Anil S. Kilor, J.

1. Heard Mr. M.M. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr. S.S. Shingane, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. P.P. Pendke, learned AGP for respondent Nos.1 and 4/State, and Mr. D.V. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr. Parth Malviya, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3.

2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

3. The petitioner-Company has approached this Court seeking a declaration that the reservation on the land in question, as effected in the Development Plan of Nagpur, has lapsed under Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the MRTP Act”, for the sake of brevity), and that the petitioner is free to develop the land under reservation in the manner permissible to the adjacent landowners. The petitioner also seeks to challenge the award dated 29.10.2025 passed by respondent No.4 in Land Acquisition Case No. 3/A-65/2024-2-25, Mouza Chikhli (Khurd), in relation to Khasra Nos.39/2 and 39/3, consequentially.

4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition, are as follows:

The petitioner is a Company registered under the Companies Act and is engaged in the business of real estate and development of land. The petitioner contends that the petitioner- Company is the owner and in possession of land bearing Khasra No.38, admeasuring 1.82 H.R., Khasra No.39/2, admeasuring 2.43 H.R., and Khasra No.39/3, admeasuring 7.87 H.R., situated at Mouza Chikhli (Khurd), Tahsil and District Nagpur (hereinafter referred to as “the aforesaid land”).

5. The Development Plan for Nagpur City was sanctioned and approved by the Government of Maharashtra on 10.09.2001 and it came into force with effect from 21.09.2001. In the aforesaid Development Plan, the aforesaid land was reserved for “Drainage and Sewerage Disposal Scheme” vide Reservation No. S-162.

6. Though the Development Plan came into force on 10.09.2001, since no steps were taken for acquisition of the aforesaid land, the petitioner served a notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act on 20.06.2014, accompanied by the documents as mentioned therein. The aforesaid notice dated 20.06.2014 is at record page No.30 (Annexure-II).

7. The aforesaid notice was served upon respondent Nos.2 and 3, the Planning Authority, on 24.06.2014. The aforesaid notice pertaining to the aforesaid land was issued by the petitioner-Company, i.e. Shree Ganesh Builders Limited, through its Director, Shri Pahilaj Jagumal Sachhani, and it included the 7/12 extracts of the aforesaid land.

8. The petitioner itself has admitted in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of its rejoinder dated 02.03.2026 that the 7/12 extracts in respect of all the three Khasra numbers, i.e. Khasra No.38, Khasra No.39/2 and Khasra No.39/3, bear the names of different entities, which read thus:

                   “4. That, the 7/12 extract in relation to Khasara No. 38 (land admeasuring 1.82 HR) is in the name of Shree Ganesh Builders through its partner Shri Pahilaj Jagumal Sachhani.

                   5. That, the 7/12 extract in relation to Khasara No. 39/2 (land admeasuring 2.43 HR) is in the name of Shree Ganesh Buildhome Infrastructures Limited through its Director Shri Pahilaj Jagumal Sachhani.

                   6. That, the 7/12 extract in relation to Khasara No. 39/3 (land admeasuring 7.87 HR) is in the name of Shree Ganesh Builders Limited through its partner Shri Pahilaj Jagumal Sachhani.”

                   (emphasis supplied)

9. In view of such discrepancy in all the three 7/12 extracts, respondent Nos.2 and 3 rejected the aforesaid notice dated 20.06.2014 vide communication dated 06.12.2014, which is at record page No.36 (Annexure-III).

10. In view of the fact that the 7/12 extracts did not show uniformity in title or interest of the petitioner-Company qua all the lands, respondent Nos.2 and 3 called upon the petitioner-Company to place on record the title deeds.

11. Though such communication dated 06.12.2014 rejected the purchase notice of the petitioner-Company, the petitioner-Company neither cured the defect nor challenged the aforesaid rejection. In fact, the petitioner-Company did nothing for a period of more than 10 years from 2014 to 2024.

