(Prayer: Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to set aside the judgment and decree dated 26.08.2019 made in O.S.No.8 of 2016 on the file of II Additional District Judge, Chidambaram by allowing the appeal.)

1. This appeal is filed by the sixth defendant, challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 26.08.2019 in O.S.No.8 of 2016, on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Chidambaram, under which the trial court granted a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of a one-half share in the suit properties and a permanent injunction against the sixth defendant.

2. The appellant is the 6th defendant, and the 1st respondent is the plaintiff; respondents 2 to 6 are defendants 1 to 5; respondents 7 and 8 are defendants 7 and 8. For convenience, the parties are referred to by their rank in the suit.

3. Plaintiff’s case: The plaintiff pleaded that he and defendants 1 to 3 are brothers, that defendants 4 and 5 are their sisters, that they constituted a Hindu joint family, and that, while other family properties had been divided, the two suit items were kept undivided for the convenience of the plaintiff and the third defendant.

4. According to the plaintiff, both suit items were purchased under a registered sale deed dated 01.07.1985, in the name of the third defendant, from their maternal uncle. However, the consideration was drawn from joint family funds. The plaintiff therefore claimed that the properties were treated and enjoyed as joint family properties and that he and the third defendant were each entitled to one-half share.

5. The plaint described Item No.1 as 17 cents out of 2.28 acres in S.No.129/1, situated to the north of Item No.2. It alleged that Item No.1 contained a tamarind tree, neem trees, a coconut tree and bushes; that the plaintiff and the third defendant parked their lorries there; and that the septic tank serving the houses stood there. Item No.2 was described as 21 cents out of 38 cents in S.No.129/8, with two houses. The plaintiff pleaded that he resided in the western house, while the third defendant resided in the eastern house. He further pleaded that both paid house tax separately and had separate electricity service connections. However, neither the plaintiff nor the third defendant had taken steps to have the patta transferred to their respective names. The plaintiff further pleaded that defendants 1 and 2 had already been allotted shares in the adjacent property, while defendants 4 and 5 were residing with their respective husbands. According to the plaintiff, defendants 1, 2, 4, and 5 had no share or interest in the suit properties.

6. According to the plaintiff, the immediate cause of action for the suit arose on 15.01.2016, when the sixth defendant, a company proposing to establish a textile manufacturing unit, allegedly attempted to bring ready-made slabs and to erect a compound wall in Item No.1 of the suit property. The plaintiff asserted that the sixth defendant had no right, title, or interest in either of the suit schedule properties. He therefore sought partition, stating that the third defendant was away from the station and that an actual division of the properties had become necessary.

7. Therefore, he sought prayer for a preliminary decree declaring the plaintiff's one-half share in the suit properties; division by metes and bounds by an Advocate Commissioner and allotment of one such half share; possession, if necessary; a permanent injunction restraining the sixth defendant and persons claiming under it from interfering with the plaintiff's possession; and costs and consequential reliefs.

8. Defendant’s case: The sixth defendant denied the joint-family character, possession, and the physical features pleaded in Item No. 1. According to the sixth defendant, the suit properties and other properties originally belonged to different persons and had already been divided among the members of the plaintiff and defendant’s family, with separate pattas standing in their respective names. It was pleaded that R.S.No. 129/1 had been subdivided among the family members and relatives. R.S.No. 129/1A was stated to have been allotted to Dayalan, son of Pethusamy Naidu, the maternal uncle of the plaintiff and Defendants 1 to 5; R.S.No. 129/1B to the wife of the 2nd defendant; and R.S.No. 129/1C to the husband of the 4th defendant (Pethusamy Naidu’s brother). Revenue records were also stated to have stood in the names of the respective persons.

9. It was pleaded that Item No.1 stood in the name of Pethusamy Naidu and thereafter in the name of his son, Dayalan, and that the alleged sale deed dated 01.07.1985 conferred no right upon the 3rd defendant. Item No.1 was stated to have remained in the possession and cultivation of Pethusamy Naidu and Dayalan, while Item No.2 alone was in the enjoyment of the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant, where houses had been constructed.

