K. V. Jayakumar, J.

1. This criminal appeal is preferred impugning the judgment of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Wayanad, dated 02.04.2019, in S.C. No.63 of 2017. The appellant stood for trial for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 324, 326 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 450, 324, 326 and 302 of IPC, convicted and sentenced him as follows :

                  i) to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/-and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.

                  ii) to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a default clause for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC.

                  iii) to undergo imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a default clause, for the offence under Section 450 of IPC.

                  iv) to undergo imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence under Section 324 of IPC with a default clause.

Prosecution case

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 15.09.2016 at about 06:00 p.m., the accused criminally trespassed into the house of CW2 (Balakrishnan), the second husband of his mother Chandrika, situated at Pazhuppathoor, Sulthan Bathery, wherein his mother was residing, armed with a wooden plank.The prosecution further alleges that the accused inflicted blows on the head and other parts of her body in the veranda of the house with the intention of causing her death. When Chandrika attempted to escape by running into her room, the accused pursued her and continued to attack her. As a result of the injuries sustained in the incident, she succumbed to the injuries at Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Sulthan Bathery, on the same day. It is further alleged that, when CW2 (Balakrishnan) attempted to prevent the accused from assaulting the deceased, the accused intentionally caused grievous hurt to CW2 by beating him with a wooden piece on his face and left leg, thereby causing a fracture of his left leg. The alleged motive for the commission of the crime was that the deceased Chandrika had solemnised her second marriage with CW2 (Balakrishnan), ignoring his protest.

Registration of FIR and the Investigation

4. On the basis of Ext. P1 FIS lodged by PW1 (Ananthakrishnan), PW25 (Biju Antony), the Sub Inspector of Police, Sulthan Bathery Police Station, registered Ext.P31 FIR on 15.09.2016 at 23 hours.

5. PW24 (M.D. Sunil), the Circle Inspector of Police, Sulthan Bathery Police Station, took up the investigation on 16.09.2016. Thereafter, he conducted the inquest of the deceased Chandrika at Government Hospital, Sulthan Bathery, and prepared Ext.P3 inquest report in the presence of witnesses. He seized MO3, the nightie worn by the deceased. He arrested the accused at around 11:30 a.m. on 16.09.2016 after preparing Ext. P21 arrest cum inspection memo. He recorded the confession statement of the accused. On the basis of the information given by the accused and as led by him, MO1 and MO2 wooden pieces were recovered after preparing Ext. P9 mahazar. He prepared Ext.P4 scene mahazar of the scene of occurrence as shown by PW2(Rajesh), in the presence of PW18, Scientific Assistant, and PW21, Photographer. He seized the bloodstain collected by the Scientific Assistant, as per Ext.P11 seizure mahazar. He has also seized MO4 (shirt) and MO5 (lungi), the dress worn by the accused, after preparing Ext.P12 seizure mahazar. Thereafter, he filed Ext.P23 report showing the name and address of the accused before the court, and Ext.P24, section adding report. He produced the accused before the court as per Ext.P25 remand report. He had seized the blood samples of injured Balakrishnan, as per Ext.P13 seizure mahazar. He filed Ext.P26 report for adding Section 326 of IPC. He seized the photos and CDs taken by PW21 as per Ext.P15 seizure mahazar. He produced the properties before the court after preparing Ext.P27 series property lists. The material objects were forwarded to the Jurisdictional Court as per Ext. P28 forwarding note. He has obtained Ext.P13 photocopy of the marriage certificate to prove the marriage between the deceased Chandrika and Balakrishnan. He has taken steps for recording the statement of CW2, Balakrishnan u/s 164 of the Code. After completing the investigation, he laid the charge sheet before the jurisdictional Magistrate.

Proceedings in the trial court

6. The learned Magistrate, after completing the preliminary steps, committed the case to the Court of Session, Wayanad. The learned Sessions Judge made over the case to Additional Sessions Court-I, Kalpetta. The learned Additional Sessions Judge framed the charge after hearing both sides. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances put to him and maintained the stand of innocence.

7. In order to prove the charge against the accused, PWs. 1 to 25 were examined, and Exts. P1 to P31 were marked. MOs.1 to 5 were also identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He denied the incriminating circumstances levelled against him and pleaded innocence. No evidence was adduced from the side of the defence. The learned Sessions Judge, after a full-fledged trial, convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as aforesaid. Impugning the findings of the learned Sessions Judge, the accused preferred this appeal.

The contentions of the appellants

8. Sri. Thareeq Anver, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the impugned judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is patently illegal and unsustainable.

9. The learned counsel submitted that the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and that no direct evidence has been adduced to prove the guilt of the accused. There are several missing links in the chain of circumstances. The trial court ought to have appreciated the fact that there is no clinching evidence adduced by the prosecution to connect the appellant with the crime. The learned Sessions Judge overlooked these vital aspects while convicting the accused. The learned Counsel urged that none of the witnesses has deposed to the presence of the accused in or around the scene of occurrence at the alleged time of assault, and no circumstances were put forward to show the same.

10. It is further submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the alleged motive to commit the crime. None of the witnesses gave evidence about the alleged motive for the commission of the crime, which is a vital link in a case based on circumstantial evidence. The evidence of PW9 (Sukumaran) is only hearsay and could not be relied upon for sustaining conviction.

11. The learned counsel would submit that the recovery effected based on the disclosure statement of the accused is not legal and proper. The alleged weapon of offence was lying in an open place, visible and accessible to anyone at any time, as the place of occurrence was not secured by the police. According to the learned counsel, there is no discovery in the eye of law, as the disclosure was not based on the accused's exclusive knowledge of the place of concealment, and therefore the recovery of the material objects is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of PW24, the investigating officer, would show that the verandah is a plain open area with only half-walls.

