1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard both sides finally with their consent.

2. Being aggrieved by order dated 10.06.2026, 15.06.2026 and 17.06.2026 passed by the respondent No. 3 – Assistant Registrar confirming the interim winding up orders and passing final order of widening up, the petitioners – co-operative societies and members have approached this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

3. The relevant facts of all petitions are identical, hence this group is decided by common judgment and order. The pleadings are complete in Writ Petition No. 2473 of 2026 and the learned counsels of both sides addressed the Court referring to those papers. Hence Writ Petition No. 2473 of 2026 would be treated as lead petition and papers therein are referred in the text of the judgment.

4. This Court has already considered the preliminary objection of the maintainability of the petitions. By reasoned orders passed on 23.06.2026 and 08.07.2026, the petitions are held to be maintainable overruling preliminary objections, which were not challenged by the respondents before any other forum or the Apex Court. Despite these facts, the learned Special Counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar appearing for the respondent No. 1 addressed on the maintainability of the petitions, which is also dealt with again in this judgment.

5. This Court had granted interim relief by speaking order staying implementation and execution of the impugned order passed by respondent Assistant Registrar, which is in operation.

6. The election of Kolhapur Zilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Limited (hereinafter referred to as the “Federation Sangh” for the sake of brevity) was overdue and the same is directed to be conducted by orders passed by Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1507 of 2026 which are confirmed by Hon’ble Apex Court on 06.05.2026, directing to conduct election of the Sangh within 90 days. The application for extension of the period is pending before Hon’ble Apex Court. The voters’ list of Sangh would be prepared soon and inclusion of petitioners is subjected to decision of this Court. Due to this exigency, petitions are taken up for final adjudication.

7. The petitioners have challenged final orders of winding up passed by respondent Assistant Registrar on various grounds including mala fides, political interference, transfers of officers with oblique motive and vagueness in pleadings. These grounds of objections involve disputed questions of facts which cannot be gone into while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The rival submissions of advocates of both sides in this regard are rejected.

8. At the outset, it needs to be made clear that scope of inquiry under writ jurisdiction is limited to the extent of decision-making process, observance of principles of natural justice, prejudice caused to the parties and violation of statutory procedure and the provisions of law. Having considered rival submissions of the parties, I propose to reason my judgment on following points for determination.

                    : POINTS FOR DETERMINATION :

                    A. Whether the writ petitions are entertainable in the wake of remedy of appeal U/Sec. 104 of the Act ?

                    B. Whether there is violation of principles of natural justice ?

                    C. Whether validity of interim orders of liquidation can be gone into in retrospect while examining final order of winding up of liquidation ?

                    D. Whether there is any correlation of interim order with final order ?

                    E. Whether the due procedure of law is followed before passing impugned orders by the respondents ?

                    F. Whether the respondents are justified in passing impugned orders ?

09. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to state background revealed from respondents that the decision was taken by the High Power Committee of the respondent No. 1 to eliminate the fictitious and non functioning primary milk societies. It was decided to take stock of the functioning of those societies and the action of winding up was proposed. There are 5470 primary milk societies, who are the constituent members of Federal Sangh. Out of them 1320 societies were found to be suspicious and vulnerable. Interim orders of winding up was passed against 1201 societies. Out of them near about 194 societies are before this Court in this group of petitions. Those who did not approach High Court, preferred appeal U/Sec. 104 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act (for the sake of brevity and convenience hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Such 337 appeals are pending before the Assistant Registrar.

10. Following are the undisputed facts in the matters :

                    I Petitioners are primary milk societies, which are members of the Federation Sangh. Few petitions are preferred by members of such primary societies.

                    II No show cause notices were issued to the petitioner – primary societies before passing interim order U/Sec. 102(1) of the Act.

                    III Interim orders were passed on 30.10.2023, 09.11.2023 and 10.11.2023.

