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CDJ 2026 Kar HC 973 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Karnataka
Case No : Writ Petition Habeas Corpus No.16 OF 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T. VENKATESH NAIK
Parties : Bhagya Versus The State Of Karnataka Represented By Its Additional Chief Secretary To Gg2overnment, Bengaluru & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: M.R. Nanjunda Gowda, Advocate. For the Respondents: B.N. Jagadeesh B.N., S.P.P-I, Along with P. Thejesh, H.G.C.P.
Date of Judgment : 04-08-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 -

Case Referred:
Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of Maharastra and Others reported in (2012) 2 SCC 72
Judgment :-

(Prayer: This writ petition habeas corpus is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, praying to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or any other writ or direction quashing of the detention order dated 23.10.2025 passed in no.mdc-jhmomag2/101/2025-jud-sec-dc-mandya passed by respondent no.3 and the confirmation order dated 29.10.2025 in no.hd504sst2025 passed by respondent no.2 and the order dated 08.12.2025 passed in hd504sst2025 passed by respondent no.2 and thereby, detaining the detenu in central prison, ballari, for a period of one year beginning from 23.10.2025 under the provisions of the karnataka prevention of dangerous activities, bootleggers drug offenders, gamblers, goondas, immoral trafficking offenders, slum grabbers and video or audio pirates act, 1985, and all further proceedings thereto produced at annexures- B, C and E.)

Oral Order:

(Per: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Venkatesh Naik T)

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, seeking for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus declaring the detention of Sri Ajay by order No.MDC-JHM0MAG2 / 101 / 2025 - JUD-SEC-DC-MANDYA, dated 23.10.2025 passed by respondent No.3 (Annexure-B) under sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, [Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates] Act, 1985, the order of approval/confirmation dated 29.10.2025 (Annexure-C) and the order of extension dated 08.12.2025 (Annexure-E) passed by respondent No.2 as illegal and void ab initio.

2. The petitioner was/is charge-sheeted, tried/being tried in all twenty-five cases under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Arms Act, 1959, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

3. On 23.10.2025, respondent No.3-Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Mandya, passed the detention order against the petitioner's son (detenu) under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, [Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates] Act, 1985, and the detenu was taken to preventive custody (Annexures-A and B). On 29.10.2025, respondent No.2 passed order approving/confirmation the order of detention passed by respondent No.3 (Annexure-C). The order of detention passed against the detenu was submitted to the Government for approval. Upon receipt of the file, the Government approved it. On 05.11.2025, the order of detention passed by respondent No.3 and approved by respondent Nos.1 and 2 was placed before the Advisory Committee in accordance with Section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. On 11.11.2025, the detenu made a representation to the respondents seeking revocation of the detention order. On 15.11.2025, respondent No.2 rejected the representation of the detenu and confirmed the detention order vide Annexure-D. Again on 21.11.2025, the detenu made a representation to the Chairman and Members of the Advisory Board. On 24.11.2025, the detenu was produced before the Advisory Board. On 08.12.2025, respondent No.2 passed order confirming/extending the detention of the detenu for a period of one year. Being aggrieved by the illegal detention, the mother of the detenu is before this Court in this petition.

4. Heard Sri M.R. Nanjuda Gowda, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Jagadeesh B.N., learned State Public Prosecutor-I along with Sri Thejesh P., learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 to 4-State, and perused the records.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that, under Section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (for short, 'Act'), the detenu shall be referred to and place before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention. In the present case, the detenu was detained on 23.10.2025, but he was produced before the Advisory Board on 24.11.2025 which is beyond the statutory period of three weeks prescribed under the Act, and the delay for not placing before the Advisory Board under the prescribed time limit has not been explained.

6. Further, the learned counsel contended that the detenu is innocent and due to personal enmity, local rivalry, and the persons who are inimical towards detenu have been successful in falsely implicating the detenu in criminal cases. Some of the cases against the detenu have ended in acquittal and some are at trial stage and investigation. Without considering all these aspects in proper prospective, the impugned orders have been passed.

7. Further, the learned counsel contended that respondent No.3 has issued incomplete detention order in a mechanical manner, the period of detention is not forthcoming in the detention order. The detenu is on bail in most of the cases, which are pending for trial. The respondents have not sought for cancellation of bail in any of those cases. When the Courts have considered the cases registered against the detenu and granted bail, the respondents are not justified in passing the preventive detention order. The order granting bail were neither placed, nor considered by the appropriate authority while passing the impugned orders. It is contended that, the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind. The subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority is found to be incomplete and irrelevant material, while vital documents having a direct bearing on issue were omitted from consideration. Consequently, the very foundation of the detention order stands vitiated. Hence, the learned counsel seeks to allow the petition by setting the detenu free.

8. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following judgments:

                  i. Raja Alias Regan v. The Deputy Secretary and Others in WPHC No.106 of 2025, disposed of on 23.02.2026.

                  ii. Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of Maharastra and Others reported in (2012) 2 SCC 72.

                  iii. Smt. R. Latha v. T. Madiyal, Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City and Others reported in 2000 SCC OnLine KAR 306.

                  iv. Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and Others in Criminal Appeal No.2897 of 2025 disposed of on 06.06.2025.

                  v. Mrs. Vijaya Rathod v. The State of Karnataka and Others in Writ Petition No.107654 of 2025 disposed of on 27.10.2025.

9. Per contra, the learned State Public Prosecutor-I for respondent Nos.1 to 4-State submits that the detenu has been involved in twenty-five criminal cases across various Police Stations. Out of twenty-five criminal cases, the detenu has been acquitted in nine cases, six cases are currently on trial, one case is under investigation and he has been convicted in one case. Additionally, eight cases have been filed against the detenu seeking execution of bond requiring his good behavior. The order of detention has been passed after following all procedural requirements and arriving at a subjective satisfaction. The order of detention along with the documents were supplied to the detenu in accordance with law. The order of detention passed by respondent No.3 and approved/confirmed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 was placed before the Advisory Committee in accordance with Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 of the Act contemplates that, the detention order passed under Section 9 of the Act be placed before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks, not the detenu. Section 10 of the Act does not contemplate that the detenu himself has to be produced within a period of three weeks. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that, the detenu was not produced before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks are not tenable. It is contended by the petitioner that, the bail orders were not considered by either the respondents or the Advisory Board cannot be accepted, as the detention order itself states that he is on bail for all offences. The bail order was brought to the Board's attention in the detention order itself. The cases in which the detenu is acquitted were also brought to the Board's attention. When the detenu was produced before the Advisory Board, he categorically admitted the service of copies of order of detention, ground of detention and annexures to the same. The petitioner's contention that, the bail orders were not considered also cannot be accepted.

10. It is contended that the detenu, despite being under trial in various offences and being out on bail, has continued his illegal activities causing disturbance to the public peace, due to which, he is required to be detained under the order of preventive detention. Hence, the learned State Public Prosecutor-I seeks to dismiss the petition.

11. In support of his submissions, the learned State Public Prosecutor-I relied on the decision in the case Smt. R. R. Latha v. T. Madiyal, Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City and Others reported in 2000 SCC OnLine KAR 306.

12. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on both sides and the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration in this petition is:

                  "Whether the order of detention dated 23.10.2025 passed by respondent No.3, the order of approval/confirmation dated 29.10.2025 and the order of extension dated 08.12.2025 passed by respondent No.2 are sustainable under law?"

13. Admittedly, respondent No.3 passed the detention order exercising the power under Section 3(1) of the Act on the ground that the detenu is habitually committing the offences under various Acts, which are detrimental to the public order. The order of approval/confirmation at Annexure-C is passed by respondent No.2 exercising the power under Section 9(f) of the Act. Annexure-A is the grounds of the detention order passed by respondent No.3 and not the order itself. There is also no dispute that the said detention order was referred to the Advisory Board as required under Section 9(b) of the Act and the Board, in its report, opined that detention order was justifiable.

14. The grievance of the detenu was only regarding the validity of the approval/confirmation order (Annexure-C) on the following grounds:

                  i. Respondent No.3 has issued incomplete detention order in a mechanical manner and period of detention is not forthcoming in the detention order.

                  ii. The detenu was produced before the Advisory Board beyond the statutory period of three weeks.

                  iii. Though the detenu was on bail in all cases, without cancellation of the bail orders, the respondents have passed the impugned orders.

15. To appreciate the case on hand, it would be useful to refer the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, [Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates] Act, 1985 (for short, 'Goonda Act'), and they are extracted for ready reference:

                  "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug-offender or gambler or goonda or [Immoral Traffic Offender or Slum-Grabber or Video or Audio pirate] that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such persons be detained.

                  (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the sub-section :

                  Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.

                  (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order.-

                  (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government.

                  (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  10. Reference to Advisory Board.-

                  In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act the State Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made against the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3.

