Parties : K. Mohammed Koya & Others Versus Union Territory Of Lakshadweep Represented By Its Administrator, Office Of The Lakshadweep Administrator, Kavaratti & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appearing Parties: P.Deepak (Sr.), Rilgin V.George, Nazrin Banu, Lal K.Joseph, P.K.Saleem, P. Muraleedharan (Thuravoor), T.A. Luxy, Suresh Sukumar, Anzil Salim, Koya Arafa Mirage, Sanjay Sellen, Ajit G Anjarlekar, G.P.Shinod, Govind Padmanaabhan, Atul Mathews, S.B. Gayathri, Ajit G Anjarlekar, .G.P.Shinod, Govind Padmanaabhan, Atul Mathews, Saiby Jose Kidangoor, P.M.Mohammed Salih, Pramitha Augustine, Irine Mathew, S. Adrisya, K.M.Firoz, M. Sayyid Mohammed Nilamuddin, C. Dinesh, Cgc, Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, Anil George, Ashik Tom, Alex Kevin George, P.M. Aakhil Mohammed, K. Kavya, Rilgin V.George, R. Ajmal Ahmed, P.Muraleedharan (Thuravoor), T.A.Luxy, Anzil Salim, Suresh Sukumar, Sonia Shibu, Anupama, Aamina Rafeek, Rilgin V.George, K.T.Raveendran, K.P. Akshara, Aashique Akthar Hajjigothi, Sayyid Mohammed Nilamuddin, E.C.Ahamed Fazil, P.C.Muhammed Noushiq, M.P. Abdul Hadi, K. Jahana Sherin, A Al Fayad, Anzil Salim, Sanjay Sellen, Akash George, R.Rohith, Harishma P.Thampi, Suresh Sukumar, Advocates, A.R.L. Sundaresan – Asgi, V. Sajith Kumar, SC, O.M.Shalina, DSGI, K.S. Prenjith Kumar, Sc, Suvin R.Menon, Senior Panel Counsel, R.V. Sreejith, SC.
Date of Judgment : 05-08-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India – Articles 226, 240, 300A, 338A – Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 – Sections 2(n), 11, 14, 15, 83, 84 – Land Rights – Pandaram Lands – Cowledars – Petitioners challenged orders proposing to take possession of Pandaram lands held by Cowledars on payment of value of improvements alone. Question arose whether Cowledars in possession when the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 came into force were landowners and whether occupancy right under Section 83 was mandatory.
Court Held – Writ Petitions allowed – Cowledars in possession of Pandaram lands at commencement of the 1965 Regulation are landowners under Section 2(n) and need not obtain occupancy right under Section 83 – Such Cowledars cannot be treated as trespassers or dispossessed except by authority of law – Orders proposing to take possession by payment of value of improvements are without authority of law – Notices seeking valuation of improvements consequently bad – Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Land Revenue and Tenancy) Amendment Regulation, 2023 declared unconstitutional and not enforceable – Challenged orders and notices quashed.
[Paras 32, 45, 54, 62, 63]
Cases Cited:
Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. [(2021) 6 SCC 771]
Union of India v. Sekkummada Attakoya [2023 KHC 9291]
S.B.Bhattacharjee v. S.D.Majumdar & Ors. [(2007) 10 SCC 513]
State of Rajasthan vs Bhawani Singh [1993 Supp. (1) SCC 306]
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain [2024 SCC OnLine SC 507]
Leelavathi N. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2253]
Keywords: Articles 226, 240, 300A, 338A Constitution of India – Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 – Sections 2(n), 11, 14, 15, 83, 84 – Pandaram Lands – Cowledars – Landowners – Occupancy Rights – Rough Patta – Dispossession – Alternate Remedy – Section 15A – Amendment Regulation, 2023
Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 59671,
Judgment :-
1. Heard Sri P. Deepak, Senior Advocate, instructed by Sri Rilgin V. George, Sri Lal K. Joseph, Sri Ajit G. Anjarlekar, Sri Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, Sri K.M. Firoz, Sri R.Rohith, Sri Aashique Akthar Hajjigothi and Sri Saiby Jose Kidangoor on behalf of the petitioners and Sri ARL Sundaresan (Additional Solicitor General of India), Smt.O.M.Shalina (DSGI), Sri K.S. Prenjith Kumar (Central Government Standing Counsel) and Sri R.V.Sreejith (Standing Counsel for Lakshadweep Administration), on behalf of the respondents.
2. The fundamental issue in all these cases concerns the rights of the natives of Lakshadweep over the lands they possessed. To decide the issue, one must study the history of Lakshadweep, the nature of the rights that existed during the early years, and the rights conferred on the landholders by the various regulations issued over the past several years. Such an exercise is required since the main challenge in all these cases is against the orders issued by the District Collector of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep instructing the Deputy Collectors to take possession of Pandaram Lands in inhibited as well as uninhibited islands subject to certain conditions and by paying compensation for the improvements made in Pandaram lands. That is to say, the natives of Lakshadweep who are holding Pandaram lands will be deprived of their holdings by the payment of compensation for the improvements alone and without any payment for the land. The premise for such a direction on the part of the Administration of Lakshadweep is that the Pandaram lands belonged to the Lakshadweep Administration and the natives did not have title over the said lands.
3. The prayers in these writ petitions are grouped together. The main reliefs prayed for are to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order quashing the following:
i. Notification of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation, 2023 dated 25.10.2023.
ii. Order F.No.34/52/2016-LR(PART)/1086 dated 07.11.2023.
iii. Notice F.No.03/01/2023-DC(KVT)/1121 dated 07.11.2023.
iv. Order F.No.3/1/2023-DC (KVT) dated 17.11.2023.
v. Order issued by the Block Development Officer, Kalpeni Island as F.No.14/16/2023-BDO (KLP)dated 20.11.2023.
vi. Order F.No:34/70/2023-LR/1195 dated 28.11.2023. vii. Order of the Deputy Collector F.No.10/09/2018-DC (KVT)/1264 dated 06.12.2023. viii. Order F.No:34/77/2023-LR/1237 dated 18.12.2023.
ix. Order F.No:34/80/2023-LR/1247 dated 20.12.2023.
x. Communication No.U-11024/1/2019-UTL dated 20.12.2023.
xi. Order in Review Petition No.1/2023 issued by the District Collector dated 1.02.2024.
xii. Order F.No: 34/42/2024-LR dated 27.06.2024.
xiii. Corrigendum F.No: 34/42/2024-LR-605 dated 29.06.2024.
xiii. Notice issued by Deputy Collector in F.No.30/03/2021- SDO(AND) dated 08/2024. xiv. Order F.No.14/16/2023-BDO(KLP) issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO(East) Androth(HQ) and Kalpeni dated 01.07.2024.
xv. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.10/18/2023-DC(KVT)/437 dated 02.07.2024
xvi. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.10/18/2023-DC(KVT)/447 dated 04.07.2024.
xvii. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 05.07.2024.
xviii. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.14/16/2023-BDO(KLP) dated 06.07.2024.
xix. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 12.07.2024.
xx. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.14/16/2023-BDO(KLP) dated 21.07.2024.
xxi. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 25.07.2024.
xxii. Notice F.No.10/18/2023-DC(KVT) 514 issued by the Deputy Collector dated 31.07.2024.
xxiii. Order F.No: 34/56/2024-LR dated 21.08.2024.
xxiv. Notice issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO(East) Androth Island bearing F.No: 30/01/2023-DC(Land) dated 21.08.2024.
xxv. Order issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO(East) bearing F.No: 30/04/2025-DC(AND)/718 dated 22.08.2025.
Some of the Additional prayers sought for are:
4. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction:
a) Declaring that the land of the Petitioners is not Pandaram land (Government Lands) and that proceedings against the petitioners can only be initiated by invoking the provisions under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
b) Directing the Administrator, UT of Lakshadweep to confer the Occupancy Right of the petitioner under the provisions of the Laccadive Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965.
c) Commanding the Administrator of Lakshadweep to direct the occupants of Pandaram lands, by way of a general notice stipulated under Rule 47(6) of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Rules, 1968, to apply for occupancy rights and grant occupancy rights to the petitioners, if they satisfy the conditions prescribed in Section 83 of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965.
d) Commanding the District Collector to consider and pass appropriate orders on the review petition in exercise of power conferred under Regulation 11(3) read with Regulation 81 of the Laccadives, Minicoy & Aminidivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulations, 1965.
e) Commanding the District Collector to consider and pass appropriate orders on the petition filed on 07.12.2023 under Section 82(3) of the Tenancy Regulations keeping in abeyance all proceedings pursuant to order dated 28.11.2023 F.No: 34/70/2023-LR/1195 pending disposal of review petition.
f) Direct the Administrator to notify the amendment issued by the Union of India in the official Gazette of India dated 18.03.2020 within a specific time frame.
g) Declare that Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation, 2023 is unconstitutional and it violates and ultra vires Article 14, 21, 300A, 240 of the Constitution of India.
h) Declare that the Lakshadweep administration have no power to declare the title of the land without passing an order under regulation 11(3) of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965.
i) Direct the respondents not to enforce Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation, 2023.
j) Direct to consider the petition presented to the District Collector on 16.11.2023 filed under Section 82(2) of the Tenancy Regulations.
k) Directing the Administrator, UT of Lakshadweep to hear the petitioners and pass appropriate orders in Review Petition and the stay petition dated 16/11/2023 submitted by the Petitioners 1 to 6 before the District Collector, the receipt of the said petition and Review Petition and the stay petition dated 16/11/2023 submitted by the 7th Petitioner before the District Collector and receipt of said petition in accordance with law.