                    IV Interim orders were stayed by the learned Minister by undated orders, which were subjected to challenge in Writ Petition No. 994 of 2026. It was allowed on 25.03.2026.

                    V The Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1507 of 2026 directed Federation Sangh to conduct elections, which is further confirmed by the Apex Court directing to complete the election within a period of 90 days.

                    VI Show cause notice dated 13.05.2026 was issued to the petitioners and others. Reply dated 13.05.2026 was filed by the petitioners.

                    VII Hearing was conducted by the Assistant Registrar on 21.05.2026 and 22.05.2026.

                    VIII Few documents were produced by the Federation Sangh before the authority on 27.05.2026.

                    IX Impugned final orders of winding up were passed by the Assistant Registrar on 10.06.2026, 15.06.2026 and 17.06.2026.

Point :

A. Whether the writ petitions are entertainable in the wake of remedy of appeal U/Sec. 104 of the Act ?

11. Learned Special Counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar for the respondent No. 1, raised objection that bypassing the statutory remedy provided U/Sec. 104 of the Act, the writ petitions are filed. Impugned orders are passed specifically U/Sec. 102(1)(c)(iv) of the Act and, therefore, remedy of appeal is available U/Sec. 104(1) of the Act. It is pointed out that 337 primary societies have already availed the remedy of appeal and there is no reason to entertain the present petitions. The petitioners can even take recourse to remedy of revision U/Sec. 154 of the Act.

12. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. S. S. Patwardhan, appearing for the petitioners repelled the submissions on the ground that already preliminary objections are decided by this Court by speaking orders passed on 23.06.2026 and 08.07.2026. The challenge to the impugned order is violation of principles of natural justice, non transparent and illegal decision making process and mala fides. The petitioners are stated to have made the grounds good without referring to the disputed questions of facts. Hence it is contended that there is no impediment in entertaining the writ petitions especially when there is exigency due to the directions of the Apex Court to conduct the elections expeditiously.

13. This Court examined the maintainability of the writ petitions and overruled objections by speaking order passed on 23.06.2026 and 08.07.2026. It was open for the respondents to agitate the objection of having alternative remedy available to the petitioner U/Sec. 104(1) of the Act at that time only. But no such endeavour was made. The objection raised goes to the root of the matter, hence this Court thinks it appropriate to deal with it. The tenor of the pleadings, impugned orders and the submissions would indicate that action of winding up is taken specifically under Clause (iv) of Sec. 102(1)(c) of the Act, albeit show cause notice and impugned order did not spell out specific clause.

14. While granting interim relief by reasoned order this Court noticed main submissions of the petitioners as well as respondents. The violation of principles natural justice in passing interim order as well as final impugned order has been pressed into service. The prejudice caused to the petitioners has also tried to be demonstrated. The decision making process is castigated by the petitioners. The impugned action is stated to be against Sec. 102 of the Act. Its a case of en-masse action of winding up. Before passing of the impugned orders, the directions issued by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court are in vogue to conduct election of Federation Sangh within 90 days. The period of 90 days is over and the order of extension of time by the Apex Court is awaited. The inclusion of the petitioners and other primary societies is subjected to outcome of these petitions. These are the exceptional circumstances which have compelled this Court to entertain the writ petitions.

15. Merely because 337 primary societies have preferred appeal U/Sec. 104 of the Act would not detain this Court to entertain the petitions under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that a drastic action is undertaken against the petitioners which has repercussions of their exclusion from the election of Federal Sangh. Impugned orders are passed onset of the election process.

16. Learned special counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 to advert my attention to following extracts of the judgment :

                    “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.

                    15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed or the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”

17. I find that writ petitions would come within the ambit of the categories enumerated by the Apex Court when alternate remedy does not operate as a bar.

18. Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110. My attention is adverted to para Nos. 43 to 45 of the said judgment. The matters at hand do not involve recovery of any taxes, cess, fees and it is the discretion of the High Court to entertain petitions under given facts and circumstances of the case. This judgment will not help the respondents. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I overrule the objection of the respondents and hold that the writ petitions are entertainable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. I answer point A in favour of the petitioners.

