S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. This Writ Petition (Crl.) is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the wife of Mr. Muhammed Aslam (the ‘detenue’ for short), who is detained in Central Prison, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram, by virtue of Ext.P1 order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the State Government under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for short), seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 order and a writ of Habeas corpus commanding the 3rd respondent Superintendent, Central Prison, Poojappura, to produce the body of the detenue, contending that the detention of the detenue is illegal.

2. The pleadings and materials produced in the writ petition would show that, for ordering preventive detention of the detenue, the authorities considered three criminal cases in which the detenue was involved. Among them, the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.524 of 2025 of Thadiyittaparambu Police Station, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 22(b), 27A and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’ for short), the incident of which occurred on 12.07.2025. In the last prejudicial activity, the detenue was apprehended and remanded in judicial custody. A Rowdy History Sheet was opened against the detenue in Thadiyittaparambu Police Station pursuant to the order of the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Perumbavoor. A report was also submitted before the Sub Divisional Magistrate Court, Muvattupuzha, for preventive action under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’ for short). The Sponsoring Authority, that is, the 2nd respondent District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, submitted the proposal for preventive detention of the detenue through the report dated 08.09.2025, followed by the additional reports dated 21.10.2025, 14.11.2025 and 10.12.2025. The State Police Chief forwarded the proposal and connected records to the State Government through the reports dated 14.10.2025, 13.11.2025 and 12.12.2025. When the proposal for preventive detention was placed by the Government before the Screening Committee initially on 25.10.2025, the Committee did not recommend his detention, since the detenue was in judicial custody at that time and his bail application in the last prejudicial activity had been rejected. Subsequently, the detenue was granted bail in the last prejudicial activity on 10.11.2025. Thereafter, the sponsoring authority informed the Government that the detenue had been granted bail in the last prejudicial activity and appraised the factual situation. The Government accordingly reconsidered the proposal and again placed it before the Screening Committee on 19.11.2025. The Committee, after arriving at a subjective and objective satisfaction, recommended preventive detention of the detenue, which was received by the Government on 02.12.2025. Thereafter, the Government sought further clarifications from the sponsoring authority and accordingly the additional report dated 10.12.2025, together with the final reports and supporting materials, was submitted to the Government. Thereafter, Ext.P1 detention order was issued against the detenue. The detenue was then apprehended and detained in Central Prison on 02.01.2026.

3. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, a counter affidavit dated 29.07.2026 has been filed in the writ petition, refuting the contentions of the petitioner and detailing the steps taken for ordering preventive detention. Similarly, on behalf of the additional 4th respondent, a counter affidavit dated 29.07.2026 has been filed in the writ petition refuting the contentions in the writ petition.

4. Heard Shri. Nireesh Mathew, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. Reeha Khader K., the learned Senior Government Counsel, and also Smt. O. M. Shalina, the Deputy Solicitor General of India.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is a delay of five months from the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention, and a delay of 15 days from the order of detention till actual apprehension of the detenue. The authorities have not taken any steps under Section 8 of the PITNDPS Act against the detenue after the detention order, which snaps the necessity of keeping the detenue in preventive detention. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in A. Mohammed Farook v. Joint Secretary to Government of India [1999 ICO 826] and Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura [AIR OnLine 2022 SC 349].

6.     On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the delay was properly explained in Ext.P1 order itself. It was the period taken for completion of the procedural formalities, and there is no inordinate and unexplained delay in the present case. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the detenue was absconding and that caused the delay in execution of the detention order. In support of the arguments, the learned Senior Government Pleader relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in T. A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [(1989) 4 SCC 741] and Licil Antony v. State of Kerala [(2014) 11 SCC 326].

7. The learned Deputy Solicitor General of India would submit that the State Government had duly forwarded the report under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act on 19.12.2025 itself and the said report was received by the PITNDPS Division, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India on

8. In Abdul Rahman [(1989) 4 SCC 741], Which is an appeal preferred under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by the appellant therein, questioning the validity and correctness of the order of detention passed by the State of Kerala in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(1)(iii) and Section 3(1)(iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “11. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case”.

                  (Underline supplied)

9. In A. Mohammed Farook [1999 ICO 826], in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the detenue therein challenging his preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “11. There is catena of judgments on this topic rendered by this court wherein this Court emphasised that the detaining authority must explain satisfactorily the inordinate delay in executing the detention order otherwise the subjective satisfaction gets vitiated. Since the law is well settled in this behalf we do not propose to refer to other judgments which were brought to our notice.

