Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. MURALEE KRISHNA
Parties : The Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education In Kerala, Represented By Its Chairman Versus R. Karthik Dev & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appearing Parties: Mary Benjemin, S.Ganesh, Sc, Kerala University Of Health Sciences, K.C. Santhoshkumar P.Sreekumar (Sr.) K.K. Chandralekha, K. Reeha Khader, Sr. Gp, Nisha George, Advocates.
1. The appellant in W.A.No.1550 of 2025 filed this review petition, invoking the provisions under Order XLVII Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for short), claiming that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 06.01.2026 passed by this Court in that writ appeal.
2. Heard the learned Standing Counsel for the review petitioner, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, the learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 4th respondent.
3. The learned Standing Counsel for the review petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a quasi-judicial body consisting of several members. The writ appeal was filed based on the unanimous decision taken by the committee. The said decision was formulated as a minute on 23.06.2026. Due to an inadvertent omission, the existence of the minutes could not be brought to the notice of this Court at the time of hearing the writ appeal. The judgments considered by this Court in the judgment under review are all related to cases where there are third parties and other persons aggrieved by the order of the authority. This Court did not consider various other judgments relied on by the petitioner at the time of hearing of the writ appeal. ZMFA(KME)No.1 of 2025 referred to in paragraph No.16 of the judgment in the appeal was finally heard and decided by the Division Bench of this Court, and the said fact was not considered by this Court while passing the judgment. The appeal itself was filed with a delay of 150 days, and during condonation of delay, the maintainability of the appeal was not challenged before this Court. The learned counsel further submitted that if the right of the petitioner to file the appeal challenging the adverse orders is taken away on technicalities, it will have far-reaching consequences. By pointing out the judgment of this Court dated 14.03.2018 in R.P.No.1114 of 2017 in W.P.(C)No.31814 of 2017, the learned Standing Counsel argued that the said review petition filed by the petitioner was allowed by a Division Bench, which will show that the petitioner is entitled to challenge adverse orders. The learned Standing Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 786] and argued that the appeal in that case was filed by a statutory authority. Therefore, merely for the reason that the petitioner herein is a statutory authority, the right to appeal cannot be denied to the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel further relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat [(2015) 9 SCC 1] to argue that authorities or Tribunals who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them are necessary parties and for the said reason also, the petitioner is entitled to maintain the appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned Standing Counsel for the review petitioner and submitted that the interference possible in a review petition is very limited. This Court has rightly found that the petitioner, while adjudicating a complaint, was exercising a quasi-judicial function and therefore not entitled to maintain the appeal defending its decision, when the constitutional court, by exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, found the said quasi-judicial decision taken by the petitioner as illegal. No legal injury has been caused to the petitioner by the judgment in the writ petition or writ appeal, since the function of the petitioner is to decide a dispute brought before it. In support of her arguments regarding the circumstances under which a review petition is maintainable, the learned counsel relied on the principles laid down in the common order dated 26.08.2025 passed by this Court in R.P.Nos.410 of 2023 and 643 of 2025.
5. The learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent argued that there is no other person to protect the interests of the students other than the petitioner. The functions of the petitioner can be broadly divided into administrative functions and judicial functions. In the present case, the order impugned in the writ petition falls under the category of administrative function, and therefore the review petitioner can very well maintain a writ appeal by defending its action. A blanket order preventing the petitioner from defending its decisions by filing an appeal against the adverse judgment will cause a disastrous effect.
6. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent addressed arguments supporting the 1st respondent and submitted that the only aggrieved person, if at all, is the Government and there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment.
7. From the judgment dated 06.01.2026, which is sought to be reviewed, it can be seen that this Court has considered the maintainability of the writ appeal filed by the petitioner in detail in view of the objections raised by the 1st respondent at the initial stage itself. This Court has not dealt with the merits of the contentions raised by the parties against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, since the writ appeal was dismissed on the issue of maintainability. From the judgment, it is clear that all the judgments relied by the parties on either side as precedents in order to support their contentions regarding the maintainability of the appeal were dealt in detail in the said judgment. Though the learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner contends that all the judgments relied at the time of hearing were not considered in the appeal judgment, the petitioner has not mentioned in the review petition or during the course of arguments as to what are those judgments this Court omitted to note, which related to the question of maintainability of the writ appeal. The judgments touching the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioner against the impugned judgment in the writ petition are irrelevant since this Court has considered the locus of the petitioner to maintain the writ appeal in the judgment dated 06.01.2026. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on that ground is liable to be rejected as meritless.
