1.. By way of filing the instant appeals under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the respective appellants have called in question the order dated 29.05.2026 passed by learned District Judge, Pali in Civil Misc. Case No. 97/2026 titled Shri Vishwakarma Jangid Samaj Seva Samiti, Pali & Ors. Vs. Ramchandra Pidwa & Ors., whereby the application preferred under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC came to be partly allowed.

2. The underlying suit has been instituted in relation to the management, administration and office-bearers of Shri Vishwakarma Jangid Samaj Seva Samiti, Pali (hereinafter referred to as “the Society”), which is stated to be a registered society under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958, bearing Registration No. 44/68-69, with its certificate of registration having been issued on 06.06.1968. As per the bye-laws/constitution of the Society, its Executive Committee comprises, inter alia, the posts of Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer.

3. The dispute between the parties principally concerns the validity of the amendment made in the bye-laws/constitution of the Society and the elections conducted thereafter. The plaintiffs-appellants in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2506/2026 claimed that respondent No.1(Shri Ramchandra Pidwa), who had been functioning as Chairperson during the preceding tenure, had caused amendments to the bye-laws/constitution of the Society, which were approved/recorded by the Registrar of Societies, Pali on 23.01.2026. According to the plaintiffs, the amendment introduced, inter alia, a permanent membership amount of Rs.200/- and altered the tenure of the Executive Committee to three years, and such amendment was made without the requisite approval of the general house.

4. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that, on 05.03.2026, a meeting of the general house of the Society was convened in connection with the proposed elections and that, thereafter, an election notification was issued on 07.03.2026. According to the plaintiffs, elections were thereafter declared unopposed on 09.03.2026, wherein Mohanram S/o Jetharam was declared elected as Chairperson, Omprakash Jangid as Secretary and Amarchand Sharma as Treasurer for the year 2026. The plaintiffs questioned the subsequent election process under which respondent No.1 and other office-bearers came to be shown as elected.

5. On the other hand, the contesting defendants asserted that the general house meeting had duly been convened prior to the amendment of the bye-laws/constitution and that the proposed amendments had been approved in the meeting of the general house. It was further asserted that the requisite intimation was thereafter submitted to the Registrar of Societies, Pali, who recorded the amendments on 23.01.2026. According to the defendants, no objection was raised by the plaintiffs despite their knowledge of and participation in the general house proceedings.

6. The defendants further asserted that the tenure of the then Executive Committee was to expire on 10.03.2026 and, in accordance with the applicable bye-laws, the election process was commenced within the prescribed period. The election notification was issued on 07.03.2026, the voter list was finalised and the election was conducted, resulting in respondent No.1 being declared elected as Chairperson along with the other office-bearers and members of the Executive Committee. The newly constituted Executive Committee was intimated to the Registrar on 11.03.2026, and on 19.03.2026 the Registrar made the corresponding entries in favour of respondent No.1 and the other elected office-bearers. According to the defendants, such entries continue to subsist.

7. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking, inter alia, reliefs of declaration, perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction and also preferred an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC on 21.04.2026. The plaintiffs sought interim protection in relation to the management and affairs of the Society. The defendants contested the application and disputed the plaintiffs' entitlement to any interim relief.

8. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned order dated 29.05.2026. By the said order, the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was partly allowed and the Additional District Magistrate, Pali was directed to manage the affairs of the Society. The learned Trial Court further directed the parties to hand over the keys of the immovable properties and office of the Society, bank account details, cheque books, account statements, proceedings register and other relevant records to the Additional District Magistrate within a period of eight days.

9. The aforesaid order dated 29.05.2026 has resulted in two separate appeals at the instance of the contesting sides. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2032/2026 has been preferred by the persons aggrieved by the direction transferring the management, properties, accounts and records of the Society to the Additional District Magistrate, Pali, whereas S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2506/2026 has been preferred by the plaintiffs seeking appropriate interim protection in respect of the disputed management and office-bearers of the Society.

