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CDJ 2026 BHC 2177 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : In the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
Case No : Criminal Application (APL) No. 824 of 2017
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.W. CHANDWANI
Parties : Vijay & Others Versus The State of Maharashtra, through Police Station City Officer/In-charge, P. S. Chandrapur, Chandrapur & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Applicants: S.O. Ahmed, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, N.H. Joshi, AGP, R2, None.
Date of Judgment : 31-07-2026
Head Note :-
Criminal Procedure Code - Section 482 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 BHC-NAG 9920,
Judgment :-

Oral Judgment:

1. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsels for the parties.

2. The application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) seeks quashing of First Information Report (FIR) No. 168/2017 registered with Police Station Chandrapur City, Dist. Chandrapur for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and consequent Charge-sheet No. 88/2017 filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandrapur arising out of the said FIR.

3. The brief facts of the case, as per the FIR, are as under:-

                   i) Applicant no.1 is the father-in-law, applicant no.2 is the wife of the brother-in-law, applicant no. 3 is the brother-in-law and applicant no.4 is the sister-in-law of the complainant/non-applicant no.2. It appears that applicant nos.1 and 3 have passed away during the pendency of the application. Therefore, their names were deleted from the array of the applicants.

                    ii) The marriage of the complainant with co-accused namely Chandrashekhar S/o. Vijay Pethkar was solemnized in May-2012. Out of the said wedlock, the complainant and co-accused-husband were blessed with two children. On 21.01.2017, the complainant lodged the FIR with the Police Station alleging that co-accused- husband started harassing her after birth of their first child. He used to ask the complainant to bring dowry from her paternal house. On this count, he also used to oust the complainant from her matrimonial house. Applicant nos. 2 and 4 alongwith the deceased applicant nos. 1 and 3 used to instigate co-accused-husband. All of them used to tell the complainant to behave and do whatever co-accused-husband asks her to do. It is also alleged that the applicants used to harass the complainant by asking her to bring dowry from her paternal house. Therefore, on the complaint lodged by the complainant, the aforesaid offence came to be registered against the applicants.

4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that there are no specific allegations against applicant nos. 2 and 4, the wife of the brother-in-law and the sister-in-law of the complainant respectively. The allegations are made against them by means of omnibus statement. It is also stated that applicant no.2 resides in the same house as the complainant however, their living arrangement is such that they reside in separately partitioned area. It is also contended that applicant no.4 is the married sister-in-law of the complainant and that she was residing separately at Wani and nowhere involved in the aforesaid offence. It is further contended that independent witnesses have made statements alleging that it is the complainant who used to harass co-accused-husband and his family members. Therefore, according to him, the ingredients of offence under Section 498A of the IPC are not made out against applicant nos. 2 and 4.

5. Per contra, the learned APP submitted that the FIR clearly speaks about harassment of the complainant at the hands of the applicant nos. 2 and 4. Therefore, according to him, a fair conclusion can be drawn out only after the trial concludes. He also stated that the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicants can be appreciated during the trial. Hence, sought rejection of the application.

6. At the outset it is to be noted that the husband is not the applicant here. The application is made by the relatives of the husband, who is a co-accused. Perusal of the charge-sheet indicates that the marriage of the complainant with co-accused-husband was solemnized in May-2012 rather two issues were born out of the said wedlock. There are allegations against co-accused-husband of firstly asking to bring dowry from the paternal house of the complainant and secondly of assaulting and ousting the complainant from her matrimonial house.

7. The allegation against applicant nos. 2 and 4 are that they along with other deceased applicants used to instigate co-accused-husband and also used to threaten the complainant to behave as per the will and wish of co-accused-husband. Further, by means of omnibus statements made in a sweeping way in one sentence, it has been alleged that the applicants were harassing and asking the complainant to bring dowry from her paternal house. There is no specific incident of harassment mentioned by the complainant against applicant nos.2 and 4. In the statement of the complainant she alleged that all the applicants used to harass her in chorus for bringing dowry from her paternal house.

8. Further, no detail with regard to the date, time and year has been given by the complainant in her complaint or in the supplementary statement recorded by the Police. What exact words were used by each of the applicants are not stated by the complainant anywhere in the record. Neither the articles or amount of dowry allegedly asked by the applicants is mentioned in the FIR or in the statement of any witness. It is alleged in generic terms that they in chorus instigated co-accused-husband and he used to harass her for bringing dowry. Furthermore, it is a matter of record, rather the FIR itself suggest that applicant nos. 2 and 4 were residing separately from co-accused- husband and the complainant.

9. Above all, in the statement of Suman Damodar Jaipurkar, a neighbor of the applicants and an independent witness, she has categorically stated that the complainant was not residing with co-accused- husband and used to intermittently come to her in-laws’ house and the complainant and co-accused- husband used to quarrel because the complainant was pressurizing co-accused- husband for demanding money from applicant no.1. It appears that applicant no.1 was working at the Western Coalfield Ltd., he had received a huge amount at the time of his retirement. The statement, which is recorded by the Investigating Agency itself demolish the case of the complainant. Rather, it appears that the reason for lodging the complaint is something else, perhaps merely to harass the family members of co-accused- husband the complainant has lodged the FIR.

10. It may be mentioned that in the case of Kahakashan Kausar @Sonam and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors, [(2022) 6 SCC 599], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498A of the IPC and increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analyzing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is held that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. The Apex Court has, therefore, warned the Courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

11. It would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs. State of Telangana & Anr. [2024 SCC Online SCC 3682], wherein in para Nos.20 and 27 it has been observed as under :

                   “20. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

                   . . . . . . . . .

                   27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.”

12. Merely making vague and omnibus statement that the present applicants and her husband asked the complainant to bring money and they in chorus harassed her mentally and physically without any other corroborating material is not sufficient to initiate criminal proceeding against the applicants. There is no other material in the entire charge-sheet, except the said vague and general statements against the applicants. Sweeping accusations without concrete evidence or particularized allegations, cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution.

13. The present case is one of such cases wherein all the relatives of the husband are dragged in the matrimonial dispute without there being specific allegations against them for subjecting complainant to cruelty within the meaning of Clause (a) or (b) of explanation to Section 498A of the IPC. In the absence of such material, subjecting these applicants to face criminal trial will be an abuse of the process of Court. Hence, in my considered view, this is a fit case to exercise discretion under Section 482 of the CrPC to prevent the abuse of the process of Court.

14. At this stage, a reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], wherein the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR were discussed and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under:—

                   “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

                   (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

                   (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

                   (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

                   (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

                   (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

                   (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

                   (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

15. In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that a case is made out for exercising the inherent powers of this Court and preventing the abuse of process of law by quashing the FIR and consequent charge-sheet against the applicants. Hence, I proceed to pass the following order:-

i) The application is allowed.

ii) FIR No. 168/2017 registered with Police Station Chandrapur City for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and consequent Charge-sheet No. 88/2017 arising out of the said FIR is hereby quashed against applicant nos.2 and 4.

iii) Rule is made absolute in the above-said terms.

 
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