Point :

B. Whether there is violation of principles of natural justice ?

19. Learned counsel Mr. S. S. Patwardhan for the petitioners submitted that undisputedly interim order of winding up was not preceded by any notice issued to the petitioners – defaulting societies and no opportunity was extended to them. It is further contended that the respondent No. 1 – Assistant Registrar conducted hearing on 21.05.2026 and thereafter documents were submitted on 27.05.2026 behind back of the petitioners. Both the orders are stated to have been passed against principles of natural justice.

20. Per contra, learned special counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the statutory scheme of Sec. 102 of the Act does not contemplate issuance of any show cause notice or pre-decisional hearing. It is impermissible to read something into the statute, which is expressly excluded by the legislature. It is further submitted that interim orders were not challenged by the petitioners. The grievance of violation of principles of natural justice was not reflected in reply dated 19.12.2023. The principles of estoppel and waiver are pressed into service against the petitioners. It is submitted that show cause notice was issued on 13.05.2026 before passing impugned order. It is further submitted that petitioners failed to make out any case of prejudice and their grievance of not extending opportunity of hearing is after thought.

21. Interestingly, when this Court passed ad-interim orders on 23.06.2026 by speaking order, submissions of the petitioners were recorded that after conducting hearing on 21.05.2026, documents were produced by the Federation Sangh on 27.05.2026 and those were considered in the impugned order. The petitioners have raised specific ground of objection in the memo of the writ petitions as well as re-joinder that they were not given opportunity to deal with the record produced by the Federation Sangh on 27.05.2026, post hearing. The elaborate affidavit in reply was filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 on 07.07.2026 running into 41 pages. Thereafter, short affidavit was also filed by the Assistant Registrar producing voluminous documents before this Court. No endeavour has been made by the respondents to deal with the objection of the petitioners of producing material on record behind their back and utilizing it against them. Even the notes of arguments submitted by the respondent No. 1 did not spell out any submission in that regard.

22. Impugned orders make reference of record produced by the Federation Sangh on 27.05.2026. While drawing the conclusion, Assistant Registrar refers to the opinion furnished on 27.05.2026 in respect of the data of collection of milk. Thus, it is not the case that only material was placed on record, but that was not considered. When the petitioners were facing drastic action, it was legitimate expectation to disclose them the record to be used against them. It is also not made clear by the respondents as to what was the material furnished on 27.05.2026 before the authority. I find substance in the submissions of the petitioners that the hearing was conducted and thereafter some record was produced clandestinely before the authority, which was not pitted to them. It would amount to denial of opportunity to deal with the record. Impugned order suffers from violation of principles of natural justice.

23. Undisputedly, before issuing interim orders on 30.10.2023, 09.11.2023 and 10.11.2023, the petitioners were not called upon to tender their explanation or apprise them of action U/Sec. 102 of the Act. The respondents have come up with a bold reply that pre-decisional hearing is not contemplated by the statute. It is necessary to reproduce Sec. 102(1) and (2) of the Act, which is as follows :

                    THE MAHARASHTRA COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1960

                    1. ……….

                    2. ……….

                    102. Winding up.—

                    (1) If the Registrar;

                    (a) after an inquiry has been held under section 83 or an inspection has been made under section 84 or on the report of the auditor auditing the accounts of the society, or

                    (b) on receipt of an application made upo a resolution carried by three-fourths of the members of a society present at a special general meeting called for the purpose, or

                    (c) of his own motion, in the case of a society which-

                    (i) Has not commenced working, or

                    (ii) Has ceased working, or

                    (iii) Possesses shares or members deposits not exceeding five hundred rupees, or

                    (iv) Has ceased to comply with any conditions as to registration and management in this Act or the rules or the bye-laws, is of the opinion that a society ought to be wound up, he may issue an interim order directing it to be wound up.