10. Thus, both the appeals arise out of the same impugned order dated 29.05.2026 passed in Civil Misc. Case No. 97/2026 and concern the rival claims of the parties regarding the administration and management of the Society, the validity of the amendment to its bye-laws/constitution and the elections conducted pursuant thereto.

11. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record.

12. At the outset, it is required to be borne in mind that the controversy involved in the present proceedings primarily pertains to the rival claims of the parties with regard to the validity of the amendment in the bye-laws/constitution of the Society and the elections allegedly conducted pursuant thereto. The learned Trial Court, while considering the application for temporary injunction, was not required to finally adjudicate upon the validity of the said amendment or the legality of the election. Those questions are matters for adjudication in the main suit. At the interlocutory stage, the Court was required to examine the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and the likelihood of irreparable injury, while also ensuring that the interim arrangement does not, in substance, confer upon one party a relief which could not have been granted without finally adjudicating the underlying controversy.

13. In the present case, the material placed on record indicates that the election process had already been undertaken before the institution of the suit and that, pursuant to the election, respondent No.1-Ramchandra Pidwa and the other office-bearers were declared elected. Significantly, the result of the election was not merely an internal assertion of the contesting defendants. The newly constituted Executive Committee was intimated to the Registrar of Societies on 11.03.2026 and, thereafter, on 19.03.2026, the concerned authority made the corresponding entries in its records in respect of respondent No.1 and the other elected office-bearers. Thus, as on the date when the learned Trial Court proceeded to consider the application for interim relief, there existed a completed election process followed by an intimation to and corresponding certification/recording by the competent departmental authority. The said subsequent official act assumes considerable significance while considering the question as to who should continue to administer the affairs of the Society during the pendency of the suit.

14. It is true that the plaintiffs have questioned the very foundation of the election by assailing the amendment in the bye-laws and the election process undertaken thereafter. However, merely because the validity of the election has been questioned in the suit, the election cannot, at the interlocutory stage, be treated as non-existent, particularly when the election had already been conducted and the resultant office-bearers had been intimated to the competent authority and corresponding entries had been made in the official record. Whether the amendment was validly carried out, whether the general house had requisite authority to approve the amendment, whether the election notification was validly issued, whether the voter list was properly finalised, whether the election was conducted in accordance with the governing bye-laws and, consequently, whether the election of respondent No.1 and the other office-bearers is legally sustainable, are all questions which require evidence and proper adjudication in the main suit. This Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against an interlocutory order, ought not to prejudge those issues.

15. The principle that emerges in such circumstances is equally well settled in its application: what cannot be done directly cannot ordinarily be permitted to be achieved indirectly through an interlocutory order. If the ultimate effect of an interim order is to displace an elected office-bearer, suspend the effect of an election or virtually nullify an election without the controversy regarding its legality having been finally adjudicated, the interlocutory jurisdiction would, in substance, be converted into a mechanism for granting final relief. Such a course would be particularly inappropriate where the election has already taken place and the resultant office-bearers have been recognised/entered in the records of the competent authority.

16. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the direction issued by the learned Trial Court appointing the Additional District Magistrate, Pali to manage the affairs of the Society does not appear to be justified. The learned Trial Court has, in effect, displaced the existing elected management and vested the administration of the Society, its properties, bank accounts, records and other affairs in an administrative officer. The consequences of such an order are far-reaching. It does not merely preserve the subject matter of the suit; rather, it substantially alters the existing state of affairs and removes from management the persons who had emerged successful in the election process. The direction to hand over the keys of the properties and office, bank account details, cheque books, account statements, proceedings register and other records further demonstrates that the impugned order has the effect of transferring the entire control and administration of the Society during the pendency of the suit.

17. The question, therefore, is not merely whether there is a dispute regarding the election. There undoubtedly is such a dispute, and the plaintiffs are entitled to have the same adjudicated in accordance with law. The material question at this interlocutory stage is as to what arrangement should prevail until such adjudication. In this regard, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the election process had already culminated and the result thereof had been followed by the corresponding departmental action dated 19.03.2026. Once such an election has taken place and the competent authority has acted upon the result, the appropriate course, prima facie, would be to preserve the position emerging from the election rather than to substitute it by an entirely new administrative arrangement, unless compelling circumstances warranting such exceptional interference are demonstrated.