12. On 28.01.2025, respondent No.3 – Deputy Director, Town Planning, Nagpur Municipal Corporation, submitted a proposal for acquisition of the aforesaid land. In response to the same, the land acquisition proceedings were registered and conducted, and finally, the award was passed on 29.10.2025.

13. In view of the above, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking to challenge the award dated 29.10.2025 and further seeking a declaration that the reservation of the aforesaid land stood lapsed by virtue of deeming fiction after the period of one year from the service of the purchase notice.

14. Mr. M.M. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the purchase notice dated 20.06.2014 was duly served upon respondent Nos.2 and 3 on 24.06.2014. The statutory period of 12 months, as contemplated under Section 127 of the MRTP Act, was completed on 24.06.2015. Since no steps for acquisition of the aforesaid land were taken by the respondents, the reservation stood lapsed after the statutory period of 12 months.

15. Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, further submitted that the impugned award dated 29.10.2025 passed by the respondent Authorities in consequence of the reservation of the aforesaid land, which had already stood lapsed, is thus without any authority in law and hence deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Court.

16. Mr. D.V. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, vehemently submitted that though the purchase notice dated 20.06.2014 was served upon respondent Nos.2 and 3 on 24.06.2014, it was not a valid notice.

17. The aforesaid purchase notice pertained to the aforesaid land, which comprised three Khasra numbers, i.e. Khasra No.38, admeasuring 1.82 H.R., Khasra No.39/2, admeasuring 2.43 H.R., and Khasra No.39/3, admeasuring 7.87 H.R., situated at Mouza Chikhli (Khurd), Tahsil and District Nagpur.

18. The petitioner-Company itself has admitted that all the three Khasra numbers stood in the names of three different entities on the day when such purchase notice was issued. Khasra No.38 was in the name of Shree Ganesh Builders, which was a Partnership Firm; Khasra No.39/2 was in the name of a Company, Shree Ganesh Buildhome Infrastructure Limited; whereas Khasra No.39/3 was in the name of another Company, Shree Ganesh Builders Limited.

19. The 7/12 extracts which were enclosed along with the purchase notice are at record page No.33, which reveal that all the 7/12 extracts were issued by the Talathi, Nagpur on 18.06.2014.

20. In view of the aforesaid fact, the explanation tendered by the petitioner-Company regarding such difference in the names was given for the first time in the rejoinder dated 02.03.2026. The aforesaid explanation was never made before the Planning Authority in reply to the communication dated 06.12.2014.

21. Respondent No.2, vide communication dated 06.12.2014, had specifically called upon the petitioner-Company to produce the title deeds showing its clear title pertaining to the aforesaid land.

22. The petitioner-Company, in paragraph 7 of its rejoinder, has explained how the partnership firm was later converted into a registered company and the manner in which the name of the company was changed. However, all such changes had taken place on or before 10.04.2008, when the Assistant Registrar of Companies, Maharashtra, Mumbai, issued a certificate for commencement of business in the name of Shree Ganesh Builders Limited.

23. Thus, the petitioner-Company could have very well cured the defect as pointed out by respondent No.2 in the communication dated 06.12.2014. Even if it is assumed that the aforesaid defect could not have been cured as the purchase notice was rejected by respondent No.2 on 06.12.2014, the petitioner should have immediately challenged such rejection before this Court. However, the petitioner-Company neither cured the defects as pointed out by respondent No.2 nor challenged the aforesaid rejection before this Court. In fact, the petitioner-Company did nothing in the matter for a period of 10 years from 2014 to 2024.

24. Mr. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Madanlal Zumberlal Nahar and Others Vs. Chief Officer, Municipal Council, Beed [2023 (2) Mh.L.J. 618], wherein it has been held that the reservation of land does not lapse automatically and that a valid notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act is a precondition for claiming that the reservation has lapsed. In paragraph 1 of the said judgment, the Full Bench reproduced the question which was referred for consideration, which reads thus:

                   “Whether the High Court can lawfully declare lands reserved for a public purpose, under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for an inordinate long period of time, free from reservation in absence of a valid notice under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966?”