                  11. Procedure of Advisory Board.-

                  (1) The Advisory Board shall after considering the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the State Government or from any person called for the purpose through the State Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desire to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the State Government, within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned.

                  (2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned.

                  (3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board.

                  (4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential.

                  (5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board.

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  13. Maximum period of detention.-

                  The maximum period for which any person may be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act which has been confirmed under Section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention."

16. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Sections indicates that the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any "Goonda” as defined under Section 2(g) of Goonda Act, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, pass an order directing such a person to be detained. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Goonda Act empowers the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police to exercise the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Goonda Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of Goonda Act mandates that if the order is passed by the Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Goonda Act, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government along with the grounds on which the order has been made. The order made by the Officer under sub-section (2) shall remain in force for twelve days unless in the meantime, the State Government approves it. Section 8 of Goonda Act mandates that the grounds of detention are required to be served on the detenu within five days from the date of detention and shall offer him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. Section 10 of Goonda Act mandates that the order of detention made under Goonda Act shall be placed before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks from the date of detention order by the State Government along with grounds on which the order has been made and representation, if any, made against the order. Section 11 of Goonda Act provides the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board is empowered to consider providing personal hearing to the detenu and thereafter submit report to the State Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. The Advisory Board is required to forward its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. The opinion of the Advisory Board is confidential. Section 13 of Goonda Act indicates that the maximum period for detention is twelve months from the date of detention.

17. The detention order dated 23.10.2025 is passed by respondent No.3 by recording the reasons that the detenu is aged 31 years and resident of Gandhi Nagar, Mandya, and he has been involved in criminal cases including assault, attempt to murder, robbery, and offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which has created fear in the minds of the general public. To arrive at such conclusion, the Authority placed in all twenty-five criminal cases.

18. The aforesaid crimes were registered against the detenu between 2013 and 2025. The last crime registered against the detenu was in Crime No.34 of 2025 on 28.08.2025.

19. In the case of Smt. R. Latha v. T. Madiyal, Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City and Others reported in 2000 SCC OnLine KAR 306 at paragraph No.8 is held as under:

                  "8. The above contents of the grounds of detention shows that the first respondent-detaining authority has considered the bail application pursuant to the Court order in which the Court has granted bail and it is necessary to keep detenu under Goonda Act to curb his antisocial acts and activities which spoil public peace. In the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik, supra, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner it is observed that: (page 2271)

                  "Having regard to the various above cited decisions on the points often raised, it is found appropriate to set down their conclusion as under:

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  (6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu".

20. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenu was not furnished with the documents relied on by the Detaining Authority, which violates the fundamental right of the detenu to give effective representation guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950. Hence, it is just and necessary to quote Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950:

                  "22: Protection against arrest and detention is certain cases:

                  (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order."

21. It would be useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JASEELA SHAJI v. UNION OF INDIA reported in (2024) 9 SCC 53 wherein it was held as under:

                  "23. In M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, [(1990) 2 SCC 1], this Court was considering the issue as to whether non-supply of the copies of the bail application and the bail order vitiated the right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. After taking the survey of the earlier judgments, this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 12-13, paras 19-20)

                  “19. The next submission is that of non-supply of the bail application and the bail order. This Court, as was observed in Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of Maharashtra [(1980) 4 SCC 470] has “forged” certain procedural safeguards for citizens under preventive detention. The constitutional imperatives in Article 22(5) are two fold: (1) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be i.e. as soon as practicable, after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making the representation against the order of detention. The right is to make an effective representation and when some documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention, without copies of such documents, the grounds of detention would not be complete. The detenu has, therefore, the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention along with the documents so referred to or relied on. If there is failure or even delay in furnishing those documents it would amount to denial of the right to make an effective representation. This has been settled by a long line of decisions: Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India [(1980) 2 SCC 270], Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [(1980) 2 SCC 275], Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 531], Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 525], Tushar Thakker v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 499], Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 427], Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 436] and Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 53 (1)].

