Cav Judgment:
(Per: Honourable Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri)
1. The present Miscellaneous Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-wife under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, assailing the judgment and decree, dated 30.06.2022, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Sheohar in Matrimonial Case No. 19 of 2015, whereby and whereunder, the learned Family Court, on contest, dissolved the marriage solemnized between the appellant and the respondent on 13.05.2002 by granting a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty.
2. The marriage between the parties is admitted. The appellant-wife and the respondent-husband were married on 13.05.2002 according to Hindu rites and customs. The parties lived together as husband and wife and admittedly have no child from the wedlock. The case of the respondent before the learned Family Court was that the matrimonial relationship, after an initial period of about two years, became strained on account of the conduct of the appellant, who, according to him, insisted that he should separate from his father and brother. The respondent pleaded that, although he ultimately separated from his parents and brother in the year 2005, the conduct of the appellant did not improve thereafter.
3. It was further pleaded by the respondent that the appellant used abusive language, frequently went out of the matrimonial home without informing him and, on occasions, remained away for two to three days. The respondent further alleged that on 07.12.2014, when he returned home after attending to his work, he found that the appellant was no longer present in the house and, on inquiry, learnt that her father and brother had taken her away along with her clothes, jewellery and cash of Rs. 50,000/-. According to the respondent, when he went to the parental house of the appellant to enquire about the matter, he was assaulted and driven away. He claimed that since 07.12.2014, the appellant had been residing at her parental home and that there had been no matrimonial relationship between the parties thereafter.
4. The appellant contested the matrimonial case and denied the allegations of cruelty. Her case was that she had been subjected to physical and mental cruelty by the respondent and his family members on account of demand of dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and a motorcycle. She alleged that she was assaulted during pregnancy, resulting in loss of pregnancy, and that ultimately she was beaten and ousted from the matrimonial home on 14.12.2014. She further stated that she had instituted Sheohar Mahila Police Station Case No. 14 of 2014 under Sections 498-A, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent and his family members. She also alleged that the respondent had contracted a second marriage with one Sundar Muni Devi during the subsistence of the marriage between the parties.
5. The appellant's consistent stand before the learned Family Court was that she was ready and willing to reside with the respondent as his wife, but that it was the respondent who was unwilling to keep her. She denied that she had voluntarily abandoned the matrimonial home and asserted that she had been compelled to reside at her parental home. She further stated that she had no independent source of income and that her parents were not financially capable of maintaining her.
6. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Family Court framed, inter alia, the questions whether the appellant had treated the respondent with cruelty, whether she had been living separately from him since December, 2014 and whether the respondent was entitled to a decree of divorce. The principal controversy before the learned Family Court, therefore, was whether the conduct attributed to the appellant constituted cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
7. In support of his case, the respondent examined four witnesses, namely P.W.1 Hasid Mansoor @ Hasid Miyan, P.W.2 Raj Kumar Rai, P.W.3 Bhaiju Rai and P.W.4 Ramesh Prasad himself. Besides the oral evidence, the respondent relied upon certified copies of the proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No.10 of 2016, Complaint Case No.426 of 2014, information petition, dated 19.11.2015 and Complaint Case No. C1-43 of 2019.
8. P.W.1 supported the respondent's case that the appellant had insisted upon separation from the respondent's parents and brother and that, despite such separation, her conduct towards the respondent did not improve. He also stated that the appellant used to go out of the house without informing the respondent and, on occasions, remained away for two to four days. He further supported the respondent's case regarding the appellant leaving the matrimonial home with her father and brother. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that the appellant had been residing at her parental home for about twelve to thirteen years and that she had instituted a dowry case against the respondent and his family members.
9. P.W.2 and P.W.3 also substantially supported the respondent regarding the appellant's insistence upon separate residence and her alleged conduct thereafter. Their evidence, however, also contains material admissions. P.W.2 stated in cross-examination that he had not seen the appellant leaving the house and that the appellant had been residing at her parental home for about five years. P.W.3 stated that the appellant was ready to reside with her husband but that the respondent was not agreeable to keep her.
10. The respondent, examined as P.W.4, reiterated the allegations contained in the matrimonial petition. He stated that he had separated from his father and brother in 2005, but according to him the appellant continued to subject him to mental harassment. He further stated that on 07.12.2014 the appellant left the matrimonial home with her father and brother and that, when he went to her parental home, he was assaulted. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had not instituted any case against the appellant for the alleged abusive conduct and that he did not produce any documentary evidence to establish the appellant's alleged employment as a private teacher or her alleged income of Rs. 10,000/- per month.