l) Commanding the respondents 6 to 10 to strictly comply with the procedures contemplated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the provisions of the fifth schedule of the Constitution of India before acquiring/ taking over the possession of the properties of the petitioners comprised in –
iii. Survey Nos. 83/3 part, 83/1 part, 1191/4 PART, 994/3, 1189/4 PART, 1190/3 PART of Agathi Island; iv. Survey Nos. 332 & 333(1) of Pitti Island.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
5. The history of the Lakshadweep Islands has been narrated succinctly in the book Traditional Futures Law and Custom in India's Lakshadweep Islands by Dr. V. Vijaykumar, who had authored the book while he was a District Judge in Kerala. According to the author, the earliest reference to Lakshadweep was by an anonymous author of the first century AD. The history of the Island prior to the 10th century is stated to be obscure. During the beginning of the 10th century, the Kolathiri Dynasty which controlled the entire North Malabar and the Laccadives from their headquarters at Ezhimala near Cannannore, were administering the Islands. During the late 11th century or early 12th century AD, the administration was under a principality known as the Ali Rajahs of Cannanore. In 1509, the Portuguese took control of the Islands, and they continued their oppressive rule till 1543. According to the author, it is likely that the Kolathiris transferred the Islands to the full control of the Arakkal House after the Portuguese rule. The Arakkal family administered through Kariyakkars appointed for each Island. The Royalty had monopoly over several commodities like coconut, cowries, tortoise shell and jaggery. It is stated that the coir monopoly led the people of the Amindivi group of Islands to revolt and approach Tipu Sulthan of Mysore. In 1787, the islands of Amini, Kadamat, Kiltan, Chetlath and Bitra, on the northern side of the group of Islands came under Tipu and the rest of the Islands continued under the Arakkal Rule. It is stated that Tipu Sultan put an end to the oppressive Kariyakkar administration and appointed an officer called Manegar at Amini to look after the five Islands under his control, which were collectively called as Amindivi Islands. In 1791, after the conquest of Cannanore, the Southern Islands which were under the control of the Arakkal family went into the hands of the British East India Company. In 1799, after the fall of Tipu Sulthan, the five islands in his control were also annexed by the British East India Company and made part of the South Kanara District. The Arakkal Beebi had been permitted to administer the Island for an annual tribute. In 1875, the British Government took over the entire administration and attached the Islands to the Malabar District under the Madras Presidency. For convenience, the Islands were divided into two administrative units as Amindivi group of Islands and the Laccadive and Minicoy group of Islands. The said division continued till some years after India became independant. On 01.11.1956, on coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, the two group of Islands were separated from the South Kanara and Malabar Districts of the Madras Presidency to form a separate Union Territory of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands.
Legislative intervention in the pre-independence period
6. The British India Government had promulgated the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874, and the Lakshadweep territory was declared as a Scheduled District under the said Act, giving it a separate status, by a notification dated 19.02.1889. In 1875, a Property Register (Land Manual) was prepared in Amindivi Islands. Revised in 1935, it became the first documentary recognition of private property limits. Similar attempts in Laccadive Islands did not fully materialise, though boundaries were socially respected. In the Government of India Act of 1919, the protection as Scheduled District, was preserved and the territory was declared as a backward tract under Section 52A. As per the provisions of the said Act, only Acts specifically declared as such were to be made applicable to the territory. On coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Islands were again declared excluded areas and were subject to the same immunities until the framing of the Constitution of India in 1950. Article 244 of the Constitution of India contained in Part X of the Constitution deals with administration of scheduled areas and tribal areas. The Article reads thus;
“Art.244. Administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas-
(1) The provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
(2) The provisions of the Sixth Schedule shall apply to the administration of the tribal areas in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.”
7. Part B of the Fifth schedule deals with the administration and control of scheduled areas and scheduled tribes. Part C deals with the power of the President to declare scheduled areas. The Islands were designated as a scheduled area on 26.1.1950
LAND TENURE SYSTEM OF LAKSHADWEEP
8. The land tenure system of Lakshadweep was adapted from the old Malabar system. Initially, private ownership of land did not exist. Wealth was measured by the number of coconut trees, not land. Land was managed collectively under the Muthalal (headman) and a council of elders. During the 17th century, the Cannanore Rajas asserted economic and political control over the islands. They claimed ownership over uncultivated lands and uninhabited islands and these lands came to be known as Pandaram (Government) lands. Influenced by the Rajas, leading families (Karnavans) began asserting hereditary rights over land, leading to the emergence of private ownership (Jenmom). Over time, tenants gradually acquired secure occupancy rights through custom.
9. By the 19th century, ownership became highly fragmented due to indiscriminate planting and overlapping claims. The British generally allowed customary practices to determine ownership rather than imposing new rules. In 1875, the Property Register (Land Manual) in the Amindivi Islands recorded land boundaries, providing the first documentary evidence of private ownership. Government assignments and court decisions gradually regularised ownership and tenancy rights. Classification of Lands
10. The islands' lands were divided into two broad categories:
A. Jenmom (Private) Lands, which were owned either directly by landlords (Jenmis) or occupied by tenants (Kudiyans).
B. Pandaram (Government) Lands, which Included waste lands, uninhabited islands, escheated properties, Kutcheri Pandaram lands, and land reserved for government purposes.
11. Private ownership led to creation of tenancies. There were three principal tenancy systems that existed on private lands in the islands which were (1) Nadappu Tenancy, which was a unique system where tenants cultivated coconut gardens and performed customary services such as sailing in landlords' boats, maintaining boats, and helping during family ceremonies. The tenants enjoyed almost permanent possession and could freely plant additional coconut trees and the rent remained largely fixed despite improvements made by tenants. Nadapu tenancy was prevalent in Kavaratti, Agatti, Amini and Androth islands. (2) Pattom Tenancy, which was mainly contractual and required payment of rent and limited customary services. The tenancy was generally temporary, although the tenants were entitled to compensation for improvements. (3) House Site Tenancy, under which the tenants could build houses on landlords' land without paying rent and the site reverted to the landlord when the house was dismantled.
12. Government lands consist of lands originally acquired by the Cannanore Rajas by way of confiscation, escheat and similar appropriations. They may be broadly classified as follows:
(a) Waste lands in inhabited islands.
(b) The entire area of uninhabited islands.
(c) Minor Pandarams, like Nattagathu Karaima, Karaima and Pervili lands of Androth and Kutcheri Pandarams.
Kinds of Pandaram lands:
13. Minor Pandarams consist mainly of private properties acquired through confiscations and escheats. The Pandaram lands scattered among private lands in Kavaratti and known as Nattagathu Karaima and Idiyakkal Pandaram in Kavaratti, which was confiscated possibly on the pretext of some debts were lands acquired in that manner. The Karaima and Pervili lands in Androth, which may be considered as permanently settled lands, were lands confiscated by the Rajas, but given back to the original owners on condition of paying a fixed revenue. The Kutcheri Pandarams are small plots of land surrounding the Kutchery in the islands of Androth, Kalpeni Kavaratti and Agatti. Several uninhabited islands such as Bangaram and Suheli became government property after confiscation by the Cannanore Rajas.
Introduction of the Cowle (Improving Lease) System
14. The Government lands can be classified, based on the type of lease as (a) Lands given on cowle or written lease of waste lands in inhabited and uninhabited islands, (b) Lands under lease, consisting of the great South Pandaram of Minicoy, (c) Lands with trees auctioned from time to time like the Kutchery Pandarams. The lands given on cowle or written lease, were with respect to Pandaram lands in the inhabited islands of Androth, Kalpeni, Kavaratti and Agatti and the uninhabited islands of Suheli, Bangaram and attached islands, and Cheriyam.
15. The British introduced the Cowle system from 1878 to encourage cultivation of waste lands. Long-term leases were granted on favourable terms, allowing lessees to plant coconut trees and develop the land. Assessment was based on the number and maturity of coconut trees. Initially, the lease was granted for 40 years. After ascertaining the extent of Pandaram land available to be leased through survey, which was completed by 1884, a final amended form of lease was introduced in 1885. These leases effectively provided permanent occupancy because lessees invested heavily in improvements. If the performance of the lessees were poor, they were later replaced by more industrious cultivators, and incentives were offered to encourage plantation development. Cowle leases were gradually extended to islands such as Cheriyam, Suheli, Bangaram, Tinnakara, and Parali. Although government retained ownership, long-term occupation and improvements gave lessees substantial rights over the land. In Minicoy islands, the management of Pandaram lands were different. Attempts to introduce the Cowle system in the island met with strong resistance, since the islanders enjoyed the communal rights over the land. In 1912, the Government leased the land collectively to the community, which managed it through headmen and the Amin. Later, disputes over the common fund led to subdivision of the land among individual families while reserving a part for government purposes.
16. It would appear from the introduction of the cowle system, that the then Government intended to put an end to rack renting, improve the land, and induce a sense of possession over the land. The cowle system proved popular in Androth and Kalpeni, where all the waste lands were planted up. Following the success of the cowle system in the inhabited islands, Cowles were granted in Cheriyam in 1922. In 1929, the temporary leases in Suheli were replaced by cowles granted for a period of 12 years. Cowles were granted in 1931 in Bangaram, Tinnakara and Parali. Cowles were granted in Kalpitti only in 1933. The Cowledars remained in occupation of the lease lands even after expiry of the period of cowle. The trees planted by the Government had all died out over the years and lands are covered by the trees planted by the Cowledars. Post Independence Legislative Intervention:
17. In 1959, the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Survey and Boundaries Regulation, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 1959 Regulation) was brought into force. Soon after the coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the Central Government came out with the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Protection of Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 1964 Regulation) and soon thereafter, the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 (hereafter referred to as the 1965 Regulation) also came into force. Three years later, in 1968, the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Rules (hereinafter referred to as the 1968 Rules) were brought into force.
18. Section 2(b) of the 1959 Regulation defined “Cowledar” as a person who has been or is granted a lease of pandaram land on rent for a specified period, one of the conditions of such lease being that he makes improvements thereto. Section 2(d) defined "Landowner" to mean a person (i) who is the proprietor of a parcel of land under the customary law of the Islands; or (ii) who is shown as holding land as lessee thereof in the Government accounts; or (iii) who is shown as holding pandaram land as owner or as a cowledar in the Government accounts; or (iv) whose name is registered as owner in any register maintained by the Administrator or by any of his assistants authorised by him in this behalf. Section 2(e) defines "pandaram land" to mean land in which Government has proprietary right. Section 13 of the 1959 Regulations says that subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, every land-owner shall be bound to maintain, renew and repair the survey marks on or within the boundaries of his land and in default of his doing so, the survey officer or Administrator may, at the cost of Government, maintain, renew and repair such survey marks, determine and apportion the cost of so doing, and recover such cost from the landowner concerned as if it were payable under a decree of a civil court and such cost may include the cost of all operations incidental to such renewal or repair but not any charges on account of survey officers and supervising establishment. Thus, the duties of the proprietor of the land as well as the lessees and Cowledars were at par, when it came to maintenance of the boundaries of the lands in their possession.
