Oral Judgment
1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant - State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for short) against the judgment and order dated 25.06.2012 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Nadiad Kheda (hereinafter be referred to as the "Trial Court") in Special (Atrocity) Case No. 25 of 2011 whereby the Trial Court had acquitted the respondents - accused from the charges under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as "IPC") r/w Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter be referred to as the "Atrocities Act").
2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the complainant cultivates approximately ten bighas of land belonging to Mehmudmiya Rasulmiya Shaikh of his village, situated in Chothiya Vad Sim, on a sharecropping basis, where a tobacco crop was currently standing. On 20.11.2009, in the early morning, the complainant and his wife Gitaben were present in the aforementioned tobacco field. At around 1:00 PM, the complainant's sister-in-law, Hiraben Pashabhai, along with Jethuben Somabhai Rohit and Somabhai Lallubhai Rohit from their neighborhood (faliya), also arrived at their sharecropped land near the complainant's field. All of them were working in their respective tobacco fields.
2.1 At around 1:30 PM, Ranubhai Melabhai, Raghubhai Bhopabhai, and Melabhai Bhopabhai, residing at Angadi Pahadiya, arrived near the complainant's field carrying wooden sticks to graze their sheep and goats. Seeing this, Hiraben shouted at them, asking why they were bringing their livestock near the field. The three herdsmen hurled abuses at Hiraben, saying, "Are they causing any damage to your field?" and grew increasingly enraged. When asked not to hurl abuses, Ranubhai Melabhai struck Hiraben on her right hand with his stick, and Raghubhai Bhopabhai struck her on the back with his stick, while Melabhai Bhopabhai exhorted them by shouting "beat them, beat them."
2.2 As Hiraben fell to the ground, the complainant, his wife, and others rushed to rescue her. The accused fled towards the ravines with their livestock, hurling casteist threats as they left. Hiraben sustained injuries to her hand and back and was admitted to Thasra Government Hospital. A formal complaint was lodged in person before the Second Police Sub-Inspector, Thasra Police Station.
2.3 Based on the complaint, a case was registered at Thasra Police Station under II-C.R. No. 180/2009, and the investigation was handed over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The investigating officer recorded statements of all relevant witnesses, prepared necessary panchnamas, and, upon finding sufficient evidence, arrested the accused.
2.4 Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Thasra. Since the JMFC, Thasra lacked jurisdiction to try offenses under the Atrocities Act, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and subsequently transferred to Special Court.
2.5 A charge was framed against the accused at Exhibit 4 under Section 228(1)(b) of the CrPC. The contents of the charge were read over and explained to the accused and their statements/pleas were recorded at Exhibits 5 to 47. The accused denied all allegations and pleaded not guilty, whereupon the prosecution evidence was recorded. To prove its case the prosecution has examined 13 witnesses and produced five documentary evidence.
2.6 After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on records, the Trial Court by impugned judgment and order has acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them.
2.7 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal the appellant has preferred this Appeal.
3. Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the appellant Mr. Jay Patel, learned counsel for respondent No.4 original complainant and Mr. Ramani, learned counsel for the respondents accused.
4. Learned APP has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 25.06.2012, passed by the Trial Court, is contrary to law and the evidence available on record and, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. She has submitted that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the cogent, reliable and trustworthy oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution. She has submitted that the Trial Court erred in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506(2) r/w Section 114 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(X) of the Atrocities Act beyond reasonable doubt.
4.1 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence of the complainant, PW-1 Dhirubhai Ajrambhai Rohit, Exh.10, whose testimony was consistent with the FIR produced at Exh.11 and who had clearly narrated the manner in which the incident occurred and the role played by the accused persons. She has submitted that the Trial Court also failed to properly appreciate the evidence of the injured witness, PW-6 Hiraben Pasabhai Rohit, Exh.19, who had fully supported the prosecution case and clearly described the assault and injuries inflicted upon her by the accused persons. She has submitted that the medical evidence of PW-9 Dr. Pratik Pravinbhai Rathod, Exh.27, and PW-11 Dr. Varunkumar Chandulal Patel, Exh.32, along with the injury certificates at Exhs.29 and 34, corroborated the version of the injured witness. Both the doctors stated that the injuries could be caused by a stick.
4.2 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the documentary evidence, including the complaint at Exh.11, muddamal stick at Exh.18, scene of offence panchnama at Exh.21 and caste certificate at Exh.8/6, all of which supported the prosecution case. She has submitted that the caste certificate and the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses established that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste and that the accused had allegedly uttered caste-related humiliating words in public. She has submitted that the Trial Court, therefore, erred in not properly appreciating the evidence regarding the offence under Section 3(1)(X) of the Atrocities Act,. She has submitted that the Trial Court was required to evaluate their evidence in the light of the testimony of other reliable witnesses and the evidence of the Investigating Officer.
4.3 Learned APP has submitted that it is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based even on the testimony of a single witness if such evidence is reliable and trustworthy. In the present case, the evidence of the complainant and the injured witness was materially corroborated by the medical and documentary evidence. Thus, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the overall facts and circumstances and the evidence on record in its proper perspective and committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons.
5. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents accused has supported the judgment and order of acquittal.
