Urmila Joshi-Phalke, J.
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
2. The petitioner is seeking declaration that he is arrested in connection with Crime No.1022/2025 as well as subsequent orders of remand and detention as illegal and he be released forthwith. The petitioner has also claimed the compensation.
3. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are as under:
API Vijay Gite attached to the Crime Branch Unit – No.5, he received secret information and on the basis of information he along with the other staff members searched the house of co-accused namely, Rahul Masurkar. During the search of the house, they found firearms, live cartridges, magazines, sword, narcotic drugs, which were seized. During the investigation, the provisions of Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (for short “MCOC”) has been invoked against him. The mobile of the co-accused Rahul Masurkar was also seized and it was transpired from the WhatsApp messages that there is cash transaction running into lakhs of rupees with the present petitioner. As the investigation has suspected about the involvement of the present petitioner in connection with Crime No.1022/2025, therefore, he was taken into custody and subsequently arrested.
4. As per the allegation of the petitioner, the police staff, consisting of 8 to 11 officials, came to the house of the petitioner at about 8.50 a.m. on 31.03.2026 and the petitioner was taken into custody from his house at about 8.50 a.m. on the same day. Since then the petitioner was in the custody of police and his free movements were restricted. The police officers arrested him from his house itself by actually touching and confining the body. However, he was not produced within 24 hours before the Court. He was produced before the Court at about 5.15 p.m. As such, the police have put restrictions on his free movement and his liberty was curtailed and he was not produced within the 24 hours before the Special Court. There is a violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India as well as the liberty of the petitioner was curtailed and, therefore, it is a violation of Article 21 also, therefore, petitioner claimed compensation as well as his release forthwith.
5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. He vehemently submitted that there is a violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, as the CCTV footage reflects that 8 to 11 police officers visited the house of the petitioner in the morning. The petitioner was taken into custody in the morning at about 8.50 a.m. and he was produced before the Court on 5.15 p.m. on the next day. There is a gross violation of the provisions of Sections 47, 48 and 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short “BNSS”) as well as Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, thereby violating the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed there under. He further submitted that the FIR was registered against one Rahul Ratnadeep Masurkar of the offence punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 25 of the Arms Act as well as under Sections 8(c), 20(b) (ii) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “NDPS”) and 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act. During the investigation, the present petitioner was taken into custody by restricting his movement without giving him any reasons for arrest. The CCTV footage which he has produced on record sufficiently demonstrates the facts that the petitioner was taken into custody at 8.50 a.m. itself and produced before the Special Court on 5.15 p.m. Thus, he was not produced within the 24 hours. For all above these reasons, the action against the petitioner liable to be quashed and he is to be released forthwith. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Subhash Sharma [Special leave Petition (Criminal) No.1136/2023] decided on 21.01.2025, decision in Writ Petition No.54/2025 [Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra Through PI of Baramati Taluka Police Station] decided on 27.06.2025 and Writ Petition No.5256/2025 [Vitthal Mahadeo Shelar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and anr.] decided on 17.12.2025. He submitted that in all these decisions, the aspect of taking the accused therein in custody and produced them beyond 24 hours is considered and it was held that the custody was illegal.