8. It is true that in the judgment of the Division Bench dated 14.03.2018 in R.P.No.1114 of 2017 in W.P.(C)No.31814 of 2017, the petitioner herein was one of the review petitioners therein, and the Division Bench allowed that review petition. But from paragraph 17 of the said judgment it is evident that the role played by the review petitioners therein, who are parties to the proceedings, is only that of an informant of some factual mistakes in the judgment. The petitioners therein were not aggrieved by the consequences, and they filed the review petition to help the court by bringing out the error in the judgment. The entitlement of the petitioner to file the writ appeal or review petition defending its action was not considered in that judgment. Therefore, the judgment in R.P.No.1114 of 2017 is not helpful to the petitioner.
9. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia [AIR 1963 SC 786] the principle laid down by the Apex Court is as to who are necessary and proper parties in a proceeding. In that judgment, the Apex Court held that a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively, and a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The entitlement of a quasi-judicial body to defend its action was not the issue considered in that judgment. Therefore, the judgment in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia [AIR 1963 SC 786] is also not applicable to the facts of the present case.
10. In Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji [(2015) 9 SCC 1], a general preposition that the authorities or Tribunals like Income Tax Commissioner who in law are entitled to defend orders passed by them are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition cannot be treated to be maintainable or Court may grant liberty to them as parties in exercise of its jurisdiction was the principle laid down by the Apex Court. The said principle is also similar to that of the principle stated in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia [AIR 1963 SC 786]. Therefore, the judgment in Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji [(2015) 9 SCC 1] is also not applicable to the facts of the present case.
11. At this stage, it is appropriate to restate the power of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC as well as the various judgments pertaining to the power of the Court to exercise review jurisdiction.
12. Section 114 of the CPC reads thus:
"114. Review-
Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit."
13. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC reads thus:
"1. Application for review of judgment.
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
Explanation-
The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment."
14. It is trite that the power of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the CPC is available to be exercised only on setting up any one of the following grounds by the petitioner.
(i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence, or
(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or
(iii) any other sufficient reason.
15. In Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167] the Apex Court held that under the guise of review, a litigant cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided.
16. The Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:
"Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
(Underline supplied)
17. In N.Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria [(2013) 15 SCC 534] the Apex Court held that the mistake apparent on the face of the record means that the mistake is self-evident, needs no search, and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.
18. In Sasi (D) through LRs v. Aravindakshan Nair and others [AIR 2017 SC 1432] the Apex Court held that in order to exercise the power of review, the error has to be self-evident and is not to be found out by a process of reasoning.
19. In Shanthi Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam State Electricity Board and others [(2020) 2 SCC 677] the Apex Court by referring to Parsion Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held thus:
"The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided".
20. Again in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. [2024 SCC Online SC 1090] the Apex Court considered the grounds for review in detail and held thus:
"Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as S.114, CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review power under S.114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is available to be exercised, subject to fulfillment of the above conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the following grounds:
(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
(iii) any other sufficient reason."
21. In Sujatha Aniyeri v. Kannur University [2025 KHC OnLine 212], in which both of us are parties, after considering the point, what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, this court held that review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits. If the direction in the judgment was erroneous, then the remedy was to challenge the same by filing an appeal and not by filing a review petition.
22. The aforesaid principles are stated by this Court in the common order dated 26.08.2025 in R.P.Nos.410 of 2023 and 643 of 2025, relied by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent.
