(Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 CPC, 1908 to set aside the decree and judgment dated 05.08.2010 passed in A.S. No.18 of 09, on the file of the Additional Sub-Oridinate Judge, Chenglepet, confirming the Judgment and decree dated 30.01.2009 passed in O.S. No.141 of 2003, on the file of the District Munsif, Chengalpattu and dismiss the suit.)

1. This Second Appeal is preferred as against decree and judgment dated 05.08.2010 passed in A.S. No.18 of 09, on the file of the Additional Sub- Oridinate Judge, Chenglepet, confirming the Judgment and decree dated 30.01.2009 passed in O.S. No.141 of 2003, on the file of the District Munsif, Chengalpattu

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the trial court.

3. The appellants are the defendants 1, & 2 in O.S.No.141 of 2003 and appellants in A.S.No.18 of 09. The respondents 1 to 3 as plaintiffs have filed the above suit against the appellants and respondents 4 & 5 for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents and servants from in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to handover the parent documents of the suit properties and the blank papers bearing the signatures of the plaintiff’s power agent.

4. According to the plaintiffs, their Power Agent owns vacant site described in the schedule and the same has been obtained by him as per registered General power of attorney deed dated 27.03.2003 from plaintiffs 1 and 2. The 1st Plaintiff and 2nd plaintiffs have purchased the suit property on 29.06.1998 under two registered sale deed in document No.1950/98 and Document No.1961 of 1998 from one Kumaresan. The defendants 1 and 2 approached the plaintiffs to purchase the said suit property which was refused by the plaintiffs. On 07.04.2003 the defendants threaten the power agent of plaintiffs and forcibly obtained the signature of the power agent in some blank stamp papers and also forcibly taken all parental documents from the power agent of plaintiffs and on the same day, the defendants took the power agent to the Sub-Registrar Office for registering the document. With great difficulty the power agent refused register the document. The plaintiffs had no knowledge about the document and its contents which might have been manipulated by the defendants on those stamp papers in which the signature of the power agent was obtained by force and threat. The plaintiffs filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any way interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Pending suit, the plaintiffs’ power agent sold the suit properties to the 3rd plaintiff on 15.5.2008 under a registered sale deed in Doc. NO.3265/08 and hence the 3rd plaintiff is added as a necessary party to the suit and no relief prayed by her. Hence the suit.

5. The claim of the plaintiffs was resisted by the defendants stating that the Power Agent agreed to sell the suit property to the 1st defendant for a sale consideration of Rs.96,000/-. The 1st defendant had also agreed to purchase the same for the said consideration. The plaintiff through their Power Agent received the total consideration on 7.4.2003 and agreed to execute and register the sale deed. Accordingly 1st defendant had purchased the stamp papers for Rs. 12,500/- and also typed the sale deed. The Power Agent read over the sale deed and signed in stamp papers in the presence of attestors mentioned therein. The original sale deed and original power deed were handed over to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant having paid the entire sale consideration was always ready and willing to register the sale deed. However, the plaintiffs were not willing to register the sale deed and therefore, they are not entitled for the reliefs sought for. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit.

6. On the side of the plaintiffs, the power agent of the plaintiffs, namely D.Tamilselvan, was examined as P.W.1 and Ex.A1 to Ex.A5 were marked. No oral and documentary evidence were marked on the side of the defendants.

7. The trial court, upon considering the materials on record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs by holding that the plaintiffs have proved their case through Ex.A5, which is the copy of the complaint sent by power agent to Chief Minister’s Cell, Inspector General of Police, Secretary, Home Department, Kancheepuram and Ex.A1 to A4, which are postal acknowledgment card and postal receipts and held that the defendants failed to adduce rebuttal evidence to disprove the plaintiffs’ case. Aggrieved over the same, the defendants 1 & 2 have preferred the appeal suit in A.S. No.18/09. The first Appellate Court dismissed the appeal suit. Aggrieved by this, the present Second Appeal is preferred.

