1. This petition has been filed by the sole accused in C.C. No. 237/2023 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I, Koyilandy, who has been charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 451, 354-A(ii), 354-D, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), seeking to quash the FIR, final report and all further proceedings in the above case.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that during the last week of February, 2020, the accused went to the house of the de facto complainant, who is none other than his aunt. It is alleged that the accused hugged the de facto complainant and forcibly kissed her on her lips. Further, on 15.07.2022, the accused allegedly trespassed into the house of the de facto complainant, made gestures intended to outrage her modesty, and intimidated her by threatening to mix poison in her well. Thus, the accused is alleged to have committed the aforesaid offences.

3. I heard Sri. M.P. Madhavan Kutty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri. S.K. Saju, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, and Smt. Megha K. Xavier, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present case is a classic example of abuse of the process of law, instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance upon the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the inordinate delay in reporting the alleged incident to the police, by itself, casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations levelled against the petitioner. It was further submitted that, in view of the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the possibility of deliberations, consultations and subsequent embellishments cannot be ruled out. The learned counsel further pointed out that, prior to the lodging of the statement which led to the registration of the present case, the petitioner had approached the police with another complaint and had also approached the Women's Commission with a complaint. However, the incident which subsequently formed the basis of the present prosecution had not been disclosed in either of those complaints. According to the learned counsel, the omission to mention the alleged incident in the earlier complaints itself demonstrates that the present case was subsequently engineered after due deliberation and consultation with ulterior motives. It was further submitted that the petitioner approached the police with a complaint only after the institution of a civil suit seeking recovery of money and that the criminal case was consequently instituted as a counterblast to the said proceedings. On these premises, the learned counsel urged that the proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed at the threshold.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent submitted that the victim of the alleged offence is none other than the aunt of the accused. According to the learned counsel, the allegation is that a married woman was molested by the accused in broad daylight, without any regard to her age or her relationship with him. The learned counsel fairly conceded that there was a delay of approximately two years in reporting the alleged incident to the police. However, he submitted that delay in lodging a complaint in cases involving sexual offences cannot, by itself, be treated as fatal, as victims may hesitate to report such incidents immediately owing to various factors, including concern for the dignity of the family, apprehension regarding social repercussions, the possible impact upon their marital life, and the stigma associated with such allegations. It was therefore submitted that the delay, by itself, is not sufficient to discredit the prosecution case. The learned counsel further submitted that the de facto complainant had offered an explanation for the delay in the FIS itself and that the question as to whether such delay is fatal to the prosecution case can be conclusively determined only after a full-fledged trial. The learned counsel further submitted that the mere fact that a civil suit was instituted prior to the registration of the criminal case cannot, by itself, lead to an inference that the subsequent criminal proceedings are false or foisted. It was submitted that the civil suit instituted at the instance of the petitioner's sister against the de facto complainant had already been dismissed by the court below. It was further submitted that, if the allegations contained in the FIS are taken at their face value, the essential ingredients of the offences alleged are made out and, therefore, this is not a fit case for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to terminate the criminal proceedings at the nascent stage.

6. Before delving into a discussion regarding the rival contentions, it is to be noted that this Court possesses inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. However, such jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised sparingly, cautiously and only when such intervention is necessary either to prevent abuse of the process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

7. One of the well-recognised grounds for quashing criminal proceedings is that, even if the allegations contained in the complaint or FIS are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not disclose the commission of any offence or do not make out a case against the accused. At the same time, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, this Court is not expected to conduct a meticulous examination of the evidence, assess the probative value of the materials collected during investigation, or undertake a mini-trial.

8. The scope of enquiry in a petition seeking quashing of criminal proceedings is essentially limited to examining whether the allegations, on a plain reading, together with the materials available on record, disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. Where the allegations raise disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence, such matters are ordinarily to be adjudicated by the trial court after a full-fledged trial.

9. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, while coming to the present case, it can be seen that in the FIS, specific overt acts have been attributed to the petitioner. It is specifically alleged that, on a day during the last week of February, 2020, the accused, who had come to the house of the de facto complainant, embraced her and kissed her on her lips. According to the de facto complainant, she was frightened by the incident and, thereafter, came out of the house and abused the accused. Although the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations raised in the FIS can be determined only after a full-fledged trial, if the allegation is taken at its face value, the same prima facie discloses the commission of the offences alleged.

10. I am not unmindful of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the delay of approximately two years in reporting the alleged incident to the police. However, while considering the effect of such delay, it is to be noted that a catena of judicial pronouncements has consistently held that delay in lodging an FIR in cases involving sexual offences is not, by itself, decisive. Victims of sexual offences may hesitate to approach the police immediately owing to various factors, including social stigma, concern for their future and apprehension regarding the repercussions upon themselves and their families.

11. At the same time, there can be no straitjacket formula that delay in lodging an FIR in every case involving a sexual offence is necessarily immaterial. If there are materials indicating false implication or an ulterior motive on the part of the complainant, such delay may become a relevant circumstance while appreciating the defence of the accused. However, such an exercise essentially involves appreciation of evidence and can be undertaken only at the stage of trial.

12. In the case at hand, it is true that the de facto complainant had filed complaints against the petitioner and his family members prior to the registration of the present case, but had not mentioned the incident which subsequently formed the basis of the present case in those complaints. However, whether the omission to mention the alleged incident in the earlier complaints is fatal to the prosecution case is a matter which can be determined only after trial and upon subjecting the de facto complainant to cross-examination.

13. Likewise, merely because the present criminal case was registered after the institution of a civil suit by the petitioner's sister against the de facto complainant seeking recovery of money, it cannot, by itself, lead to an automatic inference that the present criminal case is false or foisted.

14. As already noticed, specific overt acts have been attributed to the petitioner in the FIS. Whether the present case is a foisted one, instituted with an ulterior motive, or whether the allegations are true, is essentially a question of fact requiring appreciation of evidence. Such an exercise cannot be conclusively undertaken in a proceeding under Section 528 of the BNSS. Therefore, I am of the view that it would be premature to terminate the criminal proceedings against the petitioner at this stage. While considering a petition for quashing criminal proceedings, this Court is not expected to embark upon an enquiry into the veracity of the allegations or undertake an assessment of the defence set up by the accused. Nor is this Court expected to conduct a mini-trial or undertake a detailed appreciation of evidence.

15. As already stated, on a plain reading of the allegations contained in the FIS and the materials accompanying the final report, this Court has no hesitation in holding that, if the allegations are accepted at their face value, they prima facie disclose the commission of the offences alleged against the petitioner. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR, final report or the further proceedings arising therefrom.

16. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is dismissed.

It is made clear that the observations contained in this order are made solely for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not influence the trial court while considering the case on its merits.