                    (2) A copy of such order made under sub-section (1) shall be communicated, in the prescribed manner, to the society calling upon it to submit its explanation to the Registrar within a month from the date of the issue of such order, and the Registrar, on giving an opportunity to the society of being heard, may issue a final order, vacating or conforming the interim order.

24. Interim order was passed by the respondent No. 1 – Assistant Registrar under clause (iv) of Sec. 102(1)(c) of the Act and for that purpose record of Federation Sangh regarding supply of milk from 01.04.2023 to 10.09.2023 was taken into account along with Government Resolution dated 04.01.2000. There is no express provision of issuing notice to the defaulting societies before passing impugned order U/Sec. 102(1) of the Act. If the action of winding up is to be taken against defaulting society under sub clause (a) and (b) of Sub Section (1) of Section 102 of the Act, inquiry, inspection, report or the resolution of 3/4th members of the society are contemplated, which would constitute sufficient inputs to proceed against such society. In that case, there is no need to issue any notice to the society and on the basis of inputs opinion would be formed for passing interim orders. However, while taking action under Clause (c), the situation is different. The Registrar is empowered to take action on his/her own motion or if it is brought to notice that the defaulting society is guilty of sub clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (c) of Sub Section 1 of Section 102 of the Act. The Registrar is required to form the opinion for exercising powers under clause (c), which must be on subjective and objective satisfaction. Thus satisfaction cannot be arrived at unless there is data or record before the authority. For that purpose it is necessary for the Registrar to call upon the society to submit data or to explain as to why action should not be taken against it. I am of the considered view that the principles of natural justice are in built in Sub Section (1) of Section 102 of the Act, especially when powers are exercised under its clause (c).

25. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chandrapur Zilla Sahkari Krushi and Gramin Bahuudeshiya Development Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2004(1) Mh. L. J. 232. In that case interim order of liquidation was passed against the petitioner – bank, which was impugned before the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the petition. Against that letters patent appeal was preferred before the Division Bench. The challenge was on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Following are the relevant extracts :

                    “14. The crucial issue before us, how ever, is whether the Registrar can take such a drastic decision, even if termed as interim, without hearing the Societies?

                    15. We will begin from beginning of the issue under consideration Section 102(1)of the Act provides for issue of "interim order" directing the Society to be wound up. There is no specific provision of opportunity of hearing to be granted to the society before passing of the interim order under Section 102(1) of the Act. Thereafter under Section 102(2), there is a specific provision to hear the Society before passing of the final order, vacating or confirming the interim order. Section 104 provides for appeal against the final order only. There is no provision for appeal against any interim order passed by the Registrar under Section 102(1) of the Act. In effect, it is clear that there is no specific provision of hearing before the interim order and there is no provision for appeal against the interim order. The Registrar is, however, obliged to communicate the interim order to the Society calling upon the Society to explain before the final order would be passed and such final order confirming the interim order is made appealable.

                    16. It is, therefore, obvious that there is neither pre-decisional hearing before the interim order is passed nor such order is allowed to be appealed against. There is only post-interim decisional hearing before the final order is passed to vacate or confirm the interim order. Section 103 further empowers the Registrar to appoint a Liquidator of the Society, even after the interim order of winding up of the Society. It further mandates that after the interim order is passed the Society shall hand over to the Liquidator the custody and control of all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the Society is entitled and the whole record pertaining to the business of the society and thereafter the Society will have no access to the same. Such is the drastic and draconian provision empowering the Registrar to issue an interim order to the Society to be wound up. There is no appeal also against the interim order. Can it be legitimately inferred that there is no implicit provision of hearing and compliance of the principles of natural justice before passing of such a very harsh and drastic action of ordering the winding up of the very running existing society? The consequence of such an interim order to hand over to the Liquidator virtually the entire Society. Can it be construed that the Legislature intended to put such a draconian power to wind up or wipe out any Society in the hands of a Registrar without hearing before passing an interim order, the consequence and effect of which is not less injurious or harmful than a final order? We do not think so.”