19. The 1965 Regulations which followed the 1959 Regulations, contained exhaustive provisions for regulating the rights of the land holders. Section 2(e) of the 1965 Regulations defined “cowledar” in similar terms as in the 1959. Section 2(j) defines "jenmam land" as land other than pandaram land over which a person has proprietary rights under the customary law of the Islands. Section 2(k) defines "jenmi" as a person who has proprietary rights over jenmam land. Section 2(m) defines "land holder" as a landowner, a tenant in possession or a mortgagee in possession. Section 2(n) defines “landowner” in almost similar terms as in the 1959 Regulation, as a person (i) who is the proprietor of a parcel of land under the customary law of the Islands; or (ii) who is shown as holding land as a lessee thereof In the Government records; or (iii) who is shown as holding pandaram land as a cowledar in the Government records; or (iv) whose name is registered as owner in any register maintained by the Administrator or by any officer authorised by him in this behalf. The only difference is that instead of using “Government accounts” the 1965 Regulations uses the words “Government records”.
20. The definition of the term “pandaram land” underwent a change in the 1965 Regulations. Instead of defining the “pandaram lands” as merely land in which Government has proprietary right the 1965 Regulation expanded the scope and in Section 2(s) defined "pandaram land" to mean land in which Government has, a proprietary right immediately before the commencement of this Regulation and includes any land in which it may acquire such rights under this Regulation or under any other law. Section 2(z) of the 1965 Regulation defines "tenant" to means person who cultivates or holds the land of a jenmi, a cowledar or any other holder of pandaram land under an agreement, express or implied, on condition of paying rent therefor. The Regulation thus contemplates creation of tenancy by a “cowledar” who himself was a lessee of ‘pandaram land” under the government.
21. Section 11 of the 1965 Regulation declares all lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, tanks, ditches, dikes and fences on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high-water-mark, and all standing or flowing water, and all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, which are not the property of any person, as the property of the Government. The respondents place heavy reliance of Section 11(3) of the 1965 Regulation which says that where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by or on behalf of the Government, or by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such dispute shall be decided by the Collector whose order shall, subject to the provisions of this Regulation, be final. Section 11(4) says that any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order and the decision of the civil court shall be binding on the parties.
22. Section 14 of the 1965 Regulation empowers the Collector to allot pandaram land for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling houses, in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf under this Regulation and also empowers the Administrator to allot any pandaram land for an industrial purpose or for any purpose of public utility on such conditions as may be prescribed. Section 15(1) of the 1965 Regulation says that any person who occupies or continues to occupy any pandaram land without lawful authority shall be regarded as a trespasser and may be summarily evicted therefrom by the competent authority in the prescribed manner and any building or other construction erected or anything deposited on such land, if not removed within such reasonable time as such authority may, from time to time, fix for the purpose, shall be liable to be forfeited to the Government and to be disposed of in such manner as the competent authority may direct. The proviso to the section says that the competent authority may, in lieu of ordering the forfeiture of any such building or other construction, order the demolition of the whole or any part thereof. Section 15(2) further provides that such trespassers shall also be liable by way of penalty to pay a sum which may extend to six times the annual land revenue assessed on such land as may be specified by the competent authority and such sum shall be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The above provision will have to be appreciated keeping in mind that fact that Cowle period was over long back and the Cowledars are occupying the Pandaram lands all these years and the fact no land assessment has been introduced with respect the above lands. No action had been initiated till the present proposed action, to evict the Cowledars like the petitioners, treating them as trespassers.
23. Section 19 of the 1965 Regulation says that the assessment of land revenue on any land shall be based on the use of the land, like agriculture, industry, commerce, residence etc. and shall be liable to be altered and assessed at different rates depending on any diversion of purpose of use. As per Section 22, the liability to pay land revenue assessed on land shall be primarily on the landowner, the tenant or any other person in possession of the land, provided that such tenant at other person shall be entitled to Credit from the landowner for the amount paid by him.
24. Sections 83 and 84 of the 1965 Regulates assume great importance for deciding these cases. The Sections read thus:
“S.83. The Administrator may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, confer the rights of occupancy under this Chapter on –
(a) a person who immediately before the commencement of this Regulation was occupying pandaram land as cowledar;
(b) any other person who is in occupation of pandaram land at the commencement of this Regulation; or
(c) any person who may be allotted pandaram land under section 14.
S.84. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Regulation and the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Protection of Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1964, the rights of an occupant in his land shall be permanent, heritable and transferable.
(2) The occupant shall be entitled, by himself, his servants, tenants, agents or other representatives to erect buildings, construct wells or tanks or make other improvements thereon for the better cultivation of the land or its convenient or profitable use, to plant trees on his land, to enjoy the products thereof and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees on his land.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (2) shall entitle the occupant to use his land to the detriment of any adjoining land which is not his or in contravention of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force applicable to such lands.”
25. Section 86 of the 1965 Regulations protects a person holding land immediately before the commence of the Regulation, as a tenant other than as a Nadapu tenant from a landowner, for cultivation, from eviction, except as provided in the Regulation. The section further says that the interest of such tenants shall be heritable but, save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, not transferable except to a member of his family. As per Section 87 of the 1965 Regulations no tenant other than a kudiyan shall be evicted except under the orders of a competent authority issued for any of the reasons specified in the section. Section 95 of the 1965 Regulations gives a first offer to buy, to a tenant other than a tenant enjoying fixity of tenure under Section 86, in case the landowner at any time intends to sell his land held by the tenant. Rule 116 of the 1968 Rules reads thus:
“116. The Administrator may, before conferring the rights of occupancy under Chapter VIII of the regulation on any person referred to in section 83, provide-
(a) that no places of religious worship shall be constructed on a pandaram land and such land shall not be used as a burial or cremation ground;
(b) that the easement rights, if any, existing at that time in the pandaram land shall not be interfered with;
(c) that the Government shall have absolute rights over the minerals in the pandaram land;
(d) that the occupants shall not claim any compensation for the removal or quarrying by Government of the minerals except when such removal or quarrying adversely affects the agricultural operation in the pandaram land;
(e) that the pandaram land shall not be used for any purpose, other than the agricultural purpose, except with the previous sanction of Administrator.”
GRIEVANCE OF THE PETITIONERS:
26. The Administration issued orders on 27.06.2024 and 29.06.2024 to evaluate structures and trees on lands held by Cowledars. This was followed by notices informing of ex-parte evaluation, which according to petitioners indicated a clear intent for dispossession or summary acquisition. The Petitioners contend that their lands, while historically termed 'Pandaram Land,' ceased to be the absolute Government property upon the commencement of the 1965 Regulations, as they acquired vested occupancy rights. The petitioners are challenging the actions of the District Administration, which according to them are intended to take over their lands without authority of law. They are also challenging the Central Government's notification dated 25.10.2023 which omitted Section 15A of the 1965 Regulations.
27. The following issues arise for consideration:
1. Whether the Administration can treat Cowledars as temporary occupants, when Section 84 of the 1965 Regulation declares their rights to be permanent, heritable, and transferable.
2. Whether the Cowledars in occupation of land prior to 1965 and those who are alloted lands under Regulation 14 of the 1965 Regulation form two distinct classes?
3. Whether the doctrine of contemporanea expositio has to be applied to interpret Regulation 83 of the 1965 Regulations and Rule 116 of the 1964 Rules?
4. Whether the petitioners can be treated as registered holders of rough pattah and whether after issuing Rough Pattah and finalising the same, the respondents are estopped from taking away the land?
5. Whether the Administration is entitled to take advantage of their inaction in issuing occupancy right to persons whose applications are pending since 1965?
6. Whether Cowledars are entitled to fixity of tenure?
7. Whether the 1965 Regulations mandate obtaining of occupancy right by persons who are landowners as per the definition of Section 2(n)?
8. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable in the light of the alternate remedy available under Section 11(3) of the 1965 Regulations?
9. Whether Section Section 2(n), 11 and 33 of the 1965 Regulations must be interpreted in the light of Article 300A of the Constitution?
10. Whether the repeal of the 2020 amendment by 2023 amendment is bad for want of consultation with SC/ST Commission?
11. Whether Lakshadweep is scheduled area under the Constitution and if so, what are the legal consequences?
12. Whether the Government can bypass the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, by treating these lands as proprietary Government lands.
13. Whether the omission of Section 15A is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violative of the vested rights of the islanders.
28. The arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioners and the counter contentions of the respondents are being dealt with while considering each of the issues raised, to avoid surplusage.
ISSUE No.8 - Whether the writ petitions are maintainable in the light of the alternate remedy available under Section 11(3) of the 1965 Regulations?
29. I shall first consider the question of maintainability. The counsel for the petitioners submits that the existence of alternate remedy under Regulation 11(3) of the 1965 Regulations is not a bar in view of the fact that (a) this is a case where the District Collector has exceeded his jurisdiction, (b) the action is violative of principles of natural justice, and (c) the interpretation of the Regulations is involved. The counsel for the respondents contends that the prayer for declaration of title cannot be agitated in a writ petition and disputed questions of fact also cannot be entertained and decided in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is contended that since the petitioners claim ownership over the property, their remedy is to approach the District Collector under S.11 (3) of the 1965 Regulation. It is pointed out that a person aggrieved by the decision of District Collector, can approach the Civil Court and that since the authorities are exercising judicial powers, they are not prevented from interpreting the provisions of Regulations. The Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Santhosh Kumar Nair v. Suresh P.Sreedharan & Ors. [2022 (7) KHC 258], to submit that a disputed question of fact is not liable to be investigated in a proceeding under Article 226, especially when an alternative remedy is available and disputed facts which need to be decided by the civil court are involved. The judgment in State of Rajasthan vs Bhawani Singh [1993 Supp. (1) SCC 306] was relied on to submit that disputed question relating to the title of property cannot be satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a Writ Petition. The decision in Maloji Roa Narsingh Shitole Litigation Conduct Cost and Benefit Trust, Old High Court V. Municipal Corporation [2019 KHC 3426] was relied on to submit that dispute regarding ownership, possession could only be decided by a civil court in civil suit. The decision in Chaggar Singh & Ors. vs State of J&K & Ors. [2020 KHC 4865] was relied on submit that disputed questions of fact of complex nature as to whether petitioners were in actual possession or not should be decided by the civil court. The decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shilpa Jain [2024 SCC OnLine SC 507], was relied on to submit that revenue records are not documents of title and the question of title can only be determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. In Food Corporation of India v. State of Kerala & Ors. [2015 (2) KHC 198], relied on by the respondents, it was held that a show cause notice can be challenged under Article 226 only on the ground that the show cause notice is without jurisdiction and that normally courts do not entertain a Writ Petition. So also, in Special Director and Anr. V. Mohd.Ghulam Ghouse and Anr. [2004 (3) SCC 440], it was held that unless the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law, for the absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained. In Union of India & Anr. v. Vicco Laboratories [2007 (13) SCC 270], it was held that non-interference at the stage of issuance of show cause notice is the normal rule.
30. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the issue cannot be reduced or oversimplified into a property dispute. It is submitted that a general order is issued directing taking possession of all Pandaram lands held by Cowledars after ascertaining the value of the improvements. The order says that the purpose is to find land, which is a scarce resource in Lakshadweep islands, for implementing projects which will improve social capital of the Islanders and bring gainful employment opportunities, economic empowerment, women empowerment, etc. The order says that the above steps will result in increase in flow of money to the islands by way of increased export, tourism, self-employment opportunities, etc. The order says that the failure to allot land equitably after the promulgation of the 1965 Regulations, has resulted in concentration of Pandaram land among few individuals, and the order intends to correct it. Another reason stated is that the lands were given for the purpose of agriculture, and occupancy rights have not been conferred to the Pandaram landholders under Section 83 of the 1965 regulations and the entire land belongs to the Administration.
31. The law relating to maintainability of a writ petition in cases where there is an alternate remedy available is no longer res integra. In Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. [(2021) 6 SCC 771], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to earlier decisions concluded as follows:
“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One o f the restrictions placed on the power o f the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.
28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399], Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among other decisions.”
The above passage was cited with approval in a subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Leelavathi N. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2253].
32. Applying the above principles to the facts of these cases, the action challenged here is the proposal to take over the entire Pandaram lands which have been in the possession of the tribals of Lakshadweep Islands for the past several years, under Cowle agreements executed much before India became independent. The Cowle system was introduced by the British and the predecessors of the petitioners were Cowledars under the British government. Laws were brought in after Independence to give such persons permanency of rights and the law provided for issuance of occupancy right. Applications filed for the purpose are pending for the past more than 50 years in some cases. Taking advantage of the delay on their part to pass orders on such applications, and under the premise that the Pandaram lands belong to the Administration, orders affecting several persons have been issued. The contention now taken is that grievance regarding such orders have to be challenged before the District Collector under Section 11(3). It is significant that the authority to pass orders on the applications for occupancy right is the Administrator, who is a higher authority. Firstly, such an alternate relief is not in any manner efficacious. Secondly, the person who issued the orders to take back the land is apparently acting under the directions of the person who has to pass orders on occupancy and who has already decided that the property belongs to the Administration, and hence the so called relief under Section 11(3) of the Regulations is illusory. Thirdly, the entitlement of the Administration to take over the land without paying compensation depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of the 1965 Regulations and the same cannot be agitated before the District Collector who is an officer subordinate to the Administrator. Fourthly, there are no factual disputes involved since the orders challenged are general orders which propose to take control of all the Pandaram lands in the occupation of Cowledars, with respect to which no orders under Section 83 have been issued granting occupancy rights. Fifthly, the contention that question of title is involved is also not correct, since the question of title in these cases does not depend upon any documents of title but only on the legal question whether the Cowledars in possession as on the date of commencement of the 1965 Regulations are entitled to be treated as landowners. Sixthly, the issue involves the rights of tribals living in a Union Territory, to hold lands that they were holding for the past several years, from before the Independence, which are sought to be taken away by a stroke of a pen. I hence find that this is an apt case where the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and entertain the writ petitions. The issue is found against the respondent/Administration.
ISSUE No.11: Whether the UT of Lakshadweep is scheduled area under the Constitution and if so, what are the legal consequences?
33. The Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Now Lakshadweep since 1973), at the time of commencement of Constitution were a part of the erstwhile Madras State, which was a Part A State. As per Section 2 of the Scheduled Areas (Part A) States Order, 1950, issued on 26.1.1950, the area was declared as Scheduled Area within the State of Madras. Article 244 of the Constitution of India deals with the administration of Schedule area, and it says that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, for whom the provisions of the Sixth Schedule shall apply. Article 342 of the Constitution of India empowers the President to issue public notification with respect to a State or Union Territory, specifying the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities, which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union Territory. In the case of a State, the article contemplates consultation with the Governor. A reading of the above two articles would show that Article 244 applies to the States and Article 342 applies to the States and Union Territories. When the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, was issued on 6.9.1950, the inhabitants of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi islands, who, and whose parents, were born in those islands were included under Entry 40 in the list for the State of Madras. At that point of time, the inhabitants of the island were included as Scheduled tribes, within the State of Madras and the area was included as a Scheduled area, to which the 5th Schedule was to apply. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force 01.11.1956, and Section 6 of the Act provided that as from the appointed day, there shall be formed a Union Territory, to be known as the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands comprising the Laccadive and Minicoy Islands in the Malabar district and the Amindivi Islands in the South Kanara district. The said Islands were to cease to form part of the existing State of Madras. Subsequently, the Scheduled Tribes Order issued in 1951 was modified by removing the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi islands from the Madras list and including it separately under the Union Territory of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands.
34. The counsel for the petitioners argues that even though a Union Territory was formed, there was no cesser notification issued, stating that the area ceased to be a Scheduled Area, as is required to be done under Article 244 read with 5th Schedule of the Constitution of India. On the above premise, it is contended that Lakshadweep continues to be a Scheduled area and being a Scheduled area, all policy decisions require prior consultation with SC/ST Commission and in the absence of such consultation the orders issued are bad in law. To buttress the argument, reliance is placed on the definition of “State” in General Clauses Act, which was introduced after the commencement of the Constitution of India, which says that “State”, as respects any period after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union territory. The Counsel also relies on Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act which says that the provisions of Part II of the Act, shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day. It is hence argued that the declaration as Scheduled area continues despite the formation of the entire area as a Union Territory.
35. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Balbir Singh & Ors. [1976 (3) SCC 242], wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered Section 2(g) of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, which defined “law” to include any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, byelaw, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having, immediately before the appointed day, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Punjab. The Court was of the opinion that mere splitting up of the territories of Punjab into four successor States would not ipso facto result in the abrogation or repeal of the laws which were immediately in force before the appointed day in those territories. The Court held that the definition dispels doubts as to the continuity of the laws which were in force before the appointed day in the former State of Punjab, until the competent legislature or authority of the successor States effects any change in those laws. The Court concluded that administrative orders issued prior to the reorganisation will also continue to be in operation unless replaced by another order.
36. The counsel for the respondent/Administration argued that the UT of Lakshadweep is not a Scheduled Area under Schedule V of the Constitution of India. It is contended that Article 244 of the Constitution of India provides for the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes and that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution are applicable only to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any States other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram and the provisions of the Sixth Schedule shall apply to the administration of the tribal areas in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. It is contended that the Union territory of Lakshadweep falls under the First Schedule of the Constitution of India and is administered by the President of India through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify (Article 239 of the Constitution), and that it does not have the same level of legislative autonomy as other States and Union Territories. It is contended that Article 244(1) is applicable in respect of States and not applicable to the Union Territories and the provisions related to the Scheduled Areas do not apply to the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. It is stated that the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India undertook an interministerial consultations with the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Departmental of Legal Affairs, Govt. of India and it was clarified vide letter No. U-11011/1/2024-UTL dated 06.06.2025 that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution are worded in a manner to make it applicable only to States and not to Union Territories. According to the Counsel for the respondents, the object behind declaration of certain areas as scheduled areas under Article 244 read with the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India is to give special attention for the progress and welfare of Schedule Tribe population within a State and since Lakshadweep is under the direct control and administration of the President of India through Administrators appointed by him, there is no need to notify the area as Scheduled Area. It is submitted that the framers of the Constitution in their wisdom had consciously excluded the Union Territories from Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.
37. I find considerable force in the arguments of the Counsel for the Administration. A reading of Article 244 shows that it applies only to administration of Scheduled areas within a State. A reading of the 5th Schedule fortifies the above view. Clause 2 of the 5th Schedule only makes the extension of the executive power of the State subject to the provisions of the Schedule. That is to say, the State remains in administration. A restriction is imposed by requiring the Governor to submit reports to the President, regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas. To put it simply, it only has the effect of some Central control in relation to the administration of scheduled areas. Once the entire area is made a Union Territory, there is no State Government involved and the entire administration is by the President himself, thus doing away with the requirement of reporting. The 5th schedule does not speak of administration of any Union Territory. Clause 5(2) of the 5th schedule empowers the Governor to make regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area. Once the area becomes a Union Territory, Article 240 will apply, and the President can make regulations for the peace, progress and good Government of the Union territory of Lakshadweep. Thus there is no longer a need to retain the area as a Scheduled Area. The contention of the petitioners based on the definition in the General Clauses Act is totally misplaced in the context of this case. The judgment in the case of Balbir Singh (supra) also does not apply to the facts of this case, since this is not a case of splitting up of a State into two or more States, where all the newly formed States will have the characteristics of a State and there can be Scheduled areas within any of such newly formed States. In the case at hand, the portion removed from the Madras State is to be administered directly by the President, without any intermediary of a State, as in the case of a Scheduled area. I hence find that the Lakshadweep has ceased to be a Scheduled area once it is formed as a Union Territory.
ISSUE Nos. 1,2 and 3:
1. Whether the Administration can treat Cowledars as temporary occupants when Section 84 of the 1965 Regulation declares their rights to be permanent, heritable, and transferable?
2. Whether the Cowledars in occupation of land prior to 1965 and those who are allotted lands under Regulation 14 of the 1965 Regulation form two distinct classes?
3. Whether the doctrine of contemporanea expositio has to be applied to interpret Regulation 83 of the 1965 Regulations and Rule 116 of the 1964 Rules?