6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor strongly opposed the said contentions and submitted that there is clear-cut distinction between the term “arrest” and “custody” as well as there is difference between someone who is an accused and somebody who is just a suspect. The definition of “arrest” is not given in any enactment, however, these terms received the interpretations by the Courts through various judgments. These terms have been used at different places for different purposes. Therefore, while deciding the issue as to the period when the 24 hours commences in terms of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) or 187 of BNSS, it is not just the language of CrPC or BNSS assumes importance, but other sections in the Indian Evidence Act equally assume importance. It is settled by the Supreme Court in various judgments that in every arrest there is a custody, but not in every custody there is an arrest. If custody is not by formal arrest, then in that situation, preventing the person for investigation purpose cannot be termed to be his deemed arrest. Section 167 of Cr.P.C. and now Section 187 of BNSS require both arrest of person and detention of a person in custody to start the clock of 24 hours of production. The person claiming benefit of alleged unauthorized detention to be treated as his arrest for starting the clock of 24 hours, therefore cannot just show that he should be deemed to be arrested, but also that it also amounted his custody. Thus, considering the difference between the person who is accused and the person who is suspect also has to be kept in mind because there can be custody of suspect for preliminary investigation, but there cannot be custody of an accused. Now the chargesheet is already filed after investigation and the chargesheet also discloses that the present petitioner was served with the grounds of arrest when he was arrested. This means that there is a compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. and Section 47 of the BNSS. The suspect turns into an accused when he is arrested after completing the formalities of his formal arrest. He further invited our attention towards the provision of the Indian Evidence Act and Sections 24 and 26 in particular and submitted that Section 24 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the expression ‘accused’. There is no reference to expression ‘in custody’ in both the provisions. However, Section 26 as a clear title in as much as confession of accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. Section 26 therefore, not only contemplates a person to be an accused to an offence but also requires that accused to be custody of police for getting benefit of Section 26. Even if the intention of legislature was to give the benefit of Section 26 to a suspect who has not been accused of crime, the provision would have said so. This therefore, indicates that a person unless the person becomes the accused, benefit of the said provision is not available. Similarly, he has invited our attention towards Section 167 of Cr.P.C. and submitted that in Section 167 sub-section (2) the word any person is used an arrest happens only when somebody is accused of an offence and not when somebody is just a suspect. In view of the above provisions, taking the present petitioner in custody cannot be termed to be his arrest in a legal sense. When he was arrested after preliminary inquiry the grounds of arrest are supplied to him and, therefore, there is no illegal detention. Thus, petition being devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on following decisions:
(i) Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh and another Vs. The State reported in AIR 1970 Bombay 79 (V 57 C 11),
(ii) Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another reported in (1994) 3 SCC 440,
(iii) Roshan Beevi and others Vs. Joint Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1983 SCC OnLine Mad 163 and,
(iv) Sundeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2014) 16 SCC 623.
7. Before entering into the merits, it is necessary to understand the difference between the ‘arrest’ and the ‘custody’. Admittedly, the phrase “arrest” is neither defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor defined under the Penal Code or Constitution of India. As per Black’s Law Dictionary, “accused” is defined as involving someone or something implicated in wrongdoing or someone who has been blamed for wrongdoing. A person who has arrested and brought before Magistrate or who has been formally charged with the crime indictment of information. The “suspect” defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary means a person believed to have committed a crime of offence, someone thought to be guilty of malfeasance. As already observed earlier that the term arrest is not defined in any of the above enactment. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the “arrest” as the act of laying hold of. The apprehending of one's person, in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning arrest to catch or to take hold of, seize capture. Arrest the act of seizing or taking hold of. The Black's Law Dictionary in 5th Edition (1979), gives the following definitions :
"Arrest : To deprive a person of his liberty by legal authority. Taking, under real or assumed authority, custody of another for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or civil demand.”
8. This term “arrest” is explained by the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Roshan Beevi and others referred above wherein the Madras High Court after considering the various dictionary meanings to the word ‘arrest’ observes that “Arrest involves the authority to arrest, the assertion of that authority with the intent to effect an arrest, and the restraint of the person to be arrested. All that is required for an 'arrest' is some act by officer indicating his intention to detain or take person into custody and thereby subject that person to the actual control and will of the officer, as formal declaration of arrest is required.”
9. By referring 'A Dictionary of Law' by L. B. Curzon (1979) gives the meaning of the word 'arrest' at page 22, as follows :
"To restrain and detain a person by lawful authority "
10. Thus, after considering the various definitions in various dictionaries Full Bench of Madras High Court held in para No.16 as under:
16. From the various definitions which we have extracted above, it is clear that the word 'arrest', when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. When used in the legal sense in the procedure connected with criminal offences, an arrest consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing, the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested. In this connection, a debatable question that arises for our consideration is whether the mere taking into custody of a person by an authority empowered to arrest would amount to 'arrest' of that person and whether the terms 'arrest' and 'custody' are synonymous.
