Parties : R. Balachandran Versus State Of Kerala, Represented By The Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Kerala, Ernakulam & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Revision Petitioner: Sharan Shahier, Rhea Sherry, P.M. Umamaheswary, Angelina Joy, Shwetha Maria Solomon, Shalvin Chamathakal Robin, Advocates. For the Respondents: Sreelal N.Warrier, Special Public Prosecutor.
Date of Judgment : 17-08-2026
Head Note :-
Indian Penal Code - Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) -
1. Criminal Revision Petition No. 741/2026 has been filed challenging the order dated 30.05.2026 in Crl.M.P.No. 204/2016 in C.C. No. 25/2014 on the files of the Special Court/CBI-III, Ernakulam, at the instance of Sri. R. Balachandran, the second accused in the said case.
2. The same, Sri. R. Balachandran, is the revision petitioner in Crl.Rev.P.No. 737/2026 wherein he impugns the order dated 30.05.2026 in Crl.M.P. No. 990/2025 in C.C. No. 8/2014, where he is arrayed as the first accused.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the CBI and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Kerala.
4. In Crl. R.P. No. 737/2026, arising out of C.C.No. 8/2014 (Crime No. RC 24(A)2008/CBI/KER of the CBI, Kochi Unit), the prosecution case is that, the first accused/revision petitioner herein, Sri. R. Balachandran, Sr. Section Engineer (Electrical/Drawing), and in-charge of Drawing Section of the Electrical Department, the 3rd accused, Sri. Shishir Tyagi, Senior Divisional Electrical Engineer, the 5th accused, Sri. M.K. Sasidharan, Assistant Divisional Electrical Engineer and the 6th accused, Sri. V. Muralidharan Nair, Head Clerk (tender clerk), who were the public servants of Southern Railways, Palakkad Division, along with the 4th accused, Sri Sanjay Mysheri, Marketing Consultant of Asian Electronics Ltd. and the 2nd accused, Sri. K. S. Suresh, Proprietor of M/s. Sankos Electricals, Municipal Bus Stand, Chalakudy, Thrissur hatched criminal conspiracy among themselves during 2007-2008 to cheat the Southern Railways, Palakkad Division in the matter of Electrical contract works and obtain pecuniary advantage to themselves and in furtherance of the said criminal conspiracy, the aforesaid officials of Southern Railway Palakkad Division, by abusing their official position as public servants, dishonestly and fraudulently prepared the estimates and tender schedules with non approved light fittings, issued tender notice, awarded the tender with inflated scheduled rates and got executed the work with the 'Asian make' light fittings, which are not approved by the Southern Railways. On the basis of the aforesaid tender, payments were made in favour of the second accused and above mentioned public servants obtained illegal gratification from the 2nd accused for the said official favour and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Southern Railways, Palakkad Division and obtained corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. Thereby, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (the 'IPC' for short) and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the 'P.C. Act', for short) by the accused persons.
5. In Crl.R.P.No.741/2026, pertains to C.C.No. 25/2014 (Crime No. RC 24(A)2008/CBI/KER of the CBI, Kochi Unit), the prosecution case is that, the first accused, Sri. Shishir Tyagi, Senior Divisional Electrical Engineer, Southern Railways, Palakkad Division, Palakkad, the 2nd accused/revision petitioner herein, Sri. R. Balachandran, Sr. Section Engineer (Electrical/Drawing), and in-charge of Drawing Section of the Electrical Department and the 4th accused, V. Muralidharan Nair, Head clerk (tender clerk), who were the public servants of Southern Railways, Palakkad Division, along with the 3rd accused, Sri Sanjay Mysheri, Marketing Consultant of Asian Electronics Ltd. and the approver Sri. K. Hari, Proprietor of M/s. Sunmac Enterprises, Coimbatore hatched criminal conspiracy among themselves during October 2006 to August 2008 to cheat the Southern Railways, Palakkad Division in the matter of Electrical contract works and obtained pecuniary advantage to themselves and in furtherance of the said criminal conspiracy, the aforesaid officials of Southern Railway Palakkad Division, by abusing their official position as public servants, dishonestly and fraudulently prepared the estimates and tender schedules with non approved light fittings, issued tender notice, awarded the tender with inflated scheduled rates and got executed the work with the 'Asian make' light fittings, which are not approved by the Southern Railways. On the basis of the aforesaid tender, payments were made in favour of the aforesaid approver and above mentioned public servants obtained illegal gratification from the approver for the said official favour and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Southern Railways, Palakkad Division and obtained corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. Thereby, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 120B read with Section 420 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) and Sections 7 and 12 of the P.C. Act, by the accused persons.
