1. Heard Mr. Rathod, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners and Ms. Yadav, learned APP, for the Respondent-State of Maharashtra.
2. In the present Writ Petition, the relief sought is seeking quashing and setting aside the proceedings in CC No. 333/DV/2025 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, 66th Court, At Andheri, Mumbai.
3. It is the submission of Mr. Rathod, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, that Petitioner No.1, who is the ex-husband of Respondent No.2-Complainant, has in fact filed proceedings under the Maintenance And Welfare Of Parents And Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“Senior Citizens Act”) and Orders have been passed therein. He submits that the proceedings filed under the Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) are not maintainable for the purpose of getting title. He further submits that there is suppression of material facts and, therefore, the DV proceedings are also required to be quashed and set aside.
4. The admitted factual aspects are as follows:
i. The marriage between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 took place on 21st February 1988.
ii. It is the contention raised in the DV proceedings that Respondent No.2 is a Punjabi Sikh and, therefore, a Hindu in the eyes of law, and that she was married to Petitioner No.1, who is a Kashmiri Muslim, through a Nikah ceremony in Mumbai.
iii. Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 have a son, whose date of birth is 23rd December 1988.
iv. Petitioner No.1 married Petitioner No.2 on 26th January 1996.
5. The perusal of record shows that the above aspects are admitted.
6. It is the contention of the Petitioners that Petitioner No.1 has given Talaq to the Respondent No.2 on 19.01.1996. The contention raised in the Complaint filed in the DV proceeding is that the Petitioner No.1 by completely suppressing that he is a married person and that the Respondent No.2 is his wife, married Petitioner No.2.
7. In the above background, it is necessary to set out the contentions raised in the Complaint filed under the DV Act:
i. The marriage between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 took place on 21st February 1988.
ii. It is the contention raised in the DV proceedings that Respondent No.2 is a Punjabi Sikh and, therefore, a Hindu in the eyes of law, and that she was married to Petitioner No.1, who is a Kashmiri Muslim, through a Nikah ceremony in Mumbai.
iii. Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 have a son, whose date of birth is 23rd December 1988.
iv. Various averments are raised in the Petition regarding the domestic violence.
v. In the DV Complaint, allegations have been raised regarding the relationship of Petitioner No.1 outside the marriage with a third person. It is stated that Petitioner No.1 married Petitioner No.2 on 26th January 1996 and falsely declared his marital status as “single” or “unmarried” in the form submitted for registration of the said marriage, despite the subsistence of his marriage with Respondent No.2.
vi. It is further stated in the DV Complaint that, in the year 2012, Petitioner No.1 asked Respondent No.2 to reside in a flat situated at Hiranandani Gardens, Powai, Mumbai, where Respondent No.2 and her son have been staying. The contention raised is that Petitioner No.1 abruptly stopped paying maintenance and household expenses and also stopped paying society maintenance charges and BMC taxes in respect of the said flat, where Respondent No.2 has been staying for the past 13 years.
vii. In the DV Complaint, it is stated that Petitioner No.1 is a wealthy businessman having extensive properties in Mumbai and in Kashmir and that his annual income is approximately Rs.60 Lakhs. It is further stated that Petitioner No.1 has a lavish, upper-class lifestyle. He owns two luxury cars, namely a Mercedes Benz and a BMW. It is stated that he frequently travels on vacations to various countries, including destinations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, and to America. It is further stated that he has frequently traveled to Bangkok, Singapore and other Southeast Asia resorts as well as Switzerland.
viii. In the DV Complaint details of Petitioner No.1’s various properties in Mumbai have also been set out.
ix. It is stated that, as Respondent No.2 is a senior citizen, she requires financial support for her maintenance and that rental income of Rs.50,000/- is her only source of income. It is further stated that Petitioner No.1, at the instance of Petitioner No.2, may alienate the said flat at Powai or create third-party rights therein, with an intention to ensure that Respondent No.2 and her son are evicted.
x. It is stated that on 23rd November 2025, Respondent No.2 was called to the Powai Police Station for questioning, as Petitioner No.1 had filed a Complaint against her and her son Mikhael alleging criminal trespass, extortion and threats.
xi. The Complaint filed by Petitioner No.1 under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, seeking to dispossess Respondent No.2 from the shared household, has also been referred to. It is stated that Petitioner No.1 is under an obligation to provide maintenance, including residential accommodation, and to maintain Respondent No.2.
xii. There are various detail contentions raised regarding domestic violence in the DV Complaint to which Respondent No.2 is subjected to.