10. The sixth defendant further pleaded that Item No.1 had been acquired by the Government for industrial purposes following due acquisition proceedings. The plaintiff, the 3rd defendant and other claimants were aware of the proceedings, did not object to the acquisition and received compensation. After the acquisition, possession was taken over and the patta was transferred in favour of the relevant industrial development authority. Item No.2, however, was not acquired.

11. It was further pleaded that the sixth defendant obtained Item No. 1 and other lands on lease from SIPCOT under a registered lease deed dated 13.09.2006 and was put in possession. Since then, it claimed to be in actual possession and enjoyment of Item No. 1. It denied any unlawful attempt to encroach upon the property. It stated that the construction of the compound wall was undertaken only on the property it held under the lease. It also pleaded that the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant were not in possession of Item No. 1 and were therefore not entitled to an injunction. The sixth defendant further raised the plea of non-joinder of the Government and SIPCOT as necessary parties and sought dismissal of the suit with costs.

12. In the additional written statement, it specifically pleaded that the sale deed dated 01.07.1985 relied upon by the plaintiff was a sham and nominal document, and that the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant had never been in possession of Item No.1. It also contended that, in view of the acquisition and the title claimed by the Government, the plaintiff ought to have sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession, and that the suit for partition, as framed, was not maintainable and was barred by limitation. On these grounds, the sixth defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs.

13. During the pendency of the suit, the District Collector and SIPCOT were impleaded as defendants 7 and 8. The eighth defendant filed a written statement, which the seventh defendant adopted. Their principal defence was that Item No. 1 had already been subjected to statutory land acquisition proceedings and, therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to examine the validity or legality of those proceedings. It was pleaded that the lands in Periyapattu Village, Block No. 14, comprised in Survey Nos. 119, 129, 130 and 131, measuring about 10.67.0 hectares, were acquired for an industrial public purpose. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was duly published, followed by the statutory declaration and other proceedings contemplated under the Act. After notice to the landowners and an enquiry, Award No. 5/2002 dated 19.02.2002 was passed.

14. They contended that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a complete code and that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to examine the validity of the notification, declaration or consequential acquisition proceedings was excluded. According to them, the concluded acquisition proceedings could not be indirectly challenged in the present suit for partition and permanent injunction. It was further pleaded that notices had been issued to the concerned landowners, that the plaintiff and other claimants had knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and had not raised any objection, and that compensation had been determined and paid to the persons found entitled under the award.

15. It further contended that the document dated 01.07.1985 relied upon by the plaintiff did not reflect the facts and was sham and nominal. According to it, Pethusamy had never handed over possession of Item No. 1, and after his death, his son Dayalan continued in possession until the acquisition. On that basis, it also raised a plea that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Dayalan as a necessary party.

16. It was also pleaded that Item No. 2, being a house site, had not been acquired and remained outside the acquisition proceedings. As to Item No. 1, it was pleaded that after acquisition, the land, along with other properties, was handed over to the 6th defendant under a registered lease deed dated 13.09.2006, and that the 6th defendant had thereafter been in possession and enjoyment of the land. It further contended that the State had acquired title to the property by adverse possession for more than twelve years.

17. Thus, they contended that, in view of the completed acquisition proceedings and the possession claimed by the State and its lessee, the suit was not maintainable without seeking the reliefs of a declaration of title and recovery of possession. On these grounds, they sought dismissal of the suit with costs.

18. The plaintiff filed a reply statement pleading that an oral partition among the family had been reduced to writing on 12.03.2000; however, it is not registered, and that the suit survey fields were shown in the schedules allotted to the plaintiff and the third defendant. He maintained a claim to one-half share in both suit items.

19. The trial court framed the following issues :

                     1. Whether the suit properties are the Hindu undivided joint family properties?

                     2. Whether the sale deed dated 01.07.1985 is acted upon?

                     3. Whether the Suit 1st item was entitled by Pethusamy and his son Dayalan as stated in the written statement?

                     4. Whether the suit properties and other properties were acquired by the Government in 2002 and the Pethusamy Naidu, Plaintiff, 1st Defendant and others received compensation from the Government?

                     5. Whether the 6th defendant is in possession and enjoyment of Suit 1st item from 13.09.2006 as Lessee from the Government?

                     6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/2 share in the suit properties?