11. The first limb of submission of learned Public Prosecutor/ Senior Counsel was that sub-section (1) of Section 167 uses the expression “person is arrested and detained in custody". The word 'accused' occurring in the second limb of sub-section (2) of Section 167 refers only that person "arrested and detained in custody." Section 167 is one of the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code commencing from Section 154 and ending with Section 176 under the caption "Information to the police and other powers to investigate". Though Section 167(1) refers to the investigation by the police and the transmission of the case diary to the nearest Magistrate as prescribed under the Code etc., the main object of sub-section (1) of Section 167 is the production of an arrestee before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours as fixed by Section 56 when the investigation cannot be completed within that period so that the Magistrate can take further course of action as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 167.
12. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of Cr.P.C. and Section 35 of BNSS deals with cases where the police may arrest the person without a warrant.
13. Section 47 of the BNSS states that, person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail which specifically states that, every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. It further states that, where a police officer arrests without warrant any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is entitled to be released on bail and that he may arrange for sureties on his behalf.
14. Section 48 of the BNSS talks about obligation of person making arrest to inform about the arrest, etc., to relative or a friend. It speaks that, every police officer or other person making any arrest under the BNSS shall forthwith give the information regarding such arrest and place where the arrested person is being held to any of his relatives, friends or such other persons as may be disclosed or mentioned by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such information and also to the designated police officer in the district. It further states that, the police officer shall inform the arrested person of his rights under sub-section (1) as soon as he is brought to the police station. An entry of the fact as to who has been informed of the arrest of such person shall be made in a book to be kept in the police station in such form as the State Government may, by rules, provide. It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before whom such arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that the requirements of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) have been complied with in respect of such arrested person.
15. Now reverting back to the facts of the present petition. It is alleged in the present petition that the petitioner was though taken from the home at about 8.50 a.m., however he was shown to be arrested at about 8.18 p.m. As per the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the CCTV footage shows that 8 to 11 police officers visited the house of the present petitioner, his movements are restricted and he was taken along with them. However, he was shown to be arrested in the evening at about 8.18 p.m. and was produced before the Court on next day at 5.15 p.m. Thus, he was illegally detained by the police and, therefore, the action initiated by the police requires to be quashed and set aside.
16. As far as this allegation is concerned, the CCTV footage was placed before us in a Pen Drive. We have seen the said CCTV footage in presence of learned APP as well as learned counsel for the petitioner. On perusal of the entire CCTV footage, it nowhere reveals that any force was used by the police officers while taking the petitioner along with them. The CCTV footage also nowhere reveals that the activities of the petitioner were restricted and the petitioner was restricted from the free movement. It only shows that the petitioner was accompanied by the police officials and proceeded along with them. The Station Diary entry taken at Serial No.23 dated 31.03.2026 at 12.56 p.m. shows that the petitioner was brought for the inquiry purpose in SDPO Office. The entry at Serial No.12 dated 31.03.2026 taken at 8.36 a.m. also shows that the police officials left the Police Station to trace out the suspect in Crime No.1022/2025 registered under Sections 3, 4, 25 of the Arms Act and under Sections 8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The subsequent entry at Serial No.42 dated 31.03.2026 shows that during inquiry and investigation, it revealed that the present petitioner was having monetary transactions with the other co-accused in illegal business of trafficking of the Narcotic Drugs and, therefore, he was arrested after his medical examination. The said entry further discloses that his relatives i.e. his uncle was informed about his arrest. The grounds of arrest are also supplied to him and mentioned in the said General Diary entry. The grounds of arrest which are reproduced as under:
17. Thus, the documents on record shows that initially, the petitioner was brought to the Police Station for inquiry purpose and thereafter, after inquiry his involvement revealed and hence, he was arrested. His arrest was at about 8.18 p.m. and he was produced before the Court on the next day 5.15 p.m. i.e. within 24 hours.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the petitioner was kept in illegal detention and relied upon on Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Subhash Sharma supra wherein the facts of the case shows that the Apex Court observed that the perusal of the arrest order shows that the typed order was kept ready. The date and time of arrest were kept blank, which appear to have been filled in by hand, which is not the case in the present case. Similarly, in Writ Petition No.54/2025 the facts are not identical with the present case and the order in Writ Petition No.5256/2025 nowhere refers the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another supra. Hence, this judgment is not helpful to the petitioner.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that there is violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
“21. Protection of life and personal liberty-
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
20. Article 22 of the Constitution of India reads thus:
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. -(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply — (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless—
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe—
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under [sub-clause (a) of clause (4)].”
