(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under clause 15 of letters patent, praying to prefer this memorandum of grounds of writ appeal against the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by Honourable MR.JUSTICE K.KUMARESH BABU, in W.P.(MD). No. 30911 of 2024, for the following among other grounds.)

C.V. Karthikeyan, J.

1. Aggrieved by the directions issued by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 10.09.2025 in W.P.(MD) No. 30911 of 2024, the present writ appeal has been preferred.

2. The said writ petition had been filed by the 1st respondent herein namely P.Jegan, who had been appointed as “Watchman” in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadar Higher Secondary School, Palayakuyavarpalayam Road, Madurai in the nature of certiorarified mandamus, seeking records relating to orders issued by the 4th respondent therein / 4th appellant herein / District Educational Officer, Secondary Education, Melur, Madurai District in March 2023 and to quash the same and to direct the 3rd respondent therein / 3rd appellant herein / The Chief Educational Officer, Madurai, to approve his appointment as “Watchman” with effect from 01.03.2021 in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadar Higher Secondary School, Palayakuyavarpalayam Road, Madurai and also to disburse grant in aid towards the salary and also all attendant benefits.

3. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it had been contended that the writ petitioner had been appointed as “Watchman” in the Virudhunagar Hindu Nadar Higher Secondary School, Palayakuyavarpalayam Road, Madurai from 01.03.2021 and the management had forwarded the said appointment seeking approval to the appellants herein. It had been stated that there was no response in spite of reminders being sent. The proposal was again resubmitted on 01.08.2022. The appellants herein placed reliance on G.O.(MS).No.238 School Education Department dated 13.11.2018 as a ground for refusing to grant approval. It must be immediately pointed out that G.O.(MS).No.238 School Education Department dated 13.11.2018 came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in a batch of writ petitions in W.A.(MD).No.816 of 2023 and etc., batch, wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench finally held as follows:-

                   “31. Therefore, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared that the right to receive aid is not a fundamental right and that a policy decision, including a decision to withdraw the aid, cannot be challenged as a matter of right, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the judgment of this Court in Deva Asir’s case continues to hold the field cannot be countenanced. As already indicated, Rule 15 also deals with the power of the Government to determine, from time to time, the number of posts to be sanctioned with reference to academic requirements, the teacher-pupil ratio, and overall financial considerations. The Government Order has been issued after taking into account the introduction of computer technology and automation. It is common knowledge that such technological advancements reduce the requirement for manpower in every field. Therefore, merely because the Government has fixed the staff strength having regard to financial considerations, institutions that had hitherto been receiving grant-in-aid as a matter of right cannot challenge the decision of the Government to reduce the staff strength.

                   32. We are of the view that, if the institutions genuinely require additional non-teaching staff owing to the death of any existing employee or for any other bona fide reason, there is no bar to their engaging persons to perform such duties. Therefore, the institutions cannot always depend upon grant-in-aid to meet their staffing requirements. Once the Government is the paymaster and provides the grant-in-aid, the institutions are required to adhere strictly to the staff strength fixed by the Government.

                   33. As a matter of right, the institutions cannot insist upon the continuance of the same pattern or number of staff originally sanctioned. The fixation of staff strength is a matter of policy to be determined by the Government. Although the Government Order has been issued in the form of an executive order under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, it is, in substance, a piece of subordinate legislation. The enabling provisions also empower the Government to frame rules in this regard. Section 19 of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules confer upon the Government the power to fix the staff strength from time to time, having regard to academic requirements, overall financial considerations, and other relevant factors. Once the Government has considered all these aspects and issued the Government Order, the same cannot be challenged merely because the institutions seek continuation of the earlier staffing pattern. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals challenging the orders of the learned Single Judges.

                   34. It is also relevant to note that, although the learned Single Judge upheld the validity of the said Government Order by order dated 07.02.2023 in W.P. (MD) No. 13428 of 2020, the said order has not been challenged in any of these Writ Appeals. Instead, the challenge is confined to the subsequent orders passed in various other Writ Petitions, wherein the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petitions by placing reliance upon the earlier order, having already upheld the validity of the said Government Order. Therefore, the order upholding the validity of the Government Order has not been put in issue in any of the present appeals. The learned Single Judge also held that appointments made prior to the issuance of the Government Order were required to be protected and considered on their own merits. We find no reason to interfere with that finding, and, accordingly, the Writ Appeals challenging the said observations are liable to be dismissed. The learned Single Judge has also made it abundantly clear that any appointment made subsequent to the issuance of the said Government Order would be governed by its provisions.