                     7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for Preliminary decree for partition as prayed for?

                     8. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties?

                     9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction?

                     10. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary party?

                     11. To what relief?

It is also noted that on 14.6.2018 and 9.11.2028, the trial court framed the following additional issues; however, these have not been reflected in the impugned judgment:

                     1. Whether this Court has Jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the bar contained in the Land Acquisition Act?

                     2. Whether the relief claimed is barred by limitation?

                     3. Whether the suit for bare injunction without seeking the relief of declaration is maintainable?

                     4. Whether the suit survey number property was allotted the plaintiff and 3rd defendant in the oral partition between the plaintiff and defendant no.1 to 5 ?

20 . The plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and P.Ws.2 to 7, and marked Exs. A1 to A5. Ex.A1 is the registered sale deed dated 01.07.1985; Ex.A2 is the Encumbrance Certificate dated 18.11.2015; Ex.A3 is the house-tax receipt dated 31.03.2015; and Exs. A4 and A5 are the house-tax and water-tax receipts. The defendants examined Dhanasing as D.W.1, the Deputy Tahsildar as D.W.2, and Sadagopan S/o Pethusamy as D.W.3, and marked Exs. B1 to B23. Ex.B1 is the statement of Sankar dated 20.07.1998; Exs. B2 to B9 relate to the land acquisition proceedings, including the proceedings of the Special Tahsildar, Award No.5/2002 dated 19.02.2002 (Ex. B2), compensation records, and Gazette publications; Ex.B10 is the registered lease deed dated 13.09.2006; Exs. B11 to B18 consist of Gazette and newspaper publications, notices, and other records relating to the acquisition proceedings; Ex.B19 contains the particulars of the lands handed over to TACID Division dated 02.04.2002; Ex.B20 is the ARegister extract; Ex.B21 is the advertisement; and Exs. B22 and B23 are the statements of Pethusamy Naidu and the 3rd defendant, respectively. Apart from the documents marked on either side, Exs. C1 to C5 were marked as Court exhibits. Ex.C1 is the Advocate Commissioner’s report dated 25.04.2016; Ex.C2 is the Advocate Commissioner’s sketch; Ex.C3 is the A-Register extract; Ex.C4 is the subdivision sketch; and Ex.C5 is the patta.

21. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court accepted the plaintiff’s case that the suit properties were joint family properties as between the plaintiff and the family defendants, and held that the registered sale deed dated 01.07.1985 had been acted upon. It rejected the defence that Item No.1 continued to remain in the possession and enjoyment of Pethusamy Naidu and, thereafter, Dayalan (DW3). The trial Court further held that the defendants had not satisfactorily established that the Government had acquired the specific Suit Item No.1, or that the plaintiff or the third defendant had received compensation in respect of that item. It also held that the sixth defendant had failed to establish its possession and enjoyment of Suit Item No.1 from 13.09.2006 as a lessee. The plaintiff was found to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and was held entitled to a one-half share therein. The plea of non-joinder was also held not to defeat the suit after the acquiring authorities were brought on record. Consequently, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree for partition, declaring the plaintiff’s one-half share, and granted a permanent injunction against the sixth defendant, with costs as set out in the decree.

22. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree, the 6th defendant preferred the appeal. In the memorandum of appeal, the 6th defendant contends that the trial Court failed to read the acquisition records, survey materials and Commissioner documents cumulatively, and thereby wrongly granted a preliminary decree and injunction in respect of Suit Item No.1. The 6th defendant relies upon Ex.B5, Ex.B11, Ex.B19 and Ex.C4, and contends that old S.No.129/1 was subdivided into R.S.Nos.129/1A to 129/1F; that the disputed 17 cents fall within R.S.No.129/1D; and that the relevant land had been acquired and handed over long before the institution of the suit. He further relies upon P.W.1's admitted participation in the acquisition proceedings and upon the evidence of D.W.3, as recorded by the trial Court, that Pethusamy Naidu received compensation in the acquisition proceedings and handed over the amount to the plaintiff and 3rd defendant; therefore, he disputes the plaintiff's plea that the acquisition was wholly without his knowledge.