38. The counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners are Cowledars in occupation of land prior to 1965 and they are not governed by the provisions of the 1965 Regulations and have become owners of the land even without conferment of occupancy rights. The counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that the 1965 Regulations does not make any distinction between persons in occupation prior to and after 1965, and that Regulation 2(e) includes persons who had been or is granted a lease and that read with Regulation 83 which provides for conferment of occupancy rights to persons who were in occupation immediately before 1965, it is evident that the provisions of the 1965 Regulations apply to all ‘Cowledars’ irrespective of their period of allotment. It is also contended that the holders of Pandaram land based on purchase from the Cowledars are illegal occupants, since Pandaram lands are heritable but not alienable and the right of alienation is available only after conferment of Occupancy Right under Regulations 83 and 84 of the 1965 Regulations. It is further contended that the Petitioners cannot claim title over Pandaram lands based on any custom in view of Regulation 122 of the 1965 Regulations.
39. I shall first consider the question whether the 1965 Regulations creates any distinction between the Cowledars who were in occupation prior to the Regulations and the persons who were allotted Pandaram lands by the Collector for agricultural purposes. Section 14 of the 1965 Regulations does not say that the allotment of Pandaram land for agricultural purpose is a Cowle arrangement, nor does it say the allotment is by way of lease. There is also no corresponding Rule for Section 14 in the 1968 Rules, though Section 14 says that the allotment shall be as provided in the Rules. The conditions for allotment, if prescribed in the Rules, need not be the same as the conditions in a Cowle agreement executed prior to Independence. Rules 7 to 15 of the 1968 Rules correspond to Sections 11 to 13 of the 1965 Regulations. Rule 16 is the only Rule which speaks about allotment of land. However, the said rule only says that all cases of allotment of land shall be disposed of by the Collector subject to such orders as may be issued from time to time by the Administrator. Coming to the definition of the term “landowner”, it speaks about a person who is shown as holding Pandaram land as a Cowledar in the Government records and this can only apply to persons holding land as Cowledars at the time of coming into force of the 1965 Regulations. I hence find that the Cowledars in occupation of land prior to 1965 and persons who are allotted lands under Regulation 14 of the 1965 Regulation form two distinct classes.
40. The next question to be considered is the nature of the holding of the Cowledars. The preamble to the 1965 Regulations says that it has been promulgated to provide for the settlement and assessment of land revenue, rights and liabilities of holders of land and other matters relating to land in the Lakshadweep. The Regulation has been promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 240 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the President to make Regulations for the “peace, progress and good Government” of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. The provisions of the Regulations must be understood based on the above purpose for which the Regulations are made. The 1965 Regulations is a post Constitution statute. One has to hence keep in mind Article 46 of the Constitution of India that comes under the Directive Principles, which says that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Section 2(e) defines a ‘cowledar’ as a person who has been or is granted a lease of Pandaram land. A ‘land holder’ is defined in Section 2(m) as a landowner, a tenant in possession or a mortgagee in possession. Section 2(n) defines a 'land-owner' to mean a person who is the proprietor of a parcel of land under the customary law of the Island or who is shown as holding land as a lessee thereof in the Government records or who is shown as holding Pandaram land as a Cowledar in the Government records or whose name is registered as owner in any register maintained by the Administrator or by any officer authorised by him in this behalf. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the definition of the landowner, as a person shown as holding Pandaram land as a cowledar, in the Government records. Section 2(z) defines ‘tenant’ to mean a person who cultivates or holds the land of a jenmi, a cowledar or any other holder of Pandaram land under an agreement, express or implied on condition of paying rent therefor. Going by the definition, a tenant can be under a private jenmi or under a cowledar or he can be merely holding Pandaram land under an agreement. Chapter VIII of the Regulations deals with occupants and their rights. Section 83 says that the Administrator may confer the rights of occupancy on a person who was occupying Pandaram land as a cowledar before the commencement of the Regulation and any other person who is in occupation of Pandaram land at the commencement of the regulation or any person who may be allotted Pandaram land under Section 14. Thus, occupancy right can be conferred on three categories of persons, one of which is a Cowledar in possession at the commencement of the Regulations. Section 84(1) says that the rights of an occupant in his land shall be permanent, heritable and transferable and this will apply to all the three categories of persons who can be issued with occupancy right. Section 84(2) says about the entitlement of the occupant, by himself, his servants, tenants, agents or other representatives to erect buildings, construct wells or tanks or make other improvement thereon. The above sub-section can only be referring to actions taken after conferment of occupancy right and cannot be referring to Cowledars who have already erected buildings or constructed wells or created tenancies, much before the 1965 Regulations. Section 86 gives fixity of tenure to every person who holds land for cultivation as a tenant other than as a Nadapu tenant from a landowner immediately before the commencement of the Regulations. The corollary is that if a Cowledar, who is a landowner going by the definition, creates a tenancy of the pandaram land in his possession, the tenant under him will be entitled to fixity of tenure, going by Section 86. It will be paradoxical to say that the landowner who gave the tenancy will be liable to be evicted for want of conferment of occupancy right, but it he had parted possession to a tenant, his tenant will be entitled to fixity of tenure. It is to be noted that there is no prohibition in the 1965 Regulations to creation of tenancy by the Cowledar.
41. Section 95 gives a first option to the tenant to purchase the land occupied by him if the landowner intends to sell the land. Section 97 provides for purchase of land by the tenant who enjoys fixity of tenure. The 1968 Rules were issued under Section 121 of the 1965 Regulations. Section 121 empowers rule making on several aspects including disputes regarding rights in or over any property claimed by or against the Government, procedure for summary eviction of trespassers on pandaram land, grant of permission to use agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, and determination of compensation for improvements to tenants who are evicted from land. Rule 47 of the 1968 Rules provides for preparation of land register in which the names of tenants or other persons who have interest in the land are to be entered in addition to the names of the land holders. Rule 47(6) says that the occupants of pandaram lands may be asked by general notice to apply for rights of occupancy if they satisfy the conditions prescribed. A reading of Section 83 along with Rule 47(6) would indicate that persons who were holding pandaram lands as on the date of the Regulation and entitled to occupancy rights were to complete the process immediately. The Rules laid down a process whereby pattas are to be issued. Rule 116 deals with occupants and their rights. It speaks about the conditions subject to which, the right of occupancy may be conferred. In 1979, the Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979 was framed. Having narrated the legal provisions, I shall consider the arguments of the petitioners and respondents.
42. The petitioners contend that even though the Rules were framed in 1968, 1509 applications for conferment of occupancy rights are pending before the authorities. This fact is seen from Ext.P14 produced along with W.P.(c)24680 of 2024, which is a Report of the Committee to address land related issues for holistic development of identified islands of Lakshadweep. The report says that steps for issuance of occupancy right was taken during 1968, 1969 and 2013 but were inconclusive and that 1509 applications were pending and it is possible that several others might not have applied. The report also says that the process should be revived. The occupancy right which should have been granted by early 1970s was delayed by the administration for the past more than 50 years and taking advantage of their own failure to issue occupancy right, the Pandaram lands held by the petitioners are sought to be taken possession of by purported exercise of proprietory right over the land. It is settled law that even an owner cannot evict a person in permissive occupation summarily, without recourse to law. According to the petitioners the conferment of occupancy right is only a formality to be completed and the right to be in occupation has already crystallised after the coming into force of the 1965 Regulations. It is in this context that reliance is placed on Rule 116 of the 1968 Rules, which states about the requirements for grant of occupancy right. According to the petitioners, once those requirements are satisfied, the Administration has no other option but to grant occupancy.
43. Another contention raised is that when the definition of a 'landowner' includes a Cowledar of Pandaram land, it does not stand to reason that a person who is already treated as a landowner by the definition under the 1965 Regulations, should also get occupancy rights. It is submitted that occupancy right is necessarily a right which is lesser than a right of an owner and is conferred only based on occupation of the land. It is thus contended that every Cowledar who was in occupation of Pandaram land at the commencement of the 1965 Regulations, becomes a landowner under Section 2(n) and such landowners do not require to have occupancy rights.
44. The counsel for respondents contends that the prescription of conditions under Rule 116 of the 1968 Rules arises only after the Administrator decides to confer occupancy right. It is submitted that the argument of the petitioners otherwise, is ‘putting the cart before the horse’.
45. I find considerable force in the contentions raised by the petitioners. Going by the statutory provisions, a Cowledar in occupation of Pandaram lands at the commencement of the Regulations is a landowner. Going by Section 86, a person in occupation of Pandaram land as a tenant under a Cowledar is entitled to fixity of tenure and he does not even require any conferment of occupancy right. It is incongruous to say that the sub-tenant in occupation of Pandaram land cannot be evicted but a tenant (Cowledar) in occupation can be evicted. Going by Section 22, a Cowledar is liable to pay assessment. A Cowledar in occupation of Pandaram land at the time of commencement of the 1965 Regulations, by operation of law has become a landowner and hence cannot be treated as a person continuing to occupy any Pandaram land without lawful authority, under Section 15 of the Regulations and he cannot be regarded as a trespasser. Section 46 of the Regulations says that an unpaid instalment of land revenue shall become an arrear of land revenue and the person liable to pay will be a defaulter. Section 47 of the Regulations says that an arrear of land revenue may be recovered by attachment and sale of the defaulter’s immovable property. If the contention of the Administration is accepted, then in a case where a Cowledar/landowner defaults payment of land revenue the land which will be attached and sold should be the land over which the Administration is claiming ownership. So is the claim for land revenue, which is to have first charge on the land under Section 44. The Administration cannot be having first charge over their own property. So, unless there is an obligation cast on the Administration to grant occupancy right, which is evident from Section 83 of the Regulation and Rule 47(6) of the 1968 Rules, the attachment and sale contemplated in Section 47 will become an impossibility. The arguments advanced by the Administration are hence against the statutory provisions.