8. In view of the various contentions raised in DV Complaint, it is necessary to set out various provisions of DV Act:
i. As per Section 2(a) of the DV Act, “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
ii. Section 2(f) defines “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.
iii. Section 2(s) defines “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.
iv. The domestic violence is defined in Section 3 in very broad manner, which includes physical violence as also inter alia economic abuse. The economic abuse is defined in Sub-Section (iv) of Section 3 in the following manner:
“(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared house hold and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.”
9. Thus, it is very clear that “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship with the respondent, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. “Domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage. “Aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. The definition of domestic violence is very broad and the contentions raised in the DV Complaint shows that prima facie the various provisions of the DV Act are attracted.
10. If the contentions raised in the Complaint are examined in the light of the ingredients of the above provisions of the DV Act, then it is clear that there are adequate contentions raised regarding domestic violence and, therefore, no case is made out to quash the DV Complaint at this preliminary stage.
11. In view of the contentions raised in the DV proceedings and above provisions of DV Act, no grounds are made out for quashing the proceedings. The parameters applicable for such consideration are those laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal(1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). In the said decision, in Paragraph No.102, the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines for the exercise of powers under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as follows:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
(Emphasis added)
12. If the contentions raised in the DV proceedings are examined on the touchstone of the above parameters, no case is made out for quashing the proceedings.
13. The contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner that, in view of the pendency of proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, the DV proceedings are not maintained, is completely devoid of merit. In fact, this is a case where Petitioner No.1 is a senior citizen of 73 years and Respondent No.2 who is his wife, is aged 71. Both are senior citizens. The scope of these two enactments which are special enactments, namely Senior Citizens Act and the DV Act, is totally different and provisions of one enactment cannot be used to defeat the provisions of another enactment.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru((2021) 15 SCC 730), has considered the scope of both these enactments, namely i.e. the DV Act and the Senior Citizen Act. The relevant discussion is in Paragraph Nos.37 and 38, which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:
“37. The above extract indicates that a significant object of the legislation is to provide for and recognise the rights of women to secure housing and to recognise the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act, 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act, 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
38. This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section 7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the civil courts, under Section 8. The jurisdiction of the civil courts has been explicitly barred under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. However, the overriding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act, 2005. The PWDV Act, 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act, 2005. Section 26 [ “26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—
(1) Any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.”] of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act, 2005 and the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a “shared household” under Section 17 of the PWDV Act, 2005. In the event that the “aggrieved woman” obtains a relief from a tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, she shall be duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act, 2005, as per sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act, 2005. This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the PWDV Act, 2005, of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realised. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realisation.”
(Emphasis added)
15. Thus, in S. Vanitha (supra) the Supreme Court has held as follows:
i. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act, 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations’ have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
ii. However, the overriding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act, 2005. The PWDV Act, 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society.
iii. It would be appropriate for a tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act, 2005. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, where the subject premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act, 2005 and the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a “shared household” under Section 17 of the PWDV Act, 2005.
16. Thus, what has been held by the Supreme Court that the remedy under the Senior Citizen Act cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and the protection granted by the DV Act.
17. The above observations of the Supreme Court in S. Vanitha (supra) are applicable in this case with more force as the Respondent No.2 i.e. aggrieved person-Complainant in DV case herself is a senior citizen and is wife of the Petitioner No.1 as per her claim and she is the ex-wife of the Petitioner No.1 as per the claim of the Petitioners.
18. Although contention is raised that Respondent No.2 has suppressed the proceedings filed under the Senior Citizens Act, however, the said contention is also baseless, as the proceedings filed under the Senior Citizens Act have been specifically mentioned in the Complaint filed under DV Act. There is no substance in the contention that the DV proceedings have been filed for the purpose of claiming title to the property. In fact, the reliefs sought are under Section 18(a), 18(e), 19(a), 19(c), 19(d), 20(1)(d), 20(3) and 22 of the DV Act.
19. Thus, in view of the facts and circumstances, and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) and S. Vanitha (supra), no case is made out for quashing of the DV proceedings.
20. In the facts and circumstances, no case is made out for granting relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and under Section 482 of of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