21. Learned Public Prosecutor strongly opposed the said contentions and submitted that the ‘arrest’ and ‘custody’ are not the synonymous words. He also invited our attention towards Section 167 of Cr.P.C. Code now 187 of BNSS and submitted that the language of Cr.P.C. or BNSS assumes importance. Section 167 of Cr.P.C. / Section 187 of BNSS require both arrest of a person and detention of a person in custody to start the clock of 24 hours of production. He submitted that person claiming benefit of alleged unauthorized detention to be treated as his arrest for starting the clock of 24 hours and therefore, cannot just show he should be deemed to be arrested, but also that it also amounted his custody. He submitted that this aspect is considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another supra, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while explaining the meaning of the word ‘arrest’ observed that the word 'arrest' is derived from the French word 'Arreter' meaning "to stop or stay" and signifies a restraint of the person. Lexicologically, the meaning of the word 'arrest' is given in various dictionaries depending upon the circumstances in which the said expression is used. The Hon’ble Apex Court also refers the decision of Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Roshan Beevi vs. Joint Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu had an occasion to go into the gamut of the meaning of the word 'arrest' with reference to various textbooks and dictionaries, the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Halsbury's Laws of England, A Dictionary of Law by L.B. Curzon, Black's Law Dictionary and Words and Phrases. The Madras High Court further refers Sections 41, 42, 43 and 44 of Cr.P.C. and concluded in para No.48 which is produced as follows:
48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police officer and a Magistrate but also under certain circumstances or given situations to private persons. Further, when an accused person appears before a Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the Magistrate is empowered to take that accused person into custody and deal with him according to law. Needless to emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the arrest of the person concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa and that both the words 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. Though ‘custody' may amount to an arrest in certain circumstances but not under all circumstances. If these two terms are interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi.”
22. He submitted that the similar view is taken by this Court in the case of Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh and another Vs. The State supra, wherein this Court has held that mere fact that there may be some restriction on the movements of the accused, or the accused person may be under some sort of surveillance at the time when he makes a confession, would not ipso facto vitiate the confession as being involuntary. It is further held by this Court arrest is a mode of formally taking a person in police custody, but a person may be in the custody of the police in other ways. What amounts to arrest is laid down by the legislature in express terms in Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure whereas the words “in custody” which are to be found in certain sections of the Evidence Act only denote surveillance or restriction on the movements of the person concerned, which may be complete as. For instance, in the case of an arrested person, or may be partial. The concept of being in custody cannot, therefore, be equated with the concept of a formal arrest and there is a difference between the two.
23. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in case of Roshan Beevi and others Vs. Joint Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others supra relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor wherein reference was made on the following questions:
(1) When is a person said to be under arrest?
(2) Are the terms 'custody' and 'arrest' synonymous?
(3) Are the customs officials vested with powers under the Customs Act, 1962 to detain any person for any period and at any place for the purpose of an inquiry, interrogation or investigation?
(4) Will the detention of a person by the customs officers for the purpose of inquiry?
24. While answering these questions the Full Bench has referred the various dictionary meanings of the word ‘arrest’ and the ‘custody’ and observes in para No.16 as under:
“16. From the various definitions which we have extracted above, it is clear that the word 'arrest', when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. When used in the legal sense in the procedure connected with criminal offences, an arrest consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested. In this connection, a debatable question that arises for our consideration is whether the mere taking into custody of a person by an authority empowered to arrest would amount to 'arrest' of that person and whether the terms 'arrest' and 'custody' are synonymous.”
