(Prayer: This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 C.P.C., against the judgment and decree dated 07.09.2012 passed in A.S.No.30 of 2005 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Thiruvallur in confirming the judgment and decree dated 06.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.128 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsif, Thiruvallur and thereby dismissing the appellant’s suit declaration and permanent injunction.)

1. This Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 07.09.2012 in A.S.No.30 of 2005 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Tiruvallur, which confirmed the judgment and decree dated 06.01.2005 in O.S.No.128 of 2004 (formerly O.S.No.80 of 1999) on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur, whereby the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction over Plot No.12 in Survey No.516/1A, Periyakuppam Village, Tiruvallur, was dismissed.

2. The appellant is the plaintiff and the first respondent is the defendant before the trial court and the second respondent is the legal heir of the first respondent. For convenience, the parties are referred to as they were before the trial Court.

3. Plaintiff’s case is that the suit property forms part of an extent of 73 cents comprised in Survey No.516/1-A of Periyakuppam Village. The said extent originally belonged to Haji Abdul Rahaman, who purchased it at a court auction under registered document No. 203 of 1954. After his demise, his wife, Kathija Bee, became entitled to the property and executed a registered power of attorney in favour of Anantharaman, son of Govindasamy. The power of attorney holder converted the entire extent into 13 house-site plots and conveyed them to different purchasers. The plaintiff purchased Plot No.12, measuring about 1,242½ sq. ft., under a registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989. According to her, she was put in possession pursuant to the sale and has since been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit property. As the property was a vacant site covered with Mesquite trees (Velikathan trees), she periodically cleared it, and no person other than her had any right, title or interest therein.

4. The plaintiff further pleaded that on 27.08.1999 the defendant attempted to trespass onto the suit property and remove the Mesquite trees (Velikathan trees). When questioned, the defendant claimed title on the strength of a decree dated 14.12.1988 passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988. Upon verification of the court records, the plaintiff learnt that the said decree had been obtained in proceedings between the defendant, his daughter, and certain other purchasers of plots in the same survey number. Since the plaintiff was neither a party to that suit nor had any knowledge of the proceedings, she contended that the decree was collusive and not binding upon her. She also disputed the defendant’s claim that the entire extent of 73 cents belonged to one Ismail Khan and that the defendant had purchased it from him under a sale letter dated 10.06.1963 for Rs.16,465/-, asserting that Ismail Khan had no title to convey. Alleging a continuing threat of dispossession, the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking a declaration of her title to the suit property and a consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant and persons claiming through him from interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment.

5. The defendant resisted the suit by denying the plaintiff’s title and possession of the suit property. According to him, Haji Abdul Rahaman had neither purchased the property at a court auction nor had it devolve upon his wife, Kathija Bee. The alleged execution of a power of attorney by Kathija Bee in favour of Anantharaman and the subsequent conversion of the property into 13 house-site plots were also specifically denied. The defendant disputed the truth, validity and genuineness of the sale deed dated 07.03.1989 relied upon by the plaintiff and contended that she had never been in possession or enjoyment of the suit property. On the contrary, the defendant claimed that he alone had been in possession and enjoyment thereof. He further referred to the order dated 12.10.1988 passed in I.A.No.851 of 1988 in O.S.No.382 of 1988 and the dismissal of C.M.A.No.21 of 1988 on 17.07.1995 as supporting his possession.

6. The defendant further contended that O.S.No.382 of 1988 was instituted on 08.06.1988 and that Anantharaman, the alleged power agent of the plaintiff’s vendor, was the first defendant therein and had entered an appearance in the said suit. Since the plaintiff’s sale deed dated 07.03.1989 was executed during the pendency of O.S.No.382 of 1988, the defendant pleaded that the purchase was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. It was also contended that, under the compromise decree passed in the earlier suit, the suit property had been allotted to the defendant and that the said decree had attained finality and remained in force. Therefore, unless the plaintiff sought to set aside that decree, a fresh suit for declaration and injunction was not maintainable.

