Urmila Joshi-Phalke, J.

1. Heard learned counsel Shri M.N.Ali for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor (Senior Counsel) Shri D.V.Chauhan assisted by Mrs.Shamsi Haider for the respondent/State. Rule.

2. By this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing and setting aside order impugned dated 7.4.2025 passed by the Detaining Authority, Principal Secretary, Home Department (Special), Home Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai (the respondent – Detaining Authority).

3. The respondent - Detaining Authority has issued detention order on 7.4.2025, along with grounds of detention, under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short, the PITNDPS Act). As per allegations, since the year 2015, the petitioner has been continuously engaging in commission of violent and other criminal activities. In all, twelve offences are registered against him with Police Stations Dhantoli and Pardi, Nagpur, out of which nine offences are registered under the NDPS Act. Whereas, three offences are registered under Chapter-XVI of the IPC. Despite preventive actions taken on 5.1.2018, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-II, Nagpur City, by passing order on 22.2.2018, externed the petitioner from the limits of the Nagpur City. The petitioner has breached the said order and unlawfully, by entering into the Nagpur City, committed offences. To prevent the petitioner from committing criminal activities, a proposal was sent under Section 110(e)(g) of the CrPC to initiate preventive action against him. Considering the past criminal record, complainant Assistant Police Inspector, Zone-II Squad, Nagpur City, sent a proposal to initiate preventive action against the petitioner on grounds that though the petitioner is in custody, there are chances of releasing him on bail. Considering his past history, if he is released on bail, there is every possibility of involving further in criminal activities. The respondent - Detaining Authority taking into consideration all criminal records and two statements of secret witnesses, is satisfied with the proposal and thereby passed detention order on 7.4.2025.

4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the present petition is filed by the petitioner on ground that there is no independent verification of contents of In-camera Statements by visiting the spot and, therefore, in absence of proper verification, In-camera Statements could not be relied upon for the purpose of passing the detention order. It is further contended that the detention order nowhere speaks about subjective satisfaction and it is extremely prejudicial to the present petitioner. The extraneous material is taken into consideration while passing the order and, therefore, the order passed by the respondent - Detaining Authority is liable to be quashed and set aside.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the said contentions and submitted that the extraneous material is taken into consideration by the respondent - Detaining Authority. The provisions of Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act and Section 12(1) of The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (the MPD Act) are pari materia and, therefore, in view of the decision of this court in Criminal Writ Petition No.223 of 2025 (Akshay Bhaskar Sahare vs. State of Mah. and anr) decided on 30.9.2025, the respondent - Detaining Authority is required to consider prevailing circumstances, which are not taken into consideration. He submitted that precondition for application of the PITNDPS Act is that, the Authority requires to satisfy himself/herself that there is a possibility of releasing of accused on bail.

In the present case, all bail applications of the petitioner are rejected. Thus, there is no reason to pass the detention order by invoking provisions under the PITNDPS Act. Therefore, the order passed by the respondent - Detaining Authority is liable to be quashed and set aside.

6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on following decisions:

                   (1) Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat, thr.his sister K.Archana Chelawat Suganchand Kanhaiyyalal Chelawat, thr. his daughter Km.Archana Chelawat vs. Union of India, reported in 1990 AIR (SC) 1196;

                   (2) Criminal Writ Petition No.2986 of 2025 (Faisal Javed Shaikh s/o Javed Mohd.Shaikh vs. Joint Secretary, (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, PITNDPS Unit and ors) decided by this court on 16.12.2025;

                   (3) Criminal Writ Petition NO.22 of 2025 (Jahanara Bibi @ Jahanara Begam @ Jahanara Mondal @ Janu vs. Union of India and ors) decided by the Calcutta High Court on 25.8.2025;

                   (4) Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India, reported in 1991 AIR (SC)1640;

                   (5) SLP (Cri.) No.18233 of 2025 (Roshini Devi vs. The State of Telangana and ors) decided by the Supreme Court on 8.1.2026 ; and

                   (6) Criminal Writ Petition No.223 of 2025 (Akshay Bhaskar Sahare vs. State of Mah. and anr) decided by this court on 30.9.2025.

7. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State submitted that the order of preventive detention is rendered by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act. As regards the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order has been confirmed by the State Government in terms of Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act and, therefore, interpretation given to Section 12(1) of the MPD Act by the Division Bench of this Court in Akshay Bhaskar Sahare vs. State of Mah. and anr (supra) is to be adopted while testing order of the respondent - Detaining Authority in the present case, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State submitted that obviously the PITNDPS Act and the MPD Act are neither identical nor have the similar objects. Both Acts are enacted with different objectives. The MPD Act is the State Legislation. Whereas, the PITNDPS Act is the Central Legislation. Though purpose of both enactments is to prevent and safeguard interests of society, striking difference between both is different. The entire purpose is to curtail drug trafficking of any quantity and to curb menace of transit trafficking of illicit drug. If compared with provisions of the MPD Act, object of which is basically for prevention and detention of a person whose activities are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The purpose and object of the PITNDPS Act is of much higher pedestal. Keeping the above said facts in mind, whenever order of preventive detention under the PITNDPS Act is tested, the same will have to be tested looking to purpose and object that this particular Act seeks to achieve. The interpretation to provisions of the PITNDPS Act, therefore, will have to be done independently and keeping this object in mind.

He submitted that Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act, if read holistically which on a plain interpretation does not require the State Government to assign independent reasons, the Advisory Board forms a definitive opinion regarding preventive detention of a proposed detenu. The said Section gives discretion to the State Government either to agree or disagree with opinion of the Advisory Board and, therefore, word “May” is used. It is only in case where the State Government decides to disagree with opinion of the Advisory Board that the interpretation of Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act would require the State Government to give independent reasons for its disagreement.

He submitted that if the State Government decides to agree with order of the Advisory Board, which comprises of trained members, there is no contemplation even on plain reading of Section that the State Government should give additional reasons. This interpretation is justified particularly because the State Government’s view with person who has indulged into such activities on regular basis particularly in trafficking of Narcotic Drugs is sought to be prevented by the PITNDPS Act. Once the State Government’s decision, keeping in mind the object of the Act, is approved by the Advisory Board by a detailed order, there is no requirement for the State Government to support its confirmation order with additional reasons.

Thus, he submitted that the respondent - Detaining Authority, considering the material on every level which indicates continuous criminal activities of the present petitioner and on subjective satisfaction based on objective material, has passed the detention order and, therefore, it requires no interference.

8. In support of his contentions, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State also placed reliance on following decisions:

                   (1) Bangalore Turf Club Limited vs. Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, reported in (2014)9 SCC 657; and

                   (2) Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. S.V.Global Mill Limited, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 171.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State and perused documentary material on record, it requires to be considered, whether the detention order is passed after taking into consideration subjective satisfaction and requirements in view of Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act.

10. Before entering into the merits of the case, it is necessary to consider the object of the PITNDPS Act.

11. The PITNDPS Act was enacted to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters concerned therewith. The object of the Act deals with situation that Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and activities of persons engaged in such traffic have a deleterious effect on the National Economy; and whereas having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in which such activities are organised and carried on, and having regard to the fact that in certain areas which are highly vulnerable to the illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, such activities of a considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on, it is necessary for the effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of persons concerned in any manner therewith.

12. Thus, considering the fact that transit traffic in illicit drug increasing day by day and spillover from such traffic has caused problems of abuse and addiction, the Act was enacted. The term “illicit traffic” is defined in Section 2(e) of the PITNDPS Act, which reads as under:

                   “Section 2(e) - “illicit traffic”, in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, means—

                   (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant;

                   (ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant;

                   (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transshipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;

                   (iv) dealing in any activities in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances other than those provided in sub-clauses (i) to (iii); or

                   (v) handling or letting any premises for the carrying on of any of the activities referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), other than those permitted under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), or any rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, term or authorisation issued, thereunder and includes—

                   (1) financing, directly or indirectly, any of the aforementioned activities;

                   (2) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance of or in support of doing any of the aforementioned activities; and

                   (3) harbouring persons engaged in any of the aforementioned activities;

                   (f) “Indian customs waters” has the same meaning as in clause (28) of section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962);

                   (g) “State Government”, in relation to a Union territory, means the Administrator thereof;

                   (h) words and expressions used herein but not defined, and defined in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.”

13. Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act conferring powers on the Competent Authority to make orders for detaining certain persons, for ready reference, is reproduced as below:

                   “Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.—(1) The Central Government or a State Government, or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner) that, with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

                   (2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order.

                   (3) For the purposes of clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.”

14. On a plain reading of Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act, in the light of the definition of “illicit traffic” given in Section 2(e) the PITNDPS Act, it is evident that the Competent Authority, who is vested with powers of detention under Section 3 the PITNDPS Act, may pass an order of detention in following manner, that-

                   (i) The detention order must be based on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority;

                   (ii) It should be with a view to preventing the detenu from committing any of the acts falling within the meaning of "illicit traffic" under PITNDPS Act, and

                   (iii) The prevention of the detenu must be in respect of committing the acts enumerated in Section 2(e) of the PITNDPS Act defining the term "illicit traffic".

15. Engaging in production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption etc. etc. fall within the definition of "illicit traffic". The subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority based upon relevant material is not subject to judicial review by the Court, in that, the Court hearing a challenge against the detention based on subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority cannot substitute its mind for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority nor can it adjudicate upon the validity or otherwise of the detention as if it is a Court of appeal. The law in this regard is well settled. It is only in a case where subjective satisfaction is vitiated by total non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority or the same is based on some extraneous or irrelevant material, the Court would be loath to interfere with the order of detention.

16. In the case of Union of India vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad, reported in AIR 2019 SC 3428, the Hon’ble Apex Court, after after surveying the case law on the subject, cautioned the Courts hearing detention matters in the following manner:-

                   "The court must be conscious that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is "subjective" in nature and the court cannot substitute its opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and interfere with the order of detention. It does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is immune from judicial reviewability. By various decisions, the Supreme Court has carved out areas within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested."

17. It is well settled that the order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose, it is necessary that grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be re- leased from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.

18. In the case of Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down guidelines as to matters wherein detention order can validly be passed; (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav vs. District Magistrate E.T., reported in (1985)4 S.C.C. 232; was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise.

19. In Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar, reported in (1986)4 SCC 416 also, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:

                   “It is well settled in our Constitutional framework that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an pies digit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of our citizens. In the affidavits on behalf of the detaining authority though there are indications that transfer of the detenu from one prison to another was considered but the need to serve the detention order while he was in custody was not properly considered by the detaining authority in the light of the relevant factors. At least the records of the case do not indicate that. If that is the position, then however disreputable the antecedents of a person might have been without consideration of all the aforesaid relevant factors, the detenu could not have been put into preventive custody. Therefore, though the order of preventive detention when it was passed was not invalid and on relevant considerations, the service of the order was not on proper consideration.”

20. In Mortuza Hussain Choudhury vs. State of Nagaland reported in (2025)SCC OnLine SC 50, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, “we may now note presidential law on the subject. In Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India (supra), the detenus were already in judicial custody at the time the orders of preventive detention were passed against them. This Court affirmed that detention orders could be validly passed against detenus who were in jail, provided the officers passing the orders were alive to the factum of the detenus being in custody and there was material on record to justify the conclusion that they would indulge in similar activities, if set at liberty. Reference was made to the earlier decision of this Court in Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar (supra), wherein it was held that there must be cogent material before the officer passing the detention order to infer that the detenu was likely to be released on bail and such an inference must be drawn from the material on record and must not be the ipse dixit of the officer passing such order. This Court, therefore, emphasized that before passing the detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy himself and such satisfaction must be reached on the basis of cogent material that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and, further, if released on bail, the material on record must reveal that he/she would indulge in prejudicial activity again, if not detained.”

