S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The 1st respondent in W.A.No.1670 of 2024 filed this review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘ the CPC’ for short), claiming that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 06.10.2025 passed by this Court in that writ appeal.

2. Heard Sri. K. Ramakumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner-1st respondent and Sri. Harish Gopinath, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-appellant.

3. The learned Senior Counsel argued that as per the order dated 28.01.2025, the Division Bench of this Court, which considered the writ appeal at that point of time, permitted the review petitioner to submit an affidavit sworn to by the expert/Doctor, to support her contention that the type of cancer that the review petitioner suffered could be diagnosed only through surgical means. In pursuance of the said order, the petitioner placed on record an affidavit dated 17.02.2025 sworn to by the oncologist of Renai Medicity. While passing the judgment dated 06.10.2025, this Court omitted to note the affidavit sworn to by the said expert. The learned Senior counsel further argued that this Court failed to properly arrive at a conclusion regarding the date of diagnosis of cancer. In the instant case, the post-operative histopathology report was available only on 28.09.2021, and the said date alone can be taken as the date of diagnosis of the endometrial carcinoma suffered by the petitioner. By relying on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Apex Court in General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain [AIR 1966 SC 1644], the learned Senior Counsel argued that in the case of ambiguity in the contract entered into between the insurance company and the insured, it has to be found in favour of the insured.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-appellant argued that to the affidavit dated 17.02.2025 filed by the oncologist who treated the petitioner, the 1st respondent-appellant filed an objection dated 09.06.2025. Apart from that, the 1st respondent-appellant had filed I.A.No.2 of 2025 in the writ appeal to obtain a report from an independent specialist as to how endometrial cancer can be diagnosed. The learned counsel further argued that in the affidavit filed by the oncologist who treated the petitioner, it is only the diagnosis of the stage of cancer is mentioned, and therefore the said affidavit will not help the petitioner to contend that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment. The learned counsel further argued that the petitioner had even undergone surgery before the receipt of the histopathological report and what is confirmed after the receipt of the histopathological report on 28.09.2021 is only the stage of cancer. According to the learned counsel for the 1st respondent appellant, there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment.

5. In order to understand the circumstances that entitle the court to exercise its power of review, it would be appropriate to go through the provisions concerned as well as the law on the point laid down by the judgments of the Apex Court, as well as this Court. Section 114 and Order XLVII of CPC are the relevant provisions as far as the review of a judgment or order of a Court is concerned.

6. Section 114 of the CPC reads thus:

                  “114. Review-

                  Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

7. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC reads thus:

                  “1. Application for review of judgment.

                  (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-

                  (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

                  (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

                  (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

                  and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record of for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

                  (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

                  Explanation-

                  The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

8. It is trite that review power under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the CPC is available to be exercised only on setting up any one of the following grounds by the petitioner;

                  (i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence, or

                  (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or

                  (iii) any other sufficient reason.

9. In Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167] the Apex Court held that under the guise of review, a litigant cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided.

10. The Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:

                  “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

                  (Underline supplied)

11. In N.Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria [(2013) 15 SCC 534] the Apex Court held that the mistake apparent on the face of the record means that the mistake is self-evident, needs no search, and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.

12. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [2013 (8) SCC 320] the Apex Court laid down the following principles as far as a review petition is concerned.

                  “16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

                  (A) When the review will be maintainable:-

                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

                  (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

                  (iii) Any other sufficient reason.

                  The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others [(1955) 1 SCR 520], to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and others [JT (2013) 8 SC 275].

                  (B) When the review will not be maintainable:-

                  (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

                  (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

                  (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

                  (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

                  (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

                  (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

                  (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

                  (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

                  (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

13. In Sasi (Dead) through LRs v. Aravindakshan Nair and others [AIR 2017 SC 1432] the Apex Court held that in order to exercise the power of review, the error has to be self- evident and is not to be found out by a process of reasoning.

14. In Shanthi Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam State Electricity Board and others [(2020) 2 SCC 677] the Apex Court by referring to Parsion Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:

                  “The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided”.

15. Again in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd [2024 SCC Online SC 1090] the Apex Court considered the grounds for review in detail and held thus:

                  “Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as S.114, CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under S.114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is available to be exercised, subject to fulfillment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the following grounds:

                  (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or

                  (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or

                  (iii) any other sufficient reason.”