46. Chapter IX of the Regulations deals with the rights of tenants. It contemplates abolition of Nadappu tenancy. It says that on abolition of the Nadappu tenancy under a Cowledar, three fourth of the land will vest in the Nadappu tenant and one fourth will revert to the Cowledar. That is to say, if Pandaram land in the possession of a Cowledar at the commencement of the Regulation is under a Nadappu tenancy, then three fourth of the land will vest in the tenant and balance with the Cowledar. It does not stand to reason that the one fourth which reverts to the Cowledar will belong to the Administration and the three fourth will go to the nadappu tenant. Such an interpretation clearly violates the very purpose of a tenancy regulation. If the interpretation placed by the Administration is accepted, every tenant under the Cowledar will be entitled to fixity of tenure. A Nadapu tenant under a Cowledar will be entitled to three fourth of the land held under the tenancy. But a Cowledar who was the actual tenant will not get any right except the value for the improvement. A reading of Chapter IX of the Regulations will show that it is similar to legislations like the Kerala Land Reforms Act and recognises the rights of a cultivating tenant over the land. A Cowledar who is cultivating the land and is in possession of the Pandaram land at the time of commencement of the Regulations cannot be put in any worser situation than a tenant or a nadapu tenant under him. This conclusion is supported by the other provisions of the Regulations as well. Section 95 considers a situation where a landowner intends to sell the land held by a tenant under him. That is to say, that the Regulation recognizes the right of a landowner to sell the land. Hence, there is no necessity for a Cowledar who comes within the definition of term “landowner” in Section 2(n) to be conferred with occupancy right under Section 83, to perfect his right. The counsel for the petitioners contended that even if there is a necessity to obtain occupancy right, it is not a matter on which the Administration has any discretion. Reference is made to Rule 47(6) and (7) of the 1968 Rules, which say that a general notice is to be issued asking the occupants of Pandaram lands to apply for rights of occupancy and if the applicants satisfy the conditions prescribed, the Assistant Settlement Officer may recommend to the Administrator for grant of occupancy right. Rule 47(8) says that such cases shall be included in the Chitta and patta referred to in Rule 48. The effect of inclusion in Chitta and Patta are dealt with separately.
47. In the above context, it is worthwhile to take note of the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, which was rendered prior to the Independence, in Jogendra Narayan Dhar v. Askarulla [AIR 1937 Cal. 27], dealing with occupancy rights. The learned Judge held that “occupancy rights” are creatures of custom or statute, only in the sense that acquisition of such rights by ryots does not depend upon the bounty or gift of the landlord, but they can be acquired against his will. The above judgment was rendered more than 85 years before the present stand taken by the Administration to the effect that the right is a bounty or gift from them to the natives of Lakshadweep. Instead of progressing, are we, a so called welfare State, moving backward to a period prior to the Zamindari system, I wonder !!!. The above judgment was quoted with approval in a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Chaitanya Charan Nayak v. Manik Chandra Nandy [AIR 1972 Cal. 520(FB)].
48. In view of my conclusion that the Cowledars who satisfy the definition of the term “landowner” need not obtain occupancy right, it may not be necessary to go into the question whether the word “may” used in Section 83 of the 1965 Regulations should be construed as “shall” and whether the Administrator has absolute discretion to grant or not to grant occupancy right. However, for the sake of completion, I shall consider the said aspect also.
49. In Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India [(2020) 13 SCC 56] the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the question as to when the word “may” acquires the meaning of “must” or “shall”. The relevant passages of the judgment are extracted below:
“80. By now it is well established that it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the object sought to be achieved by the legislature through the enacted provision and to prevent its defeat. In order to fulfil this duty, the settled canons of interpretation enable this Court to scrutinise the true import of the usage of “may” and “shall” provisions, as reiterated by this Court in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (2015) 8 SCC 744 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 824] (SCC p. 760, para 13)
“13. A long line of decisions of this Court starting with Sardar Govindrao v. State of M.P. [Sardar Govindrao v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 1222] have followed the above line of reasoning and authoritatively held that the use of the words “may” or “shall” by themselves does not necessarily suggest that one is directory and the other mandatory, but, the context in which the said expressions have been used as also the scheme and the purpose underlying the legislation will determine whether the legislative intent really was to simply confer the power or such conferment was accompanied by the duty to exercise the same.
14. In Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. [Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166] , this Court summed up the legal position thus : (SCC p. 171, paras 7-8)
‘7. … In fact, it is quite accurate to say that the word “may” by itself, acquires the meaning of “must” or “shall” sometimes. This word however, always signifies a conferment of power. That power may, having regard to the context in which it occurs, and the requirements contemplated for its exercise, have annexed to it an obligation which compels its exercise in a certain way on facts and circumstances from which the obligation to exercise it in that way arises. In other words, it is the context which can attach the obligation to the power compelling its exercise in a certain way. The context, both legal and factual, may impart to the power that obligatoriness.
8. Thus, the question to be determined in such cases always is, whether the power conferred by the use of the word “may” has, annexed to it, an obligation that, on the fulfilment of certain legally prescribed conditions, to be shown by evidence, a particular kind of order must be made. If the statute leaves no room for discretion the power has to be exercised in the manner indicated by the other legal provisions which provide the legal context. Even then the facts must establish that the legal conditions are fulfilled. A power is exercised even when the Court rejects an application to exercise it in the particular way in which the applicant desires it to be exercised. Where the power is wide enough to cover both an acceptance and a refusal of an application for its exercise, depending upon facts, it is directory or discretionary. It is not the conferment of a power which the word “may” indicates that annexes any obligation to its exercise but the legal and factual context of it.’”
81. In the present case, as discussed above, the usage of “may” provision in a discretionary manner could lead to highly iniquitous results and leave scope for arbitrary exercise of discretion. Thus, keeping in mind the context, object, legislative intent and the general policy of resolving ambiguities of beneficial provisions in favour of the employees, we hold that the expression “may” occurring in Rule 135 needs to be construed as “shall” and to make it mandatory upon the competent authority to grant specified pension benefits, in line with the spirit of the rule, to the compulsorily retired officer without exception. While doing so, we are not substituting our notion of legislative intent, rather, we are merely exercising the power to choose between two differing constructions in order to further the intent of the legislature, in line with the dictum in Kehar Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [Kehar Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 711] .
50. The situation in these cases at hand are very similar to the situation considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Section 83 of the 1965 Regulation provided for issuance of occupancy right to Cowledars who were in occupation of Pandaram lands at the commencement of the Regulations. From 1965 onwards, though several applications are pending, the Administrator who is to exercise the power was reluctant to do so, despite several communications directing to call for applications and issue occupancy rights. Not exercising the power for more than 50 years is nothing but an abuse and it has led to “highly iniquitous results and leave scope for arbitrary exercise of discretion” which was the prognosis in the above cited judgment. The above fact situation warrants that the word “may” in Section 83 of the 1965 Regulations has to be construed as “shall”. (See also Margoni Yelliah Samayya v. The State of Bombay [1959 SCC OnLine Bom.173] and Dhampur Sugal Mills Ltd. V. State of UP & Ors. [2007(8) SCC 338]
51. Regarding the contention that the maxim contemporanea expositio should be applied while understanding Section 83 of the 1965 Regulations and Rule 116 of the 1968 Rules, in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India [(2006) 7 SCC 1], the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the application of the maxim contemporanea expositio and held as follows:
“119. In Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Assn. Ltd. [(1979) 4 SCC 565] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 572, para 9)
“The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction (Maxwell, 12th Edn., p. 268). In Crawford on Statutory Construction, (1940 Edn.) in para 219 (at pp. 393-95) it has been stated that administrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive. In Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [ILR (1908) 35 Cal 701 : 12 CWN 657] , at p. 713 the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha [ILR (1916) 43 Cal 790 : AIR 1916 Cal 136] has been stated by Mookerjee, J., thus:
‘It is well-settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it. I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretation has by any means a controlling effect upon the courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises, have to be disregarded for cogent and persuasive reasons, and in a clear case of error, a court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction.’ ”
52. The contemporaneous exposition in the case at hand can be seen from the letter No.1/19(46)/70 ANL (pt) dt.24-11-1971 of MHA under the Government of India, wherein the Administration of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep was directed to recognize rights of Occupants of Pandaram Lands who are successors of ex-Cowledars and pay them compensation for land acquired for any government purpose. That was 6 years after the coming into force of the 1965 Regulations. The Administrator had been delegated powers under Notification No.F2/8/68-UTL dt.01.01.1970 of MHA for this purpose. Three years later, the Administrator as per his letter F.No.9/1/74 LR dt.07.01.1974 addressed to MHA accepts the fact that the rights of ex-Cowledars and their successors would have to be recognized and that they would have to be paid compensation for the acquisition of Pandaram Land for government purpose. In the said letter the Administrator had observed that in cases of acquisition of land for developmental programmes, which are meant for common good of the community, the individuals cannot be made to suffer by asking them to part with their land free of compensation. The Administrator even suggested that for the purpose of payment of compensation to the coweldars of Pandaram Lands, a principle similar to the one followed while terminating Nadappu Tenancy as per Section 85(2) of the 1965 Regulation can be followed and 75% of the land value in respect of Pandaram Lands may be paid to the Coweldars in all acquisition cases, in addition to the value of improvements if any belonging to them. Much later, in Office order dated 11.02.2013 by Administration of the Lakshadweep issued guidelines to be adhered to while dealing with Pandaram lands under the Union Territory of Lakshadweep. The letter directed the District Collectors to process individual cases of Pandaram Land for granting occupancy rights in terms of section 83 of LRT Regulations, 1965 based on the applications from the land holders and submit it to the competent authority for approval. The present holders of Pandaram land and persons who obtained such land by transfer like sale deed, partition deed, gift deed etc were to be instructed to apply for Occupancy Right. It was directed to maintain the permission under the Lakshadweep (Diversion of Land use) Rule 2003 which was granted since long. It was also stated that as these types of lands have been freely transferred since long time and no orders for the stoppage of transfer/registration have been issued by the Administration in this regard, the status quo in that regard be maintained. It can thus be seen that the manner in which the provisions were understood after they came into force in 1965, for more that 50 years, support the contentions of the petitioners. Exts.P19 to P21 produced along with W.P.(C)No.24680 of 2024 would show that the holders of such land treated as entitled to land value and compensation was paid to them when such lands were taken over for public purposes as early as in 1986. It can also be seen from the said documents that such lands were being registered in the names of the holders earlier, but registration was stopped on oral directions from higher authorities. Ext.P24 produced along with the above writ petition is the copy of the relevant pages of the 24th report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes presented before the Fifth Lok Sabha on 10.08.1973, which was more than 50 years ago. It can be seen from the report that the 1965 Regulations was intended to be a comprehensive law which contemplated more progressive land reforms such as abolition of Nadappu Tenancy, conference of occupancy right on Cowledars and other persons in occupation of pandaram (Government) land, fixity of tenure to tenants and Kudiyans, etc., and to bring in a new era of prosperity and security to the people of the Union Territory. One fails to understand how a progressive legislation can get converted into a regressive legislation after about 60 years. A different understanding of the provisions of the 1965 Regulations is sought to be introduced only in 2023, possibly after the judgment in Union of India v. Sekkummada Attakoya [2023 KHC 9291], which will be considered later. These cases are hence fit cases where the maxim contemporanea expositio is to be applied. (See also S.B.Bhattacharjee v. S.D.Majumdar & Ors. [(2007) 10 SCC 513].
