(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, praying to prefer this Memorandum of Grounds of Writ Appeal against the order dated 23.07.2026 passed in W.P.(MD) No.20877 of 2026.)

C.V. Karthikeyan, J.

1. The 3rd and 4th respondents in W.P.(MD)No.20877 of 2026, aggrieved by the directions issued in the order dated 23.07.20226 by the learned Single Judge are the appellants herein.

2. The said writ petition had been filed by the first respondent herein, Canara Bank, Manjur Branch in Paramukudi Taluk, Ramanathapuram District in the nature of a Certiorarified Mandamus seeking records relating to a communication dated 18.07.2026 issued by the 3rd respondent/first appellant herein/Project Director, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), Project Implementation Unit (PIU)-Ramanathapuram and to quash the same. The writ petitioner also sought time of at least between 9 months and 12 months to vacate the premises under their occupation, which admittedly had been acquired by the appellants for the purpose of laying a four lane road between Paramakudi and Ramanathapuram under the hybrid annuity mode.

3. The fact that the property had been acquired is not in dispute. The fact that the acquisition had proceeded under the procedure as enunciated under law is not in dispute. The fact that the writ petitioner / first respondent is a tenant under the said premises is not in dispute. The further fact that towards acquisition of the said property, the landlords had received compensation on 06.04.2026 is also not under dispute.

4. The writ petition has been filed proclaiming ignorance and innocence of the acquisition proceedings and seeking indulgence of the learned Single Judge to grant further time to vacate the premises. The time to vacate the premises, when property had been acquired, had been stipulated under Section 3E of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the said provision is as follows:

                   “3E. Power to take possession.—(1) Where any land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 3D, and the amount determined by the competent authority under section 3G with respect to such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of section 3H, with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice.

                   (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any direction made under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall apply—

                   (a) in the case of any land situated in any area falling within the metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of Police;

                   (b) in case of any land situated in any area other than the area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a District, and such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be, shall enforce the surrender of the land, to the competent authority or to the person duly authorised by it.”

5. The provision stipulates that if there has not been voluntary vacating of the premises by the person whose land had been acquired, the Acquisition Authority shall issue notice granting a maximum of 60 days to vacate the premises. The said notification under Section 3-E of the Act had been issued to the landlord on 19.09.2025. It is a moot question whether the landlord had communicated the said aspect to the writ petitioner or not. However, immediately after 19.09.2025, the present the writ petitioner had issued a paper advertisement seeking premises for immediate occupation. This was issued on 26.11.2025 and the last date of submission of prospective persons, who would be interested in offering their property for rent or lease was 16.12.2025. Reasonable presumption can therefore be drawn that the writ petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the acquisition proceedings. They had knowledge of the acquisition proceedings even in November, 2025. Their landlord had received the entire compensation, to repeat, on 06.04.2026. On receipt of the entire compensation, the landlord had no authority or right to continue to occupy the premises. They had to vacate and hand over vacant possession. This obligation of the landlord also flows on to every tenant under the landlord.

6. Even though Section 3-E of the Act stipulates that notice has to be served not only to the person, who is the owner of the building, but everybody in possession of the building, the very fact that an advertisement had been put up on 26.11.2025, would draw sufficient presumption to the fact that the writ petition was aware of necessity to vacate the premises. This has been further reinforced by a communication by the writ petitioner themselves on 02.01.2026 to the Special District Revenue Officer, NH-49, Ramanathapuram at Taluk Office in Paramukudi, wherein they have mentioned that they require 6 months time to shift the Bank premises due to National Highway Road Extension.

7. This knowledge could not have surfaced unless the notice had been communicated to them by the landlord and also they had been aware of the fact that acquisition proceedings had actually been completed over the entire stretch between Peramakudi and Ramanathapuram. In the said communication dated 02.01.2026, the writ petitioners had sought a further period of 6 months time to vacate the premises. This would indicate that they had put an effective plan into action. They had issued a paper publication. They had stated that the last date for receiving of submission from prospective owners of buildings was 16.12.2025. Immediately thereafter, on 02.01.2026, they had sought just 6 months time to vacate the premises. By any mathematical calculation, the period of 6 months had ended on 02.07.2026. They had still not vacated. This was the reason why they were issued with a copy of the notice which had been issued earlier.

8. It should also be mentioned that communication dated 20.04.2026 was just about giving a further 30 days time to vacate the premises. It had been very specifically mentioned that notice under Section 3-E(1) of the Act had been issued; 60 days time was the outer limit; 30 days had expired and that the writ petitioner should vacate within a period of next 30 days. The appellants herein can only issue communication as a responsible undertaking. The writ petitioner also had a duty to ensure that since they know very well about the concept of being guardianship over public money and public property, that such public money is not wasted by their over presence in a particular place.

9. We are very surprised by a communication issued by the writ petitioner to the learned Counsel listing out the immovable property documents which they possess, the total gold loans which they have, the liability of the bank and the appraised value of the gold. No responsible Bank Manager would communicate such information to their Counsel and further permit that to be exhibited publicly in Court. This information, which if the Branch Manager had some responsibility, should have withheld from public.

10. Further, another communication had also been forwarded to this Court giving specifications for construction of RCC strongroom. This, again is information which should not divulged in public. It shows the sheer irresponsibility on the part of the Branch Manager of the Bank, not only because he has not taken any steps to vacate the premises within the time which he wanted, but, seeking indulgence, had disclosed all official information which should not have been disclosed and which relate to public holdings by the Bank.

11. We take this as a serious issue. The Branch Manager should not have gone to this extent of divulging official information. He could have, on the other hand, taken effective steps to vacate the premises. It is not required that the Branch should be located only in that particular area. On a temporary basis, it could have been re-located to any other place and thereafter, re-shifted to a place offered to him with required specifications.

12. A parallel could be drawn, as had been pointed out during the arguments by the learned Deputy Solicitor General about a similar request, if made by a single land owner, a house owner or a house dweller, or even a shopkeeper, then mercy would not have been shown by anybody, much less even by the bank.

13. We find that the Bank is only trying to protract the issue and gathering time for reasons we do not know why, when there was an obligation to hand over the premises. There was an undertaking to handover the premises. It is only appropriate that the writ petitioner keeps up to their own undertaking on 02.01.2026 that they would vacate within a period of six months. The time has long passed by. No further time could be granted. The appellants are permitted to take steps in accordance with law.

14. We are not inclined to accept the directions given by the learned Single Judge granting further four months. The writ petitioner does not deserve such sympathy. The Court cannot grant such sympathy. The writ petition stands dismissed and the writ appeal stands allowed. After the order is dictated, it is requested by the Bank that sufficient time shall be granted to vacate the premises. We are not inclined to grant any further time. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. There shall be no order as to costs.