Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This writ petition is filed by the mother of the detenu, Sri. Rahul Manoj @ Koilandy Rahul, aged 27 years, challenging Ext.P1 detention order dated 20th February, 2026, issued by the Government under Section 3(1) read with Section 13(2)(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (for short, “KAA(P)A”). The said detention order was confirmed by the Government Order dated 9th April, 2026, whereby the Government directed that the detenu be detained for a period of one year from the date of his detention.

2. The process leading to the issuance of the detention order commenced with the submission of the proposal dated 9th December, 2025 alleging that the detenu was involved in fourteen crimes registered under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Arms Act, during the period from 2020 to 2025. The Sponsoring Authority submitted the proposal on 9th December, 2025 and based on its recommendation, the impugned detention order was issued on 20th February, 2026.

3. The crimes relied upon by the Detaining Authority for passing the order of detention are as follows:

                 

                 

4. Out of the aforesaid fourteen cases relied upon for the purpose of preventive detention, the detenu has been granted bail in thirteen cases, in which investigation has also been completed and final reports have been filed before the respective courts. The only exception is the last prejudicial activity, namely Crime No.2833/2025, which continues to be under investigation.

5. The records herein reveal that the detenu has a long history of criminal antecedents and had earlier undergone preventive detention for a period of six months pursuant to the detention order dated 27th July, 2022 passed by the District Collector, Pathanamthitta. However, even after his release from detention on 9th February, 2023, he allegedly continued to involve himself in various criminal activities involving attempt to commit murder, dacoity, arson, attempt to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and other crimes registered under the provisions of the IPC, BNS and Arms Act.

6. We heard Mr. Ajeesh M. Ummer, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mrs. O.A. Nuriya, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the detention order on several grounds. The first and the foremost challenge was that the detention order had failed to take note of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity namely Crime No. 2833/2025 of Thiruvalla Police station alleging offences under sections 118(1), 3(5), 109, 296(b) of BNS. It was further submitted that there were no reliable materials before the Detaining Authority to arrive at a satisfaction that there was a real or imminent possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the last prejudicial case. In fact, the final report had been filed within 90 days of his arrest, thereby, according to the petitioner, eliminating the possibility of him obtaining statutory bail. Reliance was placed on Kamarunnissa v. Union of India ((1991) 1 SCC 128) , wherein the Supreme Court held that preventive detention of a person already in custody requires the authority to be satisfied, on the basis of reliable material, both that there is a real possibility of his release on bail and that, upon such release, he would likely indulge in prejudicial activities.

8. The second ground of challenge was regarding the unexplained delay between the last prejudicial activity and the passing of the detention order, as well as delay in submitting the report by the Sponsoring Authority. According to the petitioner, such delay had snapped the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention.

9. The third ground of challenge was that the detenu does not fall within the statutory parameters of Section 2(p)(iii) read with Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A, and that the non-compliance with the statutory requirements had caused prejudice to him. On these grounds, it was contended that Ext.P1 detention order and the consequential confirmation order are illegal and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, and are liable to be set aside.

10. Per Contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor relying upon a memo dated 15th July, 2026 has submitted that the detenu satisfies the statutory requirements of a “known rowdy” under Section 2(p)(iii) read with Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A, as the offences involved in the cases relied upon are punishable with imprisonment for one year or more. It was submitted that the detenu has a long and continuing history of serious anti-social activities, including offences involving attempt to murder, robbery, dacoity and violations of the Arms Act, thereby posing a continuing threat to public peace and safety in Pathanamthitta District.

11. It was further submitted that Exhibit P1 is the fourth preventive detention order issued against the detenu. His earlier detention orders dated 27th July, 2022, 3rd October, 2023 and 28th September, 2024 were referred to, pointing out that the first detention was fully undergone, the second was quashed on procedural grounds relating to delay, and the third was revoked pursuant to the opinion of the Advisory Board on the ground of snapping of the live link.

