(Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374, 380 & 401 of Cr.P.C., to call for the records and set aside the judgment dated 04.10.2023 made in Special Case No.1 of 2019 in the Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Trichy and allow the above Criminal Appeal.)
1. This appeal has been preferred as against the judgment dated 04.10.2023, passed in Special Case No.1 of 2019 on the file of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Trichy, thereby convicting the accused for the offences punishable under Section 109 of IPC r/w. Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act”).
2. The case of the prosecution is that the first accused was serving as the Minister for Animal Husbandry in the Government of Tamil Nadu during the period from 13.05.1996 to 14.05.2001 and, during the said period, he was a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, 1988.The second accused is the son of the first accused and was engaged in transport business and had only a meagre income. The third accused is the second son of the first accused and was engaged in agricultural activities in respect of land measuring about 2.5 acres. The fourth accused is the daughter of the first accused, while the fifth accused is her husband. During the relevant check period, the fourth accused was residing in the house of the first accused and had no independent source of income. The fifth accused was initially employed as a Constable in the CRPF, but subsequently resigned from the said service on 24.09.1996. The sixth accused is the daughter of the brother of the first accused. She married one Palanisamy and, according to the prosecution, had no independent source of income and was dependent upon the first accused.
3. It is the further case of the prosecution that the first accused, while functioning as Minister for Animal Husbandry, in conspiracy with his family members, amassed assets and pecuniary resources disproportionate to their known sources of income during the relevant check period. According to the prosecution, as on 13.05.1995, the first accused possessed assets valued at Rs.3,63,219.99/-, apart from a house property valued at approximately Rs.7.44 crores, together with household articles. As on 14.05.2001, the accused was allegedly in possession of several items of movable and immovable properties, including lands, buildings, bank deposits, vehicles, an STD booth and household articles, having a total value of Rs.1,01,30,971.79/-.Thus, according to the prosecution, during the relevant check period, the accused had amassed assets and pecuniary resources to the tune of Rs.97,67,751.80/-, which were alleged to be disproportionate to their known sources of income.
4. Further, according to the prosecution, during the relevant check period, the first accused had an income of Rs.49,81,901.55/- and had incurred expenditure to the tune of Rs.33,57,127.20/-. Thus, the savings available to the first accused during the check period were computed at Rs.16,24,774.35/-. The prosecution arrived at Rs.81,42,977.45/- as the value of the assets and pecuniary resources allegedly disproportionate to the known sources of income. Further, the first accused was afforded an opportunity to offer an explanation in respect of the alleged disproportionate assets. However, according to the prosecution, the first accused failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation for the assets allegedly acquired by him and his family members. Consequently, the accused were charged for the offences punishable under Section 109 of IPC r/w. Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1) (e) of the PC Act, 1988. After completion of the investigation, the respondent filed the final report, and the same was taken cognizance of by the Trial Court. During the pendency of the trial, the first and fifth accused died, and consequently, all the charges against them stood abated.
5. In order to establish the charges against the accused, the prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.101 and marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.254. The prosecution also produced M.O.1 to M.O.5 as material objects. On the side of the accused, no witness was examined and no documentary evidence was marked in support of their defence. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the Trial Court found Accused Nos.2 to 4 and 6 guilty of the offences punishable under Section 109 of the IPC r/w. Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988 and sentenced each of the accused to undergo three years of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₹2,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo two months of simple imprisonment. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, the Accused Nos.2 to 4 and 6 have preferred the present appeals.
6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the allegation against the accused is that they had abetted the first accused, who was a public servant, in committing the offence of criminal misconduct. It was contended that, under Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988, if the public servant, or any person on his behalf, was in possession, during the period of his office, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, for which he was unable to satisfactorily account, he said to have committed the offence of criminal misconduct. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the statutory presumption under Section 13(1)(e) would arise only after the prosecution first establishes the foundational fact that the public servant was in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Until such foundational fact is established, the burden cannot be shifted upon the accused to satisfactorily account for the alleged disproportionate assets. It was further contended that, in the present case, the first accused was not in a position to explain the allegations levelled against him, since he died even before he could be examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the first accused was deprived of an opportunity to offer his explanation with regard to the alleged disproportionate assets. Hence, the appellants who are alleged to have abetted the commission of the offence, cannot independently be held liable for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC read with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
6.1. He further submitted that, in order to constitute an offence of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, the prosecution is required to establish the existence of any one of the three modes of abetment contemplated therein, namely, instigation, intentional aiding, or engaging in a conspiracy accompanied by an act or illegal omission in pursuance thereof. According to the learned Senior Counsel, none of these essential ingredients has been established against the appellants in the present case so as to attract the penal consequences under Section 109 of the IPC.It was further submitted that all the accused had independent and identifiable sources of income and that the disproportionate-assets case was registered only in the year 2003. Even prior to the registration of the case, the accused had regularly filed their income-tax returns, which were duly accepted and assessed by the Income Tax Department. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the properties and assets alleged to be disproportionate were in fact acquired by the respective accused from their own independent sources of income, and the corresponding income had been duly disclosed to and assessed by the Income Tax Department. Hence, the mere acquisition of assets by the accused could not, by itself, establish either the offence of abetment or their involvement in the alleged disproportionate-assets offence.