11. On behalf of the appellant, four witnesses were examined, namely O.P.W.1 Poonam Kumari, O.P.W.2 Nawal Kishor Singh, O.P.W.3 Rajdev Rai and O.P.W.4 Lalan Rai. Documentary evidence was also brought on record, including the FIR and charge-sheet of Sheohar Mahila Police Station Case No.14 of 2014, the proceedings in Miscellaneous Case No.10 of 2016 and the FIR and charge-sheet of Sheohar Mahila Police Station Case No. 08 of 2018.
12. The appellant, while entering the witness box, maintained that she had been subjected to cruelty and dowry harassment and that she was ultimately driven out of the matrimonial home. She denied the allegation that she had voluntarily left the matrimonial home and further stated that she had no independent source of income. She also maintained that she was ready to reside with the respondent.
13. The learned Family Court, upon consideration of the evidence, noticed that both parties admitted that they had been living separately since December, 2014. The Court thereafter considered the settled principles governing mental cruelty and referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 558; Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 778; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511; and Narendra v. K. Meena, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 455.
14. The learned Family Court also took note of the principle enunciated in Narendra v. K. Meena, (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the persistent insistence of a wife that the husband should separate from his parents in the context of the social and familial obligations ordinarily existing in a Hindu family. On the facts before it, the learned Family Court concluded that the appellant's conduct, viewed cumulatively with the other circumstances, amounted to cruelty. In paragraph no. 19 of Narendra v. K. Meena, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
“19. Taking an overall view of the entire evidence and the judgment delivered by the trial court, we firmly believe that there was no need to take a different view than the one taken by the trial court. The behaviour of the respondent wife appears to be terrifying and horrible. One would find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and peace of mind. Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is also not in dispute that the respondent wife had left the matrimonial house on 12-7-1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the learned counsel submitted that till today, the respondent wife is not staying with the appellant. The daughter of the appellant and the respondent has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she is working in an IT company. We have no reason to disbelieve the aforestated facts because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown up and the separation of the appellant and the wife must have also become normal for her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper to bring them together, especially when the appellant husband was treated so cruelly by the respondent wife.”
15. The learned Family Court further relied upon the fact that the parties had been living separately for several years, the allegations and counter-allegations between them, the criminal proceedings instituted by both sides and the evidence led by the respondent regarding the conduct of the appellant. It ultimately held that the respondent had established the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and, accordingly, dissolved the marriage by judgment and decree dated 30.06.2022.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the learned Family Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective and granted a decree of divorce merely on conjectures and assumptions. It has been contended that the parties had lived together for several years after marriage; that the appellant had been willing to resume cohabitation; that the allegations regarding her conduct were not sufficiently corroborated; and that the respondent had failed to establish the essential ingredients of cruelty.
17. It has further been contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned Family Court failed to appreciate her case that she had been assaulted and driven out of the matrimonial home on 14.12.2014. The appellant has also challenged the allegation regarding her employment and income, pointing out that the respondent had produced no documentary material to substantiate the assertion that she was working as a private teacher and earning Rs.10,000/- per month. The appellant has also relied upon the subsequent conduct of the respondent and has alleged that he contracted another marriage during the pendency of the matrimonial proceedings.
18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the learned Family Court had considered the evidence of both sides in its entirety. It has been submitted that the appellant's persistent conduct, her insistence upon separation of the respondent from his parents, the subsequent conduct even after the respondent had separated from his family, the incidents culminating in the parties' separation and the long period of matrimonial discord constitute a continuing course of conduct which has made the continuation of the matrimonial relationship impossible. The respondent has also disputed the appellant's claim regarding his financial position and has relied upon the assets and liabilities disclosed by him pursuant to the subsequent orders of this Court.
19. Having considered the rival submissions and carefully examined the materials available on record, this Court is of the view that the appeal cannot be decided by examining any isolated incident in isolation. The question of mental cruelty has to be determined from the cumulative effect of the conduct of the parties, the duration and nature of the matrimonial relationship, the circumstances in which the parties separated and the effect of such conduct upon the matrimonial bond.