25. The Full Bench of Madras High Court by referring Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. and Sections 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act observed that the word 'arrest' is not used in either of those two sections. Thus, the Legislature has in its wisdom, designedly, used the expression 'in the custody of a police officer' so that there may not arise any legal conundrum even in a case where a statement is made by a person accused of any offence to an authority empowered to arrest him, though not actually arrested but has come only in his custody. The Full Bench further considers the catena of decisions and in para No.37 hold that 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. It is true that in every arrest there is a custody, but not vice versa. A custody may amount to an arrest in certain cases but not in all cases. In our view, the interpretation that the two terms 'custody' and 'arrest' are synonymous is an ultra legalist interpretation, which if accepted and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting in serious consequences.
26. Thus, in the light of the above proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Mahajan and another and Roshan Beevi and others supra, if the facts of the present case are taken into consideration it shows admittedly, the petitioner was brought to the Police Station by police men for the inquiry purpose. The General Diary entry No.12 dated 31.03.2026 at about 8.36 a.m. shows the police persons left the Police Station to search this aspect. The entry No.23 dated 31.03.2026 taken at 12.56 p.m. shows the petitioner was brought to the Police Station for the inquiry purpose. The wordings in the General Diary entries specifically entry 42 dated 31.03.2026 shows that the petitioner was brought to the Police Station for inquiry purpose and as his involvement was revealed therefore, he was arrested at 8.18 p.m. Before his arrest, he was medically examined and the grounds of arrest were also furnished to his relative i.e. his uncle namely Gulam Jamal Bhai Potiyawala was informed.
27. As far as the ground raised in the petition regarding violation of Article 22 is concerned, the General Diary entry No.42 dated 31.03.2026 shows that the grounds of arrest are already communicated to the present petitioner. Whether communicating the grounds of arrest in the manner which is mentioned in the General Diary entry is sufficient compliance or not to be ascertained in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar Vs State of Haryana and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine (SC) 269, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the guidelines for the enforcement of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. This decision sets a clear precedent that the investigating agency/police officer/authorities effecting arrest of any person in connection with any cognizable offence without a warrant must provide specific, actionable reasons for an individual’s arrest, beyond citing broad provisions of law. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest should be communicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly explained in the said decision. On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. This judgment lays down the following principles, which reads as under:
“a) The requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional condition.
b) Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must understand on what grounds he has been arrested.
c) The mode of conveying the information of the grounds of arrest must be meaningful so as to serve the true object underlying Article 22(1).
d) If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).
e) On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing the grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest would stand vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
f) If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed.
g) When an arrestee pleads before a court that the grounds of arrest were not communicated, the burden to prove the compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police authorities.
h) The grounds of arrest should not only be provided to the arrestee but also to his family members and relatives so that necessary arrangements are made to secure the release of the person arrested at the earliest possible opportunity so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) meaningful and effective, failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal.”
28. Similarly, in the decision of Mihir Rajesh Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.2195/2025 decided on 06.11.2025 also deals with the various constitutional rights of the detainee and observes that, the statutory safeguard of legal assistance stands also reinforced by Section 38 of the BNSS 2023, which confers upon an arrested person the right to know the grounds of arrest. Thus, the judgment concludes on the issue which reads as under:
“i) The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023);
ii) The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language he/she understands;
iii) In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the magistrate.
iv) In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free.”
29. A plain reading of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India shows that the intent of the constitution makers while incorporating the provisions was not to create any exceptional circumstances, instead it reads as “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest.” Thus, it casts mandatory unexceptional duty on the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of such arrest with the objective to enable that person to be able to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice. This mandate of Article 22 (1) is notwithstanding any exception. The Apex Court has made it explicit that the constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not statute-specific and it is grounded in fundamental right of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore making it applicable to all offences including those under the IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).
30. In the light of the object behind the Article 22(1), we have to look into the grounds of arrest which were communicated to the present Petitioner. The grounds of arrest shows that, it was informed to the present Petitioner that his involvement was revealed in Crime No.1022/2025. His involvement further reveals in the illegal transaction between him and the other co-accused and he requires to be interrogated on the aspect of disposition of the amount which is involved in the crime. It was further informed to him that his involvement is revealed in a serious offence. Thus, the grounds of arrest specifically states about the allegations which are levelled against him.