12. It was also submitted that all statutory procedures contemplated under the KAA(P)A were duly complied with by the Detaining Authority at the time of executing the order of detention on 25th February, 2026. The order and supporting documents were served on the detenu, and the reference was made to the Advisory Board within the prescribed period. After hearing the detenu through counsel on 31st March, 2026, the Advisory Board, by its report dated 1st April, 2026, opined that there was sufficient cause for his preventive detention. Thereafter, the Government confirmed the detention under Section 10(4) read with Section 12 of the KAA(P)A by order dated 9th April, 2026.

13. Accordingly, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor concluded his submissions by pointing out that there was no non-application of mind, procedural illegality, unexplained delay or snapping of the live link, and that the detention order and its confirmation were passed in strict compliance with the KAA(P)A and Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

14. The principal issue that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order of preventive detention passed under Sections 3(1) & 13(2)(1) of the KAA(P)A, is vitiated on account of the inordinate and unexplained delay in sponsoring the proposal and passing the order of detention, thereby snapping the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities of the detenu and the object sought to be achieved by the detention.

15. To ascertain whether the live and proximate link gets snapped, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala (1990 SCC Cri 76) , wherein the Apex Court has reiterated an observation in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta ( (1974) 4 SCC 530) as follows:-

                  “10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

16. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu (1978 SCC OnLine SC 370) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

                  “6. It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. As regards the contention relating to the question of delay it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala ((2014) 11 SCC 326) , wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

18. On consideration of the materials placed on record, it could be seen that the last prejudicial activity, namely Crime No. 2833/2025 of Thiruvalla Police Station, relied upon against the detenu, was registered on 9th November, 2025. The detenu was arrested in the said case on 24th November, 2025 and he was in judicial custody. The Sponsoring Authority submitted the proposal for preventive detention only on 9th December, 2025, after a delay of 30 days. Thereafter, the order of detention came to be passed on 20th February, 2026, nearly 103 days after the last prejudicial activity.

19. The explanation offered by the Detaining Authority for the said delay is as follows:

                  “The Sponsoring Authority has sought to justify the delay by stating that Crime No. 2833/2025 of Thiruvalla Police Station, registered on 09.11.2025, was treated as the last prejudicial activity and that the proposal for preventive detention was submitted 30 days after the occurrence of the said offence. It is further stated that, even after 90 days from the date of the last offence, the detenu had not been granted bail and that, after committing the grave offence of attempt to murder on 09.11.2025, he had absconded and was subsequently arrested from Tamil Nadu.”

20. From the above explanation, it appears that, having regard to the criminal antecedents of the detenu and his status as the first accused in the last prejudicial case, the delay in passing the detention order is only slight and is therefore justified. However, the above explanation cannot, by itself, satisfactorily account for the delay. The fact that the detenu was arrested after absconding and continued to remain in judicial custody without being granted bail does not explain why the proposal for preventive detention was not initiated at the earliest point of time after his arrest or why the Sponsoring Authority waited for 30 days from the date of the last prejudicial activity to submit the proposal. On the contrary, the continued incarceration of the detenu without bail was a relevant circumstance which required the authorities to specifically consider whether there existed any immediate necessity to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of preventive detention.

21. If the Detaining Authority had a bona fide and subsisting apprehension that the detenu was likely to indulge in further prejudicial activities, one would reasonably expect the authority to have acted with promptitude upon receipt of the proposal for preventive detention. However, the records reveal that the proposal was submitted on 9th December 2025, whereas the detention order was executed only after a lapse of 103 days from the date of submission of the proposal. Such prolonged inaction, in the absence of a satisfactory and convincing explanation, raises serious doubt as to the urgent necessity and genuineness of the apprehension entertained by the Detaining Authority.

22. This Court in Anjana Das P. v. State of Kerala ( 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1125) , has reiterated that lack of promptitude may vitiate a detention order. It was held as follows:

                  “11. If the jurisdictional authority had a bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities, it would have acted swiftly after the receipt of the proposal, as well as the screening committee's report. If the true objective was to prevent the detenu from engaging in anti-social activities, the authority ought to have acted with greater alacrity in passing the detention order. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention has been snapped.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

23. The last issue to be decided is whether the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in relation to the last prejudicial activity.

