S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The 5th respondent in W.P.(C)No.3451 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 12.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition.

2. The husband of the 1st respondent - writ petitioner was a High School Assistant (HSA), Social Science in the school of the appellant. He died on 17.08.2017, while in service. According to the 1st respondent, on the death of her husband, she became eligible to make a claim for compassionate appointment under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (‘KER’ for short). On 18.12.2017, she made an application to the appellant for compassionate appointment in the prescribed form, which was acknowledged by Ext.P3 letter dated 23.12.2017, stating that as on that date no vacancy was available to accommodate the 1st respondent as per her qualification, and her request will be considered as and when the vacancy arises.

                  2.1. The 1st respondent further states that her father had passed away long ago, and she has no brothers. Her mother is aged, and therefore, there was nobody to look after the 1st respondent. Hence, she married one Harinarayanan. T on 16.09.2018. On account of the remarriage, the family pension was also stopped.

                  2.2. When a retirement vacancy of an office attendant arose in the appellant's school on 31.03.2024, the 1st respondent contacted the appellant and submitted an application stating that she passed S.S.L.C. and has no income. She produced an income certificate, a legal heirship certificate and other required documents to the appellant. But the appellant issued Ext.P4 letter dated 10.05.2024 stating that the income certificate produced by the 1st respondent does not show that she is still dependent upon her deceased husband. Thereafter, the 1st respondent submitted respective representations dated 20.05.2024 and 05.10.2024, before the District Educational Officer and Deputy Director of Education, to direct the appellant to appoint her in the existing vacancy of office attendant. After several communications, the Director of General Education issued Ext.P5 letter dated 03.12.2024 to the District Educational Officer informing that remarriage is not a bar for getting a compassionate appointment, but the only criterion is the income. However, the appellant issued Ext.P6 order dated 04.01.2025 stating that the 1st respondent, being remarried, is not eligible to get a compassionate appointment. Therefore, the 1st respondent approached this Court with the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P6 order dated 04.01.2025 issued by the appellant; and a writ of mandamus commanding the appellant and other respondents in the writ petition to appoint her in the existing vacancy of office attendant in the school of the appellant or in any other appropriate posts, within a time frame fixed by this Court.

                  2.3. The appellant filed a counter affidavit dated 13.03.2025 in the writ petition, opposing the reliefs sought for and producing therewith Ext.R5(a) to R5(f) documents. In the counter affidavit, the appellant contended that a compassionate appointment can be granted only to tide over the immediate financial crisis resulting from the employee's death, and the same cannot be insisted as a matter of course. The object is to enable the family to get over the financial crisis that they face at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, and compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after the crisis is over. The crux of the contention raised by the appellant is that the 1st respondent, being remarried as on the date of consideration of her application, cannot be treated as a dependent of her deceased husband.

                  2.4. The 5th respondent filed a statement dated 29.03.2025 in the writ petition wherein only factual aspects are narrated. In the statement filed by the 5th respondent, it is stated that an office attendant had retired from the school of the appellant on 30.04.2024, and the appellant has appointed an FTM in that post as per Rule 43, Chapter XIVA of the KER on 02.05.2024. Thus, a vacancy of FTM was established in the school with effect from 02.05.2024. However, without considering the claim of the 1st respondent, who is a claimant under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER, the Manager appointed a differently-abled (PwD) candidate, with effect from 01.10.2024, to the existing FTM post. Further, another office attendant was promoted as a clerk as per Rule 43, Chapter XIVA of the KER on 03.06.2024, and a vacancy of office attendant arose with effect from 03.06.2024. The Manager appointed One Ramya P.V as office attendant in that post with effect from 15.06.2024. The appointment of Smt.Ramya P.V., as office attendant, was kept in abeyance as per the interim order issued by this Court on 28.01.2025.