26. The Division Bench further referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of Guwahati High Court and went on expounding ratio of granting of opportunity of hearing and ultimately quashed the interim order as well as final order passed against that petitioner. This Court is bound by the decision rendered by the Division Bench, which is also followed by the learned Single Judge in the case of Deogaon Backward Class Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Through Chairman Mahadeo Pandurang Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Ministry of Cooperation and others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1885.

27. It is vehemently argued by learned special counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar that judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the matter of Chandrapur Zilla Sahkari Krushi and Gramin Bahuudeshiya Development Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) is per incuriam, as the decisions of the Supreme Court are not taken into account. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and another Vs. Tulshiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398. My attention is adverted to para No. 101 of the judgment, which is as follows :

                    “101. Not only, therefore, can the principles of natural Justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can be even be excluded. There are well-defined exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also to the audi alteram partem rule is subject to the doctrin of necessity and yields to it as pointed out by in J Mohapatra Co. v. State of Orissa. So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and India, it is well established that order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant the statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka Gandhi case at page 681. If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can provision of the Constitution, for a constitutional provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision. In the present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly excluded by the opening words of the second proviso and particularly its keywords "this clause shall not apply". As pointed out above, clause (2) of Article 311 embodies in express words the audi alteram partem rule. This principle of natural justice having been expressly excluded by a constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing it by side-door to provide once again the same inquiry which the constitutional provision has expressly prohibited. Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying it would be a mala fide, and therefore, void. In such a case the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. This is, however, the only scope which Article 14 can have in relation to the second proviso, but to hold that once the second proviso is properly applied and clause (2) of Article 311 excluded, Article 14 step in to take the place of clause (2) would be to nullify the effect opening words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the intention makers of the Constitution. The second proviso is based on public policy and is in public interest and for public good and the Constitution makers who inserted it in Article 311(2) were the best persons to whether such an exclusionary provision should be there and the situation which this provision should apply.”

28 My attention is also adverted to the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur reported in 1989(1) SCC 101. Following paragraphs are referred :

                    “11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the court on the question whether or not any direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th End. Explains a concept of sub silento at p. 153 in these words :

A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. The court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court. In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not and authority on point B. The point B is said to be pass sub silentio.

                    12. In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k).2, the only point argued was on the question of priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the court granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; nevertheless, since it was decided "without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority", it was not binding and would not be followed. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority.”

29. The petitioners relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Central Railway Divisional office Employees Consumer Cooperative Society Ltd., Nagpur and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in 2007(6) Mh.L.J. 737. The Division Bench was dealing with communication issued by the railways to close down railway employees consumer society with immediate effect. It was quashed and following observations are relevant.

                    “12. In this situation, we hold that the lapses, if any, on the part of the members of the Managing Committee of the Society need not go un-checked and un-controlled, yet the Railway Administration, who is seriously interested, in cooperative movement as well as orderly organization, and functioning of petitioner society should certainly be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Maharashtra Co-operative Society, and proper action can be initiated. Nevertheless, before taking any serious action, it would be appropriate to meet the obligation required to be inherently followed in the observance the principles of natural justice, which in fact, in case on hand, is not shown as complied with.”

30. In the matter before the Division Bench in the case of Chandrapur Zilla Sahkari Krushi and Gramin Bahuudeshiya Development Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) interim order of winding up passed U/Sec. 102(1)(c)(iv) of the Act was questioned. The interim order was also quashed and consequentially final order of liquidation was also quashed. It cannot be said that relevant provisions were not taken into account and the issue germane was different. It cannot be countenanced for the Single Judge to hold or treat the decision rendered by the Division Bench as per incuriam. The submissions of the respondent No. 1 are liable to be rejected.