16. In Sujatha Aniyeri v. Kannur University [2025 KHC OnLine 212], in which both of us are parties, after considering the point, what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, this court held that review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on the merits. If the direction in the judgment was erroneous, then the remedy was to challenge the same by filing an appeal and not by filing a review petition.

17. Keeping in mind the above principles, let us consider the review petition filed by the petitioner. From the materials placed on record, we notice that W.A.No.1670 of 2024 was filed with a delay of 16 days. By the order dated 25.10.2024 in C.M.Appln.No.1 of 2024, the Division Bench headed by the then Chief Justice condoned the said delay. On 28.01.2025, when the writ appeal came up for consideration, the Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:

                  “Heard Mr. Harish Gopinath, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Mr. K. Balachandran, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1.

                  2. The issue revolves around the interpretation of “waiting period” in Clause 8.II.(G) of the LIC policy. According to the Original Petitioner, the date of first diagnosis of any stage of cancer in this case would be 28 September 2021 however the Specialist in the relevant field confirmed that the second stage of cancer has reached.

                  3. According to the Insurance Company, the cancer was detected by the Medical Practitioner on 25 August 2021, i.e., on the 166th day and therefore before the expiry of 180 days.

                  4. Even if it is to be contended that the initial diagnosis has to be confirmed by a Specialist in the relevant field, and if the Specialist confirms the diagnosis and the stage of cancer after the period of 180 days, it cannot be argued that it would relate back to the date of first diagnosis by the Medical Practitioner within 180 days, as the first diagnosis would stand confirmed.

                  5. However, it is the contention of the Original Petitioner that with regard to the type of cancer that the Petitioner suffers from, the diagnosis can only be made through surgical means. The Petitioner has taken this ground in the writ petition and has relied upon scientific papers. Learned counsel for the Original Petitioner submits that he will file an affidavit of the expert/doctor to put this scientific position on record and seeks time for that purpose.

                  6. On the aspect of suppression of facts, it is the contention of the Petitioner that this was not the ground on which the Appellant Insurance Company had rejected the claim of the Petitioner. This aspect would be considered on the next date of hearing.

                  7. To enable filing of additional affidavit, post the appeal on 14 February 2025.”

18. In pursuance of the above direction, an affidavit dated 17.02.2025 sworn to by Dr. Rahul Ravind, a consultant in the department of medical oncology, Renai Medicity Multispecialty Hospital, Palarivattom, was placed on record before the Division Bench, by the learned counsel for the petitioner on 27.02.2025. Paragraphs 1 to 8 of the said affidavit read thus:

                  “1. I am swearing to this affidavit in compliance of the order dated 28.01.2025 of this Hon'ble Court, which was passed in relation to Medical Insurance Claim of Smt. Hareipreetha T., who is under my follow up. I am informed that the said Insurance Claim is now pending consideration of this Hon'ble Court in the above matter and that in the course of hearing, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass the aforesaid order. I have perused and understood the order.

                  2. I am a Consultant in the Department of Medical Oncology Renal Medicity Multispecialty Hospital at Palarivattom, Ernakulam. My Educational Qualification is DM (Medical Oncology) DMRT, DNB (Radiotherapy), MNAMS. I have received my super speciality DM degree in Medical Oncology from Tata Cancer Hospital, HomiBhabha National Institute, Mumbai. I have worked as Assistant Professor (Ad. Hoc) in the above Hospital for 1 year. I possess two degrees in Radiation Oncology(DMRT from Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences, Kochi and DNB(Radiotherapy) from HCG Hospital Bangalore. I have 10 years of experience as an oncology specialist. I am an expert Doctor in Medical and Radiation Oncology.

                  3. It is submitted that Smt. Haripreetha T. had undergone modified radical hysterectomy(MRH) +bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy(BSO)+Sentinel Lymphnode Biopsy (SLNB) and Excision of Lymphnode - (meaning Surgery where the entire uterus, both the ovaries and fallopian tube, regional lymph nodes have been removed) at Lakeshore Hospital Ernakulam on 10.09.2021. Thereafter the tissue specimen was sent for Histopathological Reporting and the post-operative Histopathology Report came only on 28.09.2021 confirming Endometroid Cancer Grade II. Accordingly, Exhibit P4 Certificate in the prescribed format was submitted to LIC along with the Claim application.