21. Having considered the aforesaid decisions and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, admittedly, against the petitioner, approximately, nine offences are registered under the NDPS Act. The chart of the said offences are as under:

                  

                  

                  

22. Admittedly, except Crime No.470/2023, in all other offences, minor quantity of contraband was involved. On the basis of the investigation material and facts available on record, the respondent - Detaining Authority has considered that several offences are registered against the petitioner. It reveals from the grounds of detention that in Crime No.51/2021, he was released on bail on 17.2.2021 and, thereafter, he was on bail. He committed offences in Crime No.159/2021. In the said crime also, he was released on bail on 11.5.2021. When he was on bail, in Crime No.159/2021, another offence is committed by him vide Crime No.348/2021 under the provisions of NDPS Act. In the said Crime No.348/2021 also, he was released on bail on 25.10.2021. Subsequent to releasing him on bail, again, his involvement revealed in the commission of the crime.

23. Perusal of the record shows that in the grounds of the detention, the respondent - Detaining Authority dealt with prejudicial activities of the petitioner engaging himself in the illicit traffic of psychotropic substances and for preventing the same, the order of the detention has been issued under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. The background of the detenu and various incidents in connection with illegal traffic of small quantity as well as huge quantity in Crime No.470/2023 were registered at Pardi and Dhantoli Police Stations, Nagpur. The Authority also considered the statements of two secret witnesses. The Authority has further considered the aspect that in all offences, except Crime No.470/2023, the petitioner was released on bail and when he was on bail, he has committed subsequent offences. The observations of the respondent - Detaining Authority specifically show that on going through the material placed before it, the Authority has considered that all activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and violation of the provisions of the NDPS Act. The Authority has further observed that the petitioner has already filed applications for grant of bail, but bail applications are rejected. The Authority has also considered other three offences registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the IPC.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that as the bail applications of the petitioner are already rejected and there is no sound apprehension that the petitioner would be released on bail, the detention order is without satisfaction that the apprehension in the mind of the Authority that the petitioner would be released on bail and would involve in similar types of activities, is baseless. There is no dispute that earlier bail applications of the petitioner are already rejected in the Trial Court as well as in the High Court. However, considering the fact that circumstances may arise that the petitioner may again move for grant of bail on various reasons and the court can consider these reasons in the light of peculiar facts and circumstances which were prevailing at the relevant time, it cannot be said that the apprehension raised by the respondent - Detaining Authority is baseless.

25. In Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal & ors, reported in (1975)2 SCR 832, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the aspect of extraneous circumstances and indicated that in the case which may vitiate the order of detention such as dishonest exercise of powers and exercise of powers for improper purpose or exercise of powers at the behest of or the threats of some other Authority etc..

26. In another case, in Vashisht Narain Karwaria vs. State of U.P. and anr, reported in 1990 Cr.L.J. 1311, the Hon’ble Apex Court came to conclusion that certain extraneous material and averments which were not mentioned in the grounds of detention might have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority to some extent one way or the other in reaching the subjective satisfaction to take the decision of directing the detention of the detenu.

27. Here, in the present case, the circumstance of the detenu having jumped bail and involved in the similar types of offences cannot be ignored.

28. In view of the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is both inexpedient and undesirable to lay down any inflexible test and question about validity of satisfaction of the Authority has to be considered in the facts of each case. We do not find that if, after recording the subjective satisfaction in the light of the relevant circumstances mentioned in the detention order referring the grounds of detention, the order passed by the Detaining Authority is without satisfaction. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority requires to be subjective in nature. The cogent material and the facts available on record disclose reasoning assigned by the respondent - Detaining Authority. The respondent - Detaining Authority has considered that the petitioner is in jail/custody. However, the apprehension raised by the respondent - Detaining Authority is also reasonable. The application of mind to the aspect of “real possibility of being released on bail” is also based on cogent and realistic material and the same is reflecting and evident from the detention order. The detention order further reflects that awareness of the Detaining Authority of person being in custody and also considered that his bail applications were earlier rejected. However, the Authority has also taken into consideration that there is possibility or real chances of the said person being released on bail and that once the person is released, he would again indulge in the said prejudicial activities.

29. Thus, the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India (supra) are followed by the respondent - Detaining Authority in its true letter and spirit.

