malafide intention, the first defendant has given false assurance in order to get vacant physical possession of the ground floor shop. Therefore, the plaintiff lodged a complaint against the first defendant for the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust committed by the first defendant before the police. Since the police has not intervened in the matter, the plaintiff has came forward with the suit by invoking Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to direct the first defendant to redelivery of possession of the ground floor shop in the suit property and for permanent injunction against the second defendant from opening and doing business in the suit property.

                     2.3 The first defendant has filed his written statement and submitted that, admittedly the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property, at the time of filing the suit and the relief sought in the suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would not lie. He further submitted that the plaintiff was in possession of the ground floor shop till December 2018 and the plaintiff has defaulted in payment of monthly rents and even the first defendant made demand, the plaintiff has evaded the payments. Therefore, based on the demand made by the first defendant, the plaintiff had vacated and handed over the vacant physical possession of the leased premises with his consent. He further denied the fact that the plaintiff was dispossessed without his consent. The agreement entered between the parties is unregistered and the plaintiff is entitled for repossession of the premises, only after the demolition and reconstruction, since the first defendant could not mobilize funds for demolition and reconstruction, he subsequently let out the ground floor shop portion to the second defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have filed appropriate suit, but the relief sought in the suit for redelivery of possession by invoking Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is not maintainable. The dispute between the parties is a landlord and tenant dispute, hence the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred and the suit is not maintainable.

                     2.4 The second defendant has also filed a separate written statement and stated that the plaintiff and the first defendant had entered into an agreement on 20.12.2018 and the same is unregistered, hence based on the same, no relief can be sought. He further submitted that the suit is filed by the plaintiff, to harass the second defendant and there is no unlawful dispossession, hence the suit of this nature is not maintainable.

                     2.5 The Trial Court after considering the pleading made, framed the following issues:

                     1. Whether the 1st defendant had induced the plaintiff to vacate and hand over possession of suit property on false assurance?

                     2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of recovery of possession of the suit property as prayed for?

                     3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for?

                     4. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?

                     2.6 Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.17. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and no documentary or oral evidences were marked.

                     2.7. The Trial Court, after considering the issues framed, has taken a view that the possession of the ground floor shop portion was handed over by the plaintiff, based on the false assurance and representation that the possession of the ground floor shop portion would be once again handed over to the plaintiff, after the demolition and reconstruction of the building. The Trial Court also observed that the first defendant, by making misrepresentation and false assurance of redelivering the possession had obtained the consent of the plaintiff and obtained the vacant physical possession, which is not a valid consent, therefore held that the suit for redelivery of possession is maintainable. The Trial Court after discussing all other issues had decreed the suit, as prayed for.

                     2.8 Aggrieved over the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the first defendant has come forward with this Civil Revision Petition.

3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/ first defendant submitted that the suit itself is not maintainable, since the plaintiff was dispossessed legally, after the consent of the plaintiff was also obtained. He further submitted that if any violation of the terms in the agreement/ Ex.A.14, the only course open to the plaintiff is to seek for enforcement of the agreement and the plaintiff is not entitled for redelivery of possession by invoking Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He further submitted that the Trial Judge has erred by accepting the agreement/ Ex.A.14 as a document, which is not valid, since it is an unregistered instrument. Though, there is no relief sought by the plaintiff as against the second defendant, to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit property, the Trial Judge has erred in granting such decree. Hence, he prays to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. To buttress his arguments, he relied on the judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in Anamallai Club vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others [1997 (3) SCC 169], M.C. Chockalingam and others vs. V. Manichavasagam and Others [AIR 1974 SC 104] and Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. and Others vs. K.S. Naravana Iyer [AIR 1965 Mad 122].

4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff has handed over the possession of the property based on the assurance given by the first defendant that he will redeliver the possession of the ground floor shop portion in the suit property, after demolishing and constructing a new building in the very same place. He further submitted that the first defendant with malafide intention and to cheat the plaintiff played fraud by giving false assurance and entered into an agreement/ Ex.A.14 with the plaintiff and dispossessed him. This dispossession is based on valid consent. He also submitted that the first defendant immediately after obtaining the vacant physical possession, let out the same to the second defendant, thereby cheated the plaintiff. Therefore, the Trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has rightly held that the plaintiff is entitled to seek relief under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and accordingly, decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, he prays to dismiss this civil revision petition. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ plaintiff also relied on the judgments in East India Hotels Ltd. vs. Syndicate Bank [AIRONLINE 1991 SC 230] and S.R. Ejaz vs. The Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. [2002 (3) SCC 137].

