(Prayer: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to the impugned order dated 24.06.2025 in Na.Ka.No.869/A1/2025 passed by the first respondent and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary, and violative of principles of natural justice and consequentially direct the respondents to disburse the death-cum-retirement gratuity benefits to the petitioner within a stipulated time as may be fixed by this Court.)

1. For better appreciation, it is necessary to take note of the brief facts that are relevant for the disposal of this writ petition:

                   1.1. The petitioner herein was initially appointed as a Secondary Grade Teacher on 27.07.1995 after due selection by the Teachers Recruitment Board and then, he was promoted as a Primary School Headmaster on 02.09.2004. It was thereafter, on the petitioner acquiring B.Lit., degree in the year 2010, he was promoted to the post of Middle School Headmaster on 20.05.2010. It was thereafter, the petitioner acquired B.Ed., degree in the year 2011 i.e., after he was promoted to the post of Middle School Headmaster. For having acquired the B.Ed., degree, the petitioner was awarded incentive increment vide proceedings bearing Na.Ka.No.871/A2/2011, dated 23.11.2011, issued by the first respondent. Then, he was promoted to the post of Block Educational Officer on 12.06.2018 and retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2025.

                   1.2. When the pension proposal of the petitioner was submitted to the office of the third respondent on 25.03.2025, the third respondent found that the award of incentive increment for acquiring B.Ed. degree is not in accordance with law and therefore, his last drawn pay was to be fixed at Rs.81,800/- instead of Rs.89,400/- and accordingly, processed the pension proposal.

                   1.3. Consequently, the second respondent herein vide proceedings bearing Na.Ka.No.869/A1/2025, dated 24.06.2025, revised the pay of the petitioner by duly disallowing the incentive increment awarded to the petitioner for acquiring B.Ed., degree with effect from 01.06.2011 and instructed the Block Educational Officer to take necessary steps for recovery and remitting the excess amount paid to the petitioner.

                   1.4. It was thereafter, the second respondent issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 26.06.2025 proposing to effect recovery. In response to the said show cause notice, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 04.07.2025. Thereafter, an order was passed by the second respondent vide proceedings bearing Na.Ka.No.0869/A1/2025, dated 11.07.2025, confirming the proposed recovery.

                   1.5. It was at that stage, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition challenging the said proceedings dated 24.06.2025, whereby the pay of the petitioner has been revised, contending that several other similarly situated persons were allowed to draw incentive increment for having acquired B.Ed., degree and also contending that the pay of the petitioner cannot be revised after a long lapse of time that too after the petitioner retired from service. It is also further contended that the proposed recovery from and out of the death-cum-retirement gratuity payable to him is not permissible in the light of the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court.

2. In response to the notice issued by this Court, the second respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit narrating the facts of the case and also contending that the B.Ed., qualification is the minimum educational qualification or an alternative educational qualification for the post of Middle School Headmaster and therefore, the same cannot be construed as an additional educational qualification, thereby entitling the petitioner to draw incentive increment. The incentive increment, that was granted to the petitioner in the year 2011, was erroneous and the same was pointed by the third respondent and therefore, the same is accordingly rectified.

3. Heard Ms.S.Modharshini, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.M.Dinesh Hari Sudarsan, learned counsel for the Government of Tamil Nadu appearing for the respondents 1 & 2 and Mr.P.Gunasekaran, learned counsel for the third respondent.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has acquired B.Ed. degree after obtaining prior approval from the competent authority and he was rightly awarded with the incentive increment for having acquired B.Ed. degree in the year 2011. She also further contended that several other persons, who were appointed as Middle School Headmasters, were also granted the benefit of incentive increment for acquiring B.Ed., qualification and the same was the subject matter of litigation before this Court on number of occasions and this Court upheld the respective claims made by the similarly situated persons like the petitioner herein. She also further contended that the revision of pay of the petitioner after a long lapse of time, that too after the petitioner attaining the age of superannuation, is not permissible and the proposed recovery is also contrary to the settled legal position. In support of her contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334; Jagdish Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 2024 INSC 591 and Thomas Daniel vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 536 and also on an unreported decision of a learned Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD) No. 1429 of 2022, dated 24.01.2024, in the case of The State of Tamil Nadu and others vs. A.Arul and others.