23. In the writ appeal judgment dated 06.01.2026, this Court has dealt with only the nature of the impugned order passed by the petitioner, which was set aside by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition judgment, and attempted to be defended by the petitioner by filing W.A.No.1550 of 2025. After a detailed analysis of the principles stated in various judgments of the Apex Court as well as the provisions governing the jurisdiction of the petitioner to pass such an order, this Court arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner cannot challenge the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby Exts.P7 and P10 orders passed by the petitioner were set aside. Once again, to understand how this Court has arrived at the said finding on merits, we are extracting paragraphs 9 to 20 of the judgment dated 06.01.2026 passed in the writ appeal.
"9. To answer the controversy, it is relevant to note some of the provisions of Act 15 of 2017 and also the judgments relied by either side. Sections 2(a), 3, 4(vii), 8, 12, and 13 of the Act 15 of 2017 read thus:
"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.-
(a) "Admission Supervisory Committee" means the Admission Supervisory Committee constituted as per Section 3.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
3. Constitution of Admission Supervisory Committee-
The Government shall, by notification in the Gazette, constitute an Admission Supervisory Committee consisting of the following members for the purpose of supervision and issuing guidelines of admission process in the private medical educational institutions, namely:--
4(7): The Committees shall regulate their own procedure for the conduct of their business.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
8. Powers and functions of the Admission Supervisory Committee.-
(1) The Admission Supervisory Committee shall exercise the following powers and perform the following functions, namely:-
(a) on receipt of a complaint regarding the admission made in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, to inquire into the admission made by any private medical educational institutions in contravention of such provisions or the collection of fee exceeding the fee determined as per the provisions of this Act or the realisation of capitation fee or the profiteering and cause inspection of the institution for the purpose of making inquiry, on the basis of the said complaint or suo moto;
(b) to take appropriate action, after conducting an inquiry under clause (a), on an inspection report prepared by the department concerned on the direction of the Government or the University concerned or the appropriate authority;
(c) if satisfied that there has been any violation by such institutions of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder regarding admission, recommend to the Government to take the following actions against such institution, namely:--
(i) impose a monetary fine up to ten lakh rupees on the institution together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum which shall be recovered as if it were an arrear of public revenue due on land;
(ii) declare admission made in any or all the seats in an institution, in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder invalid, and thereupon take necessary action causing the institution to forthwith cancel the admission of such student and the University concerned to cancel the enrolment of such student and cancel his results of examinations concerned in which the student has already appeared;
(iii) order the institution to stop admission or reduce the sanctioned intakes in any medical course for such period as it may deem fit;
(iv) recommend to the University or the appropriate authority to withdraw the recognition of the institution; (v) any other course of action, as it deems fit.
(2) The Admission Supervisory Committee shall ensure that the admission in a private medical educational institution is done in a fair and transparent manner.
(3) The Admission Supervisory Committee shall, for the purpose of making any enquiry under this Act, have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:--
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring discovery and production of any document;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavit; and
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and for local inspections.
xxx xxx xxx
12. Appeal.--
Any person aggrieved by an order of the Committees, may prefer an appeal, within thirty days from the date of such order, before the High Court.