6. While assailing the separate orders passed against the same revision petitioner, a legal question has been raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, based on the three Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal and Another [2011 KHC 4144], with reference to paragraph Nos. 16, 19, 21, 23 and 24, contending that exoneration of the revision petitioner in departmental proceedings, in a case, where the allegations in the departmental proceedings as well as in the criminal proceedings are identical, the criminal case on the same facts is liable to be quashed. Another three Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ashoo Surendranth Tewari v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and Another reported in [2020 KHC 6539] also relied on the said point. In fact in both these decisions, the Apex Court considered the earlier two Bench decision of the Apex Court in P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar reported in [1997 KHC 202 : (1996) 9 SCC 1] and discussed the same in paragraph No. 7 of the judgment in Ashoo Surendranth Tewari's case (supra) and held as under:-
“7. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1, the question before the Court was posed as follows:-
“3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.”
This Court then went on to state:
“17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.”
This being the case, the Court then held:
“23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”
In Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2011) 3 SCC 581, this Court held as follows:-
“26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (AIR p. 27) “… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.”
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29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.”
After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in paragraph 38 as follows:-
“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or S.300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” It finally concluded:
“39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.”
From our point of view, para 38(vii) is important and if the High Court had bothered to apply this parameter, then on a reading of the CVC report on the same facts, the appellant should have been exonerated.”
7. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, in both cases, the revision petitioner had been exonerated in the departmental proceedings and therefore, the prosecution case against him in the present cases would not lie.
8. Whereas, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI also relied on the above decisions as well as the decision reported in State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi [2012(9) SCC 865], contending that departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent and criminal trial must proceed on its own evidence. Apart from that, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has placed a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in Karnataka Lokayuktha Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar [2026 KHC Online 6021], wherein also the Apex court had occasion to consider the decision in State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi's case (supra)and also P.S. Rajya's case (supra). Discussing the judgment in paragraph Nos. 12, 13 and 14, the learned two Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court summarised the principles as under:-
“12. The reference too was answered in Ajay Kumar Tyagi, (2012) 9 SCC 685. A two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in P.S Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SC 1 was referred to wherein the criminal prosecution was quashed when the departmental proceedings concluded in exoneration. In P.S. Rajya (1996) 9 SCC 1 , the allegation was of possession of assets disproportionate to the source of income. The Central Vigilance Commission dealt with the charge and in its elaborate report concluded that the valuation report on which CBI placed reliance is of doubtful nature. The Court on facts found that the value given as a base for the chargesheet was not the value given in the reports subsequently given by the valuers. The decision in P.S. Rajya(1996) 9 SCC 1 relying on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; the water shed decision in invocation of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing criminal prosecution, held that the prosecution in that case should be quashed for more than one reason as laid down in Bhajan Lal. Ajay Kumar Tyagi 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 categorically held that the quashing of criminal proceedings in P.S. Rajya (1996) 9 SCC 1 was not merely on account of the exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings. Referring to a number of decisions, it was held so in paragraphs 24 & 25 which are extracted hereunder:
“24. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court quashed the prosecution on total misreading of the judgment in P.S. Rajya case (1996) 9 SCC 1. In fact, there are precedents, to which we have referred to above, that speak eloquently a contrary view i.e. exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a criminal case. On principle also, this view commends us. It is well settled that the standard of proof in a department proceeding is lower than that of criminal prosecution. It is equally well settled that the departmental proceeding or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness of the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only after the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal case cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence in the departmental proceeding or the report of the inquiry officer based on those evidence.
25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal prosecution. We hasten to add, however, that if the prosecution against an accused is solely based on a finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside by the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed. But that principle will not apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held by two different entities. Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”
13. We are of the opinion that in the present case the distinction as brought out in Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685 squarely applies and the ratio decidendi therein is not regulated by the ratio of the earlier judgment in Radheshyam Kejriwal (2011) 3 SCC 581.
