1. In the present appeal, the appellant has approached this Court to challenge the judgment and order dated 07.05.2025 passed by the Civil Court, Senior Division, Darwha in Land Acquisition Reference No. 78 of 2010, whereby the Reference Court, while deciding the issue of apportionment, has held that the respondents are entitled to 60% of the compensation and the appellant-Trust is entitled to 40% of the compensation as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer in his revised award dated 14.12.2009.

2. The brief facts of the present petition can be summarized as under:

3. The appellant is a Trust duly registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act on 31st December, 1962. The appellant-Trust claims to be the owner of the land bearing Survey Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 12/1, 16, 47/1 and 50/2 situated at Village Shindi, Taluka Darwha, District Yavatmal.

4. In the present case, the land owned by the Trust was acquired in a land acquisition proceeding initiated by the State Government vide Government Notification dated 13.03.2008 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for the project of submergence under the Antargaon Project.

5. The Land Acquisition Officer, after acquiring the land, initially determined the compensation payable in respect of the acquired land on 30.10.2009. Subsequently, same was corrected and a revised award was passed on 14.12.2009.

6. It is pertinent to note that, in the revenue records, although the Trust is reflected as the owner of the land, the actual possession of the land was with the respondents.

7. In the light of this factual position, the Land Acquisition Officer issued notices to the appellant as well as the respondents, inviting their respective claims regarding entitlement to the compensation amount for the acquired land. Both the appellant and the respondents submitted their respective claim statements before the Land Acquisition Officer. Both asserted their entitlement to the entire compensation. No consensus could be arrived at between the parties with respect to the compensation amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer in his revised award dated 14.12.2009.

8. In view of the dispute between the parties regarding entitlement of the compensation amount, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Civil Court for adjudication regarding apportionment of the compensation between the parties.

9. In the light of this reference, the proceedings were registered before the Civil Court, Senior Division as LAR No. 78 of 2010. Both the appellant and the respondents filed their respective submissions before the Civil Court, and both claimed the compensation amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.

10. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is primarily based upon an exemption certificate obtained under Section 129-B of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, once the appellant-Trust possesses the certificate obtained from the competent authority, the possession of the respondents over the land is illegal, and therefore, they are not entitled to any compensation in the matter. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shriram Mandir Sansthan vs. Vatsalabai, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 657.

11. The contention of the respondents before the Reference Court was that, at the time of acquisition of the land, they were in possession of the suit land. According to them, they have been in continuous possession for period exceeding 50 to 60 years. As such, they claimed possessory title over the acquired land. It is further stated that the exemption certificate issued by Tahsildar, Washim is under challenge before competent forum. Accordingly, claimed entire compensation.

12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, the apportionment of the compensation is required to be decided by taking into consideration the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act would not apply in the present matter.

13. In the light of the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, the learned Reference Court, by recording a finding that the appellant-Trust failed to initiate any legal proceedings to assert its right under the said certificate, held that the Trust cannot be held to be the owner of the land. According to the learned Reference Court, possession of the certificate issued under Section 129-B of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act does not alter the legal position that the present respondents were in possession of the acquired land on the date of acquisition and, therefore, considering the said fact, which is not disputed, both are entitled to the compensation. In the circumstances, the learned Reference Court, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India vs. Ajit Singh, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2669, has apportioned the compensation between the appellant and the respondents by applying the ratio of 60% in favour of the respondents and 40% in favour of the appellant-Trust.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant, to substantiate his submission has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shriram Mandir Sansthan (supra) by stating that from the date on which the certificate under Section 129-B was received by the Trust, the possession of the legal heir of the tenant became illegal. According to him, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, tenancy came to an end on the death of tenant. Tenancy is not heritable. As such, the possession of the respondents over the suit property is illegal since the year 1966. As a result, they, being not the owners of the property, cannot claim any compensation in the matter.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon Section 125 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act to state that if any suit is instituted in any Civil Court and an issue arises which is required to be decided or dealt with by the competent authority under the Act, then the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer the matter in accordance with the provisions of law to the competent authority to decide such issue, and after the decision on the said issue, the Civil Court can dispose of the suit. However, this procedure was not followed in the present matter and, hence, the decision of the learned Civil Court is bad in law and liable to be quashed and set aside.

16. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of the order of the Reference Court states that the entire proceedings arose out of the land acquisition proceedings. He has pointed out that, in any land acquisition proceeding, even a person who is interested in the property is entitled to compensation. He has particularly relied upon Section 3(b) and Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 3(b) defines the expression “person interested” and Section 11 of the Act mandates the Collector to make an inquiry while determining the compensation amount in respect of the “interested persons”. According to him, if a person interested appears before the Collector and claims compensation, the same can be decided by the Collector in the light of Section 11 of the Act.

17. Learned counsel for the respondents further states that after the amount is settled under Section 11 and if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, then the dispute is required to be referred to the Civil Court. As such, under the Land Acquisition Act, the arrangement is made to decide the issue of apportionment by the Civil Court. Therefore, once the matter is referred for apportionment of the amount which is settled under Section 11, the Reference Court has to only decide the issue of apportionment of compensation amongst the parties who are claiming entitlement on the amount of compensation.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his submission, has referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy vs P.M. Bharucha reported in 1958 SCC OnLine Bom 90. This Court has considered somewhat identical circumstances and dealt with the issue of “person interested” or “person known or believed to be interested” and observed in paragraph 6 as under:

                    “6. The Legislature has undoubtedly used different expressions such as "persons interested", "persons known or believed to be interested" and "persons possessing an interest". But, in our judgment, the expressions "person interested", and "person possessing an interest" appear to have the same meaning which the expression "person interested" defined in Section 3(6) has. We are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Gupte that the Legislature has used the expression "person interested in the land" as having a connotation distinct from the connotation of "person interested". A "person interested in the land" under Section 9 will, in our judgment, by the definition in Section 3(b), include a person who claims interest in compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of land, and the interest which is contemplated by Section 9 and the other sections to which we have referred is not restricted to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land but includes such interest as will sustain a claim to apportionment with the owner of the land. If a person has a right to remain in occupation or has a claim against the land, or some obligation or restriction is imposed upon the ownership of the land, the person in whom the right or claim is vested or who is entitled to the benefit of the obligation or restriction will, in our judgment, be entitled to compensation, even though the right, claim or the benefit may not amount to an interest or estate in the land. If a person has, without having any interest, a right to remain in occupation or possession of land of the ownership of another, compensation for extinction of that right by compulsory acquisition will be payable to the person having the right of occupation or possession. For instance, a person who has a licence which is irrevocable will be a person interested, even though the licence does not amount to an interest in the land. The owner of a dominant tenement, having an easement over a servient tenement, even though the easement does not amount to an interest in the land, is by the definition declared expressly to be a person interested in land. In our judgment, the right to receive compensation for compulsory acquisition of land is not restricted to those persons who have a legal or proprietary interest or estate in the land and is available to all persons who have a right or claim to land, even if such right or claim does not amount to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land.”

19. In the light of the submissions of both the parties, the issue that falls for determination before this Court is whether the appellant is entitled to the entire compensation amount in view of having a certificate under Section 129-B of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, or whether the respondents, who are claiming to be interested persons under the Land Acquisition Act, are entitled to the apportionment as done by the Reference Court in the matter.

20. In the present matter, it would be necessary to record the fact that the entire proceedings arose out of the land acquisition proceedings. The appellant-Trust, which is claiming to be in possession of the certificate since the year 1966, was well aware of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land. The appellant-Trust, which was supposed to raised an objection before the Land Acquisition Officer while determining the compensation amount, appears to have not raised any such objection before the Land Acquisition Officer or before the Collector. As such, in the present matter, the final award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer.