5. I have considered the submissions made on both sides and perused the entire materials available on record.

6. Admittedly in this case, the plaintiff was a tenant under the first defendant from the year 2004 onwards and he was running a business establishment in the name and style of ‘Rajshree Handicrafts’. Though in the pleadings of the first defendant, it has been stated that the plaintiff has defaulted in payment of rents and there was a negotiations to avoid further default and in order to maintain cordial relationship, the plaintiff has come forward to vacate the leased premises, it was also specifically pleaded by the first defendant that the possession was handed over by the plaintiff, based on the endorsement made in the agreement dated 20.12.2018, which is marked as Ex.A.14.

7. In the said agreement/ Ex.A.14, it has been specifically agreed between the parties that, once the plaintiff has handed over the possession of the shop portion of the property to the first defendant, the entire building will be demolished and a new construction will be carried out by the first defendant and thereafter, a portion of the newly constructed building will be once again leased out to the plaintiff for continuing his business. This agreement shows that the handing over of the leased premises to the first defendant is not based on default of rent and it was made only with the understanding that the first defendant required the leased premises for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, and after reconstruction, the plaintiff will be once again accommodated as a tenant. Based on this understanding entered between the parties, the plaintiff had vacated the leased premises and handed over the same to the first defendant. Based on the agreement, the plaintiff was awaiting for the compliance of the undertaking given by the first defendant, while so, the first defendant has not come forward to demolish or reconstruct the building, whereas he had let out the suit property to the second defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff has immediately filed a suit within six months from the date of vacating the suit property.

8. Now the question to be considered in this revision petition is, whether the plaintiff had handed over the possession of the suit property voluntarily and the agreement of terms entered between the parties, bars the plaintiff from filing a suit by invoking Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

9. For better appreciation, Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is extracted hereunder:

                     “6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.—

                     (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.

                     (2) No suit under this section shall be brought—(a)after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b)against the Government.

                     (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.

                     (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.”

10. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has been interpreted by Apex Court and by this Court in various judgment and some of the judgments were also relied on by both sides. In Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. and Others vs. K.S. Naravana Iyer cited supra, this Court considered the scope of old Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (presently Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) in paragraph Nos.10 to 12 and observed as follows:

                     “10. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act provides a special summary and speedy remedy for a person in possession of immovable property. Whatever his title may be thereto, to recover such possession from another who had illegally and without his consent and will, ousted him therefrom. This has its origin in the proceeding called Interdict undivi of the Roman law, where a person wrongfully dispossessed by another could recover it back if he put forward his claim within a period of one year on the mere ground of his previous possession irrespective of the defects in his title. English lawyers followed up this idea, by inventing two writs of assize: (1) most d' ancestor where the true heir of a deceased was kept out of possession by another person who made entry into the estate and (2) Noyal disseision where a person in possession had been tuned out by another. It is the latter form of remedy to the dispossessed, that has been put in a statutory form in this country originally by S. 15 of the Limitation Act, 1859. That section has now been replaced by S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act.

                     11. The two writs available under the old English law became gradually extinct by disuse and later they were abolished by 3 and 4 Will. IV Ch. 36. The law now in that country is that so long as the original owner makes his entry in a peaceable and easy manner, he cannot be treated as a trespasser and the person previously in possession without title, must vacate. This right of the true owner is, however, subject to the condition that the entry should really be peaceable for otherwise the owner will be exposed to the penalties referred to earlier under Statute 5 Richard II.

                     12. But these features of the English law are not applicable to this country, where this summary remedy in case of ouster of a person in possession exists by virtue of a statute. This remedy given under the statute is not a substitute for an ordinary civil action based on title whether such title be actual or possessory. It is a summary possessory process like the one provided for under S. 145 Cr.P.C., involving the decision on the rights of the parties, except in regard to actual possession on the date of dispossession, available to a wrongful party under certain circumstances. The underlying bases for the statutory provision are the two wholesome principles to be referred to presumably and not the principle underlying the English Statute 5 Richard II. Those two principles are: (1) to discourage persons from taking the law into their own hand and derive benefit by that process the benefit being that of getting possession so secured and also incidentally depriving the other party of the benefit under the law which but for the dispossession he will have of retaining such possession till the person who wants to wrest it from him, proves a better title; (2) that the law and orderly administration of the country require that possession even by the owner of the property should be taken by adopting the process prescribed by law and not by mere self-help.”