In Radheshyam Kejriwal (2011) 3 SCC 581, the adjudication proceedings and the prosecution were both by the very same entity, the Enforcement Directorate under the FERA. In Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685, the allegation was of a demand and acceptance of bribe in which a trap was laid, and the prosecution was commenced and continued by the ACB while the departmental proceedings were by the Delhi Jal Board under which the delinquent employee worked. Identical is the fact in this case where the ACB laid the trap, commenced and continued the criminal proceedings, at the behest of the appellant, while the department carried on with the enquiry. The findings in the enquiry report also do not persuade us to quash the criminal proceedings as we would presently notice.
14. At the outset, we cannot but reiterate that the enquiry report in disciplinary proceedings is not conclusive of the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent employee, which finding is in the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority. The enquiry officer is appointed only as a convenient measure to bring on record the allegations against the delinquent employee and the proof thereof and to ensure an opportunity to the delinquent employee to contest and defend the same by cross-examination of the witnesses proffered by the department and even production of further evidence, in defense. The enquiry officer, strictly speaking, merely records the evidence and the finding entered on the basis of the evidence led at the enquiry does not have any bearing on the final decision of the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority takes the ultimate call as to whether to concur with the findings of the enquiry authority or to differ therefrom. On a decision being taken to differ from the findings in the enquiry report as to the guilt of the delinquent employee, if it is in favour of the delinquent employee nothing more needs to be done since the enquiry stands closed exonerating the employee of the charges levelled. If the decision is to concur with the finding of guilt by the Enquiry Officer, then a show-cause is issued with the copy of the Enquiry Report. However, while differing from the finding of exoneration in the enquiry report, necessarily the disciplinary authority will not only have to issue a show-cause against the delinquent employee, with a copy of the Enquiry Report, but the show- cause notice also has to specifically bring to attention of the delinquent, the aspects on which the disciplinary authority proposes to differ, based on the facts discovered in the enquiry so as to afford the delinquent employee an opportunity to proffer his defense to the same.”
9. Apart from the above decisions, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI also placed another decision reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba etc., [2026 INSC 568], rendered by another two Bench of the Apex Court.
10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the CBI stoutly opposed interference with the orders impugned, contending that in these cases, the allegations in the criminal case are on a different footing for which evidence and trial are necessary and mere exoneration of the revision petitioner in the departmental proceedings, by itself, would not be sufficient to discharge him from the criminal cases.
11. The learned Special Judge addressed the said contention and while dismissing the discharge petition in C.C. No. 8/2014, which is the subject matter in Crl.Rev.P No. 737/2026, observed in paragraph No. 18 of the order dated 30.05.2026 as under:-
“ 18. I have considered the submissions made by other side. It is relevant to mention that the prosecution has obtained sanction under section 19(1)(c) of PC Act to prosecute the accused Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 and the sanction orders has been produced as documents Nos.80 to 83 along with final report. Absolutely there is no objection raised by the accused against the said sanction orders. The fact that accused 1 and 3 were acquitted in the disciplinary proceedings is not at all a sufficient ground to discharge accused No.1 and 3. The statement of Cws. 16 to 19 show that there are entries in the account books of the establishment of the 2nd accused to show that illegal gratification has been paid to the accused Nos.3, 5 and 6 in the form of money and also in the form of gold coins. The writings of the 2nd accused and CWs.16 to 19 in the account books were compared by the expert with their specimen writing and detailed opinion has been given by the expert. The report is produced by the prosecution as document No.70 along with final report. Moreover, the account books of the 2nd accused, which are produced as document Nos.31, 32, 33, 34 and 35, also show that there are entries regarding payment of illegal gratification to accused Nos.3, 5 and 6. Moreover, as stated earlier, gold coins were seized from the house of the 3rd accused and the corresponding invoices issued by the Tanishq show room at Kochi was seized from the 2nd accused. The entries in the books of accounts are specific that the illegal gratification in money has been given to accused Nos.3, 5 and 6 and also that the gold coins of 200 grams were given to the 3rd accused. I am not inclined to discard these materials as unreliable at this stage. The bank account statement in respect of bank accounts were also seized during investigation and produced before the Court. The Manager of the Tanishq show room, Ernakulam was also cited as a prosecution witness to prove the sale of gold coin in favour of the 2nd accused. It is to be taken note that in cases of criminal conspiracy, the agreement between the conspirators cannot be generally be directly proved, but can only be inferred from the facts and circumstances proved in the cases on hand. So, the prosecution has to be given an opportunity to lead evidence in that regard. The available materials show that there was dishonest intention on part of all the accused to cheat the Railway and to cause unlawful loss to the Railway and wrongful gain for the accused. The payment and receipt of illegal gratification, as alleged is also prima facie established. Hence, from the available materials on record, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the prosecution case against all the accused, so as to frame a formal charge against them. I am also satisfied that the available materials before the court are sufficient to presume that all the accused have committed the offences alleged against them and absolutely there are no materials to hold that the charge against them is groundless. Therefore, I am of the view that separate charge is to be framed against all the accused. Resultantly, discharge applications filed by the accused Nos.1, 3, 5 and 6 as Crl. M.P Nos. 990/2015, 623/2015, 330/2017 and 528/2023 are liable to be dismissed. Points are answered accordingly.