                  12. As indicated earlier the only explanation given by the detaining authority as regards the delay of 40 days in executing the detention order is that despite their efforts the petitioner could not be located at his residence or in his office and therefore the order could not be executed immediately. No report from the executing agency was filed before us to indicate as to what steps were taken by the executing agency to serve the detention order. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation explaining the delay of 40 days, we are of the opinion that the detention order must stand vitiated by reason of non execution thereof within a reasonable time. From Annexure P2 (the proceeding sheet of the M. M. Court Madras) it appears that the petitioner (accused) was present in the court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 25.2.1999 as well on 25.3.1999. Despite such opportunities neither the detaining authority nor the executing agency as well as sponsoring authority were diligent to serve the detention order on the petitioner at the earliest. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing detention order dated February 25, 1999 is vitiated. It is in these circumstances it is not possible for us to sustain the detention order.”

                  (Underline supplied)

10.   In Licil Antony [(2014) 11 SCC 326], while considering the special leave petition filed by the wife of the detenue therein against the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court, declining to quash the order of detention passed under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and we have no doubt in our mind that there has to be live link between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention. COFEPOSA intends to deal with persons engaged in smuggling activities who pose a serious threat to the economy and thereby security of the nation. Such persons by virtue of their large resources and influence cause delay in making of an order of detention. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard and fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case”.

                  (Underline supplied)

11.   In Sushanta Kumar Banik [AIR OnLine 2022 SC 349], the Apex Court, while considering an appeal filed by the detenue against the judgment and order dated 01.06.2022 passed by the High Court of Tripura at Agartala confirming his detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, held thus;

                  “20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

                  (Underline supplied)

12.   In the instant case, for initiating proceedings under Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act against the detenue, the authorities concerned have taken into consideration three criminal cases in which he was involved. They are:

                

13.   The last prejudicial activity in which the detenue was involved is Crime No.524 of 2025 of Thadiyittaparambu Police Station registered for the offences under Sections 8(c), 22(b), 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act. In the last prejudicial activity, the detenue was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. His initial bail application was dismissed on 24.09.2025. During that period, the proposal for preventive detention was moved by the Sponsoring Authority through the reports dated 08.09.2025 and 21.10.2025. Since the detenue was in judicial custody, the Screening Committee on 25.10.2025 rejected the proposal. However, the detenue was granted bail on 10.11.2025 in the last prejudicial activity. Thereafter, another report dated 14.11.2025 was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority to the Government, and the matter was again placed before the Screening Committee. The Screening Committee reconsidered the proposal on 19.11.2025, and the Government received the recommendation for preventive detention of the detenue from the Screening Committee on 02.12.2025. Thereafter, the Government sought further clarification from the Sponsoring Authority, and accordingly the Sponsoring Authority submitted an additional report dated 10.12.2025 with supporting materials. It was thereafter that the impugned Ext.P1 order dated 19.12.2025 was passed under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act.

14.   The delay is properly explained by the detaining authority in Ext.P1 order itself. As held in Licil Antony [(2014) 11 SCC 326], while dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the Court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. While considering the steps taken during the relevant period as discussed above, we find no unreasonable and unexplained delay in the present case, snapping the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the Ext.P1 detention order. In Sushanta Kumar Banik [AIR OnLine 2022 SC 349], the delay of five months was unexplained. But that is not the case in our hand therefore, the principle stated in Sushanta Kumar Banik [AIR OnLine 2022 SC 349] does not apply to the instant case.

15.   While coming to the delay attributed from the date of Ext.P1 order till apprehension of the detenue, it can be seen that in the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent it is stated that the authorised officer could trace the detenue only on 02.01.2026 and execute the order of detention. The non-taking of steps under Section 8 of the PITNDPS Act alone cannot be taken as a ground to say that the detenue was not absconding or he was readily available to comply with Ext.P1 order during the relevant period, especially when the time gap between the date of order and apprehension is only 15 days. In Abdul Rahman [(1989) 4 SCC 741], the said unexplained time gap was more than three months and in A. Mohammed Farook [1999 ICO 826], it was 40 days. Therefore, the principle stated in those judgments does not apply to the facts of the case in our hand.

16.   From the records made available for our perusal by the learned Senior Government Pleader pertaining to Ext.P1 order, we noticed that the detenue was served with copies of all relevant documents and he received the same. The report under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act was also forwarded to the Central Government within the time period mentioned therein. The details of the three cases in which the detenue was involved and the necessity to pass an order of preventive detention are considered in detail in Ext.P1 order.

17.   It is also relevant to note at this juncture that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not sit in appeal over the decision taken by the detaining authority on the basis of the materials placed before the said authority as to whether preventive detention is necessary or warranted. If there are materials, it is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. (See: George v. State of Kerala [2010 (4) KLT 416] and Aaliya Ashraf v. State of Kerala [2025 (1) KLT SN 15]). True that such interference is possible if no materials at all are there for arriving at such subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority or if the order of the detaining authority is vitiated by mala fides or it was issued by reference to and placing reliance on materials which cannot legally be taken note of. In the present case, from the pleadings and materials on record, it is not made out that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authorities concerned is vitiated by any of the aforesaid circumstances.

18. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to hold that the impugned Ext.P1 order is suffering from any illegality which warrants interference of this Court by exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In the result, this writ petition stands dismissed.