12. The learned counsel further pointed out that the investigation of this case is faulty and there are several lapses in the investigation. The learned counsel pointed out that no scientific evidence is adduced by the prosecution to link the appellant with the crime.

13. It is further submitted that the prosecution failed to prove that the blood traces or smears found on MOs. 1 and 2 belonged to the deceased or CW2 (Balakrishnan), the injured. Hence, the prosecution has failed to connect MOs. 1 and 2 with the occurrence.

14. Further, it is argued by the learned counsel that the trial court ought not have acted upon the extrajudicial confession without corroboration. The learned Counsel submitted that almost all the material witnesses turned hostile to the prosecution. The trial Court convicted the accused mainly on the basis of the extrajudicial confession of the accused allegedly made to PW12 (Dr.Ananthanadhan). The learned counsel urged that the extrajudicial confession is a weak piece of evidence in itself, which cannot form the basis of conviction in the absence of sufficient corroboration.

The contentions of the Prosecution.

15. On the other hand, Smt. Rajee P. Mathews, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. The trial court appreciated the evidence in the correct perspective and arrived at a proper conclusion. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the alleged motive for the commission of the crime is proved by the prosecution by adducing satisfactory evidence. The extrajudicial confession by the accused to PW12 (Dr.Ananthanadhan), coupled with the recovery of weapons (MOs. 1 and 2), would convincingly establish the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Public Prosecutor argued that the hostility of the material witnesses would in no way affect the core of the prosecution case.

16. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Sessions Judge is justified in sustaining the conviction against the appellant, and no interference is warranted in this appeal.

The evidence let in by the prosecution

17. PW1 (Ananthakrishnan) is the first informant. He stated that he is residing at Kuruma Colony, Kavumkara. The accused is his cousin. His aunt Chandrika died about two years back. According to PW1, the deceased sustained injuries in the house of Balakrishan CW2 and was taken to Government Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. He lodged Ext.P1 FIS at Government Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. He admitted his signature in Ext.P1 FIS.

                  17.1. However, he stated that the accused has not told him that he had beaten his mother with a stick and that there was bleeding from her ears. Ext.P2 is the case diary contradiction of PW1.

                  17.2. In cross examination, he stated that CW2 Balakrishnan is the 2nd husband of the deceased Chandrika. He is a toddy tapper. He further deposed that Balakrishnan committed suicide by consuming poison. Balakrishnan used to consume alcohol.

18. PW2 (Rajesh) is also a resident of Kavumkarakunnu Colony. He deposed that the accused and deceased are known to him. He was examined to prove that he had taken the injured Chandrika to the hospital. However, he did not support the prosecution case.

                  18.1 During the cross examination he would say that he does not know the cause of death of the deceased Chandrika.

19. PW3 (Meenakshi) is the mother of the deceased and grandmother of the accused. She would depose that the accused is her grandson. She was residing with the deceased Chandrika before her death. Occasionally, the deceased Chandrika resided with her third husband, Balakrishnan, in his house. Her own house is situated 1½ kms away from the house of Balakrishnan. On the previous day of the incident, the deceased Chandrika came to her house at about 11.00 am and left the house at about 1.00 pm. The witness turned hostile to the prosecution. The learned Public Prosecutor put leading questions to the witness as permitted by the Sessions Court. She deposed that she is now residing with the accused.

20. PW4 (Prathapan K.N.) is an attestor to Ext.P2 Inquest Report. He deposed that he witnessed the preparation of Ext.P2 Inquest Report of deceased Chandrika from the Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Sulthan Bathery on 16.09.2016. He would depose that he learned that the cause of death of the said Chandrika was due to the infliction of injuries by the accused with a wooden piece.

21. PW5 (Prajisha K.B.) is the daughter of the deceased Chandrika and the sister of the accused. She was examined to prove that the accused used to assault his mother, but she did not support the prosecution case.

22. PW6 (C.P. Surendran) would depose that the deceased Chandrika is his sister-in-law. He was not a loyal witness to the prosecution. He was examined to prove the motive for the commission of the alleged crime. He stated that he had not mentioned in his previous statement that the accused told him that he would kill his mother, as the mother used to consume liquor causing annoyance to the accused.

23. PW7 (Thulasi K.P) is the sister-in-law of the deceased Chandrika. She also turned hostile to the prosecution. According to PW7, Chandrika died due to a fall in a canal.

24. PW8 (Santhosh) is the brother of the deceased Chandrika. He deviated from his previous statement, while in the box, and testified that he did not state to the police that Chandrika died due to the injuries inflicted by the accused on 15.09.2016 using a wooden piece.

25. PW9 (Sukumaran) testified that he is residing at Pazhuppathoor. The accused and the deceased are known to him. Chandrika died two years back. He learned that the accused had beaten up his mother using a wooden plank on the succeeding day of Onam. As to the cause of death, he stated that he heard that the accused had beaten up the deceased due to the animosity in connection with the consumption of liquor by the deceased and her husband, CW2 (Balakrishnan).

                  25.1. He further stated that on the succeeding day of the incident, the police came to the scene of occurrence along with the accused. According to him, he had seen the recovery of two wooden planks by the Police at the instance of the accused. He added that one of the planks was taken from inside the house where the deceased was beaten up to death. But he does not remember from where the other wooden plank was recovered by the police. He further stated that the wooden plank was used as a bridge over the canal and he could identify the plank. He had witnessed the preparation of Ext.P4 seizure mahazar, and he put his signature in it.

                  25.2. On being cross examined, he would say that he had not stated any features to identify the wooden plank, such as its length and width. But he asserted that he could identify the wooden plank.

                  25.3. He further stated that CW2 (Balakrishnan) used to distill and sell illicit arrack in his house. He denied the suggestion that Chandrika died due to the infliction of injuries by Balakrishnan. The seizure mahazar was read over to him. He denied the suggestion that he put his signature in the seizure mahazar at the police station.