23. The 6th defendant relies on Exs. C1 and C2 to contend that the houses and the principal residential features relied upon by the plaintiff pertain to Item No. 2 and that Item No. 1 was vacant. Ex. B19 is relied upon for the handover of the acquired land, while Ex. B10 is relied upon as the subsequent lease deed in favour of the 6th defendant. It was further objected that a civil court deciding a partition suit could not ignore a completed statutory acquisition and treat the acquired land as continuing family property merely because the plaintiff pleaded want of personal notice.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant/6th defendant contended that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff had styled the suit as one for partition, without expressly challenging the land acquisition proceedings. It was submitted that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a special and self-contained enactment. Once the acquisition culminates in an award and vesting of the land in the Government, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 CPC stands impliedly barred. According to the appellant, a partition suit cannot be used as a collateral means to question a completed acquisition. Reliance was placed on State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 229, para 3, and Commissioner, BDA v. Brijesh Reddy, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 66, para 19.

25. It was further argued that, under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, once the award was passed and possession was taken, Suit Item No.1 vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Consequently, any pre-existing joint family character was extinguished, and no property was available for partition in 2016. The appellant also relied on the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act in respect of the official acquisition records and the Gazette notifications, including Exs. B8 and B9, and contended that such proceedings could not be disregarded merely on the allegation of non-service of personal notice.

26. On the question of possession, learned counsel submitted that the trial Court erred in relying on traces of lorry movement observed by the Advocate Commissioner to hold that the plaintiff was in possession of Item No.1. According to the appellant, Ex.B6, the Form-E possession record, established the taking over of possession pursuant to the acquisition proceedings. Reliance was placed on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129, to contend that formal taking of possession is sufficient for vesting and that continued occupation by the erstwhile owner would not confer a right to an injunction against the true owner or its lessee.

27. The appellant also invoked the principles of estoppel, acquiescence, delay and laches, contending that the plaintiff had knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and had received compensation in respect of portions covered by the same acquisition, as reflected in Ex.B7. The acquisition was completed in 2002, whereas the suit was instituted only in 2016. Reference was also made to Section 63 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, to contend that the Civil Court's jurisdiction in matters relating to land acquisition is barred. On these grounds, it was submitted that the trial Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction and that, Item No.1 having vested in the Government and thereafter been leased to the appellant under the registered lease deed dated 13.09.2006, the judgment and decree granting partition and permanent injunction were liable to be set aside.

28. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the trial court's judgment and contended that the suit properties were purchased under Ex.A1, a registered sale deed dated 01.07.1985, from joint family funds. However, the document was in the third defendant’s name. It was submitted that the plaintiff and the third defendant continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the properties, and that Item No.1 was used for parking their lorries. According to the respondents, the sixth defendant/appellant attempted to interfere with such possession in January 2016, necessitating the suit for partition and injunction.

29. On the question of jurisdiction, learned counsel contended that the suit was essentially one for partition of joint family properties and did not seek to set aside or invalidate any land acquisition proceedings. The plea of acquisition was raised only by the sixth defendant/appellant as a defence to contend that Item No.1 was unavailable for partition. Therefore, according to the respondents, the trial Court was entitled to examine whether the alleged acquisition covered Item No.1, and such an examination of a defence could not be equated with a direct challenge to the land acquisition proceedings that would attract the bar of Civil Court jurisdiction.

30. It was further submitted that neither the plaintiff, who claimed an interest in the property, nor the third defendant, in whose name Ex.A1 stood, was served with any notice of acquisition. The revenue records remained in the name of their predecessor, Pethusamy Naidu, and the acquisition notices and compensation were allegedly issued to him. The respondents contended that payment of compensation to Pethusamy Naidu, based on un-updated revenue records, could not bind the third defendant, who claimed title under Ex.A1. In this regard, reliance was placed on Bhama Ramamoorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1977 Mad 272, wherein this Court held that failure to follow the statutory procedure and omission to notify the lawful owner could vitiate the acquisition proceedings.

31. As regards possession, learned counsel relied on the Advocate Commissioner’s report and sketch, which, according to the respondents, disclosed traces of lorries parked at Item No.1 and showed that the compound wall erected by the sixth defendant/appellant stopped outside the said property. It was therefore contended that actual possession of Item No.1 continued with the plaintiff and the third defendant, and that the sixth defendant/appellant had not established the taking over of physical possession.