30. In case of preventive detention, the Detaining Authority‘s consideration of “real possibility of person being released on bail” is of utmost importance. The powers under the Preventive Detention Laws ought not to be invoked casually. However, it is imperative that the "real possibility of being released on bail", be based on cogent material and arrived at after taking into the consideration the relevant and special laws if any in that regard. Once the said satisfaction of "real possibility of being released on bail" is reached, the next important factor is, of the likelihood of such persons indulging in similar prejudicial activities is to be considered.

31. Considering the record of the present petitioner, it reflects that he was continuously involved in various illegal activities especially activities showing his involvement in trafficking of drugs by violating the provisions of law. It further reveals that despite various preventive actions are taken and despite the order of externment was passed, he violated the order of the externment and committed offences by entering into limits of Nagpur City by violating the provisions of the NDPS Act. The preventive action under Section 110 of the CrPC was also initiated and despite initiation of the said action also, the petitioner’s involvement in the prejudicial activities of illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances reveals which poses serious threat to the health and welfare of the citizen and having effect on the society. It further reveals that the offences committed by the petitioner are interlinked and continuous in character, grave, and executed in a planned manner. There is ample opportunity to the petitioner to repeat the said serious prejudicial acts and, therefore, there is a need to immobilize the petitioner and prevent him from engaging in illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in future by invoking preventive detention law. Therefore, we are of opinion that not only the past acts of the petitioner but also his continuous involvement in such types of activities is sufficient to detain the petitioner. From the grounds of detention, it reveals that there was subjective satisfaction by the Detaining Authority while passing the order.

32. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that extraneous material is considered by the Authority while passing the detention order. For that purpose, he invited our attention towards the fact that while passing the detention order, besides the offence under the NDPS Act, the offences which are registered under the provisions of the IPC, are also considered and, therefore, the extraneous material is taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority.

33. The term “extraneous” generally relates to things originating from outside, not belonging to a specific instrument or being irrelevant to the main issue.

34. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “extraneous” means it generally relates to things originated from outside and not belonging to specific instrument or being irrelevant to the main issue.

35. The extraneous evidence is evidence that originates from outside of written contract and deed or direct evidence of a case.

36. As far as this submission is concerned, we are unable to accept the same as the entire material considered by the Authority is offences registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the NDPS Act.

37. As far as taking into consideration the offences under the IPC are concerned, the same were considered by the Authority only in support of the material i.e. prejudicial activities of the petitioner in commission of the offences under the provisions of the NDPS Act. Therefore, there was subjective satisfaction based on objective material and, therefore, it cannot be said that any extraneous material is considered by the respondent - Detaining Authority.

38. Another submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner is that, Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act and Section 12(1) of the MPD Act are pari materia provisions and, therefore, the observations of this court in the case of Akshay Bhaskar Sahare vs. State of Mah. and anr supra are relevant wherein this court has taken into consideration the aspect of passing of orders by the Detaining Authority in a straight jacket formula without adhering to the prevailing or existing circumstances while confirming the orders.

39. It is rightly pointed out by learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State that though both provisions are pari materia, objects behind both provisions are different. He also invited our attention towards the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. S.V.Global Mill Limited (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in paragraph No.87 as under:

                   “87. At the outset, we have no hesitation in holding that any pari materia provision contained in any other legislation, similar to the one under the 2013 Act, may not have the same meaning and, therefore, a word of caution is required for the Court while dealing with the interpretation of such provisions. The reason is rather simple. Such an approach might destroy the very object enshrined under the 2013 Act, being a welfare legislation. In other words, interpretation of a word or a provision must be made contextually with respect to each statute and, therefore, importing any understanding to a different statute would be fraught with dangerous consequences.”

40. Thus, it is to be borne in mind that the PITNDPS Act is the Central Legislation and has totally different objects. Whereas, the MPD Act is enacted with a different object. To some extent, the purpose of both is preventive and to safeguard the interests of the society. The entire purpose behind the provisions of the PITNDPS Act is to curtail drug trafficking of any quantity to curb menace of transit trafficking of illicit drug. On comparison with with provisions of the MPD Act, object of which is basically to prevent prevention and detention of a person whose activity is prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The purpose and object of the PITNDPS Act is of much higher pedestal. Keeping the above said facts in mind, the order impugned is to be tested and on the touchstone of the object, if the order is tested, it clearly states the grounds of detention wherein the material against the petitioner was considered in detail which is continuous illegal activities of the petitioner prejudicial to the society and, therefore, the order of detention must sustain.