11. After considering the scope of Section 9, and after observing all the legal position on merits, this Court held that the plaintiff therein has failed to express the intention to hold the demised property and he has not objected for removal of his articles from the property. The specific contention of the plaintiff therein was also taken note of and Court has observed that the plaintiff therein has only sought for damages caused by way of loss of profits, and accordingly the plaintiff therein had failed to establish the juridical possession of the property, at the time when he was actually dispossessed. Therefore, the plaintiff therein cannot complain dispossession and claim relief under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.

12. In M.C.Chockalingam and others vs. V.Manickavasagam and others cited supra, the Apex Court has considered the scope of Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas Act (Regulations) Rules, 1957 and after considering the arguments advanced by the parties therein, by comparing the relief to be granted to the persons dispossessed under Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulations) Rules, 1957 with Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, observed in paragraph 14 as follows:

                     “14. Mr. Gupte strenuously submits that 'lawful possession' cannot be diverced from an affirmative positive legal right to possess the property and since the lease had expired by efflux of time that a tenant in this case had no legal right to continue in possession. In the context of rule 13, we are clearly of _opinion that a tenant on the expiry of the lease cannot be said to continue in 'lawful possession' of the property against the wishes of the landlord if such a possession, is not otherwise statutorily protected tinder the law against even lawful eviction through court process, such as under the Rent Control Act. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act does not offer such protection, but only, as stated earlier, forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title.”

13. In Anamallai Club vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others cited supra, the Apex Court has considered the power of the Government to resume the possession unilaterally and evicting the tenants including the meaning of the phrase “Due Course of Law” and after discussing the previous judgments of the Apex Court, observed in paragraph No.6 as follows:

                     “6. In Lallu Yeshwant Singh vs. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. [(1968) 2 SCR 203], a Bench of this Court had considered the same question after reviewing the case law in that behalf and held that the Government cannot take possession of the land except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act. In that case, the recourse to the provisions under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (Section 6 of the present Specific Relief Act, 1963) was upheld. The question was also considered by this Court by one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.) in East India Hotels Ltd. vs. Syndicate Bank [1992 Supp. (2) 29 at 44]. It was held in paragraph 29, 30 and 32 that:

                     "They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper course. In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 is summary and its object is to prevent self help and to discourage people in adopt any means fair or foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in due course of law or with consent.

                     What is meant by due course of law?

                     Due course of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the powers by duly constituted tribunal or court in accordance with the procedure established by law under such safeguards of the protection of individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a tribunal competent by its constitution, that is by law of its creation, to pass upon the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, it must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. Due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof, every material fat which bears on the question of fact or liability be conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law in a comprehensive sense.

                     It is thus clear that the course have viewed with askance any process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent. The reason is obvious that it aims to preserve the efficacy of law and peace and order in the society relegating the jurisprudential perspectives to a suit under Section 6 of the Act and restitute possession to the person dispossessed, irrespective of the fact wether the has any title to possession or not."

14. In S.R. Ejaz vs. The Tamil Nadu Handloom cited supra, the Apex Court after considering the scope of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has held that, if the person, who was in possession of the premises was forcibly dispossessed, in such circumstances the relief under Section 6 of the Act would be appropriate and further held that the plaintiff therein has to satisfy the twin condition incorporated therein.

15. In Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Others vs. Gulbhar Sheiekh and others [2004 (4) SCC 664], the Apex Court reiterated that the enquiry in the suit under Section 6 shall only be confined to finding out the possession and dispossession within a period six months from the date of the institution of the suit, ignoring the question of title. The unsuccessful party in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act shall only file a regular suit based on title to get possession and the remedy of filing a revision is available, and High Court would not interfere with a decree or order under Section 6 of the Act, except on a case for interference being made out within the well settled parameters of the exercise of Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:

                     “A suit under Section 6 of the Act is often called a summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit under Section 6 is confined to finding out the possession and dispossession within a period of six months from the date of the institution of the suit ignoring the question of title. Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section. No review of any such order or decree is permitted. The remedy of a person unsuccessful in a suit under Section 6 of the Act is to file a regular suit establishing his title to the suit property and in the event of his succeeding he will be entitled to recover possession of the property notwithstanding the adverse decision under Section 6 of the Act. Thus, as against a decision under Section 6 of the Act, the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a suit based on title. The remedy of filing a revision is available but that is only by way of an exception; for the High Court would not interfere with a decree or order under Section 6 of the Act except on a case for interference being made out within the well settled parameters of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code.”