32. The respondents alternatively contended that, even assuming acquisition proceedings had been initiated, they had lapsed under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, because, according to them, compensation had neither been paid to the plaintiff nor to the third defendant, nor had physical possession been taken from either of them. For this proposition, reliance was placed on Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183. On these grounds, learned counsel submitted that Item No.1 remained available for partition, that the trial Court's decree warranted no interference, and consequently prayed for dismissal of the appeal filed by the sixth defendant.

Discussion:

33. It is evident that the Trial Court answered the issues framed on 22.10.2016, namely, Issues Nos. 1 to 11. However, it failed to answer the following additional issues framed on 14.06.2018 and 09.11.2018:

                     2. Whether the relief claimed is barred by limitation?

                     3. Whether the suit for bare injunction, without seeking the relief of declaration, is maintainable?

                     4. Whether the suit survey number property was allotted to the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant in the oral partition between the plaintiff and Defendant Nos.1 to 5?

34. Thus, the Trial Court committed an error by failing to address all the issues, as mandated under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

35. Now, the following points are considered for the disposal of this appeal:

                     1. Whether a suit for partition is maintainable against a non-sharer when he independently claims title?

                     2. Whether suit property Item No.1 was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

                     3. Whether non-answering of the additional issues affects the findings of the Trial Court?

                     4. Whether, on account of non-answering of the additional issues, the matter has to be remanded back to the Trial Court?

                     5. Whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are liable to be set aside?

Point No.1:

36. The suit has been filed as a partition suit among the family members, and the court fee has been paid under Section 37(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees Act, as if the plaintiff were in constructive possession. In the suit, all the alleged sharers, namely, the 1st to 5th defendants, were set ex parte before the Trial Court. The real contestants are the 7th and 8th defendants. The 6th defendant is only a lessee who seeks to protect his possession under the 8th defendant.

37. The plaintiff stated that the property belongs to him and the 3rd defendant and that it was allotted to them under an oral partition. However, the 8th defendant states that the property was acquired by the Government of Tamil Nadu under the Land Acquisition Act through proceedings in Na.Ka.No.21/1999, dated 28.03.2002 (Ex.B.19), and leased to the 6th defendant on 13.09.2006 (Ex.B10). The 8th defendant claims title to the property.

38. When the title is seriously disputed, proceeding with the suit as a partition suit is clearly incorrect. The fact that the 1st to 5th defendants conveniently remained ex parte shows that the family members joined together and filed the suit under the guise of partition, rather than filing a declaratory suit. This issue ought to have been properly addressed by the Trial Court in considering Additional Issue No. 3.

39. It is a well-established proposition of law that when title is seriously disputed, a mere suit for an injunction is not sustainable, in view of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., reported in 2008 (4) SCC 594. In the present case, the Trial Court misdirected itself by ordering partition instead of deciding the question of title between the plaintiff's family members, the 1st to 5th defendants, and the 7th and 8th defendants. Such a finding is not sustainable.

40. In the circumstances, it is held that the suit for partition, including the claim against the contesting 7th and 8th defendants, is not valid. Hence, a suit for partition is not maintainable against a non-sharer who independently claims title. Thus, this point is answered accordingly.

Point No.2:

41. In view of the answer arrived at on the above point, it is unnecessary to go into the question in depth as to whether the suit land was acquired, since both sides have addressed this point at length. This Court is inclined to answer the same to give quietus to the matter.

42. The plaintiff contends that the suit item was joint family property purchased in the name of the 3rd defendant, one of the coparceners, and relies on Ex.A1. The plaintiff's case rests mainly on Ex. A1, dated 01.07.1985. After considering Ex.A1, the Trial Court concluded that the property set out therein was not acquired.

43. It is not in dispute that the 3rd defendant purchased property comprised in S.No.129/1, without mentioning the subdivision, to an extent of about 17 cents. It is not in dispute, and it is well established from the Government Gazette Notification dated 25.11.1999, marked as Ex.B9, and from the evidence of D.W.1, that the total extent of land comprised in S.No.129/1, measuring 2.28 acres, was acquired. On the defendants' side, it is stated that, out of the total extent comprised in S.No.129/1, the land covered under Ex.A1 falls within S.No.129/1D to an extent of 17 cents. As observed by the Trial Court, no specific correlation certificate was produced to show that the property covered under Ex. A1 is S.No.129/1D.