26. PW10 (Prabitha) is a neighbour of the accused. She was examined to prove that she heard hue and cry from the house of Balakrishnan (CW2) on the fateful day. However, she also turned hostile to the prosecution.

27. PW11 (Dr. K. Ibrahim), who was the Medical Officer, Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. He deposed that he collected the blood sample of one Balakrishnan and thereafter preserved the same and sealed it in a cover and handed it over to the Investigating Officer.

28. PW12 (Dr. M. K. Ananthanadhan) is the Medical Officer, Taluk Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. He testified that while he was working as Medical Officer at Taluk Hospital, Sulthan Bathery, on 15.09.2016 at about 09.05 p.m., he examined the deceased Chandrika. He has noted the following injuries:

                  1. Bleeding from left ear, persisting

                  2. Bony depression in front in 6 cm x 4 cm

                  3. An incised wound in left post Auricle area of occipital Bone 8 cm x 1 Bone depth.

                  4. An incised wound on Right upper arm 2 cm long

                  5. An incised wound in left leg (shin) 3½ cm long

                  6. Contusion (multiple) 5 scratches on the Right post Auricular area.

                  7. Swelling Right ankle of Rt ankle

                  8. Contusion on back of buttress and Both thighs.

                  9. and lacerated wound an upper part of the Right ear, which 3 cm long

                  28.1. He stated that the patient died on the same day at about 10.05 p.m. According to PW12, the deceased was brought by her son Pratheep. The history, as noted by him in Ext.P5 wound certificate, reads thus:

                 

                  28.2. PW12 further stated that he cannot say which weapon was used for inflicting injuries. He opined that it may be a wooden piece. He proved Ext.P5, the wound certificate of the deceased.

                  28.3. According to PW12, on 16.09.2016 at about 1.30 a.m., he examined one Balakrishnan, 67 years. He was brought to the hospital by Fire Force Officers. He has noted the history in Ext.P6 wound certificate as stated by the injured Balakrishnan, which reads as follows:

               

                  28.4. He has noted the following injuries in Ext.P6:

                  1. Blood clots at nostrils and mouth

                  2. An incised wound on chin. 3 cm long and incised touching wound on over his incised in the Right half 3 cm x 9 cm.

                  3. An longitudinal lacerated wound on left just below supra orbital area. 6 cm long laceration on left leg below left knee.

                  28.5 He has also noted a fracture on left Tibia. PW12 deposed that the injuries were found fresh and could be caused as alleged. The witness identified the accused who brought injured Chandrika to the hospital.

                  28.6 On being cross examined, he would say that the injuries noted in Ext.P5 could not be caused due to a fall in a canal. Later, he added that he remembers the accused who brought the deceased to the hospital. He did not conduct the alcohol test of the deceased or that of Balakrishnan. According to PW12, the accused (Pradeep) is known to him, as he had worked in that area. He denied the suggestion that, as directed by the Police, he has fabricated the wound certificate stating incorrect facts.

29. PW13 (K.G. Balakrishnan) is the Special Village Officer who prepared Ext.P7 scene plan of the scene of occurrence. PW14 (Purushothaman P.K.) was the Secretary, Block Panchayat, Sulthan Bathery. He proved Ext.P8 ownership certificate.

30. PW15 (Ramakrishnan P.K.) was the Home Guard of Sulthan Bathery Fire and Rescue Station. He deposed that on 15.09.2016 at about 12.00 p.m. on the basis of information received, he reached Kavunkara in an ambulance and brought a male person who was lying in a pool of blood to the Taluk Hospital.

31. PW16 (Raju K.K.) was a resident of Pazhuppathoor and a jeep driver by profession. He stated that the accused and the deceased Chandrika are known to him. He had taken the injured Chandrika to Taluk hospital on the fateful day.

32. PW17 (Saji T.) was the attestor to Ext.P9 seizure mahazar whereby the Police seized MO1 and MO2, wooden planks. He stated that he is a resident of Pazhuppathoor. He stated that he had not seen the alleged seizure of the material objects by the Police. According to him, he put his signature in Ext.P9 in a shop. He admitted that he was a signatory in Ext.P4 scene mahazar

33. PW18 (Mini D.) is the Scientific Officer, Forensic Science Laboratory, Wayanad, who visited the scene of occurrence on 16.09.2016 and collected blood stains from the bedroom and veranda in a cotton gauze. She prepared Ext.P10 report with regard to the visit to the scene of occurrence.

                  33.1 In cross examination she denied that blood stains were collected from a place near the concrete canal.

34. PW19 (Moncy N.P.) was the Civil Police Officer of the Traffic Police Unit, Sulthan Bathery, who assisted the Investigating Officer in the investigation. On 16.09.2016, he had seen the accused showing the canal in front of the house wherein the incident took place. At that time, the accused told the Police that the wooden plank which was put across the canal was the material object with which the crime was committed. Thereafter, he had seen the accused picking up two wooden pieces: one from the bedroom and the other from the veranda. He added that the accused had handed over those wooden pieces to the Police.

                  34.1 He had also seen the scientific officer collecting the blood stains from the bedroom and the veranda and handed it over to the Investigating Officer. He put his signature in Ext.P11 seizure mahazar. He had also witnessed the seizure of the dresses (MO4 and MO5) worn by the accused at the time of occurrence.