                  2.5. Along with I.A.No.3 of 2025, the appellant has produced Exts. R5(g) to R5 (i) documents in the writ petition. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025, allowed the writ petition by setting aside Ext.P6 order of the appellant and directed the appointment of the 1st respondent in the existing or next arising vacancy in the school. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present writ appeal.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent and the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that though the 1st respondent made a request for compassionate appointment on 18.12.2017, the vacancy arose in the school to which the 1st respondent could be accommodated based on her educational qualification only on 01.05.2024. But as on 01.05.2024, the 1st respondent had lost her status as a dependent of her deceased husband Shri. Mohanasundaram K. P., as she got remarried to Shri. Harinarayanan T., a Government employee on 16.09.2018. The learned counsel further submitted that the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for compassionate appointment and not the date of death of the employee concerned. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Santhosh N. C. v. State of Karnataka and Others [(2020) 7 SCC 617], Shreejith L. v. Deputy Director (Education), Kerala and Others [(2012) 7 SCC 248] and Tinku v. State of Haryana [2024 KHC OnLine 6629] and that of this Court in Union of India v. Kumaran [1998 (2) KLT 166], Deepak v. Secretary, General Education Department [2002 (3) KLT 288] and also General Manager v. State of Kerala and Others [2007 (3) KHC 507]. The learned counsel further relied on a Gazette Notification dated 14.07.2023 bearing G.O.(P)No.12/2023/P&ARD issued by the Government in respect of compassionate employment in support of his argument that a widow or widower who remarries is not entitled to claim compassionate appointment.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner argued that the 1st respondent became eligible to claim compassionate appointment on the death of her husband Mohanasundaram K. P. on 17.08.2017. The eligibility of a person to claim compassionate appointment under the KER has to be assessed as on the date of death of the employee concerned and not on the date of arising of the vacancy. The right under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER is a statutory right and not, as in the case of other Government departments, wherein the appointment on compassionate ground was purely based on the Government orders concerned. The accrued statutory right to claim compassionate appointment to the 1st respondent cannot be later taken away by stating that she married another person. The learned counsel pointed out Ext.P5 letter dated 03.12.2024 issued by the Director General of Education to the District Educational Officer clarifying that remarriage is not a ground to deny the claim for compassionate appointment under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Director of Treasuries in Karnataka v. V. Somyashree [(2021) 12 SCC 20] and the judgment dated 02.06.2026 in Civil Appeal No.7667 of 2025 and that of this Court in Veerappan v. Muthamma [1994 (2) KLT 649] and Glanis v. Lazar Manjila [2020 (4) KLT 222] and Manager C.A.H.S. v. D.E.O. Palakkad [2007 (4) KLT SN 57] (C.No.63).

6. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the date of death of the employee concerned has to be assessed for considering the dependency for compassionate appointment, and remarriage is not a disqualification to raise such a claim. The learned Government Pleader relied on the principles laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Santoshi v. State of U.P. [2020 (2) AWC 1035] in support of his submissions.

7. The fact that the husband of the 1st respondent, Mohanasundaram K. P., was an HSA in the school of the appellant, and he died on 17.08.2017 while in service, is admitted. It is also undisputed that the 1st respondent made an application for compassionate appointment on 18.12.2017. As per the qualification possessed by the 1st respondent, she is qualified for the post of ministerial staff, such as FTM/Office Attendant/Clerk. It is also not in dispute that the 1st respondent remarried a Government employee on 16.09.2018. The vacancy suitable for the qualification of the 1st respondent arose in the school on 01.05.2024. Therefore, the only point to be considered in this case is whether there is any illegality in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the remarriage of the 1st respondent will not disqualify her from making a claim for compassionate appointment under Rule 51B of KER?.

8. The answer to this point lies in the finding as to whether the term ‘dependent' mentioned in Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER has to be considered as on the date of the death of the employee concerned or on the date of consideration of the application for compassionate appointment. While trying to answer this point, it is pertinent to note that, unlike other Government departments, the KER gives a statutory right for a dependent of a deceased employee to raise a claim for compassionate appointment. As per Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER, the Manager shall give employment to a dependent of an Aided School Teacher dying in harness. Government orders relating to employment assistance to the dependents of Government servants dying in harness shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in the matter of such appointments. Therefore, even if the right under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER to claim compassionate appointment is a statutory right, the Government orders relating to the employment assistance to the dependents of Government servants are also applicable in the case of the claim under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER. In order to answer this point, it would be appropriate to go through the judgments relied on by the parties on either side, as mentioned above.