21. So also, as per the revenue record, though the appellant is the owner of the said agricultural land, the respondents are in cultivating possession of the land. In the award dated 14.12.2009, the respondents, who were in possession of the agricultural land, were held entitled to compensation. As such, the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector, by considering all the aspects of the matter, determined the compensation for the land acquired for the project.

22. In the present case, from the proceedings, it is clear that the appellant-Trust raised the objection after the amount of compensation had been settled under Section 11. Hence, the issue was referred to the Civil Court for determination of the apportionment of the compensation amount. In the background of this factual position, it was necessary for the appellant-Trust to establish on record that, by virtue of the certificate obtained by it under Section 129-B of the Act, it had obtained possession of the land from the respondents. Admittedly, no such proceeding has yet been filed by the appellant-Trust against the respondents in the matter. Therefore, the issue which inter se was required to be decided by the competent authority under the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act cannot be an issue which is to be decided or considered by the Reference Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

23. In my opinion, under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, while deciding the issue of apportionment, the party claiming apportionment is required to establish its entitlement to the amount which has already been determined by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11. In the present case, the appellant-Trust has, till date, failed to establish on record, by producing any cogent evidence, that by virtue of the exemption certificate obtained under Section 129-B, it became the absolute owner of the land and that there remains no dispute in that regard. Rather, it is an admitted fact on record that, on the date of acquisition of the land, the respondents were in possession of the property. As such, they were interested persons in the land. The said issue was considered by the Land Acquisition Officer while determining the compensation amount under Section 11. Not only this, the Land Acquisition Officer has specifically recorded that the respondents were found to be in cultivating possession of the land in dispute. Therefore, in my opinion, the appellant-Trust, only on the basis of possession of the certificate, cannot claim the entire compensation under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

24. The plain reading of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the rights and obligation of the parties in the matter of apportionment has to be decided in the context of circumstances existing at the date when the notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act was issued and possession was taken under Section 16. Hence, considering the scope of Section 30 of Land Acquisition Act, the Civil Court by determining the fact of possession and interest of person over the land has to done apportionment of amount.

25. The reliance placed by the appellant under Section 125 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, in my opinion, is also misconceived. The said provision can be invoked if any suit is instituted in the Civil Court and involves any issue which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority under the provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act; then only the matter is required to be referred back to that authority. After the decision of such authority, the said issue is required to be referred back to the Civil Court, and the Civil Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. In the present case, no suit has been instituted by any of the parties in the Civil Court stating that any issue is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority under the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Therefore, Section 125 of the Act would not come into play in the present matter.

26. It is further pertinent to note that, in the present case, it is the submission of the appellant-Trust that since the year 1966, it has been in possession of the exemption certificate. However, till the date of initiation of the land acquisition proceedings, which were initiated in the year 2008, no action was taken by the appellant-Trust to recover possession from the respondents in the matter. Not only this, even till the filing of the reference proceedings, no steps were seen to be initiated by the appellant-Trust to state that the possession of the respondents over the said property is illegal or declared illegal by any competent Court of law or by any authority.

27. In the absence of any order of any competent authority or competent Court of law, in my opinion, the Land Acquisition Officer, while exercising powers under Section 11 for determining the compensation, has rightly recorded that the respondents were found to be in possession of the agricultural land. Though they are not the owners, being interested persons under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, they are entitled to compensation. Consequently, respondents are entitled for compensation under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

28. In the light of the above-said facts and the findings recorded by the Reference Court in the matter, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the judgment passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Darwha while deciding the reference in the matter. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merits, stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

29. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant submits that, during the pendency of the present appeal, interim relief was operating in the matter and prays that the same be continued for a period of four weeks to approach before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

30. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposes the said prayer.

31. Considering the fact that interim relief was operating in the matter during the pendency of the present appeal, the same shall reamin continued for a period of four weeks. After a period of four weeks, same will stand vacated automatically.