7. The defendant also pleaded res judicata under Section 11 CPC, contending that the plaintiff claimed through Anantharaman, who was a party to the earlier proceedings, and that the issues concerning the property were directly and substantially the same. According to him, the plaintiff was aware of the earlier proceedings and could not characterise the compromise decree as collusive, particularly as the compromise had been entered into through the same counsel. Without prejudice to the above contentions, the defendant claimed that he had perfected title by adverse possession against Kathija Bee, asserting that his possession had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted from Fasli 1375 and that he had been paying taxes in respect of the property. He also disputed the description and valuation of the suit property, denied the alleged cause of action, and consequently sought dismissal of the suit with costs.

8. The trial court framed the following issues:

                     (i) Whether the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988 is not binding on the plaintiff.

                     (ii)Whether the plaintiff’s Power agent is a party to O.S.No.382 of 1988.

                     (iii) Whether the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata.

                     (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration as prayed for and

                     (v) To what other reliefs.

9. Before the trial court, the plaintiff examined Pw1 to Pw3 and marked Ex. A1 to Ex. A5. Ex. A1 is the original registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989, executed in favour of the plaintiff; Ex. A2 is the certified copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 382 of 1988; Ex. A3 is the certified copy of the decree dated 14.12.1998 passed in O.S. No. 382 of 1988; Ex. A4 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 09.05.1978; and Ex. A5 is the certified copy of the General Power of Attorney deed dated 30.09.1987.

10. On the defendant's side, two witnesses were examined and marked Exs.B1 to B15. Ex.B1 is the certified copy of the compromise memorandum in O.S.No.382 of 1988; Ex.B2 is the certified copy of the decree in O.S.No.382 of 1988; Ex.B3 is the certified copy of the counter filed in I.A.851 OF 1988 in O.S.No.382 of 1988; Ex.B4 is the certified copy of the affidavit and petition in I.A.No.851 of 1988 in O.S.No.382 of 1988; Ex.B5 is the certified copy of the plaint in O.S.No.382 of 1988; Ex.B6 is the certified copy of the judgment dated 17.07.1995 in C.M.A.No.21 of 1988; Ex.B7 is the certified copy of the affidavit and order in C.M.A.No.21 of 1988; Ex.B8 is the objection petition dated 26.05.1988; Ex.B9 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 20.06.1988; Ex.B10 is the letter relating to the objection raised for registration of a deed dated 27.05.1988; Ex.B11 is the complaint endorsement dated 29.08.1988 against the Village Administrative Officer, Periyakuppam; Ex.B12 consists of sixteen kist receipts; Ex.B13 is the telegram receipt; and Exs.B14 and B15 are the gift settlement deeds dated 04.09.1986 and 05.12.1985, respectively.

11. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court found that the plaintiff claimed title to Plot No.12 under Ex.A1, the sale deed dated 07.03.1989, executed by Anantharaman in his capacity as the power agent of Kathija Bee, whose antecedent title was sought to be established through Exs.A4 and A5. The Trial Court, however, observed that O.S.No.382 of 1988 concerning the very same larger extent had been instituted before the plaintiff’s purchase, and that the persons through whom the plaintiff claimed title were parties to the earlier proceedings. Under the compromise decree dated 14.12.1988 passed therein, rights in respect of the plots, including Plot No.12, had already been determined. Since the plaintiff’s purchase was made during the pendency of the earlier suit, the Trial Court held that it was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and was necessarily subject to the decree passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988.

12. The Trial Court further held that, although a compromise decree may not, by itself, operate as res judicata in the absence of an adjudication on the merits, the plaintiff could not ignore the subsisting decree in O.S.No.382 of 1988 and maintain an independent suit for declaration and injunction. According to the Trial Court, the plaintiff ought to have sought appropriate relief in the earlier suit by having the compromise decree set aside and thereafter established her title. The Trial Court also found that the plaintiff had not produced satisfactory independent revenue or possession records to establish her exclusive possession of the suit property. It consequently declined the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction and dismissed the suit, directing the parties to bear their respective costs.

13. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff preferred A.S. No. 30 of 2005 before the Subordinate Court, Tiruvallur. The First Appellate Court formulated the principal question as to whether the suit was maintainable in light of the doctrines of lis pendens and res judicata. It found that O.S. No. 382 of 1988 had been instituted against Kathija Bee and her power agent, Anantharaman, before the plaintiff’s purchase under Ex. A1, and that an order of temporary injunction restraining alienation had also been obtained in I.A. No. 1421 of 1988. Despite the pendency of the suit and the subsisting injunction, the plaintiff purchased Plot No. 12 under the sale deed dated 07.03.1989. The First Appellate Court therefore held that the plaintiff was a purchaser pendente lite who had stepped into the shoes of her vendor and was bound by the decree passed in O.S. No. 382 of 1988, notwithstanding that she was not personally impleaded in the earlier proceedings.

14. The First Appellate Court further found that, under the decree passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988, Plot No.12 had been allotted to the defendant. It held that the decree was binding upon Kathija Bee and Anantharaman, and consequently upon the plaintiff claiming through them. The fact that Kathija Bee had remained ex parte was held immaterial, since her power of attorney holder, Anantharaman, had entered appearance and contested the earlier proceedings in his representative capacity. Applying the principle that an act done through an agent is deemed to have been done by the principal, the First Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff could not maintain an independent suit for declaration without first seeking to set aside the decree in O.S.No.382 of 1988 and working out any equities available to her as a subsequent purchaser. It accordingly confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 07.09.2012, without costs.

15. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff preferred this second appeal. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

                     1. Whether the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff is not entitled for declaration of title over the plaint schedule property upon his sale deed dated 07.03.1989, is legally sustainable in the eye of law?

                     2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as prayed for?

                     3. Whether the compromise decree in O.S.No.782 of 1988 ( correct number is OS 382 of 1988) bind the vendor of the plaintiff in her absence in the compromise decree?

16. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the Courts below erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s title under Ex.A1, the registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989. According to the learned counsel, the larger extent of 73 cents in Survey No.516/1-A originally belonged to Haji Abdul Rahman, who had purchased it at a court auction under Document No.203 of 1954. After his demise, the property devolved upon his wife, Kathija Bee, who appointed Anantharaman as her power agent under Ex.A5. The power agent then laid out 13 plots and conveyed Plot No.12 to the plaintiff under Ex.A1. Thus, the plaintiff had established a valid and continuous chain of title and was entitled to the declaration sought.

17. Learned counsel further submitted that O.S.No.382 of 1988 was not decided on the merits. Kathija Bee remained ex parte, and the Court neither framed issues nor recorded evidence or rendered findings on the rival claims of title. The suit was disposed of solely based on a compromise entered into between the plaintiffs therein and defendants 3 to 12. Neither Kathija Bee nor her power agent, Anantharaman, was a signatory to the compromise memorandum. In fact, Anantharaman, who had been arrayed as the first defendant and represented Kathija Bee, was given up. Therefore, the compromise decree could bind only the parties who consented to its terms and could not affect the title of Kathija Bee or that of the plaintiff claiming through her.

18. It was also contended that a compromise decree is merely a record of the agreement between the consenting parties and does not amount to an adjudication by the Court. Consequently, it cannot operate as res judicata under Section 11 CPC against a person who was neither a party to nor a signatory of the compromise. Reliance was placed on Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, and Jamia Masjid v. K.V. Rudrappa, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 792, to support the proposition that a compromise decree does not operate as res judicata, though it may, in an appropriate case, create an estoppel between the parties to the compromise.

19. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff referred to the definitions of “facts in issue” and “proved” under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act and submitted that a fact can be treated as proved only after considering the materials before the Court. Reference was also made to Section 11 CPC to contend that res judicata applies only where the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit had been heard and finally decided in the former suit.

20. Learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff was not required to institute a separate suit to set aside a fraudulent or collusive compromise decree that was neither executed by nor binding upon her vendor. Reliance was placed on Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh, (2000) 7 SCC 543. It was therefore argued that the Courts below failed to distinguish between a decree rendered after adjudication and a decree founded merely on a compromise between some of the parties. The findings based on res judicata and the compromise decree were thus legally unsustainable, warranting interference under Section 100 CPC and the grant of a declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff.

21. Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the appellant purchased the suit property under Ex.A1 dated 07.03.1989, during the pendency of O.S.No.382 of 1988, in which Kathija Bee and her power agent, Anantharaman, were defendants 1 and 2. The appellant was therefore a purchaser pendente lite and was bound by the decree passed in the earlier suit under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, irrespective of notice or good faith. Since Plot No.12 had been allotted to the respondent under the compromise decree, which had not been challenged by Kathija Bee, her power agent, or the appellant, the present suit for declaration and injunction, without seeking to set aside that decree, was not maintainable.

22. It was further submitted that the allegations of fraud and collusion were neither specifically pleaded nor proved, and that the absence of Kathija Bee’s signature from the compromise would not enable the appellant, claiming through her, to disregard the decree. The plaintiff had also failed to establish possession, as there was no satisfactory evidence that the plaintiff, her vendor, or the power agent possessed the property during the relevant period. The concurrent findings of the Courts below on lis pendens, res judicata, estoppel, and possession were based on the evidence and did not warrant interference under Section 100 of the CPC.

Substantial Question of Law No 3:

23. Answering this substantial question of law concerning the binding nature of the compromise decree dated 14.12.1998, passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988, would have a material bearing on the other two substantial questions of law. Therefore, this question is taken up first.

24. The first defendant herein, together with his two daughters, instituted O.S.No.382 of 1988 on 08.06.1988, originally against three defendants, namely: (i) the power agent of the vendor of the present plaintiff; (ii) the vendor of the present plaintiff; and (iii) the purchaser of Plot Nos.6 and 7. Subsequently, by an order dated 17.01.1990 passed in I.A.No.537 of 1989, defendants 4 to 12 were impleaded. The impleaded defendants were purchasers of various plots from the second defendant through her power agent, the first defendant.

25. The present plaintiff purchased the suit property, bearing Plot No.12, forming part of a layout comprising 13 plots prepared by the first defendant, acting as the power agent of the second defendant, for an extent of 73 cents. The purchase was made under a registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989, executed by the first defendant in his capacity as the power agent of the second defendant. Because the purchase was made during the pendency of O.S.No.382 of 1988, it was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The doctrine operates from the date of presentation of the plaint, irrespective of whether the subsequent purchaser had notice of the pending litigation. A transfer pendente lite is not void. It remains valid but is subject to the parties' rights, as may ultimately be determined in the pending suit.

26. In O.S.No.382 of 1988, the plaintiffs challenged the title claimed by the second defendant, Katheejabee, through her deceased husband, Haji Abdul Rahman, who purchased at a court auction sale in 1954. The plaintiff therein and the 1st defendant herein asserted their own title on the strength of an unregistered sale letter, allegedly executed by Ismail Khan dated 10.06.1963, and by adverse possession.

27. During the pendency of that suit, the claim against the first defendant, who was the power agent of the second defendant and the executant of the sale deed in favour of the present plaintiff, was given up. The second defendant, who was the vendor of the present plaintiff, was set ex parte. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 12 entered into a compromise. The Court recorded the compromise and, by decree dated 14.12.1998, disposed of the suit in terms thereof, directing that the compromise memo shall form part and parcel of the decree.

28. Admittedly, the second defendant in O.S.No.382 of 1988—the vendor of the present plaintiff—neither signed the compromise nor was a party to it. The question, therefore, is whether the compromise decree binds her and, consequently, the present plaintiff claiming under her.