6.2. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused produced a statement, along with the prosecution records, demonstrating that certain assets had been erroneously treated as disproportionate to the known sources of income of the accused, without properly taking into consideration all the legitimate and disclosed sources of income available to them. According to him, upon a proper computation of the income, expenditure, and assets of the accused, the alleged disproportionate assets would substantially stand reduced or would not exist at all. The said particulars are as follows:-
Insofar as the assets held by the accused at the beginning of the check period, as reflected in Statement-I, are concerned, the accused have not disputed the correctness of the said assets.
6.3. Insofar as Statement-II, relating to the assets held at the end of the check period, is concerned, the accused have disputed the inclusion and valuation of the following assets:-
Accordingly, upon reconsideration of the disputed assets, the difference in the value of the assets at the end of the check period is Rs.16,81,740/-.
6.4. Insofar as the income of the accused, as reflected in Statement-III, is concerned, the accused have disputed the following items and the valuation of the same were not properly taken into consideration by the prosecution:-
| Sl. No. | Assets | Valuation as per the prosecution | Valuation as per the accused |
| 1 | Agricultural income | 2,31,625 | 10,11,000 |
| 2 | Loan borrowed from India Cements for TATA Sumo jeep TN-45-Q-777 | 3,30,000 | 5,80,906 |
| 3 | Gift (Moi) for the marriage of the second accused | 82,279 | 20,56,978 |
| 4 | Income from contract work | 9,32,451 | 37,07,000 |
| 5 | Income from STD booth | 55,790 | 1,30,000 |
6.5. Insofar as the expenditure of the accused, as reflected in Statement-IV, is concerned, the accused have disputed the following items of expenditure:-
| Sl. No. | Expenditures | Valuation as per the prosecution | Valuation as per the accused |
| 1 | Family expenditure of the accused and his family | 3,92,242 | 3,53,943 |
| 2 | Repayment of loan to India Cements Capital for TN-45- Q-0777 | 85,144 | 35,160 |
| 3 | Interest for the loan of M/s. Adayar Finance for TN-45- M-5556 | 28,000 | 2,800 |
| 4 | Interest paid for loan to M/s.SREI International Fiance for PY-01-M-4034 | 2,63,021 | 2,48,021 |
| 5 | Interest paid for loan to SREI International Finance for L&T Komatsu PC 60 | 2,53,003 | 2,37,003 |
| 6 | Expenditure for the marriage of A2 | 4,84,968 | 1,40,000 |
| 7 | Gift to marriage of A2 by A5 & A6 | 10,000 | 0 |
| 8 | Fuel (POL) and maintenance expenditure for TN490037 | 41,482 | 0 |
| 9 | Bore Well 2 Nos.5 HP | 75,972 | 0 |
| 10 | Bore Well 2 Nos. with casing pipe 5 HP | 78,114 | 0 |
| 11 | Bore well with casing pipe 7.5 HP | 53,020 | 0 |
| 12 | Air compressor 10 HP | 41,124 | 0 |
7. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side and also perused the entire materials placed on record before this Court.
8. On perusal of the entire records, including the statements of accounts relied upon by the prosecution and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side, it is seen that P.W.1 conducted a house search at the residence of the first accused on 09.01.2003 in the presence of P.W.2. P.W.3 conducted a search at the residence of the fifth accused in the presence of P.W.9, while P.W.6 conducted a house search at the residence of the sixth accused in the presence of P.W.4. Further, P.W.10 deposed with regard to the sale of the lorry belonging to the accused, while P.W.11 deposed regarding the transfer of ownership of the said lorry in favour of the second accused and marked Ex.P22 in support of the same.