20. The law relating to mental cruelty is well settled. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that cruelty in matrimonial matters has to be understood with reference to human conduct and behaviour and its effect upon the other spouse. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that mental cruelty is to be determined on the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Family Court has correctly noticed these principles. In paragraph 35 of Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
“35. Each case depends on its own facts and must be judged on these facts. The concept of cruelty has varied from time to time, from place to place and from individual to individual in its application according to social status of the persons involved and their economic conditions and other matters. The question whether the act complained of was a cruel act is to be determined from the whole facts and the matrimonial relations between the parties. In this connection, the culture, temperament and status in life and many other things are the factors which have to be considered.”
21. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned that there can be no uniform standard for determining mental cruelty and that the matrimonial life has to be assessed as a whole. The Court indicated that a sustained course of abusive or humiliating treatment, conduct affecting the physical or mental health of the spouse, sustained unjustifiable conduct and a matrimonial relationship which has deteriorated to such an extent that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together may, depending upon the facts, constitute mental cruelty. In paragraph 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive:
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.”
22. Equally, trivial irritations, ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life and isolated instances of disagreement cannot by themselves constitute cruelty. The Court must, therefore, guard against treating every matrimonial disagreement as a ground for dissolution of marriage. The test is whether the conduct complained of, viewed in the backdrop of the entire matrimonial relationship, is of such a nature that continued cohabitation has become unreasonable or harmful.
23. In the present case, the evidence of the respondent's witnesses is not free from inconsistencies on minor aspects of the chronology. There are also differences in the evidence as to the exact period for which the parties had been living separately. Such discrepancies, however, do not by themselves demolish the consistent core of the respondent's case that the matrimonial relationship had become seriously strained and that the parties had ultimately been living separately for several years.
24. More importantly, the evidence has to be considered cumulatively. The respondent's case regarding the appellant's insistence upon separation from his parents and brother is supported by P.Ws.1 to 3. The respondent stated that, even after he separated from his parents and brother, the alleged discord did not cease. The parties admittedly have not resumed matrimonial cohabitation since December, 2014. The appellant herself acknowledges the prolonged separation, although she attributes its cause to the conduct of the respondent.
25. The appellant's argument that she had expressed willingness to resume cohabitation also requires consideration. The willingness of one spouse to resume matrimonial life is certainly a relevant circumstance, but such subsequent willingness cannot by itself efface the established conduct of the parties during the matrimonial relationship. The Court has to determine whether, having regard to the totality of circumstances, the matrimonial bond had already deteriorated to such an extent that continuation of the relationship had become unreasonable.
26. The criminal proceedings instituted by the parties against each other also cannot be treated as conclusive proof of the allegations contained therein. Mere institution of a criminal case does not, by itself, establish cruelty. At the same time, where such proceedings form part of a larger and continuing matrimonial discord, the factum of such proceedings and the nature of the allegations may legitimately form part of the overall circumstances to be considered by the matrimonial Court. The learned Family Court, therefore, was justified in considering the relevant documentary proceedings, though the same could not have been treated in isolation.
27. The appellant has also challenged the reliance placed by the learned Family Court upon the alleged employment and income of the appellant. This Court finds substance in the submission that the respondent had not produced documentary material establishing that the appellant was employed as a private teacher and was earning Rs.10,000/- per month. However, this circumstance, even if excluded from consideration, does not by itself dislodge the remaining evidence concerning the matrimonial discord and the prolonged separation of the parties.
28. The allegation regarding the respondent's alleged subsequent marriage has also been noticed. The learned Family Court did not grant divorce on the ground of such alleged subsequent marriage. The present appeal is against the decree passed under Section 13(1)(ia), and the question before this Court is whether the ground of cruelty stood established on the evidence led in the matrimonial proceedings. Therefore, the alleged subsequent marriage cannot be permitted to alter the statutory test applicable to the original decree, though the subsequent circumstances may have relevance while considering the appellant's claim for financial relief.
29. On an overall assessment of the evidence, this Court finds that the learned Family Court did not commit such perversity or error of law as would warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction. The conduct alleged by the respondent, the evidence supporting the continuing matrimonial discord, the prolonged separation of the parties since 2014 and the circumstances emerging from the record, taken cumulatively, establish that the matrimonial relationship had deteriorated beyond a stage at which the parties could reasonably be expected to resume a normal matrimonial life. The finding of cruelty recorded by the learned Family Court, therefore, does not call for interference.