5.1 Learned counsel for the respondents accused has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is legal, just, and proper and has been passed after thorough appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The Trial Court has assigned cogent, convincing, and well-reasoned findings while acquitting the respondents-accused, and the same does not warrant any interference by this Hon'ble Court.
5.2 Learned counsel for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led by the prosecution suffers from material contradictions, omissions, and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. The prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and has not produced reliable, trustworthy, and corroborative evidence connecting the respondents accused with the commission of the alleged offence.
5.3 It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further strengthened by an order of acquittal. Unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal, or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with an order of acquittal.
5.4 It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence in the impugned judgment and order. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and settled legal principles. The Trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents- accused, which is a substantive right flowing from the fundamental principles of criminal law.
5.5 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is submitted that the present appeal is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court therefore deserves to be confirmed.
6. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this Court are as under:-
Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from any illegality or perversity?
7. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to first examine the facts of the case. On 20.11.2009, at about 1:00 to 1:30 hours, PW-6 was present in an agricultural field originally owned by Mahemoodmiya Rasoolmiya Shaikh, which was being cultivated by PW-6 along with her family members. At that time, the present respondents-accused, along with their cattle, entered the agricultural field where tobacco crops had been cultivated. As the cattle were damaging the tobacco crop, PW-6 asked the respondents- accused to keep their cattle away and ensure that they did not enter the agricultural field. Upon being so asked, all three respondents-accused became enraged. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 allegedly inflicted stick blows upon PW-6, while Respondent No. 3 instigated Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to assault her. The respondents-accused also allegedly abused and insulted PW-6 by uttering caste-related derogatory words with the intent to humiliate her on account of her community. Thus, the alleged offences came to be committed by the present respondents- accused, and a complaint in respect thereof was lodged by the brother-in-law of the victim, PW-6.
8. It appears from the record that PW-1 did not state in the complaint that the cattle belonging to the present respondents-accused had entered the agricultural field. Further, material contradictions emerge from the depositions of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-6. PW-1 specifically denied having accompanied PW-6 when she was taken to the doctor, whereas PW-4 and PW-6 specifically stated that PW-1 had accompanied PW-6 and that they had all gone to the hospital together.
9. Furthermore, PW-9 and PW-11, the doctors examined before the Trial Court, specifically deposed that the history of assault was given only by PW-6. However, PW-6 did not disclose the names of the alleged assailants to the doctors. The doctors also did not find any external injury which could be attributed to a blow with a stick. On the contrary, the medical evidence indicates that the injuries found on PW-6 could possibly have been caused by a fall on the road or on any hard surface. Moreover, no injury was found on the back of PW-6. Therefore, the allegations that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 assaulted PW-6 and that respondent No. 3 instigated them to commit such assault do not appear to have been established and seem to be a false story put forward by the complainant.
10. Further, from the depositions of PW-12 and PW-13, it is revealed that the caste certificate of PW-6 was neither collected during the investigation nor produced before the Trial Court to establish that PW-6 belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Moreover, the allegations regarding the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act were also not proved. According to the evidence of PW-1 and PW-6, the alleged incident took place in the agricultural land cultivated by the family of PW-6, where no member of the public was present. There is no evidence to establish that the alleged caste-related abusive words were uttered by the present respondents accused with an intention to insult the complainant in any place within public view.
11. Thus, from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it appears that the alleged incident itself has not been satisfactorily proved. The Trial Court, after considering the evidence and assigning detailed reasons in paragraphs 14 to 29 of the judgment, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges against the present respondents-accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506(2) of the IPC r/w Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act. Further, in paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Trial Court specifically observed that no evidence had been led by the prosecution to establish that an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act had been committed by the present respondents-accused. No evidence supporting the essential ingredients of the said offence had come on record. The Trial Court, in paragraphs 31 to 34, therefore assigned cogent reasons for holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case and establish the charges against the present respondents-accused beyond reasonable doubt.
12. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
"(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1) (r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held, 'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or "based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to exist prima facie.
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1) (r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in present case, an accused may argue that although allegations levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint, then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused - duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be independent and without being influenced by the provisions figuring inLicenced to : Shri.Ashish Modi (Judicial Academy) complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence under this Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint clearly points towards commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 that bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for determining whether an offence under the Act has been committed or not is to ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary to constitute offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not - accusation which does not disclose necessary ingredients of offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to bring into operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in cases like the one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to look into materials based upon which complaint has been registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in the complaint - if on a prima facie reading of materials referred to in complaint and complaint itself, ingredients necessary for constituting offence are not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not be applicable - hence, it would be open to Courts to consider plea for grant pre-arrest bail on its own merits.
(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC - from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status.
(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" - words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the "upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation - humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart - distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation - resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it - however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words "with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC - if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.
13. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes 375 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;
10. The expression any place within public view has been interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this Court reaffirmed that:
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public view, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in any place within public view, which is an essential component of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.
14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against the Appellants.
15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of the SC/ST Act.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in accordance with law."
14. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0) AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the case of State Of Gujarat Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been taken by this Court.
15. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held liable under the said provision. In the absence of the fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the present respondents.
16. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that the respondents-accused has established his innocence before the learned Trial Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the learned Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.
17. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
18. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.
19. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re- affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon'ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.
20. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-
"20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
"42. .... (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained."
21. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
22. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.
23. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
