1. This Criminal Petition has been filed by the petitioner/accused No.1 seeking to quash the proceedings in Crime No.11 of 2026 of the Economic Offences Wing Police Station, Cyberabad, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 419, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’).

2. Brief facts of the case:

               2.1 That on 13.02.2026 at about 17-00 hours, respondent No.3/de-facto complainant lodged a complaint before the Inspector of Police, E.O.W., Cyberabad, stating that N.Johnson had executed a General Power of Attorney (for short ‘ G.P.A.’) in the year 1994 in favour of respondent No.3 and the petitioner jointly authorizing them to sell certain residential plots in Sy.Nos.88/1 and 89/1, for a total extent of 4813.4 square yards, situated at Serilingampally Village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District vide document No.181 of 1994, dated 17.10.1994 registered in the office of the District Registrar, Medak at Sangareddy. Subsequently, N.Johnson cancelled the above said G.P.A. vide document No.1711-IV-44/2004, on 15.12.2004. In the interregnum period, the petitioner, without the knowledge and consent of respondent No.3, executed various sale deeds behind her back by impersonating her and thereby fraudulently registered the sale deeds forging her signatures and caused severe financial loss to her and to N.Johnson and the present market value of the said property is approximately Rs.22 Crores. As soon as she came to know about the fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner, she questioned the same and the petitioner assured that he would cancel the said sale deeds. However, the petitioner failed to cancel the sale deeds. Based on the said complaint, the present crime has been registered for the aforesaid offences.

3. Heard Mr. J.Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel, representing Mr.G.Bhaskar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.B.Chanakya, learned counsel for respondent No.3, and Mr.Jithendar Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2.

4. Submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner:

               4.1 Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated in the present crime. Even according to the complaint, the alleged allegations are pertaining to 2004 and respondent No.3 lodged the present complaint on 13.02.2026, i.e. after a lapse of nearly 22 years, without assigning any reasons for the said delay. He further submitted that the allegations levelled in the complaint are purely civil in nature and in respect of the execution of sale deeds by the petitioner dated 21.02.2004, 26.03.2004 and 17.04.2004. Respondent No.3 ought to have approached the competent Civil Court, on the other hand, filed the present complaint on 13.02.2026 by giving criminal colour, especially the statutory period of limitation to pursue the civil law remedy is expired long back.

               4.2 He further submitted that even according to the allegations levelled in the complaint, respondent No.3 is aware about the execution of sale deeds by the petitioner in favour of third parties in the year 2004, pursuant to the G.P.A. dated 17.10.1994, and cancellation of G.P.A. by the N.Jhonson on 15.12.2004 are within the knowledge of respondent No.3. However, she filed the present complaint after a long lapse of time and the same is not permitted under law.

               4.3 He also submitted that by virtue of the cancellation of the G.P.A., dated 17.10.1994, which was executed by the original owner namely N.Johnson, on 15.12.2004, the said G.P.A. is no more in existence, and therefore, respondent No.3 is not having any right to lodge the complaint against the petitioner. He further submitted that, especially neither the purchasers, who purchased the property through registered sale deeds dated 21.02.2004, 26.03.2004 and 17.04.2004, nor N.Jhonson lodged any complaint against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner, by forging the signatures of respondent No.3, impersonated her and got registered the sale deeds fraudulently in favour of third parties. Hence, continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner is a clear abuse of the process of law.

               4.4 In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:

               i) Nazibul Rahim Khan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2026 INSC 619);

               ii) Bolisetti Narasimha Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (2024 SCC OnLine AP 5128); and

               iii) Bimalendu Ghosh and another v. State of West Bengal (2011 SCC OnLine Cal 5610).

5. Submissions of the learned counsel for respondent No.3:

               5.1 Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that the original owner namely N.Johnson had executed a G.P.A. in the year 1994 jointly in favour of the petitioner and respondent No.3 authorizing them to sell certain residential plots in Sy.Nos.88/1 and 89/1 for a total extent of 4813.4 square yards situated at Serilingampally Village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District vide document No.181 of 1994, registered in the office of the District Registrar, Medak at Sangareddy. The petitioner, without consent and knowledge of respondent No.3, executed eleven (11) sale deeds on various dates i.e. 21.02.2004, 26.03.2004 and 17.04.2004 by forging her signatures, impersonated her and received sale consideration from the purchasers. Respondent No.3 after coming to know about the alleged forgery and fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner, lodged the present complaint.