30. The decree of divorce, however, does not bring to an end the Court's obligation to consider the financial consequences of dissolution of marriage. During the pendency of the appeal, this Court directed the parties to place their respective assets and liabilities on affidavit in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 and the subsequent jurisprudence governing disclosure of financial circumstances. The parties have accordingly placed their respective affidavits and subsequent pleadings before this Court.
31. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 empowers the matrimonial Court, at the time of passing a decree or subsequently, on an application made for the purpose, to award a gross sum or a monthly or periodical sum for maintenance and support, having regard, inter alia, to the income and property of the respondent, the income and property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case. The provision, therefore, does not contemplate a mechanical formula. The determination has to be just, reasonable and founded upon the actual financial circumstances placed before the Court.
32. In the present case, the appellant has asserted that she has no independent source of income sufficient for her maintenance. Her affidavit of assets and liabilities does not disclose any established independent income from employment, business or property. The respondent had earlier alleged that she was a private teacher earning Rs.10,000/- per month, but, as noticed above, no convincing documentary material has been produced to establish such income. The appellant, therefore, cannot be treated as having a sufficient independent income merely on the basis of an unsubstantiated assertion.
33. On the other hand, the respondent has also disputed the appellant's assertion regarding his financial capacity. The appellant has alleged substantial income from the respondent's grocery business, agricultural land and Bolero vehicle and has also claimed that the respondent owns a considerably larger extent of land. The respondent has disputed these assertions and has stated that he has only a small grocery shop and limited agricultural land. His affidavit discloses a Bolero vehicle purchased through bank finance with a monthly EMI of Rs.17,650/-. The financial disclosures of the parties, however, establish that the respondent has agricultural property and, having regard to the overall circumstances of the case, a reasonable portion thereof can be secured in favour of the appellant as part of permanent alimony.
34. In these circumstances, this Court would not be justified in accepting either extreme version in the absence of reliable proof. The appellant's assertion of an income exceeding Rs.50,000/- per month has not been established to the extent necessary for fixing permanent alimony at a substantially higher figure. Equally, the respondent's assertion of very limited financial capacity cannot be accepted mechanically when the record discloses a continuing business activity, agricultural holding and ownership/use of a financed vehicle. The Court is required to strike a fair balance between the needs of the appellant and the actual paying capacity of the respondent.
35. The recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Tasmeer Qureshi v. Asfia Muzaffar, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7272, while dealing with maintenance, has emphasised that maintenance proceedings directly concern the sustenance and dignity of the dependent spouse and that the Court must disclose the material upon which its assessment of income and the resultant quantum is founded. The judgment also cautions against fixing maintenance merely on imagination or unsupported assumptions and requires the financial disclosures and circumstances of the parties to be considered holistically. The said principle is apposite here. Maintenance is not intended to reduce a dependent spouse to mere subsistence; at the same time, it cannot be converted into an excessive financial burden disproportionate to the paying spouse's established means.
17. This Court, however, finds one significant aspect of the impugned order that calls for interference by this Court. After recording the findings that the petitioner had concealed his true income and was a man of means with sufficient financial capacity to maintain the respondent and the minor child, the learned Family Court proceeded to award a total maintenance of Rs. 20,000/- per month. However, the order does not disclose any assessment - either actual or notional - of the petitioner's monthly income on the basis of which this quantum was determined. The omission to record even a tentative finding regarding the petitioner's earning capacity or notional income leaves the basis of the determination of maintenance unclear. Even while taking a prima facie view at the interim stage, the learned Family Court is expected to indicate, at least in broad terms, the income presumed or assessed from the available material, as that forms the very foundation of determining the quantum of maintenance. Absence of such an assessment makes it difficult to discern how the figure of Rs. 20,000/-was arrived at.
18. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained in its present form. While the learned Family Court rightly observed that the petitioner had concealed his true income and possessed sufficient means, it proceeded to fix the amount of maintenance without recording any assessment of his income or indicating the basis on which the figure of Rs. 20,000/- per month was arrived at.
