(Prayer:  This Crl.p is filed u/s.482(filed u/s.528 BNSS) Cr.p.c praying to quash the fir in crime no.15/2025 of cubbon park police station dated 18.02.2025 registered for the offence p/us/ 3(1)(r)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Amendment Ordiance act 2014, pending on the files of city civil and sessions judge, Bengaluru city (cch-71).)

Oral Order:

1. The petitioner is before the Court calling in question the registration of a crime in Crime No.15/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Ordinance, 2014 ('the Atrocities Act' for short).

2. Heard the learned Senior counsel, Sri. P. P. Hegde appearing for the petitioner, Smt. M.M. Waheeda, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1, Sri. R. Ravi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 - the complainant.

3. Facts adumbrated are as follows:

The petitioner is the accused and the 2nd respondent the complainant who is an employee working in Aishwarya Apartments. It is the case of the complainant that she is working in the said apartment complex for the last 13 years and has been doing her duty diligently. In the year 2024, it transpires that the management of the committee changed pursuant to an election and the present petitioner becomes the Secretary of the association handling the apartment complex. It is after that the petitioner and the respondent No.2 - the complainant appear to have had some differences with regard to the functioning of the complainant,. It is alleged of by the petitioner that she was not working properly and therefore, had to take action against her. This becomes the fulcrum of the complaint registered by respondent No.2 - the complainant against the petitioner not for anything, but for the offences under the Atrocities Act with particular reference to offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s). The registration of the crime has driven the present petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

4. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the complaint nowhere indicates that abuses have been hurled at what place whether it was in a public place or a place of public view is not even indicated in the complaint. The complaint is as vague as it could be and on such bald complaint, no investigation also can be permitted, as the complainant was wanting to settle scores against the petitioner, who had tried to discipline her and shown her the shoddy work that she used to do. It is therefore, he would seek that the crime must be obliterated.

5. Learned counsel representing respondent No.2 - the complainant submits that for 13 years, there was no problem in the apartment complex, it is only when the petitioner took over as the Secretary, all problems cropped up, as she came to know that the complainant belongs to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe and wanted to terminate her services and she eventually terminated also. Therefore, the complaint comes to be registered, is the submission. He would further contend that both the ingredients of it being a public place and the abuses being hurled in a public view are clearly met in the complaint. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. The learned High Court Government Pleader would toe the lines of the learned counsel for complainant in seeking dismissal of the petition.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1 and the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. They are, infact, the averments in the petition. The position of the complainant in the apartment complex ,where the petitioner is the Secretary, is again a matter of record. The entire issue now gets triggered from the complaint. The complaint reads as follows:

                 

                                                  Myself G Parvathi working from last 13 years in Aishwarya Apartments 8 Rest House Road, Bangalore 560001. I have been working peacefully and doing my duties as building Manager in the Apartment since _ No complaint against me. As in 2024 new committee formed. New Secretary Ms. Chitra Pinto - 9663382747, Treasurer-Prathibha Raghavan-9886485808. Since they took the committee. Everyday Ms. Chaitra Pinto is unnecessary picking things against me calling me "you SC/ST, dirty people, nonsense don't know how to work".

                  There are camera in the Society for the proof. Today she called me again, asked to "get out" and even tried to hit me. I am in mental trauma. This behavior is Every day "Low class SC/ST, dirty nonsense people go away".

                  Please help me and take necessary action.

                  Thanks & Regards"

                  The complaint then becomes a crime in Crime No.15/2025.

9. The offences alleged to be punishable are the ones under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act and they read as follows:

                  "3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

                  ……… ……… ………

                  (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

                  (s)  abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act punishes a person who hurls abuses with an intention to insult a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a public place. Section 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act would punish a person hurling abuses in a place of public view. Whether they are met in the case at hand, even to its semblance is what is required to be noticed.

10. The complaint is quoted hereinabove. A perusal at the complaint does not even lay a foundation as to where the abuses are hurled. It is also not narrated whether it is in a public place or in a place of public view.

11. This Court in RITHESH PAIS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA considered whether an apartment basement would be a "place in public view" to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act. While quashing the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, the Court observes as follows:

                  "….. ….. …..