25. After considering the various provisions of the Statute and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more specifically in the case of Prafulla C. Dave Vs. Municipal Commissioner [2014 Mh.L.J. OnLine (S.C.) 191] and Chhabildas Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [2018(4) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 550], the Full Bench answered the reference as follows:

                   “12. In the light of the aforesaid pronouncements, it is clear that reservation of land does not lapse automatically and a valid notice under section 127 of the Act is a precondition to claim that it has lapsed.

                   13. Validity of the notice will have to be determined considering the facts of each case. It would depend upon whether notice under section 127 of the said Act is issued within stipulated time after revision of development plan.

                   14. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question in following terms :

                   In absence of valid notice under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, High Court cannot lawfully declare lands reserved for public purpose under Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for inordinate long period of time, free from reservation.

                   15. We however make it clear that validity of such a notice will have to be determined on the facts of each case on the touchstone of principles laid down in Prafulla Dave and Chhabildas (supra).

                   Reference answered accordingly.”

26. The Full Bench has specifically held that, in the absence of a valid notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the High Court cannot lawfully declare lands reserved for public purpose under the MRTP Act free from reservation and that the validity of such notice will have to be determined on the facts of each case on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

27. In our considered opinion, the purchase notice dated 20.06.2014 issued by the petitioner-Company pertaining to the aforesaid land, which included three Khasra numbers in three different titles, suffered from a major defect.

28. The aforesaid defect was immediately pointed out by respondent No.2 on 06.12.2014, which was never cured by the petitioner. Thus, in our considered opinion, the argument raised by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sudame, that the reservation stood lapsed automatically after the issuance of the purchase notice on 20.06.2014 is not in accordance with the law as settled by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Madanlal Zumberlal Nahar and Others (supra).

29. Apart from the validity of the notice dated 20.06.2014, another reason for which the present petition should fail is the conduct of the petitioner-Company. Though the purchase notice was rejected by respondent No.2 on 06.12.2014, pointing out the requirement of title deeds, the petitioner did not cure the aforesaid defect. The petitioner did not even challenge the aforesaid communication dated 06.12.2014 for a period of more than 10 years.

30. Respondent Nos.2 and 3, vide Resolution dated 18.01.2025, granted approval for acquisition of the aforesaid land along with the adjoining lands. The acquisition notice under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act read with Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, was published by respondent No.4 on 16.04.2025, which is at record page No.45 (Annexure-VIII). The aforesaid acquisition notice was published in two different newspapers on 26.04.2025 and 01.05.2025. The petitioner, however, did not challenge the aforesaid acquisition notice.

31. On 16.06.2025, respondent No.4 issued notice under Section 21(1)(4) of the Act of 2013 to the petitioner, which was duly served upon the petitioner and is at record page No.49 (Annexure-IX). The petitioner even then did not challenge the aforesaid acquisition proceedings and the notice dated 16.06.2025. On the contrary, the reply filed by respondent No.4 describes in detail how the petitioner-Company appeared before respondent No.4 in the land acquisition proceedings and submitted the calculation for compensation.

32. The aforesaid submission of a claim for proper valuation of the land to be acquired at Mouza Chikhli (Khurd) for the Sewerage Treatment Plant was submitted by the petitioner-Company on 16.07.2025, which is at record page No.134 (Annexure-R5). The petitioner did not immediately approach this Court raising a challenge to the acquisition proceedings, and such conduct of the petitioner speaks volumes about the waiver of any right, even if it had crystallised in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner should have immediately approached this Court raising a strong objection to the acquisition proceedings and thereby requesting this Court for stay of the further proceedings in view of the lapsing of the reservation of the aforesaid land, as argued by the learned Senior Counsel.

