(Prayer: Petition Under Section 24 of the C.P.C. Praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith,the High Court may be pleased topleased to pass and order or orders to withdraw the case H.M.O.P No.96/2023 on the file of III Additional Senior Civil Judge Kakinada District at Kakinada and transfer the same to the Honble Family Court, Vijayawada, in the interest of justice and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2025

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to stay all further proceedings in the H.M.O.P No.96/2023 on the file of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada District at Kakinada and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased May be pleased to grant leave to file the review petition in Order Dated 09.04. 2026 in Tr.C.M.P No.263 of 2025 and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased May be pleased to dispense with the filing of the certified copy of Order 09.04.2026 passed in Tr.C.M.P No.263 of 2025 and pass

IA NO: 3 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased May be pleased to condone the delay of 44 ays in filing the review petition against the Order dt.09.04.2026 in Tr.C.M.P No.263 of 2025 and pass

IA NO: 4 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased May be pleased to review the order Dated 09.04.2026 in Tr.C.M.P No.263 of 2025 and pass)

Common Order

I.A.No.1 of 2026 is filed by the petitioner-revision petitioner seeking to grant leave to file the review petition in order dated 09.04.2026 in Tr.C.M.P.No.263 of 2025.

I.A.No.3 of 2026 is filed seeking to condone the delay of 44 days in filing the review petition against the order dated 09.04.2026 in Tr.C.M.P.No.263 of 2025.

I.A.No.4 of 2026 is filed seeking to review the order dated 09.04.2026 passed by this Court in Tr.C.M.P.No.263 of 2025.

2. Case of the review petitioner-husband in brief is as follows:

                  The review petitioner herein filed H.M.O.P.No.96 of 2023 on the file of the III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, and he was examined as P.W.1 and got his mother examined as P.W.2, and his uncle was to be examined as P.W.3, and the chief-examination affidavit of P.W.3 was filed and the matter is coming up for cross-examination of P.W.3. The review-petitioner further contended that the trial has been commenced in H.M.O.P.No.96 of 2023 and the said case was filed in the year 2023 and after the commencing of trial and when the evidence is going to be completed, the transfer civil miscellaneous petition is filed with an intention to drag on the case. The review petitioner further pleaded that he is working in the Mega Engineering Project at Hyderabad, and he is also residing at Hyderabad in Telangana State and the petitioner herein is not having any knowledge about the issuance of notice by this Court and his counsel also did not inform him and that he filed the present application to review the order dated 09.04.2026 passed by this Court in Tr.C.M.P.No.263 of 2025.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent would contend that there are no merits in the review application filed by the petitioner, and he would further contend that the delay of 44 days in filing the review petition is not yet properly explained by the review petitioner and there are no merits in all the three interlocutory applications filed by the petitioner and that the petitions may be dismissed.

4. Heard Sri T.V. Jaggi Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioner-husband and Sri S. Mallikharjuna Rao, learned counsel, representing Sri K.B. Ramana Dora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife.

5. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner is none other than the husband of the respondent and they are not residing together. The petitioner herein filed H.M.O.P.No.96 of 2023 on the file of the III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage. The respondent herein filed Tr.C.M.P.No.263 of 2025 before this Court seeking transfer of H.M.O.P.No.96 of 2023 from the file of the Court of learned III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, to the file of the Family Court, Vijayawada. A notice was issued to the respondent before the Court below and the same was returned, and in view of the orders passed by this Court, a notice has been sent to the learned counsel on record for the petitioner herein before the trial Court and the same was received, but the respondent in the transfer petition, i.e., the review petitioner herein, did not turn up and the said Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition was allowed by order dated 09-04-2026. It is not the case of the revision petitioner herein that his counsel has not received any notice in the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition, and he admits in the grounds of the review application itself that “his counsel received notice in Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.263 of 2025, but he did not inform him”.

6. In a case of In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. and Others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) (MANU/SC/0285/2024), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that

                  (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

                  (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

                  (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

                  (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

                  (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

                  (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

                  (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

                  (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

7. In Basawaraj and others Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (MANU/SC/0850/2013), the Apex Court held in para Nos. 9 and 15 as follows:

                  "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”

                  15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

8. In Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Vs. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh and Others (MANU/SC/0019/1977), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-matter and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around s. 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day's delay. These and similar considerations which influence the decision of S. 5 applications are out of place in cases where the appeal itself is preferred within the period of limitation but there is an irregularity in presenting it. Thus, in the instant case, there was no occasion to invoke the provisions of s. 5, Limitation Act, or of rule 4, Chapter 1, of the High Court Rules. If the Division Bench were, aware that rifle, 3 of Chapter 2-C is directory, it would have treated the appeal as having been filed within the period of limitation, rendering it inapposite to consider whether the delay caused in filing the appeal could be condoned.”

9. In the case at hand, the notice was served on the petitioner's counsel herein before the trial Court in Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.263 of 2025 and the same is admitted by the petitioner herein, but his contention is that his counsel has not informed him of the same. It is a well-settled principle that a review petition cannot be used to agitate the issues which have already been considered and decided. The review petition is filed with a delay of 44 days, and such delay cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient cause. It is also well-settled that the scope of review is very limited, and in the exercise of review jurisdiction, neither can the Court sit in appeal nor it is open for the review petitioner to agitate or argue the questions which have already been decided by this Court. The notice in Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition proceedings was served on the counsel on record for the revision petitioner herein before the Court below, and the revision petitioner herein, i.e., the respondent in the transfer civil miscellaneous petition, did not make an appearance, and no counter has been filed to deny the averments in the affidavit filed in the transfer petition, and the said Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition was decided on merits by this Court.

10. As noticed supra, the law is well settled that review petition has to be filed within the stipulated period prescribed under the law. Belated reviews can be condoned if sufficient reason is shown before this Court for the delay. The review petitioner, who seeks to condone the delay, must explain the delay of each day. The Courts should not be pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay and explanation of each day's delay should not be taken liberally but the fact remains that there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay.

11. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the expression "sufficient cause", as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there are several laches on the part of the petitioner and there is gross negligence and inaction in pursuing the matter. In such circumstances, the delay of 44 days cannot be condoned liberally.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, there are no merits in I.A.No. 3 of 2026. Resultantly, I.A.No. 3 of 2026 is dismissed. Since I.A.No. 3 of 2026 to condone the delay of 44 days, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in filing the review application is dismissed, the question of granting leave to file a review petition does not arose. In view of the dismissal of the delay condonation petition, the review application vide I.A.No. 4 of 2026 is liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand dismissed in consequence. No costs.