41. The order of detention is further criticized on the ground that the Advisory Board constituted in view of Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act has not assigned any reasons while approving the said detention order. Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act deals with the Advisory Boards. Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act specifically states that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the    detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith.

42. Thus, what Section 9(1)(f) of the PITNDPS Act requires is that if the Advisory Board has agreed with the grounds mentioned in the detention order, it may confirm the detention order. However, if the Advisory Board is of opinion that there no sufficient cause for detention, it has to pass a reasoned order and revoke the same.

43. If the present case is examined, in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it can be said that the first condition, that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention, is satisfied. Second condition, that the Detaining Authority shall satisfy itself that the detenu is likely to release from custody in near future, is also satisfied as detailed grounds of detention are mentioned and the apprehension of releasing the petitioner on bail cannot be ruled out.

44. Though it is vehemently submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that all the bail applications of the petitioners are rejected and, therefore, there is no base for this apprehension, the same is to be considered in the light of the fact that the petitioner may move for bail on other grounds, for example delay in trial or on medical grounds and there is a possibility of consideration of the said grounds and, therefore, the apprehension raised by the Detaining Authority is on the basis of satisfaction.

45. Another condition is that, nature of antecedents and activities of the detenu whether are taken into account and considering the antecedents, it revealed that as and when the petitioner was released on bail, his involvement revealed in the prejudicial activities. The Detaining Authority has further considered that despite of passing of the externment order, which was violated by the petitioner, and involved in commission of the crimes as well as despite of the action taken under Section 110 of the CrPC, his involvement reveals in the prejudicial activities, which are sufficient to show that the entire material was considered by the Detaining Authority and, thereafter, the order came to be passed.

46. In view of that, we find that the petitioner’s acts in prejudicial activities of illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of the society and the offences committed by the petitioner are interlinked and continuous in character and the petitioner has a continue inclination to engage in such prejudicial activities.

47. There is an ample opportunity for the petitioner to repeat the said prejudicial activities and, therefore, there is need to immobilize the petitioner and prevent him from engaging in illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in future in invoking the preventive detention law.

48. We are of opinion that, the power of directing preventive detention or invoking the laws under preventive detention should be exercised in furtherance of the objects of the preventive detention laws. The preventive detention law is to be used in view of the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex court in catena of decisions.

49. Here, in the present case, the detention order is passed by taking into account relevant and pertinent provisions of law. The power of the authority of preventive detention is exercised by taking due care and caution. It is not merely a reference of past acts and misconducts, but it is based on the material collected against the petitioner and also by considering that there is a “real possibility of person being released on bail.”

50. The analysis of the facts is as to there is a possibility of getting bail, which is undertaken by the respondent - Detaining Authority and, thereafter, the order came to be passed.

51. The acts of the petitioner involving himself in continuous activities, when he was released on bail in earlier offences, are jumping from bail conditions.

52. Section 37 of the NDPS Act deals with offences which are cognizable and non-bailable. Section 37(1)(ii) specifically deals with aspect that where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

53. Thus, after recording the satisfaction by the court, that the petitioner is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail, he was released on bail. However, he has contravened provisions of Section 37(1)(ii) of the NDPS Act.

54. We have noted that the respondent - Detaining Authority has specifically dealt with the nature of the offences; the entire material; continuous prejudicial activities, and the possibility of releasing of the petitioner on bail. The respondent - Detaining Authority has also considered that the preventive actions taken against the petitioner were found to be inadequate to curb his illegal activities and, thereafter, the order of detention was passed.

55. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of opinion that the detention order complies with principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India (supra) as it dealt with fact that there is a “real possibility of the petitioner being released on bail” as well as the detention order was passed after considering overall facts and circumstances and, therefore, we are of view that the detention order deserves to be sustained and the petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed and the same is dismissed.

Petition stands disposed of. Rule is discharged.