13. Protection of action taken in good faith.--
No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or the officers or employees, or the Chairperson or members of the Committees for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith under this Act. (Underline supplied)
10. In S.M. Noorudin [AIR 1952 Bom 165], which is an appeal arising out of an order made by the Registrar of Trademarks, the High Court of Bombay held thus:
"12. The next question is what order as to costs we should make with regard to the Registrar. Now, there are certain cases in which the Registrar should appear and can legitimately claim his costs. In our opinion, this is not one of those cases. The Solicitor-General, who appeared for him, made it clear that the Registrar was not interested in the decision. As a matter of fact, there is no decision, because the only order of the learned Judge below is an order of remand. The Solicitor-General said that he appeared in order to help the Court by pointing out certain errors in the judgment of the lower Court. Now, it seems to us that this is rather a startling proposition for the Solicitor General to advance. I have never heard of a Judge of first instance briefing counsel in a Court of appeal in order to point out that the judgment of the lower appellate Court was wrong and his judgment was right. If this were the true principle, then every time we hear a second appeal we should look to being guided by the Judge of the trial Court appearing by counsel and telling us what the mistakes in the judgment of the lower Court are. We take it that this Court is sufficiently competent to find out for itself, with the guidance of the counsel of parties, as to what errors, if any, have been committed by the lower Court. We, therefore, think that it was entirely wrong on the part of the Registrar in this case to have appeared merely for the purpose of elucidating his own judgment and pointing out the errors in the judgment of the Court below. That is not the proper function of the Court of first instance, and in this case the Registrar is nothing else except the Court of first instance. He must submit to the judgment of lower appellate Court if there is no appeal from that judgment. If there is an appeal, he must submit to the judgment of the final Court of appeal. If his judgment is right, it will be restored by the final Court and the errors of the lower appellate Court will be rectified; if his judgment is wrong, then the lower appellate Court's judgment will be confirmed by the final Court of appeal. But, as I said before, this Court neither needs illumination nor guidance from the Judge of the first instance as to what are the errors in the judgment of the lower appellate Court". (Underline supplied)
11. In M. Noushad [2013 (4) KHC 464], a Division Bench of this Court, while considering an appeal filed by the State of Kerala and two of its officers against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in a litigation between the Manager of an aided school and a Teacher appointed in that school, held thus:
"3. The revisional decision rendered by the Government is under Rule 92 of Chapter 14A of KER, which is essentially one in the nature of quasi-judicial adjudication in exercise of revisional powers. This is the format and setting in which the various sub-rules under Rule 92 of Chapter 14A are couched. The repository of such power of revision would not have the authority to support its decision, when that is questioned in a competent judicial forum either by way of writ proceedings or otherwise. See for support, Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan [1964 KHC 457 : AIR 1964 SC 477 : 1964 (5) SCR 64] in which the Constitutional Bench, as can be learnt from what is stated in paragraph 19 of that judgment, laid down that unless allegations are made against the repositories of such power which need a reply from them, such authorities ought not to support such decisions, when under challenge before a superior Court or authority. Their Lordships clearly laid down that, in ordinary cases, position of such authorities is like that of Courts and other Tribunals against whose decisions writ proceedings are filed. They are not interested in the merits of the disputes in any sense, and so, their representation or any particular stand taken by them in such actions before superior Courts or Tribunals would be even inappropriate. The only exceptional circumstance carved out to this principle is that such authority should have the opportunity to answer any plea of personal mala fides, bias or other personal actuations. No such allegation surfaces in this case after the verdict rendered by the learned Single Judge. Not only that, there was no such allegation against the Government even before the learned Single Judge. Therefore, we are clear in our mind that this writ appeal at the instance of the State of Kerala and two of its officers in their official capacity, as against the impugned judgment, is inappropriate". (Underline supplied)
12. A Division Bench of this Court, in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner [2015 (5) KHC 16], while considering an appeal preferred by the assessee of the Regional Provident Fund, challenging the course of proceedings leading to the fixation of liability under the relevant provisions of the EPF Act/Scheme with reference to interim relief, held thus:
"9. Another important aspect, which has come to the notice of this Court is that, there is an inherent defect on the part of the 1st respondent in having preferred the original petition before this Court, challenging Ext. P4 order passed by the second respondent Tribunal. This is for the reason that, the 1st respondent happened to be the 'adjudicating authority', who passed Ext.P1 order mulcting the liability upon the appellant herein. The said order passed by the 1st respondent was subjected to challenge by the appellant, by filing a statutory appeal before the second respondent/Tribunal. After considering the facts and figures and the relevant provisions of law, the second respondent/Appellate Tribunal found that, the order passed by the 1st respondent was not liable to be sustained and accordingly, the said order was set aside as per Ext. P4. The question to be considered is whether the 1st respondent, who happened to be the 'adjudicating authority', could have moved the original petition before this Court, challenging the order passed by the higher authority/Appellate Tribunal. The position can be answered only in the 'negative' as discussed below.