44. If only part of the land covered under S.No.129/1 had been acquired, this aspect would have assumed significance. However, in the present case, the entire extent under S.No.129/1 was acquired. From the above, it is clear that the entire extent covered under S.No.129/1 was acquired. It is also clearly established that the land purchased under Ex. A1 was covered by the acquisition proceedings.

45. From the evidence and records, it appears that although the 3rd defendant purchased the property in 1985, over which the plaintiff claims a joint family interest, the acquisition proceedings commenced around 1999.

46. According to the revenue records, the property stood in the name of Pethusamy Naidu, the maternal uncle and vendor of the 3rd defendant. It is obvious that when only a portion of the land covered by a survey number is conveyed, that portion should be delineated or conveyed by providing boundaries. Only when the entire extent of land covered by a survey number is conveyed would there be no necessity to provide boundaries. Admittedly, under Ex.A1, only a small portion of the land covered by the unsubdivided S.No.129/1 was conveyed. In the absence of boundaries, the revenue authorities failed to effect the mutation in the revenue records.

47. Further, from Ex.B1, the statement of the plaintiff dated 20.07.1998, it is seen that acquisition proceedings were undertaken in nearby places known to the plaintiff. Of course, Ex.B1 is not related to the suit property. However, as a prudent person, the plaintiff ought to have enquired about the acquisition proceedings initiated in S.No.129/1 as well.

48. The conduct of the plaintiff is also evident from the records and from the evidence of D.W.3, his cousin. The suit has been filed as one for partition with the intention of obtaining the acquired land. From the Government Gazette and the award copy, it is clear that the acquisition in S.No.129/1 also includes the land covered by Ex.A1. The finding of the Trial Court, as recorded, is erroneous. Accordingly, this point is answered.

Point Nos.3 and 4:

49. When the Trial Court fails to answer the issues framed, or fails to frame necessary issues and answer them, the Appellate Court would normally be inclined to remand the matter to afford the parties concerned an opportunity to put forward their respective cases. However, in the present case, both parties were fully aware of their respective cases and had already put them before the Court.

50. Nevertheless, the Trial Court misdirected itself by failing to address the issue of the suit's maintainability for partition. Under the guise of a partition suit, the matter proceeded, whereas the suit ought to have been for a declaration of title, given the dispute between the parties.

51. The 6th defendant has no independent right and holds the property only as a lessee. The 7th and 8th defendants claim the actual title. If the plaintiff intended to institute a suit against the State, the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure ought to have been followed.

52. Furthermore, merely because the compensation was not disbursed to the person in whose name the sale deed is registered, the acquisition proceedings would not be invalid. At most, the remedy available would be to seek recovery of the amount from the person to whom the compensation was paid.

53. In this case, based on the evidence of D.W.3, it appears that the acquisition authority paid the amount to the original owner, who in turn paid the same amount to the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant. At most, the plaintiff could dispute the payment and file a suit to recover the amount from that person, subject to limitation.

54. The contention regarding possession by the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant cannot be accepted. It is also relevant to note that possession cannot be determined merely on the basis of the Advocate Commissioner’s report. In respect of vacant land, possession ordinarily follows title. Therefore, the plaintiff has to establish his possession by acceptable evidence independently, and it cannot be inferred solely from the Advocate Commissioner’s report. When the title itself is seriously disputed, the Commissioner’s report cannot be made the basis for deciding possession in favour of the plaintiff.

55. Considering all these aspects, this Court concludes that the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands. Under the guise of a family partition, the plaintiff has attempted to pursue a vexatious suit by adding his family members and including an undisputed property as one of the items. Hence, to give final quietus to this appeal, this Court declines to remand the matter. These points are accordingly answered.

Point no. 5

56. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs, and the Judgment and Decree dated 26.08.2019, passed in O.S.No.8 of 2016 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Chidambaram, are set aside. Consequently, the suit stands dismissed. The connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand closed.