9. In Santhosh N. C. [(2020) 7 SCC 617], the challenge was against the amendment made to the provisions of Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996 with effect from 01.04.1999, whereby the proviso to Rule 5 was amended stipulating that in case of a minor dependent of the deceased Government employee, he/she must apply within one year from the date of death of the Government servant and he must have attained the age of 18 years on the day of making the application. Before the amendment, the minor dependent was entitled to apply till one year of attaining majority. In the judgment, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “20. Applying the law governing compassionate appointment culled out from the above cited judgments, our opinion on the point at issue is that the norms, prevailing on the date of consideration of the application, should be the basis for consideration of claim for compassionate appointment. A dependent of a Government employee, in the absence of any vested right accruing on the death of the Government employee, can only demand consideration of his/her application. He is however, disentitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as applicable, on the day of death of the Government employee.”

                  (Underline supplied)

10. In Shreejith L. [(2012) 7 SCC 248], while considering the issue of delay in making an application for compassionate appointment and meanwhile the applicant got married and has settled in life, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “24. There is, in our view, considerable merit in the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. The application filed by respondent No. 1 was indeed belated having been filed 14 years after the respondent attained majority. No explanation, much less a worthwhile one, is forthcoming for this kind of inordinate and unexplained delay. Delay assumes greater significance keeping in view the fact that respondent No. 1 has got married and has now settled with her husband comprising a separate family. The appointment of the said respondent may not in that view lead to any financial help for the other members of the family left behind by the deceased. While it is true that marriage by itself does not in view of the language employed in the scheme, disqualify the person concerned from seeking a compassionate appointment, the fact remains that delay of more than 14 years could itself prove fatal to the prayer for a compassionate appointment. The orders passed by the Educational Officer and the Government and those by the High Court in Writ Petition and in Writ Appeal are therefore unsustainable and, hence liable to be set aside.”

                  (Underline supplied)

11. In Tinku [2024 KHC OnLine 6629], while considering the question whether compassionate appointment is a vested right of the deceased employee’s dependents and whether illegal benefits granted to others can create right for similar treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “12. As regards the compassionate appointment being sought to be claimed as a vested right for appointment, suffice it to say that the said right is not a condition of service of an employee who dies in harness, which must be given to the dependent without any kind of scrutiny or undertaking a process of selection. It is an appointment which is given on proper and strict scrutiny of the various parameters as laid down with an intention to help a family out of a sudden pecuniary financial destitution to help it get out of the emerging urgent situation where the sole bread earner has expired, leaving them helpless and maybe penniless. Compassionate appointment is, therefore, provided to bail out a family of the deceased employee facing extreme financial difficulty and but for the employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis. This shall in any case be subject to the claimant fulfilling the requirements as laid down in the policy, instructions, or rules for such a compassionate appointment.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  15. The purpose, therefore, of such policies is to give immediate succour to the family. When seen in this conspectus, three years as has been laid down from the date of death of the employee for putting forth a claim by a dependant, which, includes attainment of majority as per the 1999 policy instructions issued by the Government of Haryana cannot be said to be in any case unjustified or illogical, especially when compassionate appointment is not a vested right.”

                  (Underline supplied)

12. In Kumaran [1998 (2) KLT 166], on the question whether the right of a dependent to get appointment on a compassionate basis is a vested right, a Division Bench of this Court held thus;