35. PW20 (Dr. Sonu R.) is the Assistant Professor and Assistant Police Surgeon, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government Medical College, Kozhikode. He conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased and issued Ext.P16 postmortem report. He noted as many as 24 antemortem injuries on the body of the deceased. He has noted the following antemortem injuries:

                  1. Contusions of scalp (i) 10x5x1cm, on right frontal region, inner extend in midline, lower border at right superior orbital ridge (ii) 8x4cm over the left temporo parietal region with contusion of superficial fibres of left temporalis muscle. There was a fissure fracture of left petrous temporal bone (iii) 4x4x0.7cm over the left parietal prominence (iv) 4.5x3x0.7cm over the right parietal prominence. The left parietal region of scalp showed a sutured lacerated wound, oblique 4x1x1cm, the lower inner end was 4.5cm behind and 3.5cm above the top of pinna. The dura mater was intact. There was diffuse, subarachnoid haemorrhage over the dorsilateral surfaces of cerebrum and cerebellum. The ventricles contained blood stained cerebro spinal fluid.

                  2. Sutured wound, 2cm long on top of helix of right ear.

                  3. Multiple abrasions (0.1x0.4cm to 2x1cm) over an area 6x4cm behind the right ear.

                  4. Multiple abrasions (0.5x0.5cm to 1x1cm) over an area 12x3-4cm on right side of face, upper border at the outer angle of right eye.

                  5. Lacerated wound 2x1.5x1cm involving the right half of lower lip.

                  6. Multiple abrasions (0.1x0.1cm to 0.6x0.8cm) over an area 8x6cm on side of front of upper chest, inner border in midline, upper border at the level of collar bone.

                  7. Multiple abrasions (1x1cm to 2x1cm) over an area 7x3cm on front and inner aspect of right upper arm, upper border 8cm below the top of shoulder.

                  8. Lacerated wound (sutured) 1x0.6x1.5cm on outer aspect of right upper arm, 5cm above the elbow.

                  9. Multiple abrasions (0.2x0.5cm to 0.5x0.5cm) over an area 3.5x2cm on back of right elbow.

                  10. Abrasion 1.5x0.6cm on back of right hand; 2cm below the root of thumb.

                  11. Lacerated wound (sutured), 3x1x0.5cm on front of right leg, 15cm below the knee.

                  12. Contusion, 40x5-10x1.5cm involving the front and inner aspect of right leg, lower border at the ankle.

                  13. Contusion 30x10x1.5cm on front and inner aspect of left leg, lower border 6cm above the ankle.

                  14. Multiple abrasions (0.1x0.1cm to 0.5x0.7cm) over an area 12x3-5cm on back of left hand, upper border at the wrist.

                  15. Multiple spot abrasions over an area 4x4cm, inner aspect of left elbow.

                  16. Multiple spot abrasions 4x5cm outer aspect of back of left elbow.

                  17. Contusion, 20x12x1cm on back of right side of trunk, upper border 25cm below the top of shoulder, inner extent 6cm outer to midline.

                  18. Contusion 25x10x1cm on left side of back of trunk, upper border 20cm below the top of shoulder, inner extent 3cm outer to midline.

                  19. Contusion, 27x16x2-2.5cm involving both buttocks.

                  20. Contusion, 68x15-18x1cm involving the back of right lower limb, lower border at the ankle.

                  21. Contusion, 21x12x1cm, on back of left leg, upper extent at the knee.

                  22. Multiple abrasions (0.1x0.2cm to 0.2x0.5cm) over an area 3x2.5cm on back of left knee.

                  23. Contusion, 10x5x1cm, on back of left thigh, upper extent at inferior gluteal fold.

                  24. Fracture of 4-6 ribs on right side in midclavicular line.

                  35.1 PW20 opined that the deceased died due to the multiple blunt force injuries sustained to the head and soft tissues. The pattern of injuries were consistent with the history of multiple blows with the wooden stick. He deposed that injury No.1 noted in Ext.P16 is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The injuries can be caused with wooden planks.

36. PW21 was the photographer of the District Police Service, Wayanad. On 16.09.2016, he had taken photos of the scene of occurrence and photos of the deceased while preparing the inquest report. Ext.P17 series are the photos and Ext.P18 is the certificate issued by him under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Ext.P19 is the CD which contains Ext.P17 series photos.

37. PW22 (Sasikumar K.V.) was the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Sulthan Bathery Police Station. He assisted the Inspector of Police in the investigation of this case. He testified that on 16.09.2016, at about 12 pm, he went along with the Circle Inspector of Police. On that day, he had seen the recovery of MO1 and MO2 wooden planks at the instance of the accused. He stated that the accused had pointed out the scene of occurrence and the canal in front of the house of CW2, Balakrishnan. The accused had taken the wooden planks used for the commission of the offence from the veranda of the house and the bedroom of the house. He identified the material objects as MO1 and MO2. He denied the suggestion that MO1 and MO2 were not recovered from the house of CW2.

38. PW23 was the Judicial First Class Magistrate I, Sulthan Bathery. He had recorded the Ext.P20 statement of one Balakrishnan under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., involved in Crime No.960/2016 of Sulthan Bathery Police Station, as per the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kalpetta. He deposed that he has complied all the formalities for recording the statement.

39. PW25 was the Sub Inspector of Police, Sulthan Bathery Police Station. He deposed that on 15.09.2016, at about 23 hours, he recorded Ext.P1, F.I.Statement of PW1, and on the basis of which registered Ext.P31 F.I.R, on the same day.

Defence version

40. No defence evidence was adduced. According to the appellant/accused, he was falsely implicated in this case. Suggestions were made in cross examination that there was an altercation between CW2 and the deceased and Chandrika died due to the infliction of injuries by CW2. Some suggestions were also made to the tune that the deceased fell into the canal and sustained injuries.