                   35. We are of the view that, in order to give quietus to the issue, any appointment already made, in respect of which proposals for approval are pending either before or after the issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 238, dated 13.11.2018, shall be considered on its own merits. It is, however, made clear that, if any such appointment is approved, the post shall be treated as co-terminus with the incumbent so appointed, and the institutions shall have no right whatsoever to fill up the said post after it falls vacant.

                   36. It is further clarified that, even in cases where an earlier appointment is approved pursuant to the directions of this Court, or where an appointment made subsequent to the issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 238, dated 13.11.2018, is approved by the Government, such approval shall also be co-terminus with the tenure of the incumbent concerned. Upon the post falling vacant thereafter, no fresh appointment shall be made to that post. Any future appointments shall be made strictly in accordance with the staff strength fixed by the Government under G.O.Ms.No.238, dated 13.11.2018.

                   37. Accordingly, all the Writ Appeals and the Writ Petitions are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.”

4. The writ petitioner / P.Jegan had been appointed on 01.03.2021. The refusal to approve appointment was in March 2023. It had been contended in the writ petition that the respondents could not have placed reliance on the aforementioned G.O.(MS).No.238, School Education Department dated 13.11.2018, particularly because the post of “Watchman” was a sanctioned post in the 5th respondent school and also because according to the writ petitioner, there was no surplus in the other schools under the same management, which could be termed as corporate group management schools. This is disputed by the appellants herein. It is their contention that clause 10 of the Government Order states that if there is surplus of staff in other schools obtaining aid under the same management then those excess staff should be re-deployed in the school where a post has fallen vacant and a fresh recruitment should not be affected. It had been contended that the writ petitioner had been appointed afresh, inspite of there being surplus staff in other schools obtaining aid under the same management.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, however, widened the scope of arguments by stating that the appellants herein particularly the Chief Educational Officer had granted approval of appointment of other similarly placed non-teaching staff without insisting on this particular condition of deployment of surplus staff from other schools obtaining aid but had singled out the writ petitioner herein and had rejected his appointment.

6. It is pertinent to point out that if there are two individuals who are placed on an equal footing, then there cannot be a different treatment meeted out to each other under similar circumstances. If such a different treatment is to be meeted out by the authority concerned, then a reason has to be given as to why one was preferred to the other.

7. In the instant case, the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent / writ petitioner that there were other appointments approved subsequent to the appointments of the writ petitioner necessarily has to be examined and an answer has to be given by the appellants herein.

8. In view of this particular fact, it is seen that there is a dispute whether there was a surplus staff in other schools obtaining aid and whether such staff could have been deployed and when there is a sanctioned post in the 5th respondent school, the right of the management to recruit a staff to their convenience.

9. We would interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.09.2025 in W.P.(MD).No.30911 of 2024, with respect to the two of the directions which he had issued in Paragraph 12. Paragraph 12 is as follows:-

                   “12. In such view of the matter, the following orders are passed:-

                   a) The impugned order dated ...03.2023 is set aside.

                   b) The fifth respondent School shall resubmit the proposal within a period of two weeks from date of the receipt of a copy of this order.

                   c) On receipt of the same, the third respondent shall grant necessary approval to the post of Watchman within a period of four weeks thereafter.

                   d) On grant of approval, the necessary funds shall be released to the petitioner in respect of the post approved from the initial date of the appointment to the post of Watchman.”

10. We would set aside clauses (c) and (d) and direct the appellants herein to consider afresh the writ petitioner’s application for approval on its own merits, particularly in view of the necessity to appoint a “Watchman” in the 5th respondent school and the right of the management to appoint a Watchman, notwithstanding the staff strength in other schools receiving aid under the same management. The appellants may also examine whether there are any surplus non-teaching staff in other schools receiving aid who could be designated as a “Watchman” or who could effectively discharge the duties of a “Watchman”. If not, then the 5th respondent has a right to appoint a “Watchman” since the duties are specific in nature and cannot be generalized. The appellants are also directed to give reasons as to how and on what basis other approvals were granted for other individuals, subsequent to the appointment of the writ petitioner and why the appointments of the writ petitioner alone was singled out and rejected. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

11. With these observations and directions, the writ appeal stands disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.