                  8. …….If the complaint, summary of charge sheet and the statement of witnesses, CW-2 in particular, are read in tandem, it would unmistakably reveal that hurling of abuses has happened at the basement where CWs-1 to 6 were working and in the basement, it is not indicated, any other person was even present. Two factors would emerge from a reading of the aforesaid statements - one being, the basement of the building was not a place of public view and two, only persons who claim to be present were the complainant/CWl and other employees of Sri Jayakumjar R. Nair or friends of CW-1. Therefore, hurling of abuses is clearly not in a place of public view or a public place for the aforesaid provisions of the Act to be get attracted in the case at hand. Reference being made to the judgment of the Apex Court  in  the  case  of Hitesh  Verma v. State  of Uttarakhand [(2020) 10 SCC 710] in the circumstances becomes apposite. The Apex Court has interpreted the very provision that is now invoked against the petitioner and held what would it mean to be a place of public view or a public place. The Apex Court has held as follows:

                  “11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under:

                  “3.(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; ”

                  12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view ”.

                  13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies  in  accordance  with  the  procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste.

                  14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view ” had come up for consideration before this Court  in  the  judgment  reported  as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:’’Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. ”]. The Court held as under : (SCCpp. 443-44, para 28)

                  “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar ”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view ” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies. ”

                  (emphasis in original)

                  15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court  in Swaran Singh [ Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

                  18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling ofabuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.

                  21. In Gorige Pentaiah [ Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446], one of the arguments raised was non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale [ Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 789 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 20] as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment. ”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgment, has also considered the squabble between the parties which could have led to registration of the crime. The facts therein are akin to the facts in the case at hand. Sri Jayakumar R. Nair wanting to shoot the shoulder of his employee - CW-1 for the act of the petitioner having registered a suit against Sri Jayakumar R. Nair and also secured an interim order of injunction leading to registration of the crime cannot be brushed aside as it demonstrates a clear link in the chain of events. Therefore, the registration of crime itself suffers from want of bona fides.

                  9. The aforementioned is the analysis of invocation of the provisions of the Act. Offences under the IPC are also invoked in the case at hand which would become punishable under Sections 504, 506 and 323 of the IPC. For an offence punishable under Section 323IPC there should be hurt caused in the squabble. A perusal at the records would reveal that the wound certificate shows a simple scratch mark on the fore-arm and another scratch mark on the chest. Bleeding is not what is indicated. Therefore, simple scratch marks cannot become offence under Section 323 of the IPC. Insofar as Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are concerned, they are clearly an offshoot of the allegations made under the Act. Therefore, none of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) or Section 3(2)(va) can be driven home in the case at hand as they are all shrouded with the act of 8th defendant seeking to wreck vengeance against the petitioner for having registered the suit. Therefore, none of the offences alleged are sustainable in the peculiar facts of the case at hand.

10. Reference being made to another judgment of the Apex Court  which  bears  consideration  in Hitesh  Verma's case (supra)  in  the  case  of Gorige  Pentaiah v. State  of A.P. [(2008) 12 SCC 531] is apposite wherein the Apex Court holds as under:

                  “5. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that even if all the allegations incorporated in the complaint are taken as true, even then, no offence is made out under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and under Sections 447, 427, 506 of the Penal Code, 1860. As far as Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as under:

                  “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

                  (i)-(ix)***

                  (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; ”

                  7. Similarly, we find that the ingredients of Section 506 of the Penal Code are totally absent in the complaint. In the complaint it is not even mentioned that the accused had intimidated or threatened the complainant or anyone else. In absence of basic ingredients of the section in the complaint, no case under Section 506IPC can be sustained. Section 506 reads as under:

                  “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; ”

                  8. “ Criminal intimidation ” has been defined in Section 503 which reads as under:

                  “503. Criminal intimidation.— Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threats, commits criminal intimidation. ”

                  Scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482CrPC

                  12. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts ’powers under Section 482CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482CrPC can be exercised:

                  (i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

                  (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and

                  (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

                  Inherent powers under Section 482CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases

                  13. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [[1964] A.C. 1254 : [1964] 2 WLR 1145 : [1964] 2 All ER 401 (HL)J Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [[1977] A.C. 1 : [1976] 2 WLR 857 : [1976] 2 All ER 49 7 (HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the courts ’power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. ”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment, had delineated the concept of abuses in public place or in a public view which is further amplified by a three Judge Bench in Hitesh Verma's case (supra).

