1. The present Revision Application is preferred by the original complainant under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Code’) challenging the Judgment and Order dated 20th July 2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pandharpur in Criminal Appeal No.12 of 2013 whereby the learned Appellate Court, while maintaining the conviction of Respondent Nos.1 and 2, modified the sentence imposed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pandharpur in Regular Criminal Case No.174 of 2007 by substituting the sentence of rigorous imprisonment with a sentence of fine only.
2. The prosecution originated from the First Information Report dated 19th March 2007 lodged by the Applicant with Pandharpur Taluka Police Station, being Crime No. 56 of 2007, for offences punishable under Sections 325, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Applicant alleged that on 18th March 2007 at about 4.00 p.m., while he was standing outside his house situated on his agricultural land bearing Gat No. 281 at Village Bhose, Respondent No. 1-Bandu Tukaram Pawar, along with Respondent No. 2-Kesharbai Pawar, came to the spot and, upon being questioned regarding the cutting of branches of an Umbar tree, abused the Applicant.
3. Respondent No. 1 assaulted the Applicant with a stick, causing injuries to both his hands, while Respondent No. 2 actively instigated the assault and exhorted Respondent No. 1 to kill the Applicant. When the Applicant's daughter, Deepali, intervened to rescue him, she too was assaulted. The incident was ultimately pacified by witnesses Nandu and Laxman. During investigation, the police conducted the spot panchanama, recorded statements of witnesses, collected the medical evidence establishing the injuries sustained by the Applicant, and, upon completion of investigation, filed a charge-sheet against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pandharpur. Charges were framed under Sections 447, 325, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. The Respondents denied the allegations and claimed trial, contending that the Applicant had accidentally fallen from the Umbar tree; however, no defence evidence or documentary material was adduced in support of such plea. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court, by Judgment and Order dated 20th February 2013, convicted the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of ₹300/-.
5. Heard learned counsel appearing for both the parties.
6. The issue that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge exercised judicial discretion in accordance with law while maintaining the conviction of the Respondents, but modifying the substantive sentence of one month's rigorous imprisonment to a sentence of fine alone?
7. The Appellate Court is vested with the jurisdiction to alter the nature or extent of the sentence while maintaining the conviction, provided such discretion is exercised in a lawful, judicious, and equitable manner. While modifying only the sentence and maintaining the conviction of the Respondents, the Appellate Court did not interfere with the findings on guilt recorded by the trial Court. Rather, after independently appreciating the evidence, it affirmed that the Respondents had committed the offences alleged against them. The modification was confined only to the quantum and nature of the sentence, which is expressly permissible under Section 386(b)(3) of the Code :
386(b) In an appeal from a conviction -
(i) …..
(ii) …...
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;”
8. The power to alter the sentence is intended to ensure that punishment remains proportionate, just and responsive to the facts existing at the time of appellate decision. Sentencing is not a mechanical exercise, but one requiring a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Appellate Court rightly considered that the occurrence had taken place in March 2007 and by the time the appeal was decided, almost 15 years had lapsed during this prolonged period. The Respondents had remained under the shadow of criminal prosecution. There was nothing on the record to indicate involvement in any subsequent criminal activity. One of the Respondents had attained advanced age and the occurrence itself arose out of a neighbourhood dispute regarding agricultural property, rather than any premeditated or heinous criminal act.
9. In case of State of Kerala v. Puttumanna illath, Jathvedan,((1999) 2 SCC 452.), the Supreme Court held that although the Revisional Court does not see as a regular Appellate Court, it is empowered to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of the Appellate Court. It is empowered to examine the legality, property of the sentence imposed by the subordinate Court. The Court observed that where the order under challenge suffers from manifest illegality, procedural impropriety or results in miscarriage of justice, interference under Section 397 and 401 of the Code becomes both permissible and necessary. Thus, while factual findings ordinarily remain immune from revisional scrutiny, an improper exercise of sentencing discretion certainly falls within a ambit of revisional jurisdiction.
10. The recent judgment of Supreme Court in Parmeshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu(2026 SCC OnLine SC 209) directly reinforces these principles in the context of sentencing. In that case, while affirming the conviction of the accused under Section 307 of IPC, the High Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and enhanced the compensation payable to the victim. Setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court categorically held that judicial discretion in sentencing cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on sympathetic consideration alone. The Court deprecated the practice of substituting substantive imprisonment with monetary compensation or fine, particularly where the conviction has been affirmed, observing that such an approach undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system and conveys an erroneous impression that criminal liability can be discharged by payment of money. The Supreme Court reiterated that sentencing must be guided by the principles of proportionality between crime and punishment, due regard to the findings recorded by the trial Court, societal impact of the offence and balanced consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Unless exceptional circumstances exist and are supported by cogent reasons, the Appellate Court ought not to interfere with a lawful sentence imposed by the trial Court.
11. In Mohammed Giasudhin v. State of Andhra Pradesh,(1973 SCC 787.) Justice V. R. Krishnaiyer emphasized that modern Criminal Jurisprudence places considerable importance upon the reformative theory of punishment and that incarceration should not be imposed where the ends of justice can be achieved through a lesser sentence.
12. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ravada Sasikala v. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.,((2017) 4 SCC 546.) also recognizes that while sentencing must maintain proportionality, the Court is required to weigh mitigating circumstances and mold the sentence according to the facts of each case. The judgment does not mandate imprisonment in every case, but acknowledges that the nature of punishment depends upon the overall circumstances of the offence and the offender.
13. In case of State of Punjab versus Prem Sagar,((2008) 7 SCC 550.) the Supreme Court held that sentencing policy must balance the nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the antecedents of the accused, the passage of time and the possibility of reformation. The Court recognizes that proportionality is the governing principle and that punishment should not be harsher than what justice demands.
14. In the case in hand, 19 years have been lapsed since the occurrence. Directing the Respondents to undergo imprisonment after such an extraordinary lapse of time would neither advance the object of deterrence, nor serve any meaningful reformative purpose. On the contrary, the sentence of fine imposed by the affidavit would adequately preserves the finding of guilt, while avoiding unnecessary incarceration for an offence committed almost two decades earlier. The ratio of parmeshwari (supra) cannot be mechanically extended to minor offences, where the punishment awarded is minimal and the mitigating circumstances overwhelmingly justify substitution of imprisonment with fine.
15. Accordingly, it appears that the learned Additional Sessions Judge exercised the discretion vested under Section 386(b)(3) of the Code upon relevant considerations, maintained the conviction, and merely modified the sentence in a manner that was fair, proportionate and consistent with the principles governing sentencing. The impugned judgment therefore does not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code.
16. The Revision Application is accordingly rejected.