24. So far as the question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case where the detenu is in judicial custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. In Union of India v. Paul Manickam & Anr ((1990) 2 SCC 1) , the principles were reiterated, and it was held as under in paragraph No. 14 as follows:

                  “14. So far as this question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N., [(1989) 4 SCC 418] and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, [(1990) 1 SCC 746]). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, [(1991) 1 SCC 128]. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

25. We also refer to Kamarunnissa (supra) wherein it was held as follows:-

                  “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav, ((1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315) (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This stems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. The first mandatory condition that the Detaining Authority shall be aware of is that the detenu is in custody, and is very well taken note of by the Detaining Authority. As regards the second and third requirements, though no bail application had been filed by the detenu in the case in which he was in judicial custody, the Detaining Authority has recorded cogent reasons for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that there existed a real possibility of his securing release on bail. The detention order specifically notes that, having regard to the detenu's past conduct and criminal antecedents, there was every likelihood of his obtaining bail on technical or other legal grounds. The authority has further taken into account the consistent pattern exhibited by the detenu, namely, that immediately after securing liberty in earlier cases, he resumed his involvement in prejudicial activities without any sign of reformation. On the contrary, the materials disclose that each successive crime reflected an increased degree of audacity and aggression, indicating that the detenu had remained undeterred by previous prosecutions or periods of incarceration.

27. However, the crucial aspect arising from the records is whether the bail conditions in the relied upon cases were duly taken into consideration before arriving at the subjective satisfaction. Though the Detaining Authority has adverted to the fact that the detenu had been granted bail in the earlier cases and has proceeded on the premise that there was a real possibility of his securing release in the last prejudicial case, the bail orders passed in the earlier cases and, in particular, the conditions imposed therein do not appear to have been considered while arriving at the subjective satisfaction regarding the likelihood of the detenu indulging in further prejudicial activities upon his release.

28. The fact that the detenu had earlier been granted bail cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient material to conclude that, upon his release from custody in the last prejudicial case, he would necessarily revert to prejudicial activities. The conditions attached to such bail orders constitute relevant material for assessing the nature and extent of the liberty available to the detenu and whether there was any material to demonstrate that he had violated or disregarded the restrictions imposed upon him.

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India ( 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1807) has held as follows:

                  “27. Considering the facts in the instant case, the bail application and the bail order were vital materials for consideration. If those were not considered the satisfaction of the detaining authority itself would have been impaired, and if those had been considered, they would be documents relied on by the detaining authority though not specifically mentioned in the annexure to the order of detention and those ought to have formed part of the documents supplied to the detenu with the grounds of detention and without them the grounds themselves could not be said to have been complete. We have, therefore, no alternative but to hold that it amounted to denial of the detenu's right to make an effective representation and that it resulted in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India rendering the continued detention of the detenu illegal and entitling the detenu to be set at liberty in this case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

30. It was also held in Shajitha Suneer v. State of Kerala (2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3037) as follows:

                  “21. In the judgment in K. Varadharaj v. State of T.N. (supra), the Apex Court observed that placing of bail application and bail order is not mandatory and such requirement would depend upon facts of each case. In the judgment in M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India (supra), the Apex Court indicated as to when such documents become relevant. If consideration of a document is likely to impair the subjective satisfaction of detaining authority, the document would be vital. The judgment in M. Ahamedkutty (supra) was followed by the Apex Court in P.U. Abdul Rahiman v. Union of India (supra). In Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that order of detention without considering vital bail conditions, would vitiate the order.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

31. In the order of detention, 14 cases, including the last prejudicial activity being Crime No.2833/2025, have been considered. It does not appear from the record that the respondents have filed any application in any of the earlier cases for cancellation of bail alleging violation of such conditions if any.

32. In the above context, it is relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala & Others(2025 INSC 809 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315 : AIR 2025 SC 2868) . The said Special Leave Petition and the Criminal Appeal arose from the final judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No. 874/2024, dated 4th September, 2024. This Court had affirmed the order of detention. The appellant’s husband, Rajesh, was kept under preventive detention in prison in terms of Section 3 of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Preventive) Act, 2007 [KAA(P)A]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public order of the State. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public order of the State, and further observed that the State had not filed any application for cancellation of bail in respect of the earlier cases.