33. The petitioner, in fact, allowed respondent No. 4 to complete the entire proceedings and, not only that, participated in the aforesaid acquisition proceedings by submitting its claim for determination of proper compensation and participating in the hearing. Accordingly, the award came to be passed on 29.10.2025. The petitioner-Company, even during the pendency of the present writ petition, has filed a reference under Section 64 of the Act of 2013 for enhanced compensation, which is at record page No.147 (Annexure-R11).

34. All these facts clearly reveal that the petitioner, on the one hand, was claiming lapsing of reservation of the aforesaid land and, on the other hand, had waived the aforesaid right as claimed in the present writ petition by participating in the land acquisition proceedings without challenging the same before this Court till filing of the reference for enhancement of compensation.

35. Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, has relied upon the preliminary objections dated 13.08.2025 submitted by the petitioner before respondent No.4, which are at record page No.51 (Annexure-X).

36. It is true that, in the aforesaid preliminary objections, the petitioner had contended that the acquisition proceedings were not at all maintainable in view of the lapsing of reservation under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. However, this Court cannot ignore the communication submitted on the same day, i.e. 13.08.2025, by the petitioner to respondent No.4, praying for determining proper compensation for the aforesaid land and paying the same to the petitioner-Company as early as possible. The aforesaid communication dated 13.08.2025 submitted by the petitioner-Company is at record page No.140 (Annexure-R7).

37. In view of these two self-contradictory communications, Mr. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, is completely justified in contending that the petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time by contending that the acquisition proceedings were without jurisdiction on the basis of alleged deemed lapsing, after having participated in those acquisition proceedings at every stage, right from personal hearing to the determination of compensation and passing of the award, and again filing a reference for enhancement of compensation.

38. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the challenge raised by the present petitioner-Company is without any basis and is an afterthought, and accordingly, it is rejected.

39. It is worth to mention here that the aforesaid land was reserved for “Drainage and Sewerage Disposal Scheme” vide Reservation No.S-162 in the Development Plan of Nagpur City. Respondent Nos.2 and 3, in paragraph 10 of their reply, have stated on oath the importance of the aforesaid land for the aforesaid public purpose, which reads thus:

                   “10. The answering respondents submit that the said land is situated at the outer limits of Nagpur City. The land and its surrounding area have thin population density and substantial vacant land. As per the office of the Superintending Engineer (Public Health Engineering) of the answering respondents, the said site is an ideal location for construction of the Sewerage Treatment Plant and Pumping Station, which is necessary in view of the increasing population of Nagpur City.”

40. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 have also pointed out that the proposed Sewerage Treatment Plant is a part of the Maharashtra Government-funded “Pohra River Pollution Abatement Project” of NMC and is essential to cater to the needs of the growing population of the city. The aforesaid project is extremely indispensable to reduce the burden on the existing STPs of respondent Nos.2 and 3, and hence the Planning Authority has also deposited the compensation amount of Rs.11,77,10,704/- in favour of the petitioner with the office of respondent No.4, Land Acquisition Officer, on 11.09.2025 itself. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 have pointed out that the work order in respect of the aforesaid project for construction of the proposed STP has already been issued; however, the work could not be completed because of the status quo granted by this Court during the pendency of the present writ petition.

41. Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.865 of 2020 (Pravin S/o. Dadaji Khobragade Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, decided on 13.06.2022), in order to substantiate the contention that the 7/12 extract is a document which indicates the interest of the petitioner in the land and, hence, the Planning Authority should rely upon the same. However, the fact remains that, in the aforesaid case of Pravin S/o. Dadaji Khobragade, only one land bearing Survey No.145, situated at Tahsil Mul, District Chandrapur, was involved and the petitioner therein was the sole owner of the aforesaid land. The petitioner had issued the purchase notice by enclosing the 7/12 extract standing in his name. In the present case, the petitioner-Company, whose name was admittedly not included as the owner in at least two out of the three 7/12 extracts, had issued the purchase notice pertaining to those lands. Hence, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment would be of no assistance to the petitioner.

42. Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, has also relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Abdul Gani N. Wadwan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [2018 (4) Mh.L.J. 454], wherein this Court has held that entries in the 7/12 extracts constitute sufficient material to show the interest of the person concerned in the land and that the requirement is not of producing documents of title. However, a perusal of the aforesaid judgment reveals that, in that case, the Planning Authority had rejected the purchase notice as defective on the ground that, though the names of the petitioners appeared in the 7/12 extract, a charge in favour of a Co-operative Bank had been recorded in the “other rights” column. In those circumstances, this Court had held that, merely because a charge was recorded, the petitioners did not cease to be the owners or persons interested in the land. Thus, the requirement was of producing documents showing title, which included the 7/12 extracts, and, therefore, the title deeds were not required to be produced.

43. However, in the present case, the petitioner-Company, whose name was admittedly not included as the owner in the 7/12 extracts pertaining to Khasra Nos.38 and 39/2, had issued purchase notice in respect of the said lands. Hence, the Planning Authority, i.e. respondent Nos.2 and 3, was completely justified in calling upon the petitioner-Company to produce the title deeds on record substantiating its title to the aforesaid two Khasra numbers. In our considered opinion, in view of the aforesaid distinction in the facts, the judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Gani N. Wadwan (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.

44. Lastly, Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.13965 of 2024 (Yakub Salebhai Contractor (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, decided on 17.02.2026), wherein this Court has held that, after expiry of the stipulated period of 24 months under Section 127(1) of the MRTP Act from the date of issuance of the purchase notice, if the land is not acquired or no steps as contemplated under the said Section are commenced for acquisition, the land is deemed to be released from such reservation and the concerned authority cannot raise a defence that the purchase notice was defective on the ground that it was not accompanied by documents showing title or interest in the said land.

45. In our considered opinion, even the judgment of this Court in the case of Yakub Salebhai Contractor (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others (supra) will not be applicable to the present case, as the petitioner therein had produced a copy of the registered sale deed, which clearly demonstrated that, by virtue of the aforesaid sale deed, the petitioners had acquired title and interest in the land in question. This Court, in paragraph 17 of the aforesaid judgment, has clearly held that the intention behind requiring the submission of documents showing title or interest in the land along with the purchase notice is to facilitate clear transfer of title from the owner or the person interested in the land upon payment of consideration to the claimant within the stipulated statutory period.

46. Thus, even the judgment in the case of Yakub Salebhai Contractor (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others (supra) recognizes that the title to the land in question should be clear so as to facilitate its transfer from the owner to the Planning Authority upon acquisition. In the aforesaid case, the title was clear and the petitioners therein had submitted the title deeds to the respondent when the ground of defective purchase notice was raised by the respondent for want of documents. Thus, the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Yakub Salebhai Contractor (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others (supra) will not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

47. Thus, in our considered opinion, the acquisition proceedings as challenged in the present writ petition have been initiated and concluded strictly as per the provisions of the Act of 2013 for an essential public purpose. The petitioner participated in the entire acquisition proceedings and sought compensation and did not challenge the same till the passing of the award and deposit of the compensation amount. The huge amount of almost Rs.12 crores, which is public money, is lying with respondent No.4, and the project, which is for an extremely essential public purpose, has been withheld in view of such challenge raised by the petitioner.

48. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the challenge raised by the petitioner-Company in the present writ petition is devoid of any merit and is vitiated by the conduct of the petitioner, and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.

49. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

50. At this stage, Mr. Sudame, learned Senior Counsel, seeks extension of the interim relief, i.e. the status quo granted on 01.12.2025.

51. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that if the status quo order is continued for four weeks, no prejudice will be caused to the respondents. Though the respondents are opposing the extension of interim relief, we extend it for a further period of four weeks.

52. Needless to mention that upon expiry of four weeks, the interim relief shall stand vacated automatically.