Sudip Ahluwalia, Member

The present Revision Petition has been filed under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 by the Petitioner/Complainant, challenging the Order dated 26.02.2016 passed by the Ld. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T., Chandigarh in First Appeal No. 19 of 2016, whereby the said Commission had allowed the Appeal preferred by Respondent No.1-lnsurance Company and set aside the Order dated 12.10.2015 passed by the Ld. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-ll, Chandigarh, and dismissed Petitioner's Consumer Complaint No. 169 of 2015.

2. The case of the Petitioner before the Ld. District Forum was that it was the registered owner of Toyota Corolla Altis Car bearing Registration No. CH-01-AD-0376, which stood insured with Respondent No.1 under a comprehensive insurance policy valid from 22.09.2013 to 21.09.2014 for an Insured Declared Value (IDV) of Rs. 9.50 lakh. On 08.05.2014, during the currency of the policy, the vehicle met with an accident near Basantpura, District Patiala, whereupon DDR No.16 dated 08.05.2014 was registered with the concerned Police Station. The accident was duly intimated to the Insurance Company and the damaged vehicle was inspected by the surveyor appointed by the insurer. According to the Petitioner, despite the surveyor assessing the loss and despite repeated requests and a legal notice, the Insurance Company failed to settle the claim, and ultimately repudiated the same on the ground that the Petitioner had no insurable interest in the vehicle, alleging that the vehicle had already been sold prior to the accident. Contending that the repudiation was arbitrary and amounted to deficiency in service, the Petitioner filed a Consumer Complaint seeking indemnification of the loss suffered on account of the accident.

3. The Insurance Company contested the Complaint primarily on the ground that the insured vehicle had, in fact, been sold by the Petitioner to one Mr. Jasdeep Singh under an exchange arrangement facilitated through Respondent No.2-Em Pee Motors before the date of the accident. Reliance was placed upon the investigation report, the sale tracker maintained by the dealer, and the statements allegedly made by the Petitioner and Mr. Jasdeep Singh during investigation to contend that ownership had already passed on to the purchaser. It was, therefore, pleaded that since the Petitioner had ceased to have any insurable interest in the vehicle on the date of loss and the insurance policy had never been transferred in favour of the purchaser, the repudiation of the claim was legal and justified.

4. Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the Ld. District Forum, vide Order dated 12.10.2015, allowed the Complaint. It held the repudiation of the insurance claim to be unjustified and directed the Insurance Company to settle the claim in accordance with the surveyor's assessment by paying Rs. 7.50 lakh towards Insurance, together with compensation of Rs. 20,000/- and litigation costs to the tune of Rs. 7,000/-.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent No. 1-lnsurance Company preferred First Appeal No. 19 of 2016 before the Ld. State Commission. The Ld. State Commission, after examining the investigation report, sale tracker register and other documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the vehicle had already been sold by the Petitioner to Mr. Jasdeep Singh prior to the accident and that the Petitioner had consciously concealed this material fact while lodging the insurance claim. The Ld. State Commission held that once ownership of the vehicle had already been transferred, the Petitioner no longer possessed any insurable interest in the insured vehicle and, consequently, was not entitled to claim indemnification under the policy. The Appeal was accordingly allowed vide Order dated 26.02.2016 passed by Ld. State Commission, wherein the Order of the Ld. District Forum was set aside and also, the Consumer Complaint was thereby dismissed.

6. Assailing the aforesaid Order, the Petitioner has preferred the present Revision Petition. It has been contended that the Ld. State Commission committed a grave jurisdictional error in reversing the well- reasoned findings recorded by the Ld. District Forum. It has been submitted that the Registration Certificate of the vehicle continued to stand in the name of the Petitioner and there existed no registered sale deed, transfer documents or any other legally admissible evidence establishing transfer of ownership in favour of Mr. Jasdeep Singh. It has been contended that the Ld. State Commission erroneously relied upon the sale tracker register and the investigation report, neither of which constituted conclusive proof of transfer of ownership. It was further submitted that the alleged statements relied upon by the Respondent No. 2-lnsurance Company were misconstrued and, in any event, did not establish divestment of ownership or insurable interest. According to the Petitioner, the vehicle always remained its property and possession, the accident occurred during the currency of the insurance policy, and the repudiation of the claim was wholly arbitrary. The Petitioner, therefore, seeks restoration of the Order passed by the Ld. District Forum.