33. In Dhanya M. (supra), in the above context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed at paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 as follows:

                  “20. Moreover, it has been stated therein by the authority that the detenu is violating the conditions of bail imposed upon him in the cases that have been considered for passing the order of detention. However, pertinently, no application has been filed by the respondent-State in any of the four cases, alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and moreover, have not even been spelt out here.

                  21. This Court in SK. Nazneen v. State of Telangana [(2023) 9 SCC 633], had observed that the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana [(2023) 9 SCC 587], this Court observed:

                  “59.… It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.”

                  60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14: 1984 SCC (Cri) 361], Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed: (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

                  32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”

                  22. Keeping in view the above expositions of law, we have no doubt that the order of detention cannot be sustained. The circumstances pointed out in the order by the detaining authority may be ground enough for the State to approach the competent Courts for cancellation of bail, but it cannot be said that the same warranted his preventive detention. We clarify that if such an application for cancellation of the detenu's bail is made by the respondent-State, the same must be decided uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

34. In Dhanya M. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also reiterated at paragraph 9 as follows:

                  “It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in anticipation of the commission of further offence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

35. The principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh (supra) and Dhanya M. (supra) unequivocally underscore that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure which can be invoked only when the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law are found to be ineffective or inadequate. The power of preventive detention is not intended to supplant the ordinary criminal process but to supplement it in exceptional situations where the latter has demonstrably failed to prevent the detenu from engaging in prejudicial activities.

36. In the present case, the very basis on which the Detaining Authority has sought to justify the detention is that the detenu had violated the conditions of bail by involving himself in a subsequent offence. If that be so, the ordinary remedy available to the prosecution was to move the competent criminal court for cancellation of bail on the ground of breach of the conditions imposed. However, the records are completely silent as to whether any such proceedings were initiated or whether the authorities had even considered resorting to that remedy.

37. In our considered view, before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of preventive detention, the Detaining Authority was required to examine whether the ordinary remedy of cancellation of bail could effectively address the apprehended prejudice. In the absence of any such consideration, the satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority suffers from non-consideration of a relevant and material circumstance. The extraordinary power of preventive detention cannot be invoked by bypassing the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law without assigning any reasons as to why those remedies were inadequate. The omission to consider the remedy of cancellation of bail, particularly when the alleged breach of bail conditions forms the very foundation of the detention order, vitiates the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority.

38. In the present case, there is no discernible consideration of the aforesaid bail conditions in the detention order or in the materials relied upon for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. The Detaining Authority has referred generally to the antecedents of the detenu and to his alleged involvement in successive crimes, and even though there was alleged violation of bail conditions, the authority failed to file an application for cancellation of bail in any of the matters, which is a relevant factor in view of paragraph 59 of Ameena Begum (supra).

39. We are, therefore, of the view that the failure of the authorities to first resort to the remedy of cancellation of bail, or at least to record cogent reasons as to why such a remedy would be ineffective or insufficient, constitutes a serious infirmity in the decision-making process. On this ground also, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside.

40. In view of the aforesaid findings, we do not consider it necessary to examine the other issues raised by the petitioner. On an overall consideration of the materials placed before us, we are of the considered view that the Detaining Authority has failed to demonstrate a proper and meaningful consideration of the bail conditions in the earlier cases and the conduct of the detenu while on bail. This omission assumes significance in the backdrop of the further fact that the detenu was already in judicial custody in the last prejudicial case and that the authorities failed to satisfactorily explain the considerable delay in initiating and passing the order of preventive detention. The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is vitiated by non-application of mind to relevant and material circumstances.

41. In light of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is allowed and Ext.P1 detention order dated 20th February, 2026 is hereby set aside.

42. The detenu, Rahul Manoj @ Koilandy Rahul, shall be released forthwith, if his continued detention is not required in connection with any other case or proceedings.

43. The Registry shall communicate this order to the Superintendent of Jail, Central Prison, Viyyur, forthwith.

44. The records produced in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor forthwith.