Judicial Evaluation

41. The first question to be decided is whether the death of Chandrika is a homicide or not.

42. PW20 (Dr. Sonu R.), who conducted the autopsy of the body of the deceased, noted as many as 24 ante-mortem injuries on the body of the deceased. He opined that the deceased died due to multiple blunt force injuries sustained to the head and soft tissues. The pattern of injuries were consistent with the history of multiple blows with the wooden stick. According to Dr. Sonu, injury No.1 noted in the postmortem certificate was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause the death of a person. He further opined that the injuries can be caused with the wooden planks.

43. In his cross-examination, he deposed that the injuries noted are not possible on a person if he fell into a dry, deep concrete canal. The contusion injuries are not possible in a single fall. He further deposed that it is not correct to say that all injuries would not be caused by wooden planks. In view of the categorical and unequivocal evidence of Dr. Sonu R, we are of the view that there is overwhelming evidence to prove that the death of Chandrika is homicidal.

44. Now, the crucial questions that arose before us are who inflicted the stab injuries on the deceased and whether there is any evidence to prove the involvement of the appellants in the alleged crime.

45. According to the prosecution, the incident occurred at the house of CW2, Balakrishnan, who is the second husband of the deceased Chandrika, on 15.09.2016 at about 6.00 pm. The accused trespassed into the house of Balakrishnan and inflicted injuries on his mother and CW2 using wooden planks. Both of them sustained injuries. Chandrika succumbed to the injuries at 10.05 p.m. on the same day at Taluk Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. According to the prosecution, there were no eyewitnesses to the incident except the injured CW2, Balakrishnan. However, CW2 committed suicide by consuming some poison before the commencement of the trial. Therefore, the prosecution could not examine the crucial witness.

46. The case on hand rests solely on circumstantial evidence. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to refer to the settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence.

47. In Hanumant v. State of M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 71] , the Apex Court observed that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

48. In Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration ([1974 AIR SC 691]) , the Apex Court observed that the circumstances, in the first place, have to be established by the prosecution by clear and cogent evidence and those circumstances must not be consistent with the innocence of the accused. For determining whether the circumstances established on the evidence raise but one inference consistent with the guilt of the accused, regard must be had to the totality of the circumstances. Individual circumstances considered in isolation and divorced from the context of the overall picture emerging from a consideration of the diverse circumstances and their conjoint effect may by themselves appear innocuous. It is only when the various circumstances are considered conjointly that it becomes possible to understand and appreciate their true effect.

49. In Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of Maharashtra ([(1984) 4 SCC 116]) the Apex Court observed that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not reasonably support any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. Paragraphs 152, 153 and 154 of Sharad Birdhichand Sardar (supra) read thus:

                  “152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952 SCR 1091). This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1969 (3) SCC 198) and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1972 SC 656). It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case (1952 SCR 1091) :

                  “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

                  153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

                  (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

                  It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807]

Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

                  (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

                  (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

                  (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

                  (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

                  154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”

50. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Others (AIR 1990 SC 79) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that, when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

                  (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

                  (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;

                  (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and

                  (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

51. In State of UP v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal5, the Apex Court held that the circumstantial ingredients to prove the guilt of an accused person by circumstantial evidence are :

                  (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion is drawn should be fully proved;

                  (2) The circumstances should be conclusive in nature;

                  (3) All the facts so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with innocence; and

                  (4) The circumstances should, to a moral certainty, exclude the possibility of guilt of any person other than the accused.

52. Guided by the aforesaid principles, we shall now consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant.

Motive

53. The first submission by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive for the crime. As regards the contention of motive, it is a settled legal proposition that, in cases based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes significance; however, where reliable direct evidence is available, its significance is diminished. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to refer to the judicial precedents on the relevance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

54. In Atley v. State of UP (AIR 1955 SC 807) , the Apex Court held that where there is clear evidence that the person has committed the offence, it is immaterial where no motive for commission of the crime has been shown.

55. In Tarseem Kumar v. The Delhi Administration (AIR 1994 SC 2585) , the Apex Court held as under :

                  “Normally, there is a motive behind every criminal act and that is why investigating agency as well as the Court while examining the complicity of an accused try to ascertain as to what was the motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime in question. It has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that where the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond all reasonable doubts on basis of the materials produced before the Court, the motive loses its importance. But in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the part of the accused assumes greater importance. Of course, if each of the circumstances proved on behalf of the prosecution is accepted by the Court for purpose of recording a finding that it was the accused who committed the crime in question, even in absence of proof of a motive for commission of such a crime, the accused can be convicted. But the investigating agency as well as the court should ascertain as far as possible as to what was the immediate impelling motive on the part of the accused which led him to commit the crime in question”.

56. In State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing and Another (AIR 1997 SC 2780) , the Apex Court held that the motive gets locked in the mind of the makers. If the motive is proved, it would supply a chain of link, but the absence of motive is not a ground to reject the prosecution case.

57. In the instant case, the alleged motive for the commission of the crime is the solemnization of marriage of the deceased with CW2, Balakrishnan, who was engaged in the distillation of arrack and their habit of consumption of arrack together. The trial court, after evaluating the evidence of PW9 and PW12, Dr. Ananthanadhan, took the view that the motive was proved by satisfactory evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the evidence of PW9 is hearsay and inadmissible.

58. We have carefully reassessed the evidence of PWs.9 and 12. PW9 has clearly testified that the reason for the incident is the consumption of arrack by the deceased, Chandrika with CW2 in his house. PW12, Dr.Ananthanadhan would depose that the accused confessed to him that he inflicted blows on his mother with wooden pieces and the mother has consumed alcohol. If the evidence of PW9 and PW12 is considered cumulatively, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge that the motive is proved by the prosecution by adducing satisfactory evidence.

Hostility of some material witnesses

59. According to the prosecution, the crucial witness, the injured, committed suicide after the incident, but before the commencement of the trial. Many of the witnesses including the mother of the deceased, sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased did not support the prosecution case.

60. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that those witnesses turned hostile to the prosecution and they deposed true facts before the court. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that despite the hostility of some of the material witnesses would not cut the root of the prosecution case and there is sufficient evidence on record to fasten penal liability on the accused.

61. The learned Sessions Judge mainly relied on the evidence of PW12, Dr. Ananthanadhan, as proof of extra judicial confession and the recovery of MOs.1 and 2, the wooden planks at the instance of the accused. Now, we shall proceed to examine the various circumstances relied on by the learned Sessions Judge to arrive at the conclusion.

Extra judicial confession

62. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e., judicial and extrajudicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before a Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings and recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 183 BNSS). Extrajudicial confessions are those which are made by a party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court, before private individuals.

63. Before further discussion, it would be profitable to refer to the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court on this point.

                  24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.--

                  A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

                  25. Confession to police-officer not to be proved.--

                  No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

                  26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.--

                  No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

                  27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.--

                  Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

64. In Mulk Raj v. State of U. P. (AIR 1959 SC 902) , a three-judge bench of the Apex Court held that an extrajudicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. The value of the evidence as to the confession, just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. In the circumstances, if the evidence of the witnesses is acceptable, there is no reason why the extrajudicial confession made by the accused could not be acted upon. The relevant paragraph of Mulk Raj (Supra) reads as follows:

                  “11. We must notice another argument of the learned Advocate at this stage. It is said that the exact words used by the appellant when he made the extra judicial confession were not given and that therefore the confession should be excluded. P. Ws. 1, 5, 6 and 7 repeated before the learned Additional Sessions Judge what the appellant stated before them and there is no appreciable difference in the gist of the confession made by the accused. Every one of them stated that the accused had stated that he stabbed the deceased because Amarnath and Milkiraj brought him there to do so. An extra judicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. The confession will have to be proved just like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance were given. If the rule is inflexible that the Courts should insist only on the exact words, more often as not, this kind of evidence, sometimes most reliable and, useful, will have to be excluded; for, except perhaps in the case of a person of good memory, many witnesses cannot repeat the exact words of the accused. It is for the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness, his capacity to understand the language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence or not. In this case, the confession made by the appellant was not a complicated one and the witnesses stated without any conflict practically the exact words used by the appellant and also how they understood the words. In the circumstances, if the evidence of the witnesses is acceptable, there is no reason why the extra judicial confession made by the accused could not be acted upon.”

65. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram ((2003) 8 SCC 180) the Apex Court has occasion to consider the evidentiary value of extrajudicial confession. Relevant paragraphs of Raja Ram(supra) read as follows :

                  “19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

                  20. If the evidence relating to extra judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the respondent-accused, is a matter of prudence and not a invariable rule of law…..”

66. In Raja Ram (supra), the Apex Court observed that an extrajudicial confession, if made voluntarily in a fit state of mind, can form the basis for conviction. The extrajudicial confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The evidentiary value of such a confession would depend on the circumstances of each case and the credibility of the witnesses who speak about such a confession. If such a confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, or not even remotely inimical to the accused, the words spoken by the witness are clear and unambiguous to convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime, the confession can be accepted and acted upon.

67. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P. ((1991) 1 SCC 286) , the Apex Court observed as follows:

                  “An unambiguous extra-judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of its falsity. But in the process of the proof of the alleged confession the court has to be satisfied that it is a voluntary one and does not appear to be the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the court has to look into the surrounding circumstances and to find whether the extra-judicial confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of the law suggesting that it may not be true one. For this purpose the court must scrutinise all the relevant facts such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words used by the accused. Extra-judicial confession if found to be voluntary, can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence on record. Therefore, even the extra-judicial confession will also have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made and the circumstances in which it came to be made and the actual words used by the accused. Sometimes it may not be possible to the witness to reproduce the actual words in which the confession was made. For that reason the law insists on recording the statement by a Judicial Magistrate after administering all necessary warnings to the accused that it would be used as evidence against him.”

68. In Sahadevan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu. ((2012) 6 SCC 403) , the Apex Court summarised the principles in respect of evidentiary value and reliability of an extra-judicial confession as follows:

                  “16. Upon a proper analysis of the above referred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused:

                  (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.

                  (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.

                  (iii) It should inspire confidence.

                  (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence.

                  (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.

                  (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.”

69. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony ((1985) 1 SCC 505) , the Apex Court observed as follows:

                  “15. There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extrajudicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The courts have considered the evidence of extrajudicial confession a weak piece of evidence. (See Jagta v. State of Haryana [(1974) 4 SCC 747] and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh [(1975) 4 SCC 472)]. In Sahoo v. State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 40] it was held that “an extrajudicial confession may be an expression of conflict of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime”. Before evidence in this behalf is accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extrajudicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However, in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [(1977) 4 SCC 452] this Court observed that the law does not require that evidence of an extrajudicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It thus appears that extrajudicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about extrajudicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extrajudicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extrajudicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon. ”

70. In Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti v. State of Uttar Pradesh ([2022 SCC OnLine SC 1396]) , a three-judge bench of the Apex Court held that an extrajudicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that an extrajudicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made, and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extrajudicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

The evidentiary value of a confession made to a medical professional

71. The Apex Court in the foregoing judgments has laid down the principles to be applied while relying upon an extrajudicial confession. The Apex Court made it clear that an extrajudicial confession may be acted upon and may form the basis for conviction if it is made voluntarily. Further, it should be proved that the alleged confession was made to a person having no bias; it should be unambiguously clear and free from any vitiating elements like coercion, undue influence, and any other discrepancy.

72. The crucial question before us is what is the evidentiary value of an extrajudicial confession made to a doctor/medical practitioner?