18. The existence of a dispute regarding the legality of the election by itself cannot furnish sufficient justification for appointing an outsider/administrative officer to take over the management of the Society. If such a course were routinely adopted merely upon institution of a suit challenging an election, every disputed election could be rendered ineffective by obtaining an interim order and the elected body could be prevented from functioning without the election dispute ever being tried. Such an approach would not only disturb the statutory and internal scheme governing the Society but would also permit an interlocutory order to achieve substantially the same consequence which could ultimately follow only upon a decree setting aside the election.

19. There is another important aspect of the matter. The record, as presently available, does not suggest that, as on the date of the impugned order, the election had been set aside by the competent authority or by any Court. On the contrary, the election had already been conducted, respondent No.1 had been declared elected, and the resultant change had been intimated to the Registrar, who made the corresponding entries on 19.03.2026. Therefore, unless and until the said election is declared invalid in the main proceedings, the Court at the interim stage must be slow in treating the elected office-bearers as having no authority whatsoever to administer the affairs of the Society.

20. The contention raised by the appellants in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2506/2026 that their claimed election should be given effect to at this stage also cannot be accepted in the manner sought. The plaintiffs may have placed material in support of their assertion that an election was earlier declared unopposed in their favour; however, that rival claim itself forms part of the very controversy which is required to be adjudicated in the suit. This Court cannot, at the interlocutory stage, finally pronounce upon which of the rival elections is legally valid. To accept one disputed election as conclusive and to put the claimants thereunder in exclusive control of the Society would equally amount to granting an interim relief which substantially determines the ultimate controversy.

21. The distinction, therefore, is between preserving the existing state of affairs and creating a new state of affairs by an interim order. The former is ordinarily the object of interlocutory jurisdiction, whereas the latter requires exceptional justification. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, instead of preserving the position which had emerged after the election and the subsequent departmental recording thereof, directed the Additional District Magistrate to take over the entire administration. Such a direction cannot be sustained merely because the parties have raised serious allegations against each other's election process. Those allegations are required to be tested on evidence in the main suit.

22. The balance of convenience also weighs against the continuation of the impugned arrangement. The elected management had already come into existence before the passing of the order dated 29.05.2026. The competent authority had been informed of the election and had made corresponding entries in its record on 19.03.2026. Thus, the appointment of the Additional District Magistrate has disturbed a position which had already crystallised. On the other hand, permitting the person who was managing the affairs pursuant to the election to continue, subject to the final decision in the suit, would preserve continuity in the administration of the Society without foreclosing the rights of either party. If ultimately the plaintiffs succeed in establishing that the election or the amendment was invalid, appropriate consequential relief can always be granted by the competent Court.

23. There is yet another significant aspect which emerges from the material and the submissions advanced before this Court. During the course of arguments, it came to light that the documents and records of the Society, including the bank account details, cheque books and other relevant papers, were already in the possession of the appellant/respondent No.1, who was functioning in the capacity of the office-bearer pursuant to the election in question. The learned Trial Court, nevertheless, directed that such documents, records, cheque books and other material be taken from his possession and handed over to the Additional District Magistrate, Pali. Thus, the impugned direction does not operate merely to preserve the property, records or affairs of the Society in the condition in which they existed on the date of institution of the suit; rather, it expressly disturbs the existing possession and control and transfers the same to a third party.

24. The distinction assumes considerable significance at the interlocutory stage. The present case is not one where the Society's properties, records, bank accounts or other documents were lying unattended, were in the possession of an unauthorised stranger, or were otherwise shown to be in imminent danger of being alienated, dissipated or destroyed, so as to warrant their protective custody as a measure of preservation. On the contrary, the material indicates that the aforesaid documents and affairs were already under the control and possession of the person who was claiming to be the duly elected office-bearer and whose election had, as noticed hereinabove, been intimated to and recorded by the competent authority. In such circumstances, merely because the rival claimants have questioned the legality of the election, the existing possession could not, as an interim measure, be displaced and transferred to an administrative officer without demonstrating circumstances of such exceptional nature as would justify such an extraordinary course.