9. Further, P.W.12, the Village Administrative Officer, deposed regarding the house properties and buildings owned by the first accused and his family members. He also spoke about the marriage of the third accused and the lands owned by the first accused. He also produced the relevant document, which was marked as Ex.P23. Another Village Administrative Officer, examined as P.W.13, deposed regarding the agricultural income derived from the lands owned by the first accused, Accused Nos.3 to 6, and one Bharathidasan, who is the brother of the sixth accused. Since the said Bharathidasan was a minor during the relevant period, he was not arrayed as an accused in the case.
10. P.W.15, who was working as an Assistant in the RTO Office, Trichy, deposed regarding the vehicles owned by the accused. The sale of the vehicles belonging to the accused was established through the evidence of P.W.18 to P.W.22.The Income Tax Officer was examined as P.W.24, who produced and proved the income-tax returns filed by the accused, which were marked as Exs.P42 to P76. Though the accused had disclosed their income and the same had been assessed to income tax, they failed to substantiate the said income by producing any independent or supporting evidence. It is well settled that mere assessment of income to income tax, by itself, does not establish that the income was actually derived from a legitimate or known source of income. The accused are required to substantiate the nature and source of such income by acceptable evidence.
11. In this regard, it is relevant to rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2017) 6 SCC 628 in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. J.Satyanarayana, which held as follows :-
“7. Evidence was led by the respondent in support of the above pleas. The prosecution itself placed on record, Ext. P-17, an income tax return filed by the wife of the respondent for the previous year. It was produced from proper quarters and proved by ITO, PW 8. Income tax return, Ext. P-17, had been filed by the wife on 2-1- 1986, admittedly much before the date of raid and even before registration of the case. The evidence regarding loans which were claimed to have been received by the wife was led through DW 15 and DW 25 who stood the scrutiny of cross-examination well. Loans received by the wife from the lenders had found reflection in the accounts of those lenders with their accounts also, prepared much earlier to the date of raid. It was argued before the High Court that Ext. P-17, income tax return of the wife should not be relied upon and that it was an afterthought, brought into existence to save the respondent. The High Court rightly rejected it. We fail to understand how the income tax return, Ext. P-17, filed by the wife on 2-1- 1986 could be labelled as an afterthought when it had been filed much prior to even the registration of the case against the respondent by ACB. Not only was that return filed but the assessment had also been completed. The receipt of various loans which had been shown by the wife in the return, thus, stood accepted by the Income Tax Authorities. The evidence led by the prosecution itself by filing of income tax return of the wife coupled with the evidence of defence witnesses clearly goes to establish that the house in Anand Nagar Colony was an asset belonging to the wife of the respondent and not to the respondent himself. The High Court, therefore, rightly arrived at the conclusion that the said house could not be treated as an asset of the respondent by correct appreciation of evidence and proper application of law to the facts of the case. We are satisfied that the finding recorded by the High Court to the effect that the house in Anand Nagar Colony was an asset of the wife of the respondent and not of the respondent is correct and proper and suffers from no infirmity at all. Once we arrive at that finding, the conclusion becomes irresistible that an order of acquittal of the respondent recorded by the High Court is well merited. It suffers from no illegality, let alone perversity. We, consequently, do not find any reason to interfere with the well-merited order of acquittal. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India considered the evidentiary value of income-tax returns in the context of a prosecution relating to disproportionate assets. In the present case, though the accused had filed their income-tax returns even prior to the registration of the FIR, it appears that the said returns were relied upon by them to project the illgotten money as income derived from their own legitimate sources. Mere disclosure of income in the income-tax returns, particularly when such income is not supported by independent and credible evidence regarding its actual source, cannot by itself establish that the amount constituted a legitimate source of income for the purpose of determining disproportionate assets.
12. It is also to rely upon the judgment reported in (2024) 20 SCC 269 in the case of Puneet Sabharwal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, which held as follows :-
“29.This Court, in Selvi J. Jayalalitha (supra), was concerned with an appeal against an order of acquittal passed in a case of disproportionate assets under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The accused persons therein had sought to place reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders. In that context the Court had concluded that income tax returns and orders are not by themselves conclusive proof that they are lawful sources of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would be required. The Court held:
“188. In Anantharam Veerasinghaiah & Co. v. CIT, 1980 Supp SCC 13 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 274] , the return filed by the petitioner assessee, who was an Abkari contractor, was not accepted by the ITO as amongst others, excess expenditure over the disclosed available cash was noticeable and further several deposits had been made in the names of others. The assessee's explanation that the excess expenditure was met from the amounts deposited with him by other shopkeepers but were not entered in his book, was not accepted and penalty proceedings were taken out against him holding that the items of cash deficit and cash deposit represented concealed income resulting from suppressed yield and low selling rates mentioned in the books. The Appellate Tribunal, however, allowed the appeal of the assessee and set aside the penalty order. The High Court reversed [CIT v. Anantharam Veerasingaiah & Co., 1971 SCC OnLine AP 262 : (1975) 99 ITR 544] the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and the matter reached the Supreme Court.