ISSUE No.4: Whether the petitioners can be treated as registered holders on issuance of rough pattah and whether after issuing Rough Pattah and finalising the same, the respondents are estopped from taking away the land?
53. The counsel for the respondents contends that issuance of Rough Pattah, by itself, will not confer any right on the petitioners. It is submitted that Rule 48 (3) (b) and FORM 10 of the 1968 Rules, makes it clear that the preparation of Rough Pattah is only for the assessment of land revenue. In FORM 10, distinction is made between ‘Janmam land’ and ‘Pandaram Land’. It is contended that the issuance of Rough Pattah is not a step towards the issuance of rights of occupancy, but a step towards preparation of settlement registers and assessment of land revenue. It is argued that the definition given to the terms ‘Registered Holder’ and ‘Registered land’ under Lakshadweep Survey and Boundaries (Supplementary) Rules, 1972 will not help the petitioners. It is submitted that the term ‘Pandaram land’ is defined under the 1965 Regulations as the land in which Govt. has proprietary right immediately before the commencement of the Regulations and in the Lakshadweep Survey and Boundaries (Supplementary) Rules, 1972, the term ‘Registered Land’ is defined as any land the proprietary right of which does not vest in the Government. It is hence contended that ‘Registered land’ is ‘janmam land’ and does not include ‘Pandaram land’. It is also argued that as per Section 2(m) of the 1965 Regulations, a land holder is defined to mean a landowner and since landowner includes a Cowledar, land holder will also include Cowledar.
54. The contentions of the counsel for the respondents are not legally sustainable. It may be true that the purpose of rough pattah and rough chitta are for assessment of land revenue. However, it can be seen from Rule 47 that inclusion in rough chitta and patta presupposes the existence of an application for rights of occupancy and that the same has been recommended by the Assistant Settlement Officer. It cannot hence be disputed that the petitioners who have been issued with rough patta are persons who had applied for occupancy rights and the same had been recommended. Form 8 under Rule 48(3)(a) is prepared in respect of the Registered holder/tenant and has a column for Patta Number. Form 10 under Rule 48(4)(a) relating to Rough Patta is also issued with reference to Registered holder/tenant. The distinction sought to be made by the Counsel for the respondents that it refers to Pandaram land and jenm land is totally misplaced, since the rule requires that the name of the tenant, persons having interest in land as well as the name of land holders must be entered in the Form. There can be a tenant in jenm land as well as in Pandaram land. So also, the Registered holder may be holding pandaram land or jenm land. Hence, a Cowledar who has been issued with rough patta is a person who is entitled to be issued with an occupancy right, since going by the Rules the rough patta can be issued only if such persons have applied for occupancy right and the same has been recommended.
ISSUE No.5: Whether the Administration is entitled to take advantage of the inaction in issuing occupancy right to persons whose applications are pending since 1965?
55. Regarding the argument that the applications for occupancy right are pending with the Administrator since 1964, it is contended by the counsel for the respondents that the Administration has issued Occupancy Rights to Cowledars of Minicoy Island and that mere pendency of application for occupancy rights will not make the petitioners owners of Government land. It is also contended that no Rules have been framed laying down the procedure to scrutinise the applications and to pass orders thereon. It is contended that the Government needs land for public purposes and the said need will have preference over individual needs/rights. The above arguments cannot be countenanced. As I have already held, the Cowledars who are also landowners do not need to be conferred with occupancy right. Hence, if the Government needs their land, the same will have to be acquired in accordance with law and cannot be taken possession under the pretext that the Administration owns the land. It is admitted that occupancy right has been conferred in Minicoy. There is no justification for not issuing the same in the other parts of the island. The Administration cannot take advantage of their own wrong in performing their duties under the Regulations for over 50 years and claim that they remain as owners. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the Government of India vide letter No. U- 14011/47/74-ANL dated 18.08.1975, recognises the right of occupants of Pandaram land to get full compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, in case of requirement of Pandaram land for public purposes. It is submitted that, based on the above, the Administration has been paying full compensation to the Cowledars, whose lands were acquired. The said letter was withdrawn in 2023 when these Writ Petitions were pending, to defeat the claims of petitioners. The Counsel for the respondents argued that the letter dated 18.08.1975 has no statutory backing, and that since the Administration owns Pandaram lands as per the 1965 Regulations, it is not possible for the Government to acquire the land after paying compensation. It is argued that no estoppel can be claimed based on such an executive order. It is submitted that the mistake was corrected by the letter dated 20.12.2023, by withdrawing the earlier letter dated 18.08.1975. Reliance is sought to be placed on the judgment dated 06.06.2008 in E.P.Attakoya Thangal v. The Union Territory of Lakshadweep & Ors. [WP(C) No.28018 of 2006], wherein it was held that the question of Cowledars becoming entitled for getting value of the acquired lands as compensation for the acquisition can arise only if the Administrator has conferred occupancy rights invoking Regulation No. 83 of the 1965 Regulation. I have gone through the above judgment. In the said case, the learned Single Judge was considering the case of Kacheri Pandaram land that was in the possession of the Administration and where the Coir departments building was situated. The said building was demolished and one Barkath Bhavan building was put up there. Subsequently the said building was also demolished and an approach road from main road was constructed. It was admittedly not a land on which a Cowledar tenancy had been given. The finding of the Court was that the land never belonged to the petitioner before the court or his ancestors and that name of the petitioner’s father was never recorded in the revenue records of 1934-36 or in any prior or subsequent records as owner or Cowledar. It was on the above facts that the learned Judge observed that the right to compensation can arise only if the Administrator has conferred occupancy right to the petitioner invoking Section 83 of the 1965 Regulation. A reading of the judgment will show that none of the other statutory provisions have been considered and that this Court had never considered the question whether Cowledar who is a landowner, as defined under the Regulation, has to obtain occupancy right. The judgment cannot be treated as a precedent for the said issue. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Union of India v. Sekkummada Attakoya [2023 KHC 9291]. The above judgment was in an appeal filed by the Administration against the judgment of the District Court, Lakshadweep granting compensation for acquisition of land. The contention of the Administration was that the land in question was Pandaram land and that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation. This Court modified the decree setting aside the additional compensation granted by the trial Court, than what was granted by the Administration. The Administration had awarded land value of Rs.62,500/- in the case though they contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to land value. This Court noted the judgment in E.P.Attakoya Thangal (supra) and found that the plaintiff was claiming right as a Cowledar and was not the title holder of the property. In the said judgment also, this Court did not consider the question whether a Cowledar in occupation of Pandaram land from prior to 1965 and is included within the definition of the term “landowner”, had to be conferred with an occupancy right also for perfecting his right over the land. The Court also did not consider any of the provisions of the 1965 Regulations, other that Section 83 to hold that the Cowledar has no right over the land. The said judgment also cannot be treated as a precedent for the purpose of these writ petitions. Since neither of the decisions have considered the question whether a Cowledar holding Pandaram land when the 1965 Regulations came into force and has been recognized as a landowner as per the definition of the term, is required to obtain occupancy right, the judgments are not precedents as they are sub silentio regarding the said legal issue. With all respects at my command, I am of the view that the judgments cannot be treated as precedents as they fall under both the exceptions, per incuriam and sub silentio. The judgments have not considered any of the statutory provisions contained in the 1965 Regulations dealing with the right of the Cowledars who were in occupation on the date of coming into force of the Regulation and has considered only Section 83 of the 1965 Regulations. [See the decisions in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. [(2001) 6 SCC 356], N. Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala [(2004) 13 SCC 217], State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139], Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [(2018) 3 SCC 412] and Haris K.M. & Ors. V. Jahfar K. & Ors. [2020 (5) KHC 123 (FB)].
ISSUE No.6: Whether Cowledars are entitled to fixity of tenure?
56. Regarding the argument of the petitioners that Cowledars are tenants and as per Section 86 of the 1965 Regulations, tenants have fixity of tenure and can be evicted only as per procedure established by law, the respondents contended that if the petitioners claim to be tenants, they cannot claim ownership, which is vested with the Government. It is submitted that the petitioners do not have valid tenancy as of now as the original term of Cowle is already over. It is also submitted that the petitioners are not Cowledars and are either purchasers of Pandaram land from Cowledars or their descendants. It is argued that such sale of Pandaram land is illegal as the Pandaram lands are not transferable. As per the Cowle agreement which existed since 1885 the Leases (Cowls) of Pandaram Lands are governed by the terms of the agreement executed between the then Government and the occupants. None of the terms and conditions therein prohibit transfer of rights over the property. On the other hand, there are specific stipulations which clearly indicate the right of the occupants to assign the rights over the property. For example, one clause in a Cowle agreement executed in 1931, produced in one of the writ petitions, says that all changes of ownership shall be immediately reported to Amin. The lessee is referred to in several clauses in the agreement as “you, your heirs, representatives or assigns” which also indicates transferability. In clause 6 of the agreement, there is an undertaking by the Collector of Madras, representing the lessor, that the allottee, his heirs, representatives or assigns shall not be ousted otherwise than as contemplated in the agreement. It is also submitted by the petitioners that change of ownerships have been reported, and the same has been recorded by the concerned authority in the revenue records. The petitioners have also produced ownership certificates issued to them regarding their holdings. All the above factors go against the claim of the respondents that all the Pandaram lands still belong to them. I have already held that Cowledars in possession of Pandaram land in 1965 are landowners and do not require any conferment of occupancy right. It follows that they cannot be dispossessed except by authority of law.
ISSUE No.7: Whether the 1965 Regulations mandate obtaining of occupancy right by persons who are landowners as per the definition of Section 2(n)(iii)?
57. The above issue has already been answered while answering the issues 1 to 3. Hence there is no further elaboration required. ISSUE No.9: Whether Section Section 2 (n), 11 and 33 of the 1965 Regulation must be interpreted in the light of Art.300A of the Constitution?