25. The very object of an interim injunction is to protect the subject matter of the litigation and to maintain the position so as to prevent its alteration during the pendency of the proceedings. It is not ordinarily intended to dispossess a person who is presently in control of the subject matter and to confer such control upon a third party. If the apprehension was that the Society's properties, records or financial instruments required protection, appropriate protective directions could certainly have been considered, consistent with the object of preserving the subject matter of the suit. However, directing that the documents, bank account details, cheque books, registers and other records be taken away from the existing possession and handed over to the Additional District Magistrate travels substantially beyond the limited purpose of preservation.

26. More importantly, the direction to hand over the aforesaid material to the Additional District Magistrate cannot be viewed in isolation from the direction simultaneously vesting the management of the Society in him. The cumulative effect of the impugned order is that the person who was already in possession and control of the affairs of the Society has been divested of such control and an administrative officer has been placed in his stead. Such an arrangement does not merely preserve the status quo; it creates a new state of affairs during the pendency of the suit. The Court, while exercising interlocutory jurisdiction, has to remain conscious of the limits of such jurisdiction and cannot, under the guise of protecting the subject matter, grant a relief which substantially alters the existing position between the parties.

27. At this stage, the learned Trial Court appears to have further misdirected itself in appreciating the true nature and legal effect of the relief which it proceeded to grant. The power of appointing a receiver in a civil proceeding is a distinct and discretionary power governed by Order XL CPC and is required to be exercised with great caution and circumspection. Appointment of a receiver ordinarily entails taking the property, subject matter or management out of the existing possession or control and placing the same in the custody and management of a person appointed by the Court. Such a drastic course is not to be adopted merely because a dispute exists between the parties; ordinarily, the applicant seeking such extraordinary protection is required to establish a strong prima facie case and demonstrate circumstances indicating imminent danger of loss, injury, dissipation or mismanagement of the property so as to make judicial intervention by way of receivership necessary.

28. Equally important is the scope within which the learned Trial Court was required to exercise its jurisdiction. The application before it was one under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC. The Court, while dealing with such an application, was required to remain conscious of the relief actually prayed for by the parties as well as the factual circumstances which could legally warrant such relief. The interlocutory jurisdiction has to operate within the confines of the prayer and the circumstances established before the Court; it cannot be enlarged to grant a relief substantially different from, or travelling beyond, what was sought by the parties, particularly where such relief carries more serious and far-reaching consequences.

29. In other words, the learned Trial Court was required to examine what interim relief had actually been sought under Order XXXIX, whether the facts and circumstances of the case warranted such interim protection, and whether the relief proposed to be granted could legitimately be moulded within the scope of the application. The Court was not required, at that stage, to travel beyond the permissible ambit of the interlocutory proceedings or to devise an altogether different mechanism for achieving a result which could not have been granted directly. More particularly, where the ultimate relief in the suit is of a mandatory nature, the Court has to exercise particular caution to ensure that such final relief is not effectively granted at the interim stage under another nomenclature.

30. The position becomes more significant in the present case because the learned Trial Court itself appears to have proceeded on the premise that a mandatory relief could not ordinarily be granted at the interlocutory stage in the absence of the requisite exceptional circumstances. Having so appreciated the limited scope of interim jurisdiction, the learned Trial Court could not, thereafter, circumvent that limitation by adopting another route and directing appointment of an administrative functionary to take over the management and custody of the Society's properties, bank accounts, cheque books and records. Such a course would, in substance, amount to achieving indirectly what the Court could not have granted directly.

31. Significantly, neither the plaintiffs had sought appointment of a receiver nor had they prayed that the management, properties, bank accounts, cheque books, documents and records of the Society be removed from the existing possession and handed over to a third party. Equally, the facts and circumstances emerging from the record do not disclose such an exceptional situation as would independently warrant the Court to assume control over the Society's affairs through an administrative officer. Thus, there was neither a corresponding prayer by the parties nor a factual foundation warranting such an extraordinary order. Nevertheless, in the guise of exercising jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, the learned Trial Court has passed an order which, in its substance and practical operation, travels into the field governed by Order XL CPC.