                  “6. We are of the opinion that the direction issued by the learned Judge to appoint the second respondent herein in any of the ministerial post of clerk or typist in any of the establishment under GREF within four months is not correct. As pointed out by counsel for the appellants the learned Judge should have merely directed the appellants the consideration of the claim of the second respondent in the light of Ext. P3 communication and the rulings of the Supreme Court and of this Court. The Courts have held that there is no fundamental right or enforceable civil rights in the matter of compassionate appointment especially when the Supreme Court has laid down the law on the issue in LJ. C. of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar (AIR 1994 SC 2148). In this case, the statutory rules and its correctness have not been challenged nor the learned single Judge had the occasion to examine them. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court to which one of us (AR. Lakshmanan, J.) is a party in the judgment reported in Syndicate Bank, rep, by its Chairman & Managing Director, Manipal v. N.S. Priya (1997 (1) MLJ 123) held that a right of dependent to get appointment on compassionate basis is not a vested right and discretion given to the employer to offer appointment on compassionate grounds and such discretion has to be exercised fairly and reasonably having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. A reading of the statutory rules it is manifestly clear that the appointment of the dependants of the deceased employee on compassionate ground is left to the discretion of the appellants. At the same time, we should not forget that such appointment on compassionate ground is provided to release the economic distress by the unexpected and sudden demise of the sole bread winner of the family. It is on the above basis the problem in question has to be approached. As already noticed the first appellant has no objection for this court in issuing a direction for consideration of the claim of the second respondent herein in the light of Ext. P3 communication and the rulings of the Court on the issue. Under Ext. P3, a request was made by the first appellant to consider the female ward of the deceased GREF personnel for appointment on compassionate basis as LDC / any other suitable post as per her qualification in lower formation of the army at an early date and that the second respondent's name be considered for employment in any unit located near to her home town, namely Quilon, Kerala State. We therefore, modify the direction issued by the learned Judge to the following terms. We therefore, issue a mandamus directing the third appellant herein to consider the name of the second respondent herein for appointment on compassionate ground as LDC or any other suitable post in accordance to her qualification in lower formation of the army at an early date in any unit located in Quilon District, Kerala State. If for any reason no vacancy is available in the said area they may consider her name for appointment in any other nearby area. The second respondent shall make a fresh application in the form prescribed within two weeks from today and the third appellant shall consider and pass final orders in accordance with law within three months thereafter. Writ Appeal is disposed of. C.M.P.No. 5463 of 96 stands dismissed.”

                  (Underline supplied)

13. Again, a Division Bench of this Court in Deepak [2002 (3) KLT 288], in the case of a claim under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of KER, held thus;

                  “6 The object and purpose of introduction of Rule 51B as well as the other scheme for compassionate appointment is to give some assistance to the family of the employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the untimely death of the earning member. The Apex Court in Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, 1997 (8) SCC 85 has highlighted the purpose of the said scheme. The Apex Court in LIC of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar, AIR 1994 SC 2148, Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, 1994 (4) SCC 138, Union of India and Others v. Bhagwan Singh, 1996 (1) LLJ 1127, and State of Bihar v. Samsuz Zoha, AIR 1996 SC 1961, reiterated that compassionate appointment can be granted only to tide over the immediate financial crisis resulting from the employees death and the same cannot be insisted upon as a matter of course. The object being to enable the family to tide over the financial crisis which they face at the time of death of the sole bread winner, compassionate appointment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. The Apex Court in Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendara Kumar, 1998 (5) SCC 192, has highlighted the object of such schemes as follows:

                  The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread - earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Such a provision makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment on the post by following a particular procedure. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions. An exception cannot subsume the main provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. Care has, therefore, to be taken that a provision for grant of compassionate employment, which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions, does not unduly interfere with the right of other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek employment against the post which would have been available to them, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of a deceased employee.

                  In Sanjay Kumar v. Sate of Bihar, [(2000) 7 SCC 192], the Apex Court was dealing with appointment in the State of Bihar. It was a case where the applicants mother died when he was ten years old. Mother was working as an Excise Constable. Application was made soon after the death of the mother seeking compassionate appointment. That was rejected on 10.12.1996 as time - barred. He made another application on 26.12.1996 and that was also rejected on 21.4.1997. Contention was raised that at the time of death of the mother, applicant was a minor and consequently he could not make an application at that time. It was pointed out that he made yet another application as soon as he became major. Rejecting the claim the Apex Court held as follows:

                  "It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2.6.1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief. We are of the view if an application is made for compassionate appointment, there must be some proximity between the date of death as well as the date of application. The object of compassionate appointment, as the Apex Court observed, is to tide over the sudden financial crisis resulting due to the death of the bread - earner. It is not as if on the death of an employee, claim of the dependant is kept open for ever. Once a dependant is not always a dependant. There cannot be reservation of vacancy till such time the applicant becomes major or till such time the applicant acquires qualification. We may indicate provision like R.51B and other Government orders pertaining to compassionate appointment are all made on humanitarian consideration. It is always in the nature of an exception to the general provision. Exception cannot always occupy the place of the main provision and thereby nullify or dilute the efficacy of the main provision by denuding the right conferred by the main provision to persons otherwise eligible.”

                  (Underline supplied)

14. In General Manager [2007 (3) KHC 507], on the issue whether the claim under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER raised by the petitioner in that writ petition is legally sustainable or not, by relying on the judgment in Deepak [2002 (3) KLT 288], a Division Bench of this Court held thus;

                  “4. A Division Bench of this Court in Deepak v. Secretary, General Education Department, [2002 KHC 771 : 2002 (2) KLJ 79 : ILR 2002 (2) Ker. 513 : 2002 (3) KLT 288] held that if an application is made for compassionate appointment, there must be some proximity between the date of death as well as the date of application. The object of compassionate appointment, as the Apex Court observed, is to tide over the sudden financial crisis resulting due to the death of the bread earner. It is not as if on the death of an employee, claim of the dependant is kept open for ever. Once a dependent is not always a dependant. There cannot be reservation of vacancy till such time the applicant becomes major or till such time the applicant acquires qualification. Rule 51B and other Government orders pertaining to compassionate appointment are all made on humanitarian consideration. It is always in the nature of an exception to the general provision and exception cannot always occupy the place of the main provision and thereby nullify or dilute the efficacy of the main provision by denuding the right conferred by the main provision to persons otherwise eligible. Relying on the above mentioned principle we are of the view, clauses 19 and 20 have to be interpreted strictly. Facts would indicate that the petitioner has not submitted a proper application in compliance with Clauses 19 and 20 of the Government order, which is admittedly made applicable to aided schools as well. Government, in our view, is not justified in directing the Manager to consider the application since it was belated.”

                  (Underline supplied)

15. While going through the facts of the aforementioned judgments, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, it can only be said that the principles laid down therein are not helpful for the appellant to substantiate his contentions, since the points decided in those judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Shreejith L. [(2012) 7 SCC 248], the issue before the Apex Court was the delay in raising the claim for compassionate appointment and meanwhile, the applicant got married. The delay in making the claim in that particular case was 14 years after the dependent attained majority, and meanwhile, the dependent had married and settled in life. It was under those circumstances that the Apex Court held that though marriage by itself does not disqualify a person concerned from seeking compassionate appointment, the delay of 14 years is fatal to the case of the claimant therein.

16. In Santhosh N. C. [(2020) 7 SCC 617], the issue considered by the Apex Court was the amendment to the provisions governing compassionate appointment in the Karnataka Civil Services. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the norms that prevailed on the date of the compassionate application should be the basis for consideration of the claim. But in the case in our hand, the dispute pertains to the qualification of the applicant as a dependent, not the amendment to the provisions. Therefore, the judgment in Santhosh N. C. [(2020) 7 SCC 617], also not applicable to the present case.

17. In Tinku [2024 KHC OnLine 6629], also, the period stipulated for compassionate appointment was in dispute, and in that circumstance, the Apex Court held that it is to give immediate succour to the family, such a right is given, and the period stipulated in the provisions to make such an application cannot be held as ultra vires. It was also a case of compassionate appointment in Government service, which is not in accordance with the similar provisions under the KER. Therefore, the judgment in Tinku [2024 KHC OnLine 6629], is not applicable to the facts of the present case. As far as the judgments of this Court relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, in Kumaran [1998 (2) KLT 166], Deepak [2002 (3) KLT 288] and also General Manager [2007 (3) KHC 507] are concerned, they also laid down the general principles regarding compassionate appointment, especially as to the purpose of giving such appointments. It does not lay down a principle that remarriage of a dependent after qualifying for compassionate appointment, but before actual appointment, would disentitle them for compassionate appointment.