31. Thus, by applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra) as well as in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra), the entire object behind the said provision is that the accused should know the accusation against him and the reasons for his arrest. Thus, this mandatory constitution condition here in the present case is fulfilled by the Investigating Agency.
32. The another ground raised by the Petitioner is that he was not produced within 24 hours.
33. Section 57 of the BNSS mandates that the police officer making an arrest without Warrant should without unnecessary delay ensure that the arrested person is produced before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case.
34. Section 58 of the BNSS declares that a person arrested shall not be detained for more than 24 hours unless there is a special order of the Magistrate.
35. It is thus clear that, exhaustive provisions are provided in Chapter V which are designed to prevent the abuse of the power of arrest and the detention of an arrested person by the Police. The logic behind these provisions is clear and that is to provide a person, who has been arrested, to seek for release on bail and in the event of the offence being non-bailable to enable him to secure legal help through his friends and relatives. The Legislature was conscious of the fact that an arrested person can effectively be kept in custody by denying him the right to have access to legal aid for securing bail and hence elaborate measures are also provided to ensure that the friends or relatives of the arrested person are informed of the arrest.
36. The plain reading of these provisions shows that it ensures the compliance of the safeguards provided under Article 22 of the Constitution and to ensure that the person arrested and detained is afforded every opportunity to secure his release in the manner known to law. The explanation of the above provisions relating to the arrest of a person and his detention immediately thereafter has become necessary.
37. The concept of arresting a person is basically to investigate the offence that he has committed by subjecting him to interrogation and to ensure that he does not get a chance to tamper with the evidence or to intimidate the witnesses who may have witnessed his crime or to flee from the jurisdiction of the Court. Ultimately, it is to ensure that there is a smooth investigation conducted by the Police without there being any impediment.
38. Since the detention of a person infringes on his constitutional right to be at liberty, the statute has provided an elaborate mechanism to ensure that this detention is monitored at every stage and every attempt is made to ensure that the detention of a person is always within well-defined parameters.
39. The only question which we are concerned within the above backdrop is whether the Petitioner can be said to be in the unlawful custody or illegal detention. Our answer to that question is in the negative. The record which we have carefully perused shows that initially the Petitioner was brought to the Police Station for interrogation purpose. The various station diaries are referred above shows that at about 8.36 a.m. on 31.03.2026 the police officials left the Police Station in search of this aspect. The present petitioner was brought to the Police Station. The General Diary entry vide entry No.23 dated 31.03.2026 taken at about 12.56 p.m. specifically shows that present petitioner was brought to the Police Station for interrogation purpose and the Station Diary entry at Serial No.42 dated 31.03.2026, 8.18 p.m. shows that petitioner was arrested at about 8.18 p.m. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that he was arrested in the morning itself is not substantiated by any material. Even that submission is not substantiated by the CCTV footage also. As the CCTV footage nowhere discloses that the present petitioner was arrested and his movements were restricted. On the contrary, the CCTV footage shows that the petitioner accompanied by the various police persons freely walked along with them while coming out of the house. As already observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another supra by referring the decision of Full Bench in the case of Roshan Beevi and others Vs. Joint Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu supra that the 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. Though ‘custody’ may amount to an arrest in certain circumstances but not under all circumstances. If these two terms are interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist interpretation, which if under all circumstances accepted and adopted, would lead to startling anomaly resulting in serious consequences. While addressing on the reference wherein the question before the Full Bench of Madras High Court was when a person is said to be under “arrest” and are the terms “custody” and “arrest” synonymous; the Full Bench observed that the terms 'arrest' and 'custody' are not synonymous. It is specifically observed by referring the judgment of this Court that these two words are not synonymous and therefore, the contention of the present petitioner as to the illegal detention and violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India is not correct. The grounds of arrest are also communicated to the present petitioner. The allegation that he was not produced within 24 hours is also not substantiated. In view of that, we have no hesitation in holding that the petition is without any cause of action. The petition being devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed.
40. Rule is discharged.