                  4. On perusal of records, it is found that Smt. Haripreetha T. had undergone MRH +BSO+SLNB +Excision of Lymphnode on 10.09.2021 at Lakeshore Hospital Ernakulam. Thereafter, the tissue sample was taken and sent for Histopathological Reporting. It is further revealed from records that the post-operative Histopathological Report dated 28.09.21, received subsequently diagnosed the stage of the disease as endometroid cancer grade II, surgically staged pTlbNOMx as per American Joint Committee on Cancer Staging 8th Edition (AJCC, 8th Edition).

                  5. A scrutiny of the medical records and history of the patient would show that the patient have been staged as Endometroid Cancer pTlbNOMx(A)CC,8th Edition) only after securing the post-operative histopathology report dated 28.09.2021. Until such time no procedure treatment could be prescribed and advised to the patient. The fact that diagnosis of the stage of Endometroid Cancer can only be determined after obtaining post-operative histopathological report which is supported by the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) staging of endometrial cancer: 2023,(Reference Article – Berek)S, Matias-Guiu X, Creutzberg C, et al. FIGO staging of endometrial cancer: 2023. Int J Gynecol Obstet. 2023; 162: 383-394. doi:10.1002/ijgo.14923)

                  6. Stating the FIGO Guidelines, “Cancers of the female genital tract are surgically staged, with the exceptions of staging for cervical cancer, which is clinical, and staging for gestational trophoblastic neoplasia (GTN), which combines clinical and biological aspects.'' (Reference: content/unloads/2016/10/FIGO-cervix-uterine-vulva-2009.pdf). Hence Endometrial Carcinomas can only be staged after an Oncological Surgery.

                  7. A perusal of LIC policy in question as shown by the patient refers to two stages of cancer. First is early-stage cancer in which case it must be established by Histopathological Evidence and be confirmed by a Specialist in the relevant field. In other words, an Oncologist with the help of a pathologist can do it. It is stated that in the case stage of cancer, can be confirmed only after surgery, and post-operative Histopathology Report.

                  8. In the instant case, the post-operative Histopathology Report was available on 28.09.2021. Therefore, the stage of the cancer was diagnosed, certified and confirmed by a Specialist only on 28.09.2021.”

19. Later, the 1st respondent-appellant filed an objection to the said affidavit filed by the oncologist, producing therewith Annexure A2 document. Paragraphs 4 to 8 of that objection read thus:

                  “4. It is respectfully submitted that on 25.08.2021 writ petitioner happened to be hospitalized in Life Line Hospital, Adoor on account of profused bleeding. The writ petitioner was given 2 units of blood and conducted Dilation and Curettage (D&C) and collected samples for investigation. The ultrasound of the abdomen done on the same day indicated Endometrial Malignancy which is the first diagnosis of any stage of cancer that is on 25.08.2021. Thereafter the sample collected on 27.08.2021 was sent for Histopathology and Histopathology report dated 31.08.2021 viz. Exhibit R1(c) confirmed Endometrioid Carcinoma (FIGO Grade II). Later MRI of Pelvis (plain and contrast) with screening of upper abdomen was conducted and report dated 01.09.2021 viz. Exhibit R1(d) also confirmed the Endometrium. Later at the request of writ petitioner/patient she was referred to higher center and accordingly the writ petitioner was admitted in the Lakeshore Hospital on 09.09.2021 and on the same day again samples were collected for Histopathology investigation. By Annexure A1 Histopathology report dated 10.09.2021, the Lakeshore Hospital has also confirmed Endometrioid Carcinoma FIGO Grade II. All the above findings by the experts in the field are within 180 days of commencement of policy that is 16.03.2021.

                  5. That is there are altogether 3 histopathologic reports. Exhibit R1(c) and Annexure A1 reports are before surgery dated 31.08.2021 and 10.09.2021 respectively were obtained before surgery and both concludes Endometrial Carcinoma FIGO Grade II. After Surgery Exhibit R1(f) histopathologic report was obtained dated 28.09.2021 which also confirms Endometrial Carcinoma FIGO Grade II. Both Exhibits R1(c) and Annexure A1 were within 180 days of the commencement of the policy. Merely because a third histopathologic report dated 28.09.2021 was obtained after surgery does not mean that the first diagnosis happen after 180 days.

                  6. The writ petitioner has filed an affidavit sworn by an oncologist. The Oncologist in paragraph No.5 depose that the patient have been staged as Endometrial Cancer pT1bN0Mx (AJCC 8th Edition) only after securing post operative histopathology report dated 28.09.2021. In paragraphs Nos. 5 and 6 the doctor tried to explain that staging of Endometrioid Cancer can only be done after an oncological surgery. The oncologist no where suggest or depose that Endometrial Cancer can be diagnosed only after a post Operative histopathological report, but he only asserts that the stage of such cancer can be ascertained only by post operative histopathology report.