                  11. Insofar as the judgment relied on by the State in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 324 to contend merely because the witnesses are the friends of the complainant, it would not vitiate the proceedings. The said judgment is distinguishable on the facts of the case at hand in juxtaposition to the facts obtaining in the said case, without much ado, as the case was concerning examination of witnesses in a trial for murder under Section 302 of the IPC and all the witnesses though were friends, had corroboration with other material. In the case at hand, neither the complaint nor the statements nor the finding in the charge sheet would be enough to drive home the offence so alleged under the Act.

                  12. In the light of the afore-quoted facts, when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing, then permitting such proceedings to continue and to compel the petitioner to face the rigmarole of criminal trial would be totally unjustified, leading to abuse of the process of law. In the teeth of the aforesaid facts and analysis, permitting further proceedings to continue would degenerate into harassment and result in miscarriage of justice."

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  CNR: KAHC010145662025

12. The aforesaid judgment though not challenged before the Apex Court, the Apex Court makes a reference to it in the case of GUNJAN ALIAS GIRIJA KUMARI AND OTHERS V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER (2026 SCC OnLine SC 834)  while observing that a private place constitutes a “place within public view” under Atrocities Act only if it is accessible to public gaze. The Apex Court observes as follows:

                  “5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under,

                  “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

                  (a) to (q) ………..

                  (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

                  (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”

                  5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be said to have been committed when a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name in any place within public view.

                  5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub-clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”.

                  5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done with an intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.

                  5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is constituted.

                  5.5 In Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel7, the place where the informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the provision and the expression ‘public place’.

                  5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private place yet can be within public view,

                  “….It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view….”

                  (Para 28)

                  5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand8 in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any member of the public was present at the time of the incident in the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the persons present within the four walls of the building.

                  5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy9, this Court considered its own decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma (supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under,

                  “It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.”

                  (Para 11)

                  5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged was that when the complainant was in the office, the accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed that the incident had taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a place within public view”.

                  5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of the building was not “a place within public view”.

                  5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even happens to be a private place, then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only make the “place within public view”.

                  6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be attentively noticed.

                  6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021, the statements were made by respondent No. 2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling caste-based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground floor of the house.

                  6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No. 1-complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence.

                  6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent No. 2-complainant. According to respondent No. 2-complainant, appellant No. 1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent No. 2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in molestation charge.

                  6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No. 1 and other appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent No. 1-complainant, took place where there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was conspicuously absent.

                  6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly indicated that the place of occurrence of the incident was inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point No. 5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No. 2-complainant in point No. 6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence.

                  6.6 Respondent No. 2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only that both were the friends of respondent No. 2-complainant, from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his house, the accused interjected”.

                  6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took place in a private place and within four walls of the house of respondent No. 2-complainant and the appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No. 2-complainant had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of public was present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within public view”.

                  7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would be a scope and room for improvisation.

                  8. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11, this Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come out from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed.

                  8.1 In Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh12, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of non-mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may have been staged”.

                  8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed that even though the appellant in that case might have abused the complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence.

                  9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent.

                  9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act.

                  10. This leaves the Court to the charge framed under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. As noted hereinabove, the offence of criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503, IPC and made punishable under Section 506, IPC requires that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property and when such threat is with the intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. The “intent to cause alarm” is an pivotal aspect and consideration to judge whether the offence of criminal intimidation is made out or not.

                  10.1 In the present case, even after closely reading the averments in the complaint, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the appellants-accused exerted threat with an intent to cause “alarm” to respondent No. 2-complainant. The submission could be countenanced that the element of “alarm” to the complainant was “absent”. Even otherwise, the offence under Section 506, IPC was alleged against the appellants to conjunct the same with the offence alleged under the SC/ST Act which are not made out.

                  10.2 As far as the charge under Section 34, IPC is concerned, nothing is suggested either from the facts or attendant circumstances that the appellants-accused had any common intention to do a criminal act and that they acted in furtherance of such common intention. In that view, it would be an abuse of the process of law and would amount to harassment to the appellants to subject them to the criminal proceedings in relation to Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC.”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

13. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand is considered on the elucidation of the law that is laid down by the Apex Court and this Court as quoted hereinabove, the unmistakable inference would be that the crime cannot be permitted to be continued and is to be obliterated.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

                  ORDER

                  (i) The petition is allowed.

                  (ii) Proceedings in Crime No.15/2025 stands quashed qua the petitioner.