31. Learned special counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh and others reported in (2021) 19 SCC 706 to buttress that merely contending violation of principles of natural justice is not sufficient, unless prejudice caused to the parties is demonstrated. I have gone through para Nos. 36 to 40 referring to various judgments. Principles are culled out in para Nos. 42, which are as follows :

                    “42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:

                    42.1 Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.

                    42.2 Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.

                    42.3 No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.

                    42.4 In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.

                    42.5 The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”

32. In the cases at hand after interim orders, final orders of winding up are passed against the petitioners. There is correlation between interim orders and the final orders, which is reasoned in further part of the judgment. The petitioners are primary village level societies, who have suffered drastic action. They are declared to be defunct and consequently they would be excluded from participating in the election. There is reason to infer that they could have demonstrated the respondent authorities that they were functional and actually following the bye-laws of the Federation Sangh in letters and spirits. The marginal short fall in supply of milk was rectifiable defect. There was room for them to show that drastic action was disproportionate. The prejudice caused to them is substantial in nature and writ large.

33. I find that impugned order is vitiated due to violation of principles of natural justice. I answer point B in favour of the petitioners.

Point :

C. Whether validity of interim orders of liquidation can be gone into in retrospect while examining final order of winding up of liquidation ?

D. Whether there is any correlation of interim order with final order ?

34. It is tried to be demonstrated by the petitioners that there is correlation of the interim orders and the final orders. If the interim orders are vitiated, consequentially final orders also become unsustainable. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Chandrapur Zilla Sahkari Krushi and Gramin Bahuudeshiya Development Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) quashed interim order as well as final order.

35. Learned special counsel Mr. S. B. Talekar submitted that interim orders were not challenged by the petitioners before any forum and they are estopped from challenging interim orders. It is further contended that the grievance of non issuance of notice before passing interim orders is after thought because reply filed by the petitioners on 19.12.2023 does not spell out the grievance.

36. The Division Bench in the case of Chandrapur Zilla Sahkari Krushi and Gramin Bahuudeshiya Development Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) was examining interim order of liquidation. It was pointed out that by the supervening events final order of liquidation was also passed against the then appellant. It is apposite to reproduce following observations of the Division Bench.

                    “20. We are informed that the Registrar has passed the final orders under Section 102(2) ordering final winding up of the Societies during the intervening period. It is needless to say that the consequences of quashing the interim order would be that the final orders would also fall as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Haribhau Dagdu Tandale v. Industrial Co-operative Association Ltd., JT 1996(9) SC 211 The Apex Court in para 14 observed thus :

                    "The Government while considering the appeal of the first respondent under Section 104 and on coming to know of the developments pending appeal namely the sale of society's land invoked the power under Section 154 to find out the propriety and legality of the sale. It is not the case of the appellant that an appeal lies against the sale by the liquidator. Therefore, the exercise of power by the Government under Section 154 cannot be faulted. Here again there is no substance in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel. The other contention that the interim order merges with final order and therefore, in the absence of any separate appeal against the final order, the appeal against interim order will become infructuous, is also without substance. If the foundation is knocked of, structure standing on it cannot stand in the air, automatically falls down. The interim order is expressly liable to be confirmed or vacated by the authority who passed the interim order. That being the position, the appellate authority who has a right to decide all the correctness of an, interim order cannot be denuded from considering the same on the ground that a final order has been passed pending appeal. The merger theory will not apply to the instant case. Therefore, the High Court was right in rejecting such a contention. The contention based on Section 103(6) also not acceptable as "acts done" contemplated in that section will cover only legally carried out acts and not otherwise. Here the sale by liquidator pending appeal before Government was in contravention of Sections 105 and 106. Hence, no help can be derived from Section 103(6) of the Act."

37. The ratio of the Division Bench is followed by the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Deogaon Backward Class Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Through Chairman Mahadeo Pandurang Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Ministry of Cooperation and others (supra). I have no alternative than to follow the ratio referred for rejecting the submissions of the respondents.