73. Like any other fact, an extrajudicial confession should also be proved by adducing clear and cogent evidence by the prosecution. If the extrajudicial confession is made to a medical practitioner, it has more probative value than the confession made to others, in our view. The reasons are manifold:

                  (1) Usually a confession to a doctor is made by the accused immediately after the incident; often, such a confession is made by the accused without having a second thought.

                  (2) The doctor, who is recording the confession in the wound certificate or any other records in the course of his official discharge of duty.

        (3) Normally, a doctor who is treating the patient has no interest, animosity or bias towards the maker of the confession.

                  (4) There is no reason to assume that the doctor to whom the confession was made had any bias towards the accused.

74. We have carefully examined the evidence of Dr. Ananthanadhan, and perused Exts.P5 and P6 wound certificates. In Ext.P5, wound certificate of the deceased Chandrika, he has noted the history as told by the accused himself. The doctor gave clear evidence that the accused told him that he had beaten her mother with a wooden stick. The doctor had examined the injured Chandrika at 9:05 p.m. at Taluk Hospital, Sulthan Bathery, and the patient died at 10:05 p.m. At the time of making confession, the accused may not have any idea that his mother would die within a short time.

75. PW12 examined CW2 Balakrishnan at about 1:00 a.m. on the next day. Balakrishnan told him that his stepson had inflicted blows on him with a wooden stick.

76. On a careful evaluation of the evidence of Dr. Ananthanadhan, we agree with the view of the learned Sessions Judge that the confession was made voluntarily, unambiguously and there were no vitiating elements. The learned Sessions Judge rightly appreciated the evidence of extrajudicial confession to form a strong basis for conviction.

The recovery evidence

77. The learned counsel vehemently challenged the recovery effected by the prosecution. Before scrutinising the recovery effected in the present case, it would be apposite to refer to the principles laid down by the Apex Court on this point.

78. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, (AIR 1947 PC 67) , after examining Section 27 of the Evidence Act, observed that the section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. The relevant paragraph of Pulukuri Kottaya (Supra) reads as follows:

                  “10. S.27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the "fact discovered" is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of S.27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to S. 26, added by S. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed a" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.

79. In Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti (supra), the Apex Court held that in the absence of exact words attributed to an accused person, as statement made by him being deposed by the investigating officer in his evidence, and also without proving the contents of the panchnama, the courts were not justified in placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of weapon. In Paragraphs 59, 67 and 73 observed as follows:

                  “ 59. The requirement of law that needs to be fulfilled before accepting the evidence of discovery is that by proving the contents of the panchnama. The investigating officer in his deposition is obliged in law to prove the contents of the panchnama and it is only if the investigating officer has successfully proved the contents of the discovery panchnama in accordance with law, then in that case the prosecution may be justified in relying upon such evidence and the trial court may also accept the evidence. In the present case, what we have noticed from the oral evidence of the investigating officer, PW 7 Yogendra Singh is that he has not proved the contents of the discovery panchnama and all that he has deposed is that as the accused expressed his willingness to point out the weapon of offence the same was discovered under a panchnama. We have minutely gone through this part of the evidence of the investigating officer and are convinced that by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the investigating officer has proved the contents of the discovery panchnama (Ext. 5). There is a reason why we are laying emphasis on proving the contents of the panchnama at the end of the investigating officer, more particularly when the independent panch witnesses though examined yet have not said a word about such discovery or turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution. In order to enable the Court to safely rely upon the evidence of the investigating officer, it is necessary that the exact words attributed to an accused, as statement made by him, be brought on record and, for this purpose the investigating officer is obliged to depose in his evidence the exact statement and not by merely saying that a discovery panchnama of weapon of offence was drawn as the accused was willing to take it out from a particular place”.

                  xxxxx

                  67. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the Act are broadly as under:

                  (1) Discovery of fact in consequence of an information received from accused;

                  (2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to;

                  (3) The accused must be in police custody when he gave information; and

                  (4) So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible — Mohmed Inayatullah Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 199 : AIR 1976 SC 483] .

                  and

                  Two conditions for application—

                  (1) Information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact;

                  (2) Information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered — Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka [Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 447 : AIR 1983 SC 446] .

                  Xxxxxxxxxxxxx

                  73. Thus, in the absence of exact words, attributed to an accused person, as statement made by him being deposed by the investigating officer in his evidence, and also without proving the contents of the panchnama (Ext. 5), the trial court as well as the High Court was not justified in placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of weapon. “

80. In Modan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan ([(1978) 4 SCC 435]) , it was observed by the Apex Court that where the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution version.

81. In Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra ([(2001) 9 SCC 362]) , it was further held that even if panch witnesses turn hostile, which happens very often in criminal cases, the evidence of the person who effected the recovery would not stand vitiated.

82. In Avtar Singh v. State of Rajasthan ((2004) 10 SCC 657) , the Apex Court has summarized the requirements of Section 27 as follows:

                  “16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows:

                  (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible.

                  (2) The fact must have been discovered.

                  (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act.

                  (4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence.

                  (5) He must be in the custody of a police officer.

                  (6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to.

                  (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible. “

83. In State of H. P. v. Jeet Singh ([1999 (4) SCC 370]) , the Apex Court observed that there is nothing in S.27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is "open or accessible to others". It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred, its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others. It is now well settled that the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused as to it.

84. In the case on hand, MOs.1 and 2, wooden planks, were recovered at the instance of the accused. One of the wooden planks was recovered from the veranda and the other from the bedroom of the house of CW2.

85. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that PW17, the witness to the alleged recovery, did not support the prosecution case and he would say that he had not seen the recovery. According to PW17, he put his signature on Ext.P9, the recovery mahazar from a shop. It is true that the independent witness to Ext.P9 mahazar turned hostile to the prosecution. However, PW24, the Investigating Officer, PW22, ASI of Police, who assisted the Investigating Officer, and PW19, the Civil Police Officer, gave unequivocal evidence about the alleged recovery of the weapons of offence.