16. Admittedly in the case in hand, the plaintiff has come forward to file a suit within the period of 6 months from the date of dispossession. According to the plaintiff, the consent obtained for taking possession of the demised property by the first defendant is based on false representation made by the first defendant. The plaintiff specifically pleaded and adduced evidence that his consent has been obtained by the first defendant by making false representation and he relied on subsequent conduct of the first defendant that without any intention to perform the promise, the first defendant had given undertaking that he need the building for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, and after that the plaintiff would be accommodated in the new building as tenant. According to him this promise is made in order to vacate the plaintiff from the demised premises.

17. The object and scope of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is well settled, and apply if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law. This Section emphasis that a person seeks possession shall get the consent of the person, who is in possession of the immovable property. If there is no consent from the possessor, then the person seeking possession, including the real owner of the property has to take steps to dispossess him, only by due course of law. In the case in hand, the plaintiff has stated that he has handed over the possession of the property to the first defendant only based on the fraudulent statement given by the first defendant, hence the consent relied on by the first defendant is not a valid or free consent. However, the first defendant has relied on the endorsement made by the plaintiff in the agreement/ Ex.A.14 and claimed that the plaintiff has given consent and voluntarily surrendered the demised premises to the first defendant.

18. Before the Trial Court, the first defendant has not established his case that the plaintiff has defaulted in payment of rents, thereby the possession of the suit premises was handed over to him by the plaintiff. But he has deposed that, based on consent of the plaintiff, he took possession of the property and had subsequently let out the same to the second defendant. Admittedly before vacating the suit premises, the plaintiff has entered into an agreement dated 20.12.2018/ Ex.A.14 with the first defendant, though first defendant contend that receipt of Ex.A.14 as evidence is not proper since same is unregistered. Even in the absence of Ex.A.14, it is admitted fact that, the possession was handed over to the first defendant, only based on the undertaking that, the shop and the building would be demolished and reconstructed. After reconstruction, a shop in the newly constructed building would be allocated to the plaintiff. Though the first defendant claims that he was not able to demolish and reconstruct the building due to financial constraint, he has let out the suit premises to the second defendant, but to substantiate his bonafide intention, the first defendant has not produced any iota of evidence, before the Trial Court.

19. The conduct of the first defendant, after entering into an agreement with the plaintiff and subsequently, leasing out the suit property to the second defendant clearly indicates that the first defendant has made a promise to the plaintiff without any intention to comply the same and only in order to get consent and to vacate the plaintiff from the demised property, probablise the fact that the first defendant has made false representation to dispossess the plaintiff.

20. If the first defendant is not in a position to demolish and reconstruct the building due to financial constraint, he ought to have once again handed over the possession of the suit premises back to the plaintiff, whereas the first defendant has chosen to let out the very same suit premises to the second defendant, which clearly exhibits his malafide intention, and that he has taken possession of the suit property by illegal means by playing fraud. Therefore, the consent claimed by the first defendant is not a valid consent and the same is obtained by making false representation.

21. As per legal maxim that, ‘No one can take advantage of his own wrong’, the first defendant shall not be entitled to claim that he obtained the possession of the property voluntarily. Since the consent obtained is based on false representation and by playing fraud on the plaintiff, he is barred to rely on such dispossession. The Trial Court, after appreciating the above facts in proper perspective held that the suit is maintainable and the findings rendered by the Trial Court is based on sound principle of law and also based on proper appreciation of evidence. Hence, this Court finds that there is no infirmity or illegality in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, directing the first defendant to redeliver the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff.

22. It is also contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/ first defendant that the Trial Court has directed the second defendant to vacate the suit property and hand over the same to the plaintiff, when no such relief had been sought as against the second defendant in the plaint.

23. Admittedly, the second defendant was a party to the proceedings and the plaintiff has sought for the relief of re-delivery of possession of the suit property in his favour and he has also prayed for permanent injunction against the second defendant from opening a shop or doing business or any commercial activities in the suit property. Since the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of the suit property, the Trial Court is empowered to modify or mold consequential relief.

24. In this case, the Trial Court has ordered the first defendant to redeliver the possession of the suit property, it could be complied, only after vacating the second defendant herein from the suit property. The second defendant is already a party to the suit and he has not come forward to challenge the decree passed against him, andg the direction to vacate and hand over the possession to the plaintiff. In such a view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner/ first defendant, and challenging the direction issued to the second defendant to vacate and hand over the suit property to the plaintiff has no merits.

25. In view of the above discussions, this Court finds that there is no infirmity and illegality in the order of the Trial Court. Accordingly, this civil revision petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected civil miscellaneous petition stands closed. There shall be no order as to costs.