7. Heard Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner as well as the Respondent No. 1 and perused the material available on record. None appears for Respondent No. 2, nor any written synopsis has been filed on their behalf.

8. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the Ld. State Commission erred in holding that the insured vehicle had been sold to Mr. Jasdeep Singh, and in concluding that the obligation to intimate the insurer regarding the transfer rested upon the purchaser. It was argued that the Registration Certificate continued to stand in the name of the Petitioner and that the vehicle had never been sold or transferred, but was merely being driven by the Petitioner's friend, Mr. Maninder Singh, at the time of the accident. Ld. Counsel further contended that the finding regarding transfer of ownership was unsupported by any documentary evidence, as the Respondent No. 1 had relied only upon the sale-tracker register and the statement of Mr. Jasdeep Singh without producing any sale deed or transfer document, despite the burden of proving the alleged sale resting upon it.

9. It was further submitted that the Ld. State Commission failed to properly appreciate the objections and documents placed on record and erroneously held that the Petitioner lacked an insurable interest merely because Mr. Jasdeep Singh and Mr. Maninder Singh had not been impleaded as parties. Ld..Counsel has maintained that there was neither any concealment of material facts nor any abuse of process, and that the documents annexed with the Revision Petition were true copies of age the originals. On these grounds, it was prayed that the Impugned Order dated 26.02.2016 be set aside and the Final Order dated 12.10.2015 passed by the Ld. District Forum be restored, along with such other reliefs as this Commission may deem fit in the interest of justice.

10. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 has supported the impugned Order of the Ld. State Commission and submitted that the evidence on record unmistakably establishes that the insured vehicle had already been sold by the Petitioner before the occurrence of the accident. Reliance has been placed upon the investigation report, the sale tracker register maintained by Respondent No.2, the written confirmation of Mr. Jasdeep Singh and the statements recorded during investigation, all of which, according to the Respondent, clearly establish that the Petitioner had divested itself of ownership prior to the accident.

11. It has been further argued that the Petitioner deliberately failed to disclose these material facts while lodging the insurance claim and, having ceased to possess any insurable interest in the insured vehicle, was not entitled to any benefit under the policy. Ld. Counsel for Respondent No.1 has also relied upon the decisions of this Commission in Ramesh Kumar v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. (RP No. 1070 of 2013) and Gawar Construction Company v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (RP No. 3160 of 2013) to contend that where the insured has already transferred ownership of the vehicle without transfer of the insurance policy, repudiation of the claim is legally sustainable.

12. We have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

13. Reliance of the Petitioner is on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Surendra Kumar Bhilawe Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited, (2020) 18 SCC 224". In the said case, the Insured vehicle had purportedly been transferred by the original Insured, Surendra Kumar Bhilawe in favour of one Mohammad Iliyas Ansari. Consequently, the Insurance Claim after the accident was not allowed by the Insurer who asked the Insured to show-cause why his Claim should not be repudiated on account of his having sold the vehicle to the said Mohammad Iliyas Ansari. The fact that the Insured had entered into a Sale Agreement with the proposed Transferee was not in dispute, and also the fact that the Complainant/lnsured contended to be registered Owner of the concerned vehicle on the date of accident, even though the Claim following the accident had been submitted by the proposed Transferee Mohammad Iliyas Ansari. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the Order of this Commission vide which the Revision Petition filed by the Insurance Company was allowed after the Insurance Claim had been granted by both the Ld. Fora below. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision are set out as below -

                          "34. The National Commission overlooked the definition of "owner" in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In Section 2(30) "owner" has been defined to mean-

                          "a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered and, where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire- purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. "