32. The nomenclature employed in the impugned order cannot determine its true legal character. What is required to be examined is the substance and effect of the direction. In the present case, the Additional District Magistrate has not merely been directed to take protective measures in relation to any identified property; he has been directed to manage the affairs of the Society, while the existing office-bearer has simultaneously been directed to surrender the keys of the Society's properties and office, bank account details, cheque books, account statements, proceedings register and other relevant records. Such a direction, in substance, removes the existing possession and control from one side and places the same in the hands of a Court-directed third party. The practical effect is, therefore, virtually that of appointing a receiver, notwithstanding that no such relief was sought and no independent consideration under Order XL CPC appears to have been undertaken.

33. The learned District Judge, therefore, appears to have conflated two distinct jurisdictions. The jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is directed towards granting temporary and protective relief for preservation of the subject matter and prevention of injury during the pendency of the suit, whereas the appointment of a receiver under Order XL CPC constitutes a substantially more intrusive form of interlocutory intervention whereby possession, custody or management may be removed from the existing hands and entrusted to a person appointed by the Court. The latter power, being extraordinary in nature, cannot be exercised indirectly merely by describing the resulting direction as an order of temporary injunction.

34. The distinction is not merely technical. If, while considering an application for temporary injunction, the Court were permitted to remove the existing possessor from the management and custody of the subject matter and to vest the same in a third party without satisfying the requirements applicable to receivership, the safeguards governing the exercise of the power under Order XL CPC would be rendered otiose. Such a course would permit a party to obtain, through an application under Order XXXIX, a relief which is substantially different in nature and far more intrusive than the relief contemplated by the provisions under which the application was made. Jurisdiction cannot be enlarged merely by the form in which an order is expressed.

35. In the present case, therefore, the direction to take away the Society's documents, bank account details, cheque books, registers and other records from the person already in possession and to place the same with the Additional District Magistrate, coupled with the direction to the latter to manage the affairs of the Society, cannot be regarded as a mere order for preservation of the subject matter. It virtually amounts to an order of appointment of a receiver or, at the very least, an arrangement substantially analogous thereto. Such a relief, when neither prayed for nor shown to be necessitated by the circumstances of the case, could not have been granted merely in exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

36. There is also no apparent justification, at least from the material presently available, for unnecessarily bringing the governmental machinery into the internal affairs of a private society when the dispute is essentially between rival sets of persons claiming authority to administer the Society. Governmental and administrative functionaries have their own statutory and public responsibilities, and their involvement in the day-to-day management of a private society ought not to be directed as a matter of routine, particularly when no statutory necessity or exceptional circumstance requiring such intervention has been demonstrated. The mere existence of a dispute between rival claimants cannot, by itself, justify transferring the Society's management and its properties, accounts and records to an administrative officer.

37. If the concern of the learned Trial Court was only to ensure that the Society's properties, records and affairs remained protected during the pendency of the suit, such object could have been achieved, if warranted, by adopting a less intrusive measure which did not disturb the existing possession and management. Where the property and records are already in possession and control of one of the contesting parties, taking them away from such possession and placing them in the custody of a third party necessarily amounts to a substantive alteration of the existing position rather than its preservation. The distinction between preservation of the subject matter and displacement of its existing possession could not have been overlooked while exercising interlocutory jurisdiction.

38. The consequence becomes even more apparent when the nature of the relief sought in the suit is taken into consideration. The plaintiffs have themselves sought, inter alia, reliefs of declaration, perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction in respect of the management and affairs of the Society. At the interlocutory stage, therefore, an order which requires the existing office-bearer to surrender the Society's documents, bank account details, cheque books, records and control of its affairs, and simultaneously places those affairs in the hands of an outsider, substantially gives effect to the very nature of a mandatory relief. Such a course cannot ordinarily be adopted merely as an interim arrangement, particularly when the entitlement of either side to exercise such control is itself the subject matter of adjudication in the main suit.