8. Mr.K.Pattabhi, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the First Appellate Court erred in believing the evidence of Power Agent in the absence of the plaintiffs, the real owner and principal getting into the box who were conversant with the facts of the case and further the evidence of power agent is unbelievable, uncorroborated and further the allegations made in the plaint was not proved beyond the reasonable doubt. Mere marking of Ex.A1 to A.5 on the side of the plaintiffs do not establish their case. The First Appellate Court ought to have placed onus on the plaintiffs, to prove whether the plaintiffs 1 & 2 were taken to the Sub Registrar’s Office by the defendant under coercion and threat with the connivance of the other defendants namely 3 & 4. The First Appellate Court ought not to have drawn adverse inference against the defendants for not examining themselves and producing any documentary evidence for the reason that the plaintiffs 1 & 2 failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. He would further contend that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court ought to have seen that the 3rd plaintiff was not a bonafide purchaser for value without notice and that it is admitted fact that the original document of title and original power of Attorney deed were handed over to the 2nd defendant and without verifying the title deeds, the 3rd plaintiff could not have purchased the suit property. Further, the learned counsel relied upon the case in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani Vs. Indusland Bank Ltd., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 217 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a power of Attorney holder cannot depose for the principal in respect of matters of which only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is liable to be cross examined. Hence, he would submit that in the present case, the plaintiffs deliberately stayed out of witness box to shield themselves from cross examination and chose to let their power of attorney holder (P.W.1) to depose on their behalf. If the plaintiffs have stepped into the witness box, they would have admitted about receiving the entire sale consideration, thereby divesting them to any equitable right to seek a discretionary injunction. Since the plaintiffs intensionally abandon the trial and refused to face cross examination under oath, this Court is bound to draw a severe, mandatory adverse inference against them under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. He would further submit that under Order 3 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a Power of Attorney holder is legally authorized to “act”, appear, plead, or handle administrative and procedural filings on behalf of the principal. However, the term “ Acts” cannot be expanded to include appearing in the witness box as structural substitute for a party on matters requiring direct, personal knowledge. It does not include the act of deposing in place and instead of the principal. Further, it is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred case held that, where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box, state his own case on oath, and offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a mandatory presumption arises that the case set up by him is entirely incorrect. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that, plaintiffs 1 & 2 have purchased the suit property on 29.06.1998 and the power of attorney deed was executed only on 27.03.2003. Therefore, P.W.1 Power Agent is legally incompetent to testify on the structural property rights and ownership intent from 1998 because those facts predated his involvement. Further, it is submitted that the Court below structurally inverted the elementary, foundation principles of the law of evidence. Under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the primary Rule of Law is inflexible and that the burden of proving a fact rests immutably on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not on the party who denies it. In the present case, the plaintiffs have asserted that the physical custody of the original title deeds and signatures on document were obtained on 07.04.2003 through physical duress, coercion, and high-handed armed police threats. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiffs to lead clear, cogent and independent evidence to establish the above allegations. While so, the Courts below erroneously held that in the absence of evidence led by the defendants, the plaintiffs’ case of coercion must automatically be accepted as true, which constitutes a severe illegal inversion of evidentiary law. To support his contention, he has relied upon the case in Anil Rishi Vs. Gurbaksh Singh reported in (2006) 5 SCC 558. Further, the learned counsel would submit that the suit is time bared and that the law of limitation fixing a period of limitation for the initiation of any suit or proceeding is a procedural law and not a substantive law. To support his contention, he has relied upon the judgment in Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge V. Baburao Bala Yadav reported in (1978) 1 SCC 669. Relying upon the above judgment, the learned counsel would submit that the law declares that once a substantive property right is extinguished by the longstanding adverse possession of the defendants, no procedural shuffle or subsequent litigation can bring life back into that expired interest. A right that has been legally extinguished cannot be revived by any length of time or any subsequent claim. He would further submit that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are in possession of the suit property and that they have attempted to bypass the barrier of limitation, filed a simple proxy suit for an injunction simpliciter through their agent. Hence, prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below.

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the plaintiffs 1 & 2 have purchased the suit property on 29.06.1998 under registered sale deeds and from the date of purchase the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and the power agent of the plaintiffs is now looking after the suit property. The defendants 1 & 2 approached the plaintiffs for purchasing the suit property and accompanied by defendants 3 & 4 Police Constables of Maraimalai Nagar Police Station. However, the plaintiffs refused to sell the property to the defendants 1 & 2. On 07.04.2003 the defendants threatened the power agents of plaintiffs and forcibly obtained his signatures in blank papers and had also taken the parent documents from the power agent and forcibily took him to the Sub Registrar Office for registration of sale deed. However, the Power Agent refused to register the document since he was not aware of the contents of the document, which was manipulated by the defendants in which his signature was forcibly obtained. The plaintiffs issued a lawyer notice to the defendants calling upon them to return the stamp papers, documents and also not to interfere with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Inspite of the said notice, the defendants continuously threatened the plaintiffs and their Power Agent and attempted to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit property. Hence, the plaintiffs were constrained to file a suit for bare injunction against the defendants. The Courts below rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, warrants any interference by this Court.