10. A similar order involving the Provident Fund Department (when the original order passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, was subsequently intercepted by the Appellate Tribunal) came to be challenged before this Court by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. A preliminary objection was raised from the part of assessee/Employer of the establishment as to the maintainability of the original petition. Various judgments rendered by the Apex Court were cited across the bar; particularly the ruling rendered by the Apex Court in AIR 1961 SC 182, 1961 KHC 484 : 1961 (1) SCR 474 : 1960 (40) ITR 618 : 1961 (1) MLJ (SC) 35 Bhopal 18 (Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer), AIR 2000 SC 3678, 2001 KHC 274 : 2001 (1) KLT SN 54 : 2001 (1) SCC 582 (Union of India v. K. M. Sankarappa) and 2007 (8) SCC 254, 2007 KHC 4014 : JT 2007 (12) SC 41 : 2007 (220) ELT 3 : 2007 (3) SCC (Cri) 531 (Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail v. Spl. Director, Enforcement Directorate and Another), wherein it has been categorically laid down that the 'adjudicating authority' cannot challenge the order passed by the 'higher authority' under any circumstance; which otherwise would undermine the principles of 'judicial discipline'. Following the law declared by the Apex Court, the question was answered by a learned Judge of this Court, as per the decision reported in 2012 (1) KLT 704, 2012 KHC 134 : 2012 (1) KLJ 738 (Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. West Coast Petroleum Agency), holding that the Departmental authority who passed the order in adjudication, could not have challenged the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. We affirm the position as above".
(Underline supplied)
13. From the provisions of the Act 15 of 2017 extracted above, we notice that, as rightly argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, the appellant Admission Supervisory Committee, which is a statutory body constituted under Section 3 of the said Act, is exercising a decision making power as far as complaints received under Section 8 of the said Act. As per Section 8(a) of the Act 15 of 2017, the appellant has to inquire into the admission made by any private medical institutions in contravention of such provisions or the collection of fee exceeding the fee determined as per the provisions of that Act or the realisation of capitation fee or the profiteering or cause inspection of the institutions for the purpose of making inquiry if a complaint is received regarding the admission made in contravention to the provisions of the Act. For the purpose of making inquiry under the Act, the Committee have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of certain matters, enumerated in Section 8. The function of the appellant, therefore, is adjudicatory in nature and not a ministerial one.
14. It is also relevant to note that, as per Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017, there is a statutory remedy provided to the person aggrieved by the decision of the committee. By the notification No.4573/LEG.H1/2019/Law dated 28.06.2019, the Government has substituted the word 'committee' with 'committees' in Sections 12 and 13 of the Act 15 of 2017. Hence, as per the scheme of the Act, after the substitution of the word 'committee' with 'committees', the aggrieved person can challenge the decision of the Admission Supervisory Committee or that of the Fee Regulatory Committee, as the case may be, before this Court within 30 days from the date of the order by filing an appeal. Therefore, we verified with the Registry of this Court about the filing of the writ petition instead of an appeal against the decision of the Admission Supervisory Committee as provided under Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017.
15. On verification with the Registry of this Court, we notice that after the amendment to Sections 12 and 13 of the Act 15 of 2017, the Registry of this Court obtained administrative orders from the then Acting Chief Justice on 20.11.2017 to give nomenclature to such appeals filed against the decisions of the committees mentioned in Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017. In continuation of the administrative order, a notification No.D1-69978/2010 dated 22.11.2017 was issued by this Court, publishing the nomenclature to the appeals filed under Section 12 of the Act 15 of 2017 as Miscellaneous First Appeal (Kerala Medical Education) - MFA (KME) with effect from 20.11.2017.