39. In substance, therefore, the impugned direction proceeds not on the principle of preserving what exists, but on the premise of taking away what is already in the possession and control of one party and placing it with a third party. The distinction is crucial. Interim jurisdiction cannot be utilised to dispossess one claimant, confer control upon another or create an altogether different administrative arrangement unless the circumstances are of such compelling nature that such extraordinary intervention becomes indispensable for protecting the subject matter of the litigation. No such compelling circumstance is apparent from the material presently before this Court.

40. The impugned order, viewed from this perspective, suffers from the further infirmity that the learned Trial Court has not demonstrated why the existing possession and control could not have been preserved subject to appropriate safeguards, nor why the drastic step of transferring the Society's documents, financial instruments, records and administration to the Additional District Magistrate was necessary for securing the ends of interlocutory protection. More significantly, the learned Trial Court, while purporting to exercise jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, has effectively granted a relief in the nature of receivership without the prayer for such relief, without recording circumstances warranting such extraordinary intervention and without undertaking the requisite examination applicable to the exercise of power under Order XL CPC.

41. Thus, the learned District Judge has, in substance, passed an order of appointment of a receiver while ostensibly deciding an application for temporary injunction. Such an exercise amounts to a material misdirection in law and constitutes an impermissible expansion of the interlocutory jurisdiction vested in the Court. The impugned direction, being substantially in the nature of receivership and mandatory in its operation, could not have been sustained merely by invoking Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC.

42. Consequently, the impugned order, insofar as it removes the existing possession and control of the Society's properties, accounts, documents and records from the appellant/respondent No.1 and vests the management thereof in the Additional District Magistrate, Pali, is legally unsustainable. The direction does not preserve the status quo; rather, it substantially alters it and grants, at the interlocutory stage, a relief which is virtually mandatory and in substance akin to appointment of a receiver. Such an exercise, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is bad in law and cannot be permitted to stand merely because it has been couched as an order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

43. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle governing exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order XLIII CPC that an appellate Court ordinarily ought not to substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court merely because another view may also be possible. The discretion vested in the Court of first instance is required to be respected and ordinarily interfered with only where the same has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, on irrelevant considerations, by ignoring material considerations, or in disregard of settled principles governing the exercise of such jurisdiction. However, judicial discretion, by its very nature, is not an unstructured or unbounded discretion; it is a discretion which must be exercised judiciously, reasonably and within the confines of law. Where the exercise of such discretion ceases to bear the character of a judicial determination and is vitiated by a patent error of law, jurisdictional overreach or an approach which no judicially prudent Court, properly directing itself to the relevant considerations, could reasonably have adopted, such exercise of discretion cannot claim the protection ordinarily accorded to discretionary orders and becomes perverse and amenable to interference. The present case falls within that exceptional category. The learned Trial Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, has travelled beyond the relief actually prayed for and beyond the factual circumstances shown to exist, and has devised an altogether new arrangement by displacing the existing management and vesting the affairs of the Society in a governmental functionary. Neither was there a prayer seeking appointment of a receiver or vesting of the Society's management in an administrative officer, nor do the circumstances emerging from the record disclose any such compelling or exceptional situation as could legitimately invite invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction contemplated under Order XL CPC. The Court could not, by moulding an interim relief, create a case which the parties themselves had not set up and grant a relief which was neither prayed for nor warranted by the factual foundation of the proceedings. The impugned direction, therefore, is not merely an alternative exercise of discretion with which this Court may ordinarily be slow to interfere; rather, it suffers from a patent illegality and constitutes an excess of jurisdiction, inasmuch as the learned Trial Court has crossed the permissible boundaries of the jurisdiction invoked before it and has effectively entered into a field which was neither pleaded nor sought by the parties. The vice is further aggravated by the fact that, through the instrumentality of the State administration, the learned Trial Court has sought to intervene in and take over the internal affairs and management of a private Society arising out of an essentially inter se dispute between two rival sets of persons claiming authority within the same social organisation, without demonstrating any statutory necessity or exceptional circumstance warranting such governmental intervention. Such an unwarranted expansion of interlocutory jurisdiction cannot be sustained merely on the ground that the learned Trial Court was exercising discretion. Indeed, where the discretion is exercised in disregard of the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by law, contrary to the relief sought, in the absence of circumstances warranting such extraordinary intervention, and with the consequence of creating an entirely new state of affairs during the pendency of the suit, the resulting order is rendered perverse rather than merely discretionary. It is precisely in such a situation that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution assumes significance, for the constitutional power of superintendence is intended, inter alia, to ensure that subordinate Courts act within the bounds of their jurisdiction and to prevent patent illegality, manifest perversity and jurisdictional abuse from being allowed to operate under the guise of judicial discretion. The present case, therefore, is not one where this Court is substituting its own view merely because another view is possible; rather, it is a case where interference is necessitated because the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court has, in substance, travelled beyond the permissible limits of law and resulted in a relief which was neither sought nor legally warranted.