38. Additionally, I find that the action U/Sec. 102(2) of the Act cannot be taken independently or directly without following the interim stage contemplated by Sub Section (1) of Section 102 of the Act. It is impermissible to pass order of winding up without there being any interim order. The power to pass final order under Sub Section (2) of Section 102 of the Act is couched with either vacating or confirming the interim order. Any independent recourse to winding up is not contemplated by the legislature. Therefore, it has to be held that unless there is interim order under Sub Section (1) of Section 102 of the Act, there cannot be final order under Sub Section (2) of Section 102 of the Act. If the interim order is defective or illegal, there is reason to infer that the defect or illegality gets perpetuated in the final order also. Therefore, while examining the final order passed under Sub Section (2) of Section 102 of the Act, the validity of the interim order in retrospect needs to be gone into. In such a peculiar situation and the frame work the interim order would get merged into final order. But still interim order would be within judicial review. Accordingly, I answer point Nos. C and D in affirmative.

Point :

E. Whether the due procedure of law is followed before passing impugned orders by the respondents ?

39. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that notice dated 13.05.2026 is vague and inconsistent with interim orders passed on 09.11.2023 and 10.11.2023. It is submitted that the petitioners produced documents before the authority to show that in the year 2023 the short fall in supply of milk was due to outbreak of Lumpy skin disease . The record has not been taken into consideration. It is tried to be demonstrated from rejoinder that there was no short fall of supply of milk from 01.04.2023. It is further submitted that initially petitioners were called upon to disclose supply from 01.04.2023 to 01.09.2023, which is not adhered to while passing final order. It is further submitted that application of Government Resolution dated 04.01.2000 is misplaced. It is further submitted that stand of the respondents is inconsistent and only farce was made to show meeting of 27.09.2023. The data was available on 22.09.2023 itself. It is submitted that no objective scrutiny was conducted and the impugned decision was predetermined.

40. Per contra, Mr. S. B. Talekar, learned special counsel has referred to affidavit in reply to make out a case that due procedure was followed in arriving at the impugned order. It is submitted that objective scrutiny of each and every petitioner was conducted after considering the record. It is submitted that the petitioners fall short of the benchmark in collection and supply of milk. My attention is also adverted to record produced at Exhibit R – 4 from 01.04.2023 to 10.09.2023. The latest record is also produced by way of short affidavit by the respondent No. 1.

41. It is specifically recorded in the impugned order that the petitioners – societies failed to supply 50 liters milk per day to the Federation Sangh. The parties have rival submissions regarding the record of individual society for collection and supply of milk. The examination of the record may involve inquiry into disputed questions of facts in the writ jurisdiction. While examining decision making process, it is necessary to see that the record from 01.04.2023 to 10.09.2023 was considered while passing interim orders of liquidation on 30.10.2023, 09.11.2023 and 10.11.2023. It is reiterated by learned special counsel Mr. Talekar that the relevant period is 01.04.2023 to 11.09.2023. The show cause notice dated 13.05.2026 indicates record from January 2026 to March 2026 would be relevant. Final impugned orders would disclose the record of supply of milk from the period 01.01.2026 to 31.03.2026 as well as 01.04.2025 to 31.03.2026 was considered. This amounts to inherent consistency. There is no certainty of the period of which milk supply was to be considered.

42. If the drastic action is proposed against erring societies, then the societies must be apprised of the definite duration for which their record is to be examined. The collection of the milk and the supply of milk depend upon many factors. At one stage respondents proposed to examine record of the year 2023, which is deviated in the final stage. If the respondents wanted to examine the record of the year 2026 as there was considerable time gap between interim order and final order, then instead of passing final orders fresh proceedings should have been initiated.