                  7. The issue involved in this case is when was the Cancer first diagnosed and was it within 180 days of the commencement of the policy. The doctor for the reason only known to him has chosen to avoid answering the issue involved in this case. It appears that the affidavit is sworn by the doctor only to help his patient.

                  8. The appellant in this case has sought an opinion regarding diagnosis of cancer from Dr.Rose Mathew MBBS, MD(pathology), Consultant Pathologist, Metropolis Lab, Palarivattom, Cochin. The doctor on the basis of Exhibit R1(c) and Annexure A1 asserts that both the reports, the diagnosis of Endometrioid Adeno carcinoma of the Endometrium (FIGO Grade II) is firmly established. True Copy of the Medical Opinion issued by Dr. Rose Mathew, Metropolis Health Care Limited is produced herewith and marked as Annexure A2. (Annexure A1 is marked along with IA 1/2025).”

20. The contention of the petitioner at present is that by virtue of Ext.R1(f) histopathological report dated 28.09.2021 coupled with the affidavit filed by the oncologist, the date of diagnosis of endometrial carcinoma can only be taken as 28.09.2021, which is after the waiting period of 180 days from the commencement of the policy.

21. In Chandmull Jain [AIR 1966 SC 1644], the Apex Court, considering condition No.10 of the fire policy availed by the insured, by which the insurer claimed to cancel the policy at any time, held thus:

                  “11. A contract of insurance is a species of commercial transactions and there is a well-established commercial practice to send cover notes even prior to the completion of a proper proposal or while the proposal is being considered or a policy is in preparation for delivery. A cover note is a temporary and limited agreement. It may be self-contained or it may incorporate by reference to the terms and conditions of the future policy. When the cover note incorporates the policy in this manner, it does not have to recite the terms and conditions, but merely to refer to a particular standard policy. If the proposal is for a standard policy and the cover note refers to it, the assured is taken to have accepted the terms of that policy. The reference to the policy and its terms and conditions may be expressed in the proposal or the cover note or even in the letter of acceptance including the cover note. The incorporation of the terms and conditions of the policy may also arise from a combination of references in two or more documents passing between the parties. Documents like the proposal, cover note and the policy are commercial documents and to interpret them commercial habits and practice cannot altogether be ignored. During the time the cover note operates, the relations of the parties are governed by its terms and conditions, if any, but more usually by the terms and conditions of the policy bargained for and to be issued. When this happens the terms of the policy are incipient, but after the period of temporary cover, the relations are governed only by the terms and conditions of the policy unless insurance is declined in the meantime. Delay in issuing the policy makes no difference. The relations even then are governed by the future policy if the cover notes give sufficient indication that it would be so. In other respects there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of insurance there is a requirement of uberrima fides, i.e., good faith on the part of the assured and the contract is likely to be construed contra proferentem that is, against the company in case of ambiguity or doubt. A contract is formed when there is an unqualified acceptance of the proposal. Acceptance may be expressed in writing or it may even be implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it. In the case of the assured, a positive act on his part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce the policy amounts to an affirmation of it. This position was clearly recognised by the assured himself, because he wrote, close upon the expiry of the time of the cover notes, that either a policy should be issued to him before that period had expired or the cover note extended in time. In interpreting documents relating to a contract of insurance, the duty of the court is to interpret the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties, because it is not for the court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves. Looking at the proposal, the letter of acceptance and the cover notes, it is clear that a contract of insurance under the standard policy for fire and extended to cover flood, cyclone, etc., had come into being.”

                  (Underline supplied)

22. While coming to the facts of the present case, by a detailed judgment dated 06.10.2025, this Court has allowed the writ appeal. Paragraphs 9 to 14 and the last paragraph of that judgment is extracted hereunder:

                  “9. The 1st respondent obtained LIC’s Cancer cover policy bearing No.319261424 from the appellant by submitting Ext.R1 proposal form. In order to understand the contentions raised by the parties in their right perspective, it is better to extract some of the relevant clauses of that insurance policy in this judgment. Clause 13 of Part B Definitions of Ext.R1(h) policy says that the date of diagnosis is the date on which the medical practitioner first examines the life assured and certifies the diagnosis of any of the specified Early Stage Cancer and/or Major Stage Cancer under this policy. Clause 25 of the said part defines medical practitioner as a person who holds a valid registration from the Medical Council of any State or Medical Council of India or Council for Indian Medicine or for Homeopathy set up by the Government of India or a State Government and is thereby entitled to practice medicine within its jurisdiction; and is acting within its scope and jurisdiction of license but excluding the practitioner who is insured/policyholder himself or an agent of the insured or insurance agent, business partner(s) or employer/employee of the insured or a member of insured's family. Part C of the policy deals with the Benefits. Clause 1 to 3 of Part C read thus;

                  "1. Benefit Options: The policyholder has to choose one of the following two benefit options at the time of taking the policy.

                  Option I Level Sum Insured: Under this option, the Basic sum insured shall remain unchanged throughout the policy term.

                  Option II Increasing Sum Insured: Under this option, Sum Insured under the policy shall increase by 10% of Basic Sum insured each year for first five years starting from the first policy anniversary or until the diagnosis of first event of any cancer, whichever is earlier. On diagnosis of any specified Cancer as mentioned in Condition 8(A) of Part C, all the claims payable under the policy shall be based on the increased Sum Insured as the policy anniversary coinciding or prior to the diagnosis of the first claim and further increase to this Sum Insured will not be applicable.

                  The benefits payable under the Policy shall be based on the Applicable Sum Insured, Where, the Applicable Sum Insured shall be equal to-

                  The Basic Sum Insured for policies taken under Option I; or

                  Basic Sum Insured during first year and Increased Sum Insured thereafter, as per the provisions detailed in Option II

                  The option chosen under this policy is mentioned in the Schedule.

                  2. Early Stage Cancer Benefit: Provided the policy is inforce, on first diagnosis, before the stipulated date of maturity, of any one of the Early Stage Cancers as mentioned in Condition 8 (A) I of Part C, and if the same is admissible then the following benefits are payable subject to Conditions and Restrictions as mentioned in this document

                  (a) Lump sum benefit: 25% of Applicable Sum Insured shall be payable

                  (b) Premium Waiver Benefit: Premiums for next three policy years or balance policy term, which ever is lower, shall be waived from the policy anniversary coinciding or following the date of diagnosis.

                  3. Major Stage Cancer Benefit: Provided the policy is inforce, on first diagnosis, before the stipulated date of maturity, of any of the Major Stage Cancers as mentioned in Condition 8 (A) II of Part C, and if the same is admissible then the following benefits are payable subject to Conditions and Restrictions as mentioned In this document:

                   (a) Lump Sum: 100% of Applicable Sum Insured less any previously paid claims in respect of Early Stage Cancer shall be payable

                  (b) Income Benefit: In addition to the above lump sum benefit, Income Benefit of 1% of Applicable Sum insured shall be payable on each policy month following the payment of Lump Sum as mentioned in the above Condition 3(a) of Part C, for a fixed period of next ten years irrespective of the survival of the Life Insured and even if this period of 10 years goes beyond the policy term. In case of death of the Life Assured while receiving this income Benefit, the remaining payouts, if any, will be paid to his/her nominee.

                  (c) Premium Waiver Benefit. All the future premiums shall be waived from the next policy anniversary and the policy shall be free from all liabilities except to the extent of Income Benefit as specified above."

                  10. Clause 8 of that Part deals with the List and Definitions of the Cancer covered under the plan. It divides the cancer into Early Stage Cancer and Major Stage Cancer. As per Clause 8 (G), there is a waiting period for availing the benefit of the policy, which says that a waiting period of 180 days will apply from the date of issuance of the policy or date of revival of risk cover whichever is later, to the first diagnosis of "any stage" cancer. "Any Stage" is defined as all stages of Cancer that occur during the waiting period. It is also clarified in that clause that the benefit covered under the policy is not applicable, and the policy shall be terminated if any stage of cancer occurs at any time on or after the date of issuance of the policy but before the expiry of 180 days reckoned from that date or before the expiry of 180 days from the date of revival.

                  11. The prime issue involved in this case is the date of diagnosis of cancer. As per Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, Diagnosis means;

                  "1. The term denoting the disease or syndrome a person has or is believed to have.

                  2. The use of scientific or clinical methods to establish the cause and nature of a person's illness or injury and the subsequent functional impairment caused by the pathology. The diagnosis forms the basis of patient care."