189. It was held that as per Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, penalty can be imposed in case where any person has concealed the particulars of his income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The related proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and the burden lay on the Revenue to establish that the disputed amount represented income and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars. The burden of proof in penalty proceedings varied from that involved in assessment proceedings and a finding in assessment proceedings that a particular receipt was income cannot automatically be adopted as a finding to that effect in the penalty proceedings. In the penalty proceedings, the taxing authority was bound to consider the matter afresh on the materials before it, to ascertain that whether a particular amount is a revenue receipt. It was observed that no doubt the fact that the assessment year contains a finding that the disputed amount represents income constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceedings, but the finding in the assessment proceedings cannot be regarded as conclusive for the purpose of penalty proceedings. Before a penalty can be imposed, the entirety of the circumstances must be taken into account and must lead to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars.
190. The decision is to convey that though the IT returns and the orders passed in the IT proceedings in the instant case recorded the income of the accused concerned as disclosed in their returns, in view of the charge levelled against them, such returns and the orders in the IT proceedings would not by themselves establish that such income had been from lawful source as contemplated in the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988 and that independent evidence would be required to account for the same.
191. Though considerable exchanges had been made in course of the arguments, centring around Section 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, we are of the comprehension that those need not be expatiated in details. Suffice it to state that even assuming that the income tax returns, the proceedings in connection therewith and the decisions rendered therein are relevant and admissible in evidence as well, nothing as such, turns thereon definitively as those do not furnish any guarantee or authentication of the lawfulness of the source(s) of income, the pith of the charge levelled against the respondents. It is the plea of the defence that the income tax returns and orders, while proved by the accused persons had not been objected to by the prosecution and further it (prosecution) as well had called in evidence the income tax returns/orders and thus, it cannot object to the admissibility of the records produced by the defence. To reiterate, even if such returns and orders are admissible, the probative value would depend on the nature of the information furnished, the findings recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the charge levelled. In any view of the matter, however, such returns and orders would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on record. Noticeably, none of the respondents has been examined on oath in the case in hand. Further, the income tax returns relied upon by the defence as well as the orders passed in the proceedings pertaining thereto have been filed/passed after the chargesheet had been submitted. Significantly, there is a charge of conspiracy and abetment against the accused persons. In the overall perspective therefore neither the income tax returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings relatable thereto, either definitively attest the lawfulness of the sources of income of the accused persons or are of any avail to them to satisfactorily account the disproportionateness of their pecuniary resources and properties as mandated by Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
199. The import of this decision is that in the tax regime, the legality or illegality of the transactions generating profit or loss is inconsequential qua the issue whether the income is from a lawful source or not. The scrutiny in an assessment proceeding is directed only to quantify the taxable income and the orders passed therein do not certify or authenticate that the source(s) thereof to be lawful and are thus of no significance vis-à-vis a charge under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
200. In Vishwanath Chaturvedi (3) v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 380 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 302], a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking an appropriate writ for directing the Union of India to take appropriate action to prosecute R-2 to R-5 under the 1988 Act for having amassed assets disproportionate to the known sources of income by misusing their power and authority. The respondents were the then sitting Chief Minister of U.P. and his relatives. Having noticed that the basic issue was with regard to alleged investments and sources of such investments, Respondents 2 to 5 were ordered by this Court to file copies of income tax and wealth tax returns of the relevant assessment years which was done. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the net assets of the family though were Rs 9,22,72,000, as per the calculation made by the official valuer, the then value of the net assets came to be Rs 24 crores. It was pleaded on behalf of the respondents that income tax returns had already been filed and the matters were pending before the authorities concerned and all the payments were made by cheques, and thus the allegation levelled against them were baseless. It was observed that the minuteness of the details furnished by the parties and the income tax returns and assessment orders, sale deeds, etc. were necessary to be carefully looked into and analysed only by an independent agency with the assistance of chartered accountants and other accredited engineers and valuers of the property.It was observed that the Income Tax Department was concerned only with the source of income and whether the tax was paid or not and, therefore, only an independent agency or CBI could, on court direction, determine the question of disproportionate assets. CBI was thus directed to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the assets of all the respondents and to take further action in the matter after scrutinising as to whether a case was made out or not.