43. The petitioners are left to the guess work and the record of subsequent period is considered arbitrarily. I have already observed that there is correlation between interim order and final order passed U/Sec. 102 of the Act. Any independent scrutiny on the fresh material for the first time while passing final order is not permissible. I find that action undertaken against the petitioners is against Section 102 of the Act and it is arbitrary and illegal. Hence I answer point No. E in favour of the petitioners.

Point :

F. Whether the respondents are justified in passing impugned orders ?

44. The record of supply of milk of the year 2023 as well as of the year 2026 which is produced on record does not show that there is short fall of substantive quantity of milk. The benchmark was 50 liters per day and most of the petitioner societies are attempting to comply the benchmark. For marginal short fall, the drastic action is unwarranted.

45. It is relevant to notice that Federation Sangh is second largest milk society in the country. There are more than 5000 primary milk societies. The economy of Kolhapur district depends upon the collection and supply of milk in the district. It is one of the largest milk producing districts in the country. The members of the primary societies are the farmers and the villagers. The exclusion of the primary societies from the election of Federation Sangh has far reaching repercussions. This aspect is totally overlooked before taking drastic action. If the proper opportunity had been given to the primary member societies like petitioners, they would have rectified and attempted to supply requisite quantity of milk. The respondents are making capital of rectifiable defects and representing that petitioners are guilty of gross violation of norms of registration. They are dragged to liquidation for the marginal short falls, which is arbitrary, disproportionate and patently illegal.

46. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shantilal Lanchand Changede and others Vs. Prasad Oak and others reported in 2009(6) Mh.L.J. 584. Following are the relevant extracts :

                    “14. The co-operative housing societies in Mumbai are established by the persons so as to facilitate construction of residential accommodation for them. They are not established for liquidating. The members are interested in getting residential accommodation. With such a hope to get a home, since 1972 some members and managing committee members of the Petitioner no. 6 - society were prosecuting the litigation so as to get back possession of the plot so that it can be developed. This basic object of the housing society has been overlooked by the respondent no.1 while passing the order of liquidation. Continuation of the functioning of the society either at the hands of the managing committee members or by appointing an Administrator on the said society so that the activity of the society can be continued should have been the approach of the Deputy Registrar. The Deputy Registrars are expected to see that the co-operative societies remain functional and are continued instead of liquidating them. Liquidation of the society is the last resort to be taken by the Registrar, namely, after having made all efforts and only if the society cannot be made a functional one or the society is so burdened with loans that is impossible for the society to repay then only the Registrar should take the extreme step of liquidating the society. The approach of the Respondent No.1 in the instant case is to the contrary, and it seems the Respondent No.1 was in a hurry to appoint a liquidator for reasons which are not far to seek.

                    15. Under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 the Registrar has adequate powers if he finds that the society is not functioning and that there are disputes between the members of the society and/or that the co-operative movement discipline has not been followed by the managing committee members. When the Registrar finds that the elections of the society are not conducted, he can take appropriate steps to elect the new managing committee members and to remove the old members taking recourse to provisions of Sections 78 or 73-H of the said Act. However, ignoring all such powers which are vested in him which could have made the society workable in the interest of its members so that residential accommodation can be provided to its members, unfortunately, the respondent no.1 has taken a decision to liquidate the said society.”

The above observations are aptly applicable to the cases at hand and I find that impugned orders are unsustainable. I answer point F against the respondents.

47. Learned counsel for the intervenor adopted the submissions of the learned advocate Mr. S. B. Talekar. Learned counsel for the petitioners objected to entertain the application for intervention. No case is made out to grant any relief to intervenors.

48. In sequitur of above analysis, I pass following order.

ORDER

a. Rule is made absolute in all the petitions.

b. The final orders of winding up issued by the respondent No. 1 – Assistant Registrar on 10.06.2026, 15.06.2026 and 17.06.2026 are quashed and set aside.

c. The judgment and order passed today shall not preclude the respondent authorities to take action against the erring primary societies in accordance with law.

d. Intervention applications are disposed of.