10. Heard on both sides and records perused.

11. This second appeal arises out of the concurrent judgment of the Courts below decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. The defendants 1 & 2 have preferred the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the concurrent judgments of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff for:

                     (i) Permanent Injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their alleged possession of the suit property, and

                     (ii) Mandatory injunction directing return of the original title deeds, came to be decreed.

12. The principal case of the plaintiffs is that the defendants, by threat and coercion, obtained the signatures of the plaintiffs’ power agent on blank stamp papers and took away the original title deeds and power of Attorney document. According to them, no sale deed was executed, and the defendants 1 & 2 attempted to misuse the signed papers. The defendants, on the other hand, pleaded that there was a concluded contract of sale, the entire sale consideration has been paid, the sale deed had been prepared and signed by the power agent, and only registration remained to be completed.

13. During the pendency of this appeal, the defendants/appellants have filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to produce additional documents to establish that the plaintiffs have agreed to sell the suit property, delivered the original title deeds and power of attorney deed in pursuance thereof, and thereafter failed to execute the sale deed. The learned counsel for the defendants would submit that, the Courts below have adjudicated the entire dispute in an absolute factual vacuum because the defendants previous trial counsel left them completely defenseless by leading any oral or documentary evidence. To rectify the same the defendants have preferred an application for additional evidence to bring on record vital evidences which goes to the root of the transaction. The additional documentary evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit, which would enable the Appellate Court to pronounce a just judgment. To support his contention, he has relied upon the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh V. State of Kharkhand reported in (2022) 7 SCC 247.

14. Hence, the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration:

                     (1) Whether the Courts below committed an error of law in granting a decree for permanent injunction in respect of a vacant site in the absence of any acceptable evidence establishing the plaintiffs’ possession on the date of suit?

                     (2) Whether the power agent of the plaintiffs 1 & 2 was competent on behalf of the principal (plaintiffs 1 & 2)?

                     (3) Whether the burden of proving possession was wrongly shifted upon the defendants merely because they have not adduced evidence?

                     (4) Whether a decree of mandatory injunction directing return of original title deeds can be granted without the plaintiff proving the circumstances under which the documents came into the defendants’ custody?

                     (5) Whether the 3rd plaintiff was bonafide purchaser for value without notice in view of admitted case that the original title deed and original power of attorney deed are in the custody of the defendants 1 & 2?

                     (6) Whether the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC deserves to be allowed?

Question Nos.1 to 6

15. The suit property is admittedly a vacant site. The settled principle is that in the case of vacant land, possession generally follows title. However, where the defendants specifically disputes the plaintiffs’ possession and sets up an independent claim based upon an unregistered sale deed coupled with delivery of title deeds, the plaintiffs cannot succeed merely by relying upon title. The plaintiffs has to establish actual or constructive possession on the date of institution of the suit. In the present case, neither revenue records, patta, tax receipts, mutation entries, nor any other contemporaneous document evidencing possession have been produced.

16. It is also significant that the defendants did not adduce either oral or documentary evidence before the trial Court or in the First Appellate Court in support of their defence. However, the absence of defence evidence does not automatically entitle the plaintiffs to a decree. The plaintiffs are required to succeed on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the defence. The Courts below nevertheless decreed the suit solely on the reasoning that the defendant failed to produce evidence. Such an approach is legally unsustainable.

17. The burden under Sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act, always remains upon the plaintiff. The trial Court relied substantially upon Ex.A5, a copy of the complaint allegedly sent by the power agent to various authorities, along with postal receipts and acknowledgments marked as Ex.A1 to A4. These documents merely establish that certain communications were dispatched. They do not prove the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint. It is well settled that the contents of a document do not stand proved merely because the document has been marked as an Exhibit. The Courts below, therefore, erred in treating Ex.A5 a substantive proof of coercion.