               5.2 He further submitted that there are specific allegations in the complaint regarding the forgery of signatures of respondent No.3, impersonation and fraudulent execution of the sale deeds including affixing her left thumb impressions in the documents with a dishonest intention. The said allegations attract the ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 406, 419, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. The investigation is at a nascent stage. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings at the threshold.

               5.3 He further submitted that the delay in lodging the complaint is applicable only to the offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years, whereas the allegations levelled in the complaint are punishable with imprisonment of more than three years. Hence on the ground of delay, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing the proceedings.

               5.4 In support of his contention, he relied upon the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. The State of NCT of Delhi and others (Criminal Appeal No.1834 of 2025).

6. Submissions made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor:

               6.1 Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner himself is not disputing the execution of sale deeds in favour of third parties in the year 2004. It is the specific case of respondent No.3 that her signatures were forged by the petitioner while registering the land and he produced another woman before the registering authority in place of respondent No.3 and sold out the land behind her back and the allegations levelled in the complaint prima facie disclose cognizable offences and the investigation is under progress. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings at this stage.

Analysis:

7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that one N.Jhonson being a owner of the property i.e. plot Nos.1, 14 to 22 and 35 to 41 covered by Sy.Nos.88/1 and 89/1 total admeasuring 4813.4 square yards, situated at Serilingampally Village and Mandal, Rangareddy District, had executed G.P.A. on 17.10.1994 in favour of the petitioner and respondent No.3. The recitals of the said G.P.A. reveals that the petitioner and respondent No.3 are entitled to execute sale deeds pertaining to the above said property in favour of the prospective purchasers on his behalf and to present all the documents for registration of the sale deed or deeds.

8. The specific case of respondent No.3 is that, pursuant to the G.P.A., dated 17.10.1994, the petitioner, without her knowledge and behind her back, executed eleven (11) sale deeds in favour of third parties on various dates i.e. 21.02.2004, 26.03.2004 and 17.04.2004 and received the sale consideration with dishonest intention, forged her signatures, impersonated and affixed her thumb impressions on the documents as if she executed. The allegations levelled in the complaint prima facie discloses the commission of cognizable offences.

9. Insofar as the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the alleged transactions pertaining to 2004 and respondent No.3 is having knowledge about the execution of the sale deeds and cancellation of the G.P.A by N.Jhonson on 15.12.2004, neither N.Jhonson nor any of the purchasers have lodged any complaint against the petitioner, and respondent No.3, without approaching the competent Civil Court, filed the present complaint after a lapse of 22 years by giving criminal colour, especially after expiry of statutory period of limitation to avail Civil law remedies and the same is a clear abuse of the process of law, is concerned, the offences levelled against the petitioner are punishable with an imprisonment of more than three years and the bar under Section 514 of the BNSS/468 of Cr.P.C. is not applicable.

10. It is relevant to extract the provision of Section 468 of Cr.P.C., which reads as follows:

               “Section 514 of BNSS: Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.

               1) Except as otherwise provided in this Sanhita, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

               2) The period of limitation shall be

               (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

               (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

               (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

               (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.

               Explanation.-For the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of filing complaint under Section 223 or the date of recording of information under Section 173.”

11. The above said provision prescribes the statutory period of limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences punishable with an imprisonment up to three years. In the present case, the alleged offences levelled against the petitioner are punishable with an imprisonment exceeding three years and, therefore, the statutory bar of limitation is not applicable. It is also relevant to mention that mere delay in lodging the complaint, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings at the threshold.

12. In Punit Beriwala (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay in registration of an FIR, in respect of offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years, cannot by itself constitute a ground for interdicting a criminal investigation or quashing the FIR. It was further held that the delay assumes relevance only where the complainant fails to furnish a plausible explanation, and whether such explanation is plausible or otherwise is a matter to be determined by the trial Court upon appreciation of evidence. Thus, mere delay in lodging the FIR, cannot be a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings at the threshold.