18. Now coming to the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, in V. Somyashree [(2021) 12 SCC 20] on the issue of a claim made by a married daughter of a deceased Government employee, who has subsequently divorced, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “9. While considering the submissions made on behalf of the rival parties a recent decision of this Court in the case of N.

C. Santhosh (Supra) on the appointment on compassionate ground is required to be referred to. After considering catena of decisions of this Court on appointment on compassionate grounds it is observed and held that appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on the basis of principles in accordance with Art.14 and Art.16 of the Constitution of India and the compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule. It is further observed that the dependent of the deceased Government employee are made eligible by virtue of the policy on compassionate appointment and they must fulfill the norms laid down by the State's policy. It is further observed and held that the norms prevailing on the date of the consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration of claim of compassionate appointment. A dependent of a government employee, in the absence of any vested right accruing on the death of the government employee, can only demand consideration of his/her application. It is further observed he/she is, however, entitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as applicable on the day of death of the Government employee.”

                  (Underline supplied)

19. In Civil Appeal No.7667 of 2025, as per the judgment dated 02.06.2026, the Apex Court, on the issue of claim raised for compassionate appointment by the married daughter of the deceased dealer, for appointment as a fair price shop dealer on compassionate ground, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “19. The impugned provision proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of, or dependent upon, her parental family. Such an assumption is constitutionally impermissible. Marriage neither extinguishes the bond between a daughter and her parental family nor furnishes a valid basis to presume absence of dependency. Contemporary social realities demonstrate that many married daughters continue to reside with, support, or remain dependent upon their parents. Equally, there may be sons who are not dependent upon the family despite being included within the definition. Dependency is a question of fact and cannot be conclusively determined by reference to marital status alone.

                  20. Significantly, the scheme does not exclude a married son from consideration. A son continues to remain within the fold of the family irrespective of his martial status, whereas a daughter is excluded solely because she is married. The distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter, upon marriage, becomes a member of another family and loses all ties with her natal family. Such a presumption is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality and perpetuates historical notions of gender inequality which the Constitution seeks to eradicate.”

                   (Underline supplied)

20. In Veerappan [1994 (2) KLT 649], in the case of claim for compensation by a remarried widow of a Government employee under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, this Court held thus;

                  “4. That apart, even assuming that first respondent has remarried, she cannot be disentitled of the compensation amount due to her as a dependent of her deceased husband. As a widow she is entitled to the compensation being the legal heir of the deceased husband. There is no provision under the Workmen's Compensation Act that after remarriage widow is not entitled to compensation. At the time of accident first respondent's status as the wife of the deceased was not denied and so on his death she became one of his legal heirs. Contention of the appellants that on remarriage first respondent is debarred from claiming compensation as a dependent is debarred from claiming compensation as a dependent of the deceased husband is without any merit as there is no provision under the Act that after remarriage widow of the deceased would not be regarded as a dependent. Under the Act, a widow is a legal heir of her husband. Compensation due to her as a legal heir under the Act cannot be deprived to her merely on the ground that she has entered into a marriage subsequently. Under Section 21 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 widow is a dependent of the deceased husband so long as she is not remarried. No such restricted definition is found under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as a widow is a dependent under the Act and as that status is not lost on account of her remarriage, first respondent cannot be denied of the compensation even if it is assumed that she has married subsequently.”

                  (Underline supplied)

21. In Glanis [2020 (4) KLT 222], in the case of a claim for compensation for the death of her husband by the petitioner, who got remarried later, a learned Single Judge of this Court held thus;

                  “20. The couple had no children. Perhaps, the 1st appellant was persuaded by her former in-laws (parents of late Anil Abraham) to go for a remarriage or perhaps, the 1st appellant herself opted for it. In the present day society, no one wants or expects a young widow to lace herself in white attire or wear widow's weeds and mourn her entire life. The society has evolved. In spite of remarriage, a widow may keep her relations and discharge her duties towards her former in-laws even after remarriage. Such matters cannot be speculated. Those are all imponderables. Courts will not normally entertain actuarial evidence on such imponderables.