201. This decision is to emphasise that submission of income tax returns and the assessments orders passed thereon, would not constitute a foolproof defence against a charge of acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known lawful sources of income as contemplated under the PC Act and that further scrutiny/analysis thereof is imperative to determine as to whether the offence as contemplated by the PC Act is made out or not.”
………….
31. These submissions do not appeal to us for the following reasons:
(i) First of all, the inquisition mentioned in Paragraph 309 of the said decision, is the inquisition to be made by the criminal court. That is clear from a complete reading of the above-said paragraph. In that case, the High Court, while acquitting the accused, had merely gone by the income tax records which were produced by the accused persons. However, the Trial Court had independently examined the issue and had not mechanically gone by the income tax records. It was while commenting on this that this Court said an inquisition ought to have been made on the material.
(ii) Secondly, this Court in J. Jayalalitha (supra), before arriving at a conclusion regarding the probative value of the income tax returns, has examined in detail the previous decisions of this Court where there were not only assessment orders but also decisions of the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. It is only after considering this aspect that the Court laid down that the Income Tax Returns and Orders passed in IT Proceedings are not conclusive proof.
(iii) Thirdly, this Court has categorically held that while income tax returns/orders may be admissible as evidence, the probative value of the same would depend on the nature of the information furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge.
(iv) Fourthly, it is important to note that the decision in J.Jayalalitha (supra) was in a matter involving a fullfledged trial and the Court was hearing an appeal against an Order of acquittal passed by the High Court. The Court also noted that income tax returns or orders could at best be evidences which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on record.
(v) This Court, in cases involving either discharge [State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC 709 Paragraph 32.3] or quash [CBI & Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi & Anr. (2021) 18 SCC 135 Paragraph 63-64] has noted that Income Tax Returns are not conclusive proof which can be relied upon either to quash the criminal proceeding or to discharge the accused persons.”
13. Therefore, the mere submission of income-tax returns cannot constitute a foolproof defence to a charge of acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known lawful sources of income under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Though income-tax returns and the orders passed in the proceedings relating thereto may be admissible in evidence, their probative value depends upon the nature and credibility of the information furnished therein. Such returns or assessment orders do not ipso facto conclusively establish either the legality of the source of income or the absence of disproportionate assets. At the most, they constitute pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other materials available on record.
14. In the present case, the accused neither examined any witness nor produced any independent documentary evidence to substantiate their contention that the income disclosed in the income-tax returns was actually derived from lawful and identifiable sources. Therefore, neither the income-tax returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings relating thereto conclusively establish the lawful nature of the sources of income of the accused or satisfactorily account for the disproportion between their pecuniary resources and properties, as contemplated under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988. It is further relevant to note that the scrutiny undertaken in an income-tax assessment proceeding is primarily directed towards determining the taxable income and the tax liability of the assessee. The assessment order, by itself, does not certify or authenticate that the sources from which such income was derived were necessarily lawful sources of income for the purposes of a prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, an income-tax assessment cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof of the lawful origin of the income disclosed therein.
15. In respect of the agricultural income of the accused, P.W.33 and P.W.34 deposed regarding the income derived from agricultural activities and also spoken about the expenditure incurred in connection with the marriages of Accused Nos.2 and 3.Insofar as the statement of assets at the end of the check period, the statement of income during the check period, and the statement of expenditure during the check period are concerned, the prosecution has explained as follows:-
16. As per the materials available on record, insofar as the statement of income during the check period is concerned, the prosecution has explained the same as follows:-
17. Insofar as the expenditure incurred by the accused during the check period, as reflected in the available records, is concerned, the prosecution has explained the same as follows:-
18. Finally, the prosecution established the charge of acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income of the accused in the following manner:-
Thus, upon a cumulative consideration of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the prosecution has established that the accused had acquired pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to their known sources of income to the extent of 160.93% during the relevant check period.
19. Though there are certain discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses, such discrepancies are only minor in nature and do not go to the root of the prosecution case or render the prosecution version doubtful. The prosecution, through the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, has satisfactorily established the assets, income and expenditure of the accused during the relevant check period and has thereby proved the acquisition of assets disproportionate to their known sources of income.
20. Accordingly, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the charge of disproportionate assets against the accused in accordance with law. Hence, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The judgment of the Trial Court is accordingly confirmed.
21. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.