13. It is also relevant to mention that in State of Andhra Pradesh v. B.Reddeppa Reddy and others (2026 SC OnLine SC 501), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, at the stage of considering a petition for quashing of criminal proceedings, the Court should not conduct a mini-trial, assess the sufficiency or reliability of evidence, or determine disputed questions of fact; where the allegations disclose triable issues, the same are required to be adjudicated on evidence at trial. It was further held that mere delay in lodging the complaint, in the absence of material indicating prior knowledge or deliberate inaction on the part of the complainant, is not by itself sufficient to quash the criminal proceedings.

14. In Bolisetti Narasimha Rao and Others (supra) the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati held that in cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. Further, the Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. Where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the Court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case.

15. In Nazibul Rahim Khan and Others (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both civil and criminal proceedings can be maintainable. However, if the aggrieved person wishes to invoke civil as also criminal remedies, there should not be an unreasonable or inordinate gap between instituting the two. The time-factor can indicate whether the criminal proceedings are genuine and bona fide, and not meant as a pressure tactic on the opposite party for getting reliefs which may have been sought in the civil proceedings. The Court has to minutely and mindfully consider the whole factual gamut and then draw its conclusions.

16. In Bimalendu Ghosh (supra) the High Court of Calcutta held that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions, or with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply involving the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court. The Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassing and prosecution. Where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the Court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case.

17. The aforesaid judgments i.e. Bolisetti Narasimha Rao, Nazibul Rahim Khan and Bimalendu Ghosh relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case on the ground that there are specific allegations levelled in the complaint regarding forgery of signatures of respondent No.3, impersonated her and fraudulent execution of sale deeds, fabrication of documents and the said allegations prima facie disclose cognizable offences.

18. It is relevant to mention that in State v. M. Maridoss and another ((2023) 4 SCC 338), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or assess the merits of the allegations. Its enquiry is confined to determining whether the averments in the FIR, taken at their face value, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigating agency has a statutory right to conduct a fair and complete investigation and must be afforded reasonable time to do so. Premature quashing of criminal proceedings, without permitting the investigation to progress, is impermissible unless the FIR ex facie fails to disclose any cognizable offence or the prosecution is barred by law.

19. It is relevant to mention that in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Sup (1) SCC 335), the Hon’ble Supreme Court delineated the limited scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings, holding that such power may be exercised only in exceptional cases where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose any offence, are inherently improbable, legally barred, or manifestly mala fide, while cautioning that the categories so enumerated are illustrative and the power must be exercised sparingly. The said principles were reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others ((2021) 19 SCC 401);, wherein it was emphasized that the police have a statutory right and duty to investigate cognizable offences and that Courts should not interdict investigation at the threshold unless no cognizable offence is disclosed on a plain reading of the FIR; the FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia of all facts, and criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at their nascent stage.

20. It is also relevant to mention that in Sau. Kamala Shivaji Pokarnekar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ((2019) 14 SCC 350), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised in exceptional cases sparingly, with caution, only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice; and it cannot be invoked to weigh evidence or stifle a genuine prosecution, but may be applied where the allegations in the complaint, taken at face value, do not disclose the basic ingredients of any offence.

21. In the case on hand, it is already stated in the preceding paras that there are specific allegations in the complaint regarding forgery of signatures of respondent No.3, impersonation, fraudulent execution of sale deeds and fabrication of documents. The said allegations prima facie discloses the commission of cognizable offences and the investigation is under progress. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that this case does not comes within the ambit of rarest of rare cases to exercise the powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the proceedings in Crime No.11 of 2026 of EOW, Cyberabad.

22. For the foregoing reasons as well as the precedent decisions, this Court does not find any ground to quash the proceedings in Crime No.11 of 2026 of E.O.W., Cyberabad, against the petitioner by exercising the powers conferred under Section 528 of the BNSS, at this stage.

23. Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed.

Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.