                  21. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. represented by its Branch Manager, Trichy v. Nelphona and others, [2012 CDJ 3706], the Madurai Bench of the Hon'ble Madras High Court observed that social change is an inevitable phenomena of every society. Whether the social change comes through legislation or through judicial interpretation, it indicates the change in the accepted mode of life or perhaps a better life. The changing patterns of life do have an impact on the law and life of a given society and the law must keep pace with the changing socio - economic trend in the society. In other words, the law should be an instrument of social change.

                  22. It is to be noted that the 1st appellant would not have thought of a remarriage, but for the untimely death of her husband. It was not a remarriage on account of divorce. The Court has to consider the psychological hurdles that the widow will face on account of remarriage. The society is changing. The age old concept of a remarried widow cutting off all relations with the family of her ex - husband, is becoming a story of the past. Fact remains that the 1st respondent was dependent on the deceased and would have remained so, but for the demise of her husband consequent to the accident. The death has indeed resulted in loss of dependency. After the death of husband, a widow may go for employment and become self - dependent or may opt for remarriage. Either way, the loss of dependency consequent to the death of the husband does not cease merely because she has remarried or became self - reliant. The word dependency and legal representative, therefore, should receive a pragmatic interpretation. While computing compensation for dependency of a widow on the death of her husband under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, her remarriage shall not be a decisive factor.”

                   (Underline supplied)

22. In Manager C.A.H.S. [2007 (4) KLT SN 57] (C.No.63), a learned Single Judge of this Court held thus;

                  “The words, ‘dependent of the deceased’ have been so repeated often in the Government Order which would indicate that the requirement that the applicant himself should be a dependent of the deceased is an essential eligibility condition under the scheme. The applicant for employment assistance under the Compassionate Employment Scheme should be a dependent of the deceased for claiming employment under the dying in harness scheme whether the applicant is a widow/widower or son or daughter or married son or daughter or an adopted son or daughter. In fact, in the two Government orders referred to above, which recognise the right of married sons/daughters also for compassionate employment, it is specifically stated that they should be eligible otherwise. One of the eligibility conditions in the scheme is that the applicant should be a dependent of the deceased. That would necessarily mean that for becoming eligible for appointment under the scheme the married daughter/son also should have been a dependent of the deceased at the time of death. In order to become eligible to apply for compassionate employment under Rule 51B read with the Government orders on the subject the applicant should have been a dependent of the deceased at the time of his/her death. This includes the married daughter/son of the deceased.”

23. In the case of Smt. Santoshi [2020 (2) AWC 1035], the Allahabad High Court, on a writ petition filed by an employee who got appointment on compassionate ground, stating that the respondents are not permitting her to remarry, the Allahabad High Court held thus;

                  “7. From perusal of Rule 5 of the Rules, 1974, it is clear that appointment of dependent of a deceased employee under Rule 5 of the Rules, 1974 is conditional. The conditions are provided in sub-Rules (3) and (4) of Rule 5. Therefore, a person obtaining appointment under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, 1974 is bound to maintain other members of the family of the deceased government servant, who were dependent on the deceased government servant immediately before his death and are unable to maintain themselves. If the person so appointed under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, 1974 neglects or refuses to maintain a dependent of the deceased employee to whom he is liable to maintain under sub-Rule (3), then services of such compassionate appointee may be terminated under sub-Rule (4) in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, as amended from time to time. But the appointment of the dependent of the deceased employee under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, 1974, cannot be interfered with solely on the ground that he/ she has contracted remarriage. Remarriage is not restricted by the Rules, 1974.

                  8. Remarriage is a personal choice of the petitioner who has obtained employment on compassionate ground under the Rules, 1974, which does not curtail employment of the petitioner on remarriage. Even after remarriage, the petitioner is bound to comply with the provisions of sub-Rule (3) failing which he may suffer consequences under sub-Rule (4) of Rule 5.