5. Mr.M.Dinesh Hari Sudarsan, learned counsel for the Government of Tamil Nadu appearing for the respondents 1 & 2, strenuously contended that incentive increments awarded erroneously can be withdrawn at any time as the petitioner is not entitled for award of such incentive increment as the B.Ed., qualification is not a higher qualification, but the same is only an alternative qualification for the post of Middle School Headmaster. He also further contended that the learned Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD) No.1429 of 2022 was not properly appraised of the correct legal position, especially, the contents of the proceedings in Mu.Mu.No. 32215/D3/2019, dated 03.12.2010, issued by the Director of Elementary Education and the Judgment in the said writ appeal was rendered solely based upon the clarification issued by the Director of Elementary Education dated 07.06.1991, as the said clarification can neither expand the scope of the Government Order nor restrict the same. He also further contended that even if any such clarification is issued, if the same is contrary to the Government Orders, the same is not binding the Government. Thus, he contends that the B.Ed., qualification acquired by the petitioner herein, under no circumstances, can be construed as a higher qualification, thereby entitling the petitioner to draw incentive increment. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on various decisions of this Court as well as the Honourable Apex Court in The Special Officer, Tamil Nadu Cooperative State Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Limited and another vs. S.Kadiresan and another, reported in (2014) 8 MLJ 385 and Chandi Prasad Uniyal vs. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 417; and on an unreported decision of a learned Division Bench of this Court dated 24.06.2025 in W.A.(MD) No.1148 of 2025 in P.Nalluchamy vs. The Principal Secretary, School Education Department, and others and also tried to distinguish the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in White Washer's case stating that the recovery cannot be denied in all circumstances and it is only, in cases where the recovery is likely to cause grave prejudice to the government servant, the same can be interfered with by this Court.

6. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and also perused the entire materials on record.

7. There is no dispute on the factual aspects of the matter. B.Ed., qualification is admittedly a basic qualification that is required for holding the post of Middle School Headmaster. Therefore, the B.Ed., qualification cannot be construed as a higher qualification for a person holding the post of Middle School Headmaster. At the most, B.Ed., qualification can be said to be an alternative or additional qualification. There is no Government Order so far issued conferring the benefit of incentive increment for acquiring additional or an alternative qualification. Incentive increment that was contemplated right from the issuance of a Government Order in G.O.MS.No.42, Education Department, dated 10.01.1969, is only for the higher qualification. Once it is concluded that B.Ed., qualification is not a higher qualification, the question of awarding incentive increment for acquiring the same for a person like the petitioner herein while holding the post of Middle School Headmaster cannot stand.

8. The very same issue has fallen for consideration before a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(MD) No.4437 of 2022 in S.Amutha vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and the learned Judge, after having taken note of the basic qualifications that are required for holding the post of Middle School Headmaster, namely, B.Lit., or B.Ed. degrees and also taking note of the nomenclature of the post of Middle School Headmaster (B.Ed. Grade), as provided under the relevant Rules, came to the conclusion that the B.Ed., qualification acquired by a Middle School Headmaster cannot confer any right upon him to make a claim for incentive increment. The learned Judge has elaborately dealt with the very same issue vide order dated 23.09.2022. In the said decision, the learned Judge, having refused to interfere with the refixation of pay, has been pleased to quash the impugned proceedings therein only to the extent of ordering for recovery of the excess amount paid to the employee therein. The said order dated 23.09.2022 was also confirmed in W.A.(MD) No.605 of 2023 vide Judgment dated 08.06.2026.

9. The learned Division Bench, while passing orders in W.A.(MD) No.1429 of 2022, vide Judgment dated 24.01.2024, proceeded on the premise that B.Ed., qualification is a higher qualification as is evident from the first paragraph of the said Judgment. The learned Division Bench also proceeded on the footing that incentive increment awarded to the similarly situated persons was upheld by this Court. In the said decision, though the Division Bench took note of the stand of the appellants therein that B.Ed., qualification is an essential qualification for the post of Middle School Headmaster and not a higher qualification, has not chosen to consider the said aspect and was carried away by various other orders passed by this Court, by placing reliance on a clarification dated 07.06.1991, issued by the Director of Elementary Education, clarifying that when the Middle School Headmaster acquires a higher qualification of B.Ed., he would be entitled for grant of incentive increment in view of the Government Orders in G.O.Ms.No.42, Education Department, dated 10.01.1969, and G.O.No.107, Education Department, dated 20.01.1976. Thus, it is evident that the learned Division Bench of this Court proceeded on the premise that B.Ed., qualification is a higher qualification.

10. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the B.Ed., qualification is not a higher qualification for the person holding the post of Middle School Headmaster and in the absence of any Government Order providing for award of incentive increment for possessing additional qualification or alternative qualification, the award of incentive increment in favour of the petitioner by treating the B.Ed., qualification as a higher qualification is nothing but sheer abuse of process of law as well as process of this Court. Any decision rendered ignoring the relevant Rules, which prescribe B.Ed., qualification as an essential qualification, but not a higher qualification for a person holding the post of Middle School Headmaster is to be treated as per incuriam.

11. Then, coming to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Jagdish Prasad Singh's case, that is a case where the promotion and revision of pay of the petitioner therein were found to be strictly in accordance with law and then, the Honourable Apex Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner therein shall be entitled for payment of pension in terms of the revised pay duly setting aside the impugned orders therein and also struck down the proposed recovery.

12. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that no incentive increment is contemplated for acquiring additional or alternative qualification. Therefore, the decision in Jagdish Prasad Singh's case is of no help to advance the case of the petitioner herein. Once it is concluded that withdrawal of the incentive increment for acquiring B.Ed., qualification by the petitioner is in accordance with law, the revision of pay of the petitioner made through the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2025 cannot be found fault.

13. Though the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2025 appears to have been issued without affording any opportunity to the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the said proceedings on that ground to the extent of refixation of pay is concerned as in the admitted fact situation, no useful purpose would be served even if the matter is remanded back to the second respondent for fresh consideration.

14. As rightly contended by Mr.M.Dinesh Hari Sudarsan, learned counsel for the Government of Tamil Nadu, this is exactly the view taken by the learned Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD) No.1148 of 2025, vide Judgment dated 24.06.2025. The relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment read as under:

                   “6. The Writ Court is right in declining the incentive increment. When a person is eligible for promotion to the post of Middle School Headmaster, based on B.T., or B.Ed., or B.Lit., degrees, and obtained promotion as Middle School Headmaster, then after promotion, the B.Ed., qualification cannot be considered as higher qualification.

                   7. In the present case, the writ petitioner has acquired B.Lit., qualification and based on the B.Lit., the petitioner was granted promotion as Middle School Headmaster. After promotion, the petitioner has acquired B.Ed., qualification. Therefore, the same cannot be considered as higher qualification. In other words, B.T., B.Ed., and B.Lit., are considered as equal. Based on any one of the qualifications, a person is entitled to promotion. When all the three degrees of B.T., B.Ed., and B.Lit. are considered equal, then acquiring any one degree cannot be considered as higher qualification. Therefore, after completing B.Lit., if a person acquired B.Ed., the same cannot be considered as higher qualification.

                   8. Further, incentive increment is only a token to encourage the teachers to acquire higher qualification and the same is based on certain conditions. If any person is not coming within the said conditions, the same cannot be granted. However, it is seen that the petitioner was receiving incentive increment for the past five years. The contention of the petitioner is if the same is recovered, it would cause financial distress to him. Therefore, the respondents shall not recover already paid amount, but the respondents shall refix the salary without the incentive increment.” Same view has been taken by another Division Bench of this Court in W.A. (MD) No.2124 of 2023 & batch, vide Judgment dated 20.12.2023.

15. Insofar as proposed recovery of the excess payment is concerned, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner in award of incentive increment in his favour for having acquired B.Ed., qualification and especially in the context of the fact that the proposed recovery is sought to be effected after the petitioner retired from service after attaining the age of superannuation. Applying the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in White Washer's case, the proposed recovery cannot be allowed to sustain. In Paragraph No.18 of the decision in White Washer's case, the Honourable Apex Court has held as under:

                   “18.It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law:

                   (i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service).

                   (ii)Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

                   (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

                   (iv)Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

                   (v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.”

16. The case of the petitioner herein would straightaway fall under Clause (ii) of Paragraph No.18 of the said decision. The petitioner herein being a retired employee, the impugned recovery of the so-called excess payment made towards incentive increment cannot be sustained.

17. Accordingly, this writ petition is partly allowed duly quashing the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2025, issued by the second respondent herein, only to the extent of ordering recovery of excess payment to the petitioner towards incentive increment for acquiring B.Ed., qualification. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.