29. In a suit involving several defendants, is a compromise decree entered into between the plaintiff and some of the defendants binding upon a defendant who was not a signatory to the compromise and had already been set ex parte? What is the legal status of the suit in respect of such a non-signatory defendant: does it remain pending, stand decreed against him, or stand dismissed as against him?

30. In a civil suit, where the relief expressly sought is not granted, it must be deemed to have been negatived. In O.S. No. 382 of 1988, the plaintiff sought a declaration of title and a permanent injunction against the defendants. Although the second defendant was set ex parte, no ex parte evidence was recorded, and no decree was passed against him. Thereafter, the plaintiff abandoned the claim against the second defendant. Consequently, the suit, insofar as the second defendant is concerned, must be construed as having been dismissed as abandoned, and the compromise decree entered into with the other defendants cannot bind him.

31. The Courts below proceeded on the footing that, because the second defendant had been set ex parte, the compromise decree was binding upon her as if an ex parte decree had been independently passed against her. This approach is legally unsustainable.

32. Merely setting a defendant ex parte does not result in an automatic decree against that defendant. Even in an ex parte proceeding, the plaintiff must establish the claim by evidence, and the Court must adjudicate entitlement to the relief sought. In O.S.No.382 of 1988, no independent adjudication was made regarding the plaintiffs' title vis-à-vis the second defendant. Nor was any separate ex parte relief, such as a declaration or injunction, granted against her. The suit was disposed of solely on the basis of the compromise entered into between the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 12. Although the entire suit was shown as disposed of, the compromise decree could operate only between the parties to the compromise. Since no relief was independently adjudicated or granted against the second defendant, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.382 of 1988 cannot claim any declaration of title or injunction against her on the strength of that compromise decree.

33. The earlier suit was not decided on the merits. Therefore, the compromise decree does not operate as res judicata against the non-signatory second defendant. Nevertheless, it operates as an estoppel between the parties to the compromise. In Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup, (2009) 6 SCC 194: AIRONLINE 2009 SC 132, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

                     “22. Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a compromise decree is not binding on such defendants who are not parties thereto. As the appeal has been allowed by the High Court, the same would not be binding upon the appellant and, thus, by reason thereof, the suit in its entirety could not have been disposed of.

                     23.The court has also a duty to prevent injustice to one of the parties to the litigation. It cannot exercise its jurisdiction to allow the proceedings to be used to work as substantial injustice.”

34. Applying the above principle, the compromise decree dated 14.12.1998 passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988 is not binding on the second defendant therein, namely, the present plaintiff’s vendor. Consequently, it is also not binding on the present plaintiff, who claims under the sale deed executed during the pendency of that suit. Although the plaintiff’s purchase was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, no decree adjudicating or declaring the plaintiff's title in O.S.No.382 of 1988 was passed against the present plaintiff’s vendor. Therefore, the compromise entered into by the other parties neither defeated nor extinguished the title conveyed to the present plaintiff. The transfer pendente lite consequently remains unaffected by the compromise decree, subject to all other questions concerning the validity of the vendor’s title.

35. Accordingly, Substantial Question of Law No.3 is answered in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, holding that the compromise decree dated 14.12.1998, passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988, is not binding on the plaintiff or her vendor.

Substantial Questions of Law Nos 1 and 2:

36. In view of the answer to Substantial Question of Law No.3, it follows that the compromise decree dated 14.12.1998, passed in O.S.No.382 of 1988, is not binding upon the plaintiff/appellant or her vendor, neither of whom was a party to nor a signatory of the compromise.

37. The plaint discloses that the present suit was instituted after the defendants attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession and asserted title to the suit property on the strength of the said compromise decree. Upon verification of the court records, the plaintiff learned that the decree had been passed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 12 in O.S. No. 382 of 1988. The plaintiff accordingly pleaded that the compromise decree was collusive and not binding upon her.

38. Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC bars the institution of a separate suit to set aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was unlawful. However, the present suit does not seek to set aside the compromise decree between the parties to it. The plaintiff and her vendor were not parties to the compromise, and no independent adjudication or ex parte decree was passed against the plaintiff’s vendor. The compromise decree, therefore, did not affect or extinguish the title conveyed to the plaintiff.