58. In view of my findings on the other issues, this question does not require any further consideration.
ISSUE No.10: Whether the repeal of the 2020 amendment by 2023 amendment is bad for want of consultation with SC/ST Commission?
ISSUE No.14: Whether the omission of Section 15A by the Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulations, 2023 is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violative of the vested rights of the islanders.
59. Regarding the argument of the petitioners that 2020 amendment to the 1965 Regulation is a beneficial legislation, that as per Article 338A of the Constitution, consultation with SC/ST Commission is mandatory, that then 2020 amendment was brought in after consultation with SC/ST Commission, and that 2020 amendment was repealed by 2023 Amendment without consulting the SC/ST Commission, thus making the amendment unconstitutional, the counsel for the respondents submitted that the Laccadive Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation, 2020 was never notified by the Administrator in the Official Gazette and hence cannot be held to have come into effect. It is submitted that Clause (9) of Article 338A of the Constitution provides for consultation on major policy matters affecting Schedule Tribes and in the instant case, the intention of the Government is to take possession of Government land from its allottees for public purposes, in public interest. It is argued that such actions are routine administrative actions taken by all the governments regularly and cannot be termed as a major policy matter demanding consultation with National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. The relevant portions of Article 338 of the Constitution reads thus;
“Art.338A. National Commission for Scheduled Tribes- (1) There shall be a Commission for the Scheduled Tribes to be known as the National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(9) The Union and every State Government shall consult the Commission on all major policy matters affecting Scheduled Tribes.”
60. By the 2020 Amendment, which was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary on 18.03.2020, Section 15A was inserted after Section 15 of 1965 Regulations, which read as follows:
"15A. Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 14, 15, 83 and any other provisions of this Regulation and the rules made thereunder, where, a transfer by way of sale or gift of any pandaram land has been made on or before the 31st day of December, 2019, between— (a) the original allottee under section 14 or his legal heir and successor and the Scheduled Tribe Islander; or (b) the cowledar or his legal heir and successor and the Scheduled Tribe Islander, such transfer shall be deemed to be a valid transfer for all purposes under this regulation, and the Scheduled Tribe Islander who is in possession of such pandaram land shall be deemed to be— (i) the allottee of the land under sub-section (1) of section 14; (ii) in occupation of the land with lawful authority under section 15, and shall be eligible to be conferred rights of occupancy under section 83.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression "Scheduled Tribe Islander" shall mean a person who belongs to any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community specified in Part I of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) (Union Territories) Order, 1951.’'
61. It is worthwhile to understand the actions that preceded the amendment of 2020. Ext.P15 produced along with W.P.(C) No.24680/2024 is the draft note for the Cabinet received from the Ministry of Home Affairs regarding the amendment of the 1965 Regulations, which was placed as Agenda Item No.118.05 of the 118th meeting of the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes held on 27.8.2019. The note identifies the requirement of issuance of occupancy rights under Section 83 of the Regulations, that applications in that regard were kept pending for several years due to non existence of provisions for regularisation and that this resulted in the Scheduled Tribe occupants of Pandaram land being deprived from getting their statutory rights of occupancy.(emphasis supplied). The note concludes stating that the amendment is intended to serve the legislative intention behind the Regulations, which was to protect the interests of the Scheduled Tribe holders/possessors of Pandaram lands. The amendment recognised the transfers made by a Cowledar to a Scheduled Tribe Islander on or before 31.12.2019. However, Section 15 A was omitted as per Section 2 of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation, 2023, which said that Section 15A of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Regulation) shall be omitted. The Gazette Notification of the 2023 Amendment does not state any specific reason for omitting the provision after 3 years. Since the 2020 amendment specifically says that it will come into force on such day as the Administrator may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. An executive action is hence required to bring into force the amendment. According to the respondent, no notification was issued fixing the date of coming into force of the amended regulation. The respondents are not entitled to put forth their lethargy and mistakes in support of an illegality. The contention that consultation with the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes is not a mandatory requirement and the absence thereof will not affect the validity of the 2023 amendment cannot be accepted in the light of the fact that such a consultative process was undertaken before the 2020 amendment, and the notes placed before the Commission shows a positive study and discussion of the subject. It is unbecoming of a Government of a welfare State to do away with such a requirement and to withdraw the amendment without any further discussion. The contention that the amendment was not brought into force also cannot be entertained for the reason that it will question the very purpose of the 2023 amendment. There is arbitrariness writ large on the 2023 amendment. I hold that the 2023 amendment is unconstitutional.
ISSUE No.12: Whether the District Collector is empowered to resume land?
62. Regarding the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that the District Collector has no power to take away the land, that there is no enabling provision under the 1965 Regulation or Rules and that rights vested by statute cannot be taken away by executive orders, the counsel for the respondents submitted that Regulation 14 of LRT Regulation empowers the District Collector to allot Pandaram land and that an authority empowered with the power to allot Pandaram land has the inherent power to take the land back. The argument of the respondents are not in tune with the statutory provisions and are liable to be rejected. Section 14 is an enabling provision which permits allotment of Pandaram lands, after coming into force of the 1965 Regulations and does not deal with the persons who were in possession of the lands based on a Cowle agreement. Section 14 does not even state the nature of allotment. As already noted there is no corresponding rule in the 1968 Rules to govern the allotment under Section 14. Hence no power to resume the land can be derived from Section 14. The only other provision is Section 15, which can be applied in the case of persons in occupation without authority, who can be treated as trespasser. None of the petitioners can be treated as trespassers or persons in occupation without authority. Hence all the orders issued by the Collector purporting to resume the lands are without lawful authority and are liable to be quashed.
ISSUE No.13: Whether the Government can bypass the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, by treating these lands as proprietary Government lands.
63. In view of my finding that the lands belonging to the Cowledars or their legal heirs or assigns cannot be treated as Government lands, it has to be held and declared that the petitioners cannot be deprived of their lands without authority of law. It is not necessary to go into the provisions of the 2013 Act and decide on the question as to the manner in which the land can be acquired at this stage since there are no proceedings initiated under the said Act. It is for the Administration to decide whether they want to acquire the lands after giving compensation.
64. In the light of the above discussions, the following conclusions are drawn.
CONCLUSIONS:
(i) The Cowledars, who are in possession of Pandaram lands at the time of introduction of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965, are entitled to be treated as landowners in the light of the definition of the term contained Section 2(n) of the Regulations and obtaining occupancy right under Section 83 is not mandatory as far as they are concerned.
(ii) The orders issued by the officers under the Administration proposing to take possession of the Pandaram lands held by the Cowledars by payment of the value of improvements made by them in such lands are without authority of law. The notices issued seeking to value the improvements are also consequentially bad in law.
(iii) The Cowledars who come within the meaning of the term ‘landowners’, are not liable to be dispossessed of their lands except with the authority of law.
(iv) The Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Land Revenue and Tenancy) Amendment Regulation, 2023 is unconstitutional and not enforceable.
In the result, the writ petitions are ordered as follows:
A. The Orders No.F.No.34/52/2016-LR(PART)/ 1086 dated 07.11.2023, F.No.3/1/2023-DC (KVT) dated 17.11.2023, F.No:34/70/2023- LR/1195 dated 28.11.2023, F.No:34/77/ 2023-LR/1237 dated 18.12.2023 F.No:34/80/ 2023-LR/1247 dated 20.12.2023, F.No:34/42/2024-LR dated 27.06.2024, Corrigendum F.No: 34/42/2024-LR-605 dated 29.06.2024, Notice issued by Deputy Collector in F.No.30/03/2021- SDO(AND) dated 08/2024, Order F.No.14/16/2023-BDO(KLP) issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO(East) Androth(HQ) and Kalpeni dated 01.07.2024, Order F.No: 34/56/2024-LR dated 21.08.2024 and Order issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO(East) bearing F.No: 30/04/2025- DC(AND)/718 dated 22.08.2025, Notice F.No.03/01/2023-DC(KVT)/1121 dated 07.11.2023, Communication No.U- 11024/1/2019-UTL dated 20.12.2023, Order of the Deputy Collector as F.No.10/09/208-DC (KVT)/1264 dated 06.12.2023, and Order issued by the District Collector in Review Petition No.1/2023 dated 1.02.2024, are quashed.
B. Notices issued by the Deputy Collector as F.No.10/18/2023-DC(KVT)/437 dated 02.07.2024, F.No.10/18/2023-DC(KVT)/447 dated 04.07.2024, F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 05.07.2024, F.No.14/16/2023- BDO(KLP) dated 06.07.2024, F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 12.07.2024, F.No.14/16/2023-BDO(KLP) dated 21.07.2024, F.No.14/03/2024-DC(Mcy) Land dated 25.07.2024, Notice issued by the Deputy Collector as F.No.10/18/2023/ DC(KVT)/514 dated 31.07.2024, and the Notice issued by the Deputy Collector cum CEO (East) Androth Island bearing F.No: 30/01/2023-DC(Land) dated 21.08.2024 are quashed.
C. Order issued by the Block Development Officer, Kalpeni Island as F.No.14/16/2023- BDO (KLP) dated 20.11.2023 is quashed.
D. Notification of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy (Amendment) Regulation,2023 dated 25.10.2023 is declared as unconstitutional.
E. The Administrator, UT of Lakshadweep is directed to confer the Occupancy Right to all the Cowledars who were in occupation of pandaram lands at the commencement of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965, and their legal heirs and assigns within 6 months from today.
F. The Administrator of UT of Lakshadweep is directed to take steps to confer occupancy rights to all other persons, who do not fall within the category of Cowledars in possession of pandaram lands on the date of coming into force of the 1965 Regulations, but are entitled under Section 83 of the 1965 Regulations and Rule 116 of the 1968 Rules, on their pending applications or after issuance of necessary general notice as stipulated under Rule 47(6) of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Rules, 1968, within 8 months from today.
G. The District Collector is directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on the review petitions filed by the petitioners, in exercise of the power conferred under Regulation 11(3) read with Regulation 81 of the Laccadives, Minicoy & Amindivi Islands Land Revenue and Tenancy Regulations, 1965, and in accordance with the law declared in this judgment, within 4 months from today
H. The Administrator and the District Collector are directed to dispose of all representations submitted by the petitioners in these writ petitions, touching upon the issues raised in these writ petitions, in the light of the law laid down in this judgment within 4 months from today.