18. Further, the only witness examined on behalf of the plaintiffs was the power agent. Although, a power of attorney holder may depose regarding acts performed by him or facts within his personal knowledge, he cannot ordinarily depose regarding the intention, knowledge, or state of mind of the principals unless such matters are within his direct knowledge. The plaintiffs themselves did not enter the witness box. Consequently, the evidence of PW.1 (Power Agent) required careful scrutiny and independent corroboration, particularly when allegations of coercion and forcible taking of documents were made. The burden of proving coercion, unlawful possession of original documents, and entitlement to mandatory injunction rested squarely upon the plaintiffs under Sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act. The Courts below appear to have shifted the burden on to the defendants merely because they fail to adduce evidence. Such an approach is contrary to settle principles governing burden of proof.

19. The plaintiffs also sought mandatory injunction directing return of the parent title deeds. The defendants pleaded that the documents have been voluntarily handed over pursuant to the execution of sale deed. In the absence of satisfactory proof establishing unlawful possession by the defendant a decree of mandatory injunction could not have been granted.

20. The subsequent sale in favour of the 3rd plaintiff during the pendency of the suit raises additional questions regarding the original title deeds and the original power of attorney were already with them, the burden lay upon the plaintiffs to establish that the 3rd plaintiff was a bonafide purchaser without notice. The Courts below have not recorded any finding based on proper appreciation of evidence on this aspect.

21. Equally, the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs present another legal difficulty. If the defendant’s case was that a duly executed sale deed existed and the plaintiffs alleged that any such document had been obtained by fraud or coercion, the proper course would ordinarily be to seek cancellation or declaration regarding such document. A bare suit for injunction and mandatory injunction, without seeking appropriate declaratory relief were title is seriously disputed, may not be maintainable.

22. Therefore, the burden remained through out on the plaintiffs to prove coercion and unlawful possession of document. Mere marking of documents as an exhibit does not prove the truth of its contents. The Power Agent could testify only regarding matters within his personal knowledge and acts done by him, but not regarding matters exclusively within the knowledge of the principals. The plaintiffs were required to independently prove their case. If the plaintiffs failed to enter the witness box and only a power of attorney holder deposed, that provides an additional substantial ground to interfere with the concurrent findings by applying the proposition laid down in Vidhyadhar V.Manikrao, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 573 and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani V. Indusind Bank Ltd. reported in (2005) 2 SCC 217, since the plaintiffs’ personal knowledge regarding possession and entrustment of the title deeds remained unproved.

23. The judgements and decrees of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court suffer from errors in the application of law relating to burden of proof, appreciation of documentary evidence, and maintainability of the reliefs granted. The Court below failed to properly examine this issue in light of the defendants’ plea regarding possession of the original documents. The findings is unsustainable. If an executed sale deed was alleged to exist, appropriate declaratory or cancellation relief ought to have been sought. The Courts below failed to adequately examine this issue while granting equitable relief. In the facts of the present case, declaratory relief was necessary before granting consequential injunction. Further, the plaintiffs was still required to establish that the documents were entrusted for a limited purpose and that the defendant was under a legal obligation to return them. That foundational fact has not been proved.

24. Further, the defendants seeks to produce additional documents relating to the alleged transaction. The law governing reception of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 Cpc has been authoritatively explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148. Additional evidence cannot ordinarily be permitted to fill up lacunae. However, where the documents are necessary for enabling the Court to pronounce judgments are where refusal would result in failure of justice may receive such evidence.

25. According to the appellants, the proposed documents directly relate to the custody of original title deeds and the defence pleaded by them from the inception and that they have a material bearing on the controversy. This Court is therefore satisfied that the application deserves to be allowed.

26. This Court accordingly, holds that, the concurrent findings of the Courts below regarding possession are perverse as they are unsupported by legal evidence. The Courts below wrongly shifted the burden of proof upon the defendants. The plaintiffs failed to establish possession over the vacant site as on the date of institution of the suit. Through concrete evidence the decree of mandatory injunction directing return of title deed cannot be sustained in the absence of proof regarding the nature of entrustment. The Additional documents sought to be produced satisfy the requirements of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and deserve to be received, subject to proof and admissibility. The substantial questions of law are answered substantially in favour of the defendants/appellants.

27. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court are set aside. The application in C.M.P.No.9524 of 2026 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is allowed, subject to proof in accordance with law.

28. Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the additional evidence now produced, the suit is remanded to the trial Court for fresh disposal after affording both parties an opportunity to adduce further oral and documentary evidence confined to the issues relating to possession, custody of title deeds and the alleged transaction.

29. The trial Court shall dispose of the suit expeditiously as preferably within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.