39. The strict bar against a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC only prevents a party from challenging a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise itself was unlawful. Here, the distinction is that the plaintiff/successor is not seeking to modify or rewrite the compromise contract between the plaintiff and the other defendants. Instead, the successor is filing an independent suit for a declaration that their property rights remain intact and that the decree is a nullity and entirely inoperative against the plaintiff's vendor, who was earlier set ex parte.

40. When a compromise decree does not bind a person, that person is not required to seek its cancellation or setting aside. It is sufficient to seek a declaration of the title independently claimed, together with consequential protection of possession. The reference in the plaint to the compromise decree as collusive and not binding is merely incidental to the principal relief founded on the plaintiff’s independent title under the registered sale deed dated 07.03.1989. Consequently, the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC does not apply.

41. The plaintiff had no effective remedy against the interference with her title and possession except to bring the present suit for declaration and permanent injunction. She was entitled to ignore the compromise decree insofar as it purported to affect her rights and seek adjudication of her title on the strength of her sale deed. Accordingly, the present suit is maintainable. The suit property is described as a vacant house site. Where the property is vacant, and no actual dispossession is established, possession ordinarily follows title. In view of the plaintiff’s established title and the defendants’ attempted interference with her possession, the plaintiff/appellant is entitled to the reliefs of declaration of title and permanent injunction.

42. The Courts below held that the separate suit instituted by the present plaintiff was not maintainable and that she ought to have sought impleadment in O.S. No. 382 of 1988 and to have worked out her remedy therein. This finding is unsustainable. As already observed, no adverse order or decree was passed in O.S. No. 382 of 1988 against the present plaintiff’s vendor, who was the second defendant therein. Further, the plaintiff’s vendor was not a signatory to the compromise upon which the decree was passed.

43. When the present plaintiff instituted the suit, contending that the compromise decree was not binding upon her, it was for the plaintiff in O.S. No. 382 of 1988, who is a defendant in the present suit, to approach the court in the former suit and seek an appropriate order against the second defendant. He ought to have brought to the notice of that court that, although the entire suit had been disposed of by the order dated 14.12.1998, no adjudication or decree had been made against the second defendant. In the absence of any such order, the present plaintiff cannot be compelled to seek impleadment in a suit that had already been disposed of. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court in this regard is erroneous and liable to be set aside.

44. The First Appellate Court further held that the plaintiff had taken no steps to set aside the decree passed in O.S. No. 382 of 1988. This finding is factually incorrect. No decree was passed in that suit against the plaintiff’s vendor or her power agent. The power agent of the plaintiff’s vendor was originally arrayed as the first defendant, but the suit against him was subsequently given up. The plaintiff’s vendor, who was arrayed as the second defendant, was set ex parte; however, no ex parte evidence was recorded, and no decree was passed against her.

45. Despite this position, the First Appellate Court observed in paragraph 13 of its judgment that the decree passed against Anandaraman, the power agent of the plaintiff’s vendor, was binding on the present plaintiff/appellant. This observation rests on the erroneous assumption that a decree had been passed against the first defendant, whereas the suit against him had already been given up. Therefore, the finding that the compromise decree binds the plaintiff/appellant, or that she ought to have taken steps to set it aside, is factually and legally unsustainable. For the reasons stated above, the substantial Questions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly in favour of the plaintiff/appellant.

46. Thus, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. Both the courts below erred in dismissing the suit. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 07.09.2012 passed in A.S.No.30 of 2005 by the Subordinate Court, Tiruvallur, confirming the judgment and decree dated 06.01.2005 passed in O.S.No.128 of 2004 by the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur, are set aside. Consequently, O.S.No.128 of 2004 is decreed, declaring the plaintiff’s title to the suit schedule property and granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men, agents, or any person claiming through him from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions, if any stand closed.