                  12. The 1st respondent was admitted in the hospital due to illness for the first time, as per the pleadings in the writ petition is on 25.08.2021. Ext.R1(b) is the Ultrasound Scan Report dated 25.08.2021, wherein the final impression entered as Endometrial Malignancy. Ext.R1(c) is the histopathology Report dated 31.08.2021, wherein the impression is recorded as Fragments of moderately differentiated endometrioid carcinoma [FIGO Grade II]. Ext.R1(d) is the MRI Report dated 01.09.2021 wherein the impression is entered as imaging findings are suggestive of Ca endomentrium - Stage 1 a. Subsequently, the 1st respondent was admitted in Lake Shore Hospital on 09.09.2021 and discharged on 16.09.2021, and in the meanwhile, she was subjected to a surgery. Samples were collected during surgery, and the pathology report dated 28.09.2021 confirmed Endometrial Carcinoma. This shows that the final opinion arrived at by the pathology report dated 28.09.2021 is the confirmation of the diagnosis made in Exts.R1(b) to R1(d) documents. This diagnosis, done on 28.09.2021, is the confirmation by an expert, and it is not the first date on which cancer has been diagnosed. In such circumstances, it can only be said that the diagnosis of cancer was within the waiting period of 180 days. Therefore, the 1st respondent is not entitled for the policy coverage as rightly contended by the appellant and found by the learned Ombudsman.

                  13. While coming to the question of suppression of material fact is concerned, we notice that as found by the learned Single Judge, the age of the mother of the 1st respondent, while detecting cancer, is not entered in Ext.R1(e) discharge summary. No other document has been produced from the side of the appellant to prove the age of the mother of the 1st respondent at that time. The 1st respondent in her reply affidavit dated 29.01.2020, specifically pleaded that her mother is aged 74 years and the breast cancer detected was about 30 years ago. In the absence of any material to contradict this pleading, we concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that there is no suppression of material fact in the non-disclosure of breast cancer of her mother by the 1st respondent in Ext.R1 proposal form.

                  14. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find that the appellant has made out sufficient ground to hold that while allowing the writ petition the learned Single Judge failed to properly appreciate the materials on record pertaining to the waiting period of 180 days from the date of policy, during the period on which the 1st respondent was diagnosed as suffering from cancer. Therefore, the writ appeal is liable to be allowed.”

23. It is true that in the judgment dated 06.10.2025, this Court has not referred to the order dated 28.01.2025 passed by the Division Bench in the writ appeal, the affidavit filed by the oncologist and the objection filed by the 1st respondent-appellant. But while going through the order dated 28.01.2025, we notice that the said order is not one passed accepting the contentions of any of the parties. The affidavit of the oncologist was permitted to be placed on record by the petitioner based on the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

24. While going through the affidavit dated 17.02.2025 of the oncologist, it is evident that the said affidavit is nothing but the reiteration of the particulars of the treatment obtained by the petitioner under the Doctor who swore that affidavit. The 1st respondent-appellant filed objection to the said affidavit as extracted above. In the affidavit sworn to by the expert, it is only stated that since the post-operative histopathology report was available on 28.09.2021, the stage of cancer was diagnosed, certified and confirmed by the specialist only on 28.09.2021. Based on the arguments addressed at the Bar in the writ appeal, the date of confirmation of endometrial carcinoma was already found by this Court as not on 28.09.2021, and held that the histopathological report dated 28.09.2021 only confirmed the diagnosis made in Exts.R1(b) to R1(d) documents. Therefore, the non-reference of the order dated 28.01.2025 of the Division Bench, the affidavit filed by the oncologist and also the objection filed by the 1st respondent-appellant during the pendency of the proceedings in the writ appeal has no bearing as far as the decision of the writ appeal is concerned. Moreover, in the affidavit filed by the oncologist, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-appellant, it is only the diagnosis of the stage of cancer was stated.

25. As far as the judgment of the Apex Court Chandmull Jain [AIR 1966 SC 1644], relied by the petitioner, there is no quarrel about the principle stated in that judgment as extracted above. But the principle stated by the Apex Court in that judgment has no application to the facts of the present case, since there is no ambiguity in the contract of insurance entered into between the petitioner and the 1st respondent company.

26. Having considered the pleadings and materials placed on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 06.10.2025 passed in the writ appeal. The attempt of the petitioner appears as to re-agitate the issue by using review jurisdiction as an appeal in disguise.

In the result, this review petition stands dismissed.