                  20. It is immaterial whether the detenu already knew about their contents or not. In Mehrunisa v. State of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 709], it was held that the fact that the detenu was aware of the contents of the documents not furnished was immaterial and non-furnishing of the copy of the seizure list was held to be fatal. To appreciate this point one has to bear in mind that the detenu is in jail and has no access to his own documents. In Mohd. Zakir v. State (UT of Delhi) [(1982) 3 SCC 216], it was reiterated that it being a constitutional imperative for the detaining authority to give the documents relied on and referred to in the order of detention pari passu the grounds of detention, those should be furnished at the earliest so that the detenu could make an effective representation immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied with. The question of demanding the documents was wholly irrelevant and the infirmity in that regard was violative of constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 22(5).”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  xxx xxx xxx

                  35. In Ranu Bhandari [(2008) 17 SCC 348], this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 355-56, paras 25-27)

                  “25. Keeping in mind the fact that of all human rights the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is probably the most cherished, we can now proceed to examine the contention advanced on behalf of the parties in the facts and circumstances of this case. But before we proceed to do so, it would be apposite to reproduce hereinbelow a verse from a song which was introduced in the cinematographic version of Joy Adamson's memorable classic Born Free which in a few simple words encapsulates the essence of personal liberty and individual freedom and runs as follows:

                  ‘Born free, as free as the wind blows,

                  As free as the grass grows,

                  Born free to follow your heart.

                  Born free and beauty surrounds you,

                  The world still astounds you,

                  Each time you look at a star.

                  Stay free, with no walls to hide you,

                  You're as free as the roving tide,

                  So there's no need to hide.

                  Born free and life is worth living,

                  It's only worth living, if you're born free.’

                  The aforesaid words aptly describe the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom which may, however, be curtailed by preventive detention laws, which could be used to consign an individual to the confines of jail without any trial, on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of material placed before him. The courts which are empowered to issue prerogative writs have, therefore, to be extremely cautious in examining the manner in which a detention order is passed in respect of an individual so that his right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law.

                  26. We have indicated hereinbefore that the consistent view expressed by this Court in matters relating to preventive detention is that while issuing an order of detention, the detaining authority must be provided with all the materials available against the individual concerned, both against him and in his favour, to enable it to reach a just conclusion that the detention of such individual is necessary in the interest of the State and the general public.

                  27. It has also been the consistent view that when a detention order is passed all the material relied upon by the detaining authority in making such an order, must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order in compliance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution, irrespective of whether he had knowledge of the same or not. These have been recognised by this Court as the minimum safeguards to ensure that preventive detention laws, which are an evil necessity, do not become instruments of oppression in the hands of the authorities concerned or to avoid criminal proceedings which would entail a proper investigation.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  36. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would reveal that for emphasising the importance of personal liberty and individual freedom, this Court has reproduced Joy Adamson's memorable classic Born Free. This Court observed that though the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom can be curtailed by preventive detention laws, the courts have to ensure that the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. It has been held that when a detention order is passed all the material relied upon by the detaining authority in making such an order must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation. This Court held that this is required in order to comply with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, irrespective of whether the detenu had knowledge of such material or not.

                  37. It is thus a settled position that though it may not be necessary to furnish copies of each and every document to which a casual or passing reference has been made, it is imperative that every such document which has been relied on by the detaining authority and which affects the right of the detenu to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has to be supplied to the detenu."

22. It is clear from the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that though the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom can be curtailed by preventive detention laws, the Courts have to ensure that the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. It has been held that when a detention order is passed, all the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority in making such an order must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation.

23. In the present case, the detenu was furnished with the order of detention, grounds of detention and all documents that were relied on by the Detaining Authority were furnished and the same is also made available in the records furnished by the respondents. Further, we notice that the details of all the cases in which the detenu was enlarged on bail are stated in the grounds of detention. Moreover, the materials relied on to arrive at the subjective satisfaction contain the copies of all the bail orders. We are of the opinion that there is substantial compliance of the requirements of law and the contention that there is violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950, in passing of the order of detention cannot be accepted.

24. The detenu has been involved in twenty-five criminal cases across various Police Stations. Out of twenty-five criminal cases, the detenu has been acquitted in nine cases, six cases are currently on trial, one case is under investigation and he has been convicted in one case. Additionally, eight cases have been filed against the detenu seeking execution of bond requiring his good behavior. A perusal of the material filed by the respondents Authority would disclose that the cases, in which, the detenu is involved are heinous in nature. The person, having the dangerous design, would execute his plans, posing the general public to risk and causing colossal damage to life and property. It is, therefore, necessary to take preventive measures and prevent the detenu to perpetrate the mischief from translating his ideas into action. Further, personal liberty is one of the most cherished freedoms, but when individual liberty comes into conflict with interest of the security of the State or maintenance of public order, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the State. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the Writ Petition Habeas Corpus cannot succeed. Accordingly, the Writ Petition Habeas Corpus is dismissed.

 
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