                  9. Right to marry with person of choice, is an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Companionship of choice by remarriage by a widow cannot be denied as companionship is one of the faculties by which life can be enjoyed. Merely because compassionate appointment has been obtained by the petitioner, she cannot be forced to sacrifice her fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the relevant Rules as enacted dealing with disciplinary proceedings, remarriage has not been mentioned as one of the misconduct, disqualifications or disabilities. This is possibly for reason that fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be curtailed on account of remarriage by a widow. Even if a statutory provision is enacted to prohibit remarriage by a widow, as a condition for employment under the dying in harness Rule, its validity may be liable to challenge for breach of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

10. In Smt. Subhwanti Devi vs. Siksha Adhikshak, Basic Siksha, Nagar Chetra, Allanabad and others, 1988 UPLBEC 80 (paras-8 and 9), a Division Bench of this court considered termination of an employee on the ground of remarriage and held that remarriage may be a social or biological human necessity or it may be on account of oppressive or aggressive nature of certain anti-social elements but that cannot be made the basis for termination of service.

                  11. In Municipal Employees' Union vs. Additional Commissioner (Water) DWS & SDU and another, 1996 (73) FLR 963 (Paras-8 and 10), a Division Bench of Delhi High Court considered the similar controversy of remarriage of a widow and held that there being no restraint by any personal law against remarriage, she is entitled to remarry. Even if a Rule prohibiting remarriage exists, it may be liable to challenge for breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Even if any such condition is imposed in any contract of employment restricting a widow to remarry, that would be ultra vires to the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and will be of no effect in law.”

                  (Underline supplied)

24. While going through the aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent and the learned Senior Government Pleader, it can be seen that the judgment in Manager C.A.H.S. [2007 (4) KLT SN 57] and V.Somyashree [(2021) 12 SCC 20], are pertaining to the claim for compassionate appointment by a married daughter and hence not applicable to the facts of the present case. So also, in the case of the judgments of this Court in Glanis [2020 (4) KLT 222], it is pertaining to a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, and therefore the said judgment is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. At the same time, while going through the judgments of this Court in Veerappan [1994 (2) KLT 649], and that of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.7667 of 2025 and also the judgment of Smt. Santoshi [2020 (2) AWC 1035], it can be said that the principle laid down in those judgments is that when the statute does not prevent remarriage of a dependent who is entitled to raise a claim for compassionate appointment, the said remarriage alone will not disentitle the dependent to raise such a claim and whether she/he is entitled to raise such a claim has to be analysed depending upon the facts in each case.

25. As noted hereinabove, the right to raise a claim under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER is a statutory right, unlike in some of the Government departments. In the present case, the 1st respondent had raised the claim for compassionate appointment immediately after the death of her husband, and at that time she was in dire need of the said appointment, which is not in dispute. The appellant has no contention that the 1st respondent was not entitled to a compassionate appointment till she remarried. The statutory right given to her under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER accrued immediately on the death of her husband, and she made a proper claim at that time itself. Merely for the reason that the 1st respondent thereafter got remarried, the accrued statutory right cannot be taken away due to the changed circumstances which occurred only due to the non- availability of a vacancy at the relevant time.

26. Ext.P5 clarification given by the Director of General Education also shows that the remarriage of a claimant under Rule 51B of Chapter XIVA of the KER is not a ground to disqualify her for compassionate appointment. The Government order dated 14.07.2023 relied by the appellant pertains to the apportionment to be given to the dependent family members, and it do not pertains the compassionate appointment to be given to the remarried widow/widower. Therefore, that Government order would also be not applicable to the case in our hand. As noted by the learned Single Judge, the 1st respondent herein became a widow at a young age, and there is no dispute on the point that she had family obligations during that time. If a compassionate appointment had been given to her at the appropriate time, a ground for raising contention against such an appointment would not have been available to the appellant. We therefore agree with the finding of the learned Single Judge that remarriage of the 1st respondent in such circumstances cannot take away the statutory right vested in her.

27. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to hold the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising the appellate jurisdiction.

In the result, this writ appeal stands dismissed.