16. However, while considering ZMFA (KME) Nos.33 and 15 of 2017 (F) which came up before a Division Bench of this Court it was noticed that though there is a statutory provision under the Act to prefer appeal before this Court against the orders passed by the committees, no corresponding rules are framed under the Act, specifying issuance of certified copy of the order, court fee is to be paid for the appeal, etc., so as to give effect to Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017. Hence, the Division Bench, by the order dated 28.11.2017, passed in that ZMFA (KME) Nos.33 and 15 of 2017 directed to return those appeals to the appellants therein to file writ petitions, challenging the orders as appeals cannot be entertained until rules are framed. Though subsequently the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Rules 2021 were framed by the Government, no provisions relating to filing of an appeal under Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017 were made in those rules. In view of the absence of rules regarding the filing of appeals, the decision of the Division Bench dated 28.11.2017 in ZMFA(KME) Nos.33 and 15 of 2017 is still followed by filing writ petitions challenging the decision of the committees, instead of appeals as provided under Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017. We further noticed that initially, such writ petitions were listed before the Division Bench as per the administrative order dated 20.02.2019. Later, by the administrative order dated 16.03.2022, some matters related to the above subject were listed before the Single Bench. Having considered the inconsistency in the roster in the above subject, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, while issuing the roster with effect from 19.05.2025, the practice of assignment of the subject to the Division Bench was discontinued and the roster was fixed with the Single Bench only under the subject all matters relating to education with Code 47.02 for admission matter and 47.04 for fee dispute matters. Therefore, a writ petition filed before the learned Single Judge, as in the instant case, is perfectly maintainable against the decision of the appellant Committee instead of an appeal under Section 12 of Act 15 of 2017.
17. The appeal provision provided under Section 12 against the decision of the appellant Committee and also the protection of action taken in good faith granted to the officers or employees, or the chairperson or the members of the Committee under Section 13 of the Act 15 of 2017 also makes it clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the appellant Committee in the matter of a disputed question is that of an adjudicating authority.
18. Moreover, the beneficiary or the person adversely affected by the decision that would be taken by the Committee on a complaint would always be third parties and not the Committee, which has taken that decision. It is true that in the present writ petition, the appellant was arrayed as 2nd respondent. But that does not mean that the appellant has a duty to see that the decision taken by it is sustained in a court of law. The appellant Committee is only a proper party to the writ petition. From the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner [2015 (5) KHC 16], it is clear that an adjudicating authority cannot challenge the order passed by the higher authority under any circumstance, which otherwise would undermine the principle of judicial discipline. When the decision of the appellant is set aside in the writ petition, the appellant cannot be the aggrieved. It is the person or official respondents benefited by the aforesaid cancelled decision of the appellant can only be the aggrieved. The decision of the Committee can be supported or challenged by the person benefited or adversely affected by the said decision or by the official respondents who have a duty to see that the admissions are made in a fair and proper manner. If a quasi-judicial body statutorily empowered to take a decision in a dispute between third parties starts to challenge the adverse orders against the decision taken by it before the court of law, then it will create an anomalous situation that in all the cases wherein the decision of the quasi-judicial body were interfered by the Court, such quasi-judicial body or authorities will come up with appeals.
19 .It is true that in Kerala Private Medical College Management Association [2013 (3) KLT 316], W.P.(C)No.17328 of 2014, R.P. No.1114 of 2017, S.L.P.(C)No.23225 of 2018 and Civil Appeal Nos.11976- 11977 of 2014, pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the Admission Supervisory Committee was either one of the respondents or the sole respondent. But that does not mean that the aggrieved person in those cases is the Admission Supervisory Committee. The entitlement of the Admission Supervisory Committee to maintain a judicial proceeding to sustain its decision is not considered in any of these cases. Merely for the reason that the Admission Supervisory Committee was made a party in those cases, it cannot be said that it has the right to challenge the judgment passed against the decision taken by the committee. Therefore, the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant will not render any help to the appellant to find the question of maintainability in favour of the appellant.
20. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant cannot challenge the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby Exts.P7 and P10 orders passed by the appellant were set aside. Therefore, this writ appeal is liable to be dismissed on the question of maintainability."
24. The review jurisdiction exercisable by a Court of law cannot be equated with an appellate remedy. It cannot be used for re-agitating the issue which was already decided. The attempt of the petitioner by filing the present review petition is to reopen the decision rendered by this Court on merits. The review jurisdiction is not meant for reconsideration of the matter already decided on merits.
25. Having considered the pleadings in the review petition and the submissions made at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the attempt of the petitioner is to use the review jurisdiction as an appeal in disguise, which is not permissible under law. In such circumstances, we find no ground to review the judgment in the appeal.
In the result, this review petition stands dismissed.