86. PW24, the Investigating Officer, testified that he arrested the accused on 16.09.2016. Pursuant to the disclosure statement, and as led by the accused, he recovered MOs.1 and 2, wooden planks, from the house of CW2, Balakrishnan. PW19, the Civil Police Officer, also gave evidence to the tune that he had seen the handing over of two wooden pieces by the accused to PW24. PW22 also spoke in similar lines. The evidence of PW9, an independent witness, would also lend corroboration to the recovery of the weapon of offence.

87. From the evaluation of evidence of PWs.24, 9, 19 and 22, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge with respect to the recovery of the material objects.

88. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant had no intention to cause the death of the deceased and at the most, the case would be considered as a culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Penal Code.

89. On going through the evidence of PW20, Dr. Sonu R., who conducted the autopsy, it is discernible that almost all the injuries were on the head. The description of the injuries would also reveal the force with which the blows were inflicted. The nature of the weapon used, that is, the wooden planks, would also indicate the intention of the perpetrator. The available evidence on record would clearly establish that the offence alleged would fall within the ambit of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

90. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence was not proved by the prosecution. The evidence of PW9 (Sukumaran) would convincingly prove the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence during the relevant time. Moreover, the recovery of MOs.1 and 2, wooden planks, from the scene of occurrence at the instance of the accused would also indicate his presence at the place of occurrence. The evidence of PW12 (Dr. Ananthanadhan), to whom the appellant made a confession would also prove the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence. PW16 (Raju) deposed that he had taken the deceased Chandrika to Taluk Hospital, Sulthan Bathery from the house of CW2.

91. On a careful analysis of the evidence on record, we are of the view that the prosecution has adduced clear and cogent evidence to prove the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence during the relevant time.

92. The learned Sessions Judge has relied on as many as 28 circumstances to arrive at a conclusion as to the guilt and to enter conviction. Paragraph 153 reads thus :

                  “153. On analysis of entire evidence adduced by the prosecution, I find that, the prosecution has proved following circumstances against the accused.

                  1. The accused is the son of deceased Chandrika.

                  2. The deceased conducted second marriage with CW2 Balakrishnan.

                  3. The deceased resided along with CW2 Balakrishnan at the alleged house, situated at Pazhupathoor.

                  4. The accused disliked the second marriage of his mother with CW2, Balakrishnan.

                  5. The deceased had a habit of consuming alcohol.

                  6. The deceased was occasionally residing in the house of her second husband CW2 Balakrishnan is proved by PW3, the mother of the deceased.

                  7. The time of incident was 6 p.m. on 15.09.2016.

                  8. The accused along with PW16 brought the deceased to the Taluk Head Quarters Hospital, Sulthanbathery.

                  9. PW12, the Medical Officer, Taluk Head Quarters Hospital, Sulthanbathery, had examined the deceased at 9.05pm, on 15.09.2016.

                  10. The accused stated before PW12 that, he had beaten over her head and body with wooden pieces and she had the habit of consuming alcohol.

                  11. Ext.P16 postmortem report reveals that, stomach contents had an alcohol like smell.

                  12. The PW20, doctor who had conducted the postmortem, opined that, the deceased died due to multiple blunt force injury sustained to head and soft tissues.

                  13. The PW20 opined that the pattern of injuries were consistent with the history of multiple blows with wooden sticks.

                  14. PW20 and PW12 opined that injuries could be caused by beating with MO1 and MO2.

                  15. The prosecution has proved the recovery of MO1 and MO2 on the information given by the accused.

                  16. The accused had shown the place from where the MO1 and MO2 were taken by him for committing the offence.

                  17. PW9 proved that, wooden plank was used as a pole on a concrete canal situated in front of the house of the deceased.

                  18. The scene mahazar proved that the bed room and varantha of place of occurrence was soaked with blood.

                  19. PW18, the Scientific Officer collected the blood stain from the place of occurrence.

                  20. Ext.P29 F.S.L.Report proved that, in MO3 nighty of the deceased and MO5 sarong (ലു ി) of the accused contain human blood group 'AB'.

                  21. As per Ext.P29 F.S.L.Report, MO1 wooden piece also contained human blood group 'AB'.

                  22. The blood stain collected by the PW18 from the scene of occurrence contained human blood group 'AB'.

                  23. CW2 Balakrishnan sustained grievous injury in the same incident.

                  24. PW12, doctor proved the injuries of CW2, Balakrishnan and the deceased.

                  25. The history noted by the doctor in Ext.P5 and Ext.P6 wound certificates is the same, implicating the accused.

                  26. The accused has not denied the statement recorded by PW12 in Ext.P5, the alleged extra judicial confession.

                  27. No explanation has been given by the accused regarding the recovery of MO1 and MO2.

                  28. The accused has no case that PW12 doctor has any enmity towards him to falsely record his statement in Ext.P5.”

93. On a careful consideration of the various circumstances proved by the prosecution, we find that they form a complete chain of evidence, leaving no reasonable ground for any conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are satisfied that the prosecution has established the circumstances from which the guilt of the accused can be inferred and that such circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis of his guilt. The chain of circumstances is complete and leaves no reasonable ground for any conclusion consistent with his innocence. The circumstances so proved, taken cumulatively, lead to the conclusion that, within all human probability, the act in question was committed by the accused. The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances, when considered in the light of the legal principles discussed hereinbefore, sufficiently establishes the case put forward by the prosecution. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. The appeal fails.

                  In the result,

                  i. Criminal Appeal No. 764/2020 is dismissed.

                  ii. The impugned judgment of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Wayanad in S.C. No.63 of 2017 is confirmed.