12. Similarly, in Crl.Rev.P.No. 741/2026, in paragraph No. 16 of the order dated 30.05.2026, the learned Special Judge narrated his reasoning in disallowing the discharge petition and the same reads as under:-
“16. I have considered the submissions made by other side. It is relevant to mention that the prosecution has obtained sanction under section 19(1)(c) of PC Act to prosecute the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 and the sanction orders has been produced as documents Nos.51 to 53 along with final report. Absolutely there is no objection raised by the accused against the said sanction orders. The fact that accused 1 and 2 were acquitted in the disciplinary proceedings is not at all a sufficient ground to discharge accused Nos.1 and 2. The statement of the approver clinchingly establishes payment of illegal gratification of ₹.4,00,000/- to the first accused on 02/12/2007 and ₹.10,000/- to the accused No.4 through the bank account of his wife. I am not inclined to discard the statement of the approver at this stage. It is also relevant that the approver has given statement before the JFCM-I, Ernakulam and also before the CJM, Ernakulam in that regard. It is to be taken note that in cases of criminal conspiracy, the agreement between the conspirators cannot be generally be directly proved, but can only be inferred from the facts and circumstances proved in the cases on hand. So, the prosecution has to be given an opportunity to lead evidence in that regard. The available materials show that there was dishonest intention on part of all the accused to cheat the Railway and to cause unlawful loss to the Railway and wrongful gain for the accused. The payment and receipt of illegal gratification, as alleged is also prima facie established. Hence, from the available materials on record, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the prosecution case against all the accused, so as to frame a formal charge against them. I am also satisfied that the available materials before the Court are sufficient to presume that all the accused have committed the offences alleged against them and absolutely there are no materials to hold that the charge against them is groundless. Therefore, I am of the view that separate charge is to be framed against all the accused. Resultantly, discharge applications filed by the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 as Crl. M.P Nos. 622/2015, 204/2016 and 532/2023 are liable to be dismissed. Points are answered accordingly.”
13. The legal position emerges from the above discussion can be summarised as under:-
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or S.300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding.
(vii) Exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a criminal case.
(viii) The standard of proof in a department proceeding is lower than that of criminal prosecution.
(ix) The departmental proceeding or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced therein.
(x) Truthfulness of the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only after the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal case cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence in the departmental proceeding or the report of the inquiry officer based on those evidence.
(xi) The exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal prosecution. However, that if the prosecution against an accused is solely based on a finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside by the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed. But that principle will not apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held by two different entities. Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”
(xii) The enquiry report in disciplinary proceedings is not conclusive of the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent employee, which finding is in the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority.
Bearing the above legal principles in mind, on scrutinising the prosecution case in both cases and the reasons stated by the learned Special Judge to dismiss the discharge petitions in both cases, the reasons are only to be justified. Hence, on the facts in the instant revision petitions, merely on the ground of exemption given to the revision petitioner in the departmental proceedings, ipso facto, itself is not a reason to grant discharge. Therefore, the impugned orders need no interference by this Court by exercising the limited power of revision, as no absolute illegality or arbitrariness to be found therein.
In the result, both the revision petitions are dismissed. Consequently, the Special Judge is directed to proceed with the trial in both cases without much delay.