44. It is also necessary to emphasise that the present observations are confined strictly to the question of interim arrangement. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a final expression of opinion on the validity of the amendment to the bye-laws, the validity of the election conducted on 07.03.2026 or thereafter, the legality of the rival claim of election, or the entitlement of any particular person to hold the office of Chairperson or any other office in the Society. All such questions are expressly left open for determination by the learned Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings, evidence and material that may be brought on record in the main suit.

45. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the direction for appointment of the Additional District Magistrate, Pali to administer and manage the affairs of the Society cannot be permitted to operate during the pendency of the suit. The learned Trial Court, while exercising interlocutory jurisdiction, ought to have taken into consideration the fact that the election had already been conducted, that respondent No.1 and the other office-bearers had been declared elected, and that the resultant position had been communicated to and recorded by the competent departmental authority on 19.03.2026. In the absence of a final adjudication setting aside that election, displacing the elected management by an interim administrative arrangement was not warranted.

46. At the same time, this Court is not persuaded to grant the relief sought by the appellants in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2506/2026 in terms of recognising their rival claim and directing that they be put in management. Such a direction would suffer from the same infirmity in reverse, as it would effectively adjudicate upon the disputed election at an interlocutory stage. The proper course is to maintain the position which existed pursuant to the election already conducted and the corresponding departmental action, leaving the parties to establish their respective claims in the main suit.

47. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 29.05.2026, insofar as it directs the Additional District Magistrate, Pali to take over and manage the affairs of the Society and further directs handing over of the properties, keys, bank accounts, cheque books, records and other documents to the said officer, cannot be sustained and is accordingly liable to be set aside. The administration and management of the Society shall, therefore, remain with the person who was in charge pursuant to the election and the consequent departmental recording, i.e. respondent No.1-Ramchandra Pidwa, subject, however, to the final adjudication of the main suit. This arrangement shall not create or confer any equity in his favour and shall remain purely provisional.

48. The learned Trial Court is expected to proceed with the main suit expeditiously and endeavour to adjudicate the controversy concerning the amendment of the bye-laws, the rival election claims and the consequential entitlement to hold office, in accordance with law. The parties shall cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the suit and shall not seek unnecessary adjournments. Needless to observe, the learned Trial Court shall decide the suit uninfluenced by any observation made herein, which is confined solely to the determination of the appropriate interim arrangement.

49. Accordingly, S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2032/2026 is allowed. The order dated 29.05.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Pali in Civil Misc. Case No.97/2026, to the extent it directs the Additional District Magistrate, Pali to take over and administer the affairs of the Society and mandates handing over of the properties, accounts, records and other documents, is set aside.

50. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2506/2026 is dismissed. The interim arrangement shall remain as indicated hereinabove, namely, that the management and affairs of the Society shall continue with respondent No.1-Ramchandra Pidwa, subject to the final outcome of the main suit.

51. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are only prima facie in nature and shall not affect the independent adjudication of the main suit on merits. The learned Trial Court shall examine all questions relating to the validity of the amendment, the election process and the rival claims of the parties strictly on the basis of the evidence and material brought before it.