                          Even assuming that Mohd. Iliyas Ansari was in possession of the said truck at the time of the accident, such possession was not under any agreement of lease, hire-purchase or hypothecation with ICICI Bank............... "

                          52. In our considered opinion, the National Commission erred in law in reversing the concurrent factual findings of the District Forum and the State Commission ignoring vital admitted facts as stated above, including registration of the said truck being in the name of the appellant, even as on the date of the accident, over three years after the alleged transfer, payment by the appellant of the premium for the insurance policy, issuance of insurance policy in the name of the appellant, permit in the name of the appellant even after three years and seven months, absence of "No-Objection" from the financier bank, etc. and also overlooking the definition of "owner" in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as also other relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder, including in particular the transferability of a policy of insurance under Section 157.

                          53. In view of the definition of "owner" in Section 2(3)) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellant remained the owner of the said truck on the date of the accident and the insurer could not have avoided its liability for the losses suffered by the owner on the ground of transfer of ownership to Mohammad Iliyas Ansari."

14. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent/lnsurer has, however, contended that the aforesaid decision in "Surendra Kumar Bhilawe" (supra) has no application in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case in which, inspite of the Sale Agreement between the Insured and the proposed Transferee, the Insured had gone on paying loan instalments to the Financier for three years, and had also not obtained any "No Objection Certificate" from the said Financier in the absence of which he in any case could not have transferred the vehicle to the intending Purchaser.

15. Before proceeding any further, it would be appropriate to first take notice of the term "Owner" as described in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is set out as below -

                          "2.(30) "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;"

16. Submission of Ld. Counsel for the Respondent in this regard is that the definition of "Owner" within the meaning of Section 2(30) as quoted above is "a dynamic one" in view of the expression in the beginning of Section 2 which is as follows -

                          "2. Definitions.- in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, ............."

                          Hence according to Ld. Counsel, the meaning of the term "Owner" is to be understood in the context of various other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989. He specifically refers to Sections 39,40,41,50 and 147 of the Act and the Rule 47 read with Forms 20,29,30 and Rule 55 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules.

17. We, however, are unable to hold that the term "Owner" as defined in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act can mean anything other than what it explicitly defines. This is so because in Para 35 of the decision in "Surendra Kumar Bhilawe" (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had also taken note of the fact that prior to amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act in 1988, the term of "Owner" in Section 2(19) of the earlier Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was meant to be the person "in possession of the motor vehicle".

18. On the contrary, in the post amendment Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 it has now been specified that the definition of i age "Owner" is to mean the person in whose name the Motor Vehicle stands. The Hon'ble Apex Court had also noted that change in definition under the new Act had been consciously done by the Legislature. It would therefore put an end to the controversy involved. We may further, mention that various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the various Sections and Rules quoted by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondents as noted above, only indicate the procedure and formalities required to put the transfer of the vehicle from one registered Owner to another, but does not in any manner imply that any different meaning of the term "Owner" is to be inferred apart from what has been specified in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which was consciously done by the Legislature. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also examined the applicability of various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which are contained in Para 37 of its aforesaid decision, and then concluded that the Owner had to be the person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered.

19. In such circumstances, reliance of the Respondents upon two earlier decisions of this Commission passed in "RP No. 1070 of 2013" (Ramesh Kumar Vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.), and tfRP No. 3160 of 2013 (Gawar Construction Co. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.)" taking a different view would not be of any help to them. This is so because both the aforesaid decisions were pronounced by this Commission as far back as in the year 2015. But the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Surendra Kumar Bhilawe" (supra) is much later in point of time, having been pronounced on 18.6.2020, and needless to mention, its ratio is binding upon this Commission now.

20. We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned Order passed by the Ld. State Commission setting aside the well- reasoned Order passed by the Ld. District Commission is untenable. The Revision Petition is therefore allowed after setting aside the impugned Order pronounced by Ld. State Commission. Consequently, the Order of the District Commission allowing the Complaint is restored.

21. Parties to bear their own costs.

22. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed off as having been rendered infructuous.