70. This Court is also conscious of the practical difficulties faced by the learned Family Courts in the discharge of their duties. The volume of cases before the Family Courts is extremely high, and judges are often required to hear a large number of matters each day, many of which involve complex and emotionally charged disputes. Added to this are the delays frequently caused by the parties themselves, who either fail to file their affidavits of income, assets, and expenditure in time or file incomplete or evasive ones. In some cases, such non-compliance is deliberate, intended to mislead the Court or to stall the proceedings. These challenges, coupled with limited time and heavy dockets, undeniably make the task of the Family Court demanding and strenuous.
71. Nevertheless, even amidst these constraints, the Court must endeavour to strike a balance between expedition and fairness. While it may not be possible to undertake a detailed examination of every financial detail at the interim stage, the orders passed should not suffer from lack of reasoning or absence of clarity as to how the quantum of maintenance has been arrived at. The endeavour must be to ensure that even within practical limitations, the orders reflect a judicious application of mind and are based on the material available on record. Such care and precision, though requiring extra effort, not only strengthen the quality of justice delivered but also reduce avoidable litigation that often arises from unclear or inadequately reasoned orders.
72. It must always be kept in mind that this exercise is not a mere financial calculation but a judicial responsibility that affects the dignity, sustenance, and stability of lives. Therefore, orders on maintenance must reflect not only correctness in law but also an understanding of the human conditions that lie beneath the pleadings presented before the Courts.
73. In conclusion, this Court hopes that the aforesaid observations and guidelines are kept in consideration by the learned Family Courts and Mahila Courts while dealing with petitions filed by a spouse/children seeking maintenance. It is also of utmost importance that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), which provides a comprehensive and guiding framework, is always followed to ensure that orders granting maintenance, interim or final, are passed with fairness, uniformity, and clarity.
36. Keeping in view the duration of the matrimonial relationship, the age and present circumstances of the appellant, her absence of any established independent source of income, the prolonged period for which she has been living separately, the respondent's disclosed financial position, his agricultural holding and business activity, the liabilities disclosed by him including the vehicle loan, and the existing order of maintenance of Rs.5,000/- per month, this Court considers that the ends of justice would be met by awarding to the appellant one katha of land out of the respondent's legally owned and transferable agricultural property, as part of permanent alimony, besides a sum of Rs.10,000/- per month towards her maintenance and support under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Such relief is intended to secure reasonable sustenance, financial stability and dignity to the appellant, without imposing an excessive or disproportionate burden upon the respondent. The amount of Rs.5,000/- per month already payable under the earlier maintenance order shall be duly adjusted against the aforesaid monthly amount so as to avoid duplication or double recovery.
37. Before parting with the matter, it is clarified that the determination of permanent alimony herein is based upon the financial material presently available on record. Section 25(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act itself recognises that a subsequent change in circumstances may warrant variation, modification or rescission of an order of permanent alimony. The parties shall, therefore, remain governed by the statutory consequences contemplated under the said provision.
38. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment and decree, dated 30.06.2022, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Sheohar, in Matrimonial Case No. 19 of 2015. The finding that the respondent-husband was entitled to dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty is affirmed.
39. Consequently, M.A. No. 373 of 2022 is dismissed, subject to the modification that the appellant-wife shall be entitled to one katha of land out of the respondent's legally owned and transferable agricultural property as permanent alimony, besides permanent monthly alimony of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) only under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The amount of maintenance already paid or payable under the existing maintenance order shall be duly adjusted against the aforesaid monthly amount so as to prevent double recovery.
40. The respondent shall take necessary steps for transferring in favour of the appellant one katha of land from his legally owned and transferable agricultural property, free from any encumbrance, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment. The particular parcel of land shall be identified on the basis of the respondent's title and revenue records and the necessary deed/documentation shall be executed in accordance with law. The aforesaid direction shall operate only against the respondent's own right, title and transferable interest and shall not affect the right, title or interest of any co-sharer or third party. The respondent shall also continue to pay the aforesaid sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month in the manner directed hereinabove.
41. The parties shall be at liberty to seek appropriate relief under Section 25(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act in the event of any material change in their respective circumstances. The observations made in this judgment concerning the disputed properties and income are confined to the determination of permanent alimony and shall not be construed as a final adjudication upon title to any property.
42. The impugned judgment and decree, dated 30.06.2022, passed in Matrimonial Case No.19 of 2015, are, accordingly, affirmed, subject to the aforesaid modification regarding permanent alimony.
43. The appeal stands disposed of, accordingly.
