(Prayer In CRP No.5306 of 2025 : Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order dated 28.08.2025 passed in MA No.21 of 2025 by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal by confirming the order dated 25.11.2024 passed in MA No.165 of 2023 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

In CRP No.5316 of 2025 : Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order dated 28.08.2025 passed in MA No.23 of 2025 by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal by confirming the order dated 25.11.2024 passed in MA No.163 of 2023 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.)

Common Order

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, C.J.

1. These Civil Revision Petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenge the common order dated 28.8.2025, passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Chennai, in M.A.Nos.21 and 23 of 2025. By the impugned order, the DRAT set aside the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I (DRT), Chennai, dated 25.11.2024, which had condoned the delay.

2. The sole question requiring determination in these petitions is whether the delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte proceedings ought to be condoned to allow a fair hearing.

3.1. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners, being third parties to the original credit facilities, acted bona fide and, therefore, procedural technicalities should not shut the door of justice.

                     3.2. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a series of binding judgments of the Supreme Court to submit that a justice-oriented approach must prevail over rigid technicalities, and that parties should not be rendered remediless without affording an opportunity to contest on merits. The proposition laid down in the said decisions, on which emphasis is laid, is summarized herein below:

                     (A) The decision in Dwarika Prasad (D) Thr. LRs. v. Prithvi Raj Singh(2024 INSC 1030) was relied upon to emphasize that courts should not shut out cases on mere technicalities, but rather afford an opportunity to thrash out matters on merits. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that where the restoration application itself contains full justifications and reasons explaining the delay, taking a hypertechnical view that a separate formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is mandatorily required amounts to ignoring the purpose of judicial procedure.

                     (B) The decision in Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(2025 INSC 382) was relied upon to demonstrate that when substantial rights and title over property are involved, matters ought to be determined on their merits rather than scuttled at the threshold on limitation grounds.

                     (C) The decision in Raheem Shah & Anr. v. Govind Singh & Ors.(2023 INSC 651) was relied upon to underscore the necessity of adopting a justice-oriented perspective.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent bank reiterated the reasons that weighed with the DRAT and sought dismissal of these revision petitions by placing heavy reliance upon two judgments of the Supreme Court which emphasize the proposition of law that inordinate delay should not be condoned in a routine manner:

                     (i) In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.((2013) 12 SCC 649), the Apex Court set aside an order condoning a delay of 2,449 days in preferring an appeal against an interim order passed in a writ petition.

                     (ii) In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)(2024 INSC 286), where the Supreme Court affirmed the refusal to condone an inordinate delay of 5,659 days in filing a land acquisition appeal.

5. In line with settled principles, this Court restricts its consideration entirely to the issue of condonation of delay, consciously abstaining from entering into the merits of the dispute.

6. The primary ground on which the DRAT reversed the decision of the DRT was the strict calculation of days, treating the delay as spanning 1,471 days or 634 days even after excluding the Covid-19 pandemic period. However, a realistic and equitable consideration of the timeline demonstrates that the actual period requiring explanation is significantly shorter.

7. The petitioners were not original borrowers or guarantors who actively participated in the primary credit facilities. Their initial awareness of the recovery proceedings arose only when enforcement steps and attachment orders were initiated against their bank accounts toward the end of 2022. Promptly reacting to the threat to their accounts, the petitioners preferred writ proceedings before this Court in early 2023. Upon the disposal of the writ petitions with liberty to pursue alternative statutory remedies, the petitioners immediately approached the DRT.

8. In the case at hand, the total elapsed time from ex parte order to the application made before the DRT is around 1471 days. The period prior to knowledge/attachment is around 345 days, i.e., from 11.07.2019 to 14.03.2020. The petitioners were also pursuing a writ petition before this court in the year 2023. The writ petition is stated to have been filed in January, 2023 and the same was disposed of on 06.07.2023. This period also has been excluded by the DRT. Thereafter, as per the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020, the period stipulated therein to be excluded owing to Covid-19 pandemic was also deducted by the DRT.

9. When overall context was taken into consideration, excluding the mandatory pandemic relief period granted by the Supreme Court as well as the duration during which the petitioners were bona fide pursuing their remedies before the High Court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the actual unexplained delay is as per the DRT reduced to approximately 249 days. In our considered opinion, the petitioners being third parties to the original proceedings, this period represents a non-deliberate lag, rather than conscious inaction or intentional abandonment of rights.

10. In the decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court emphatically held that courts must adopt a pragmatic, justice-oriented approach rather than an iron-cast, hyper-technical view when considering applications for condonation of delay and setting aside ex parte decrees. As reaffirmed in Dwarika Prasad (supra), procedural rules are intended to serve as the handmaid of justice, meaning an innocent litigant should not be rendered remediless. Furthermore, as highlighted in Inder Singh (supra) and Raheem Shah (supra), when substantial rights such as property titles are involved, the expression "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally so that meritorious claims are adjudicated on their merits rather than scuttled at the threshold on technical grounds of limitation, provided the delay is non-deliberate and lacks negligence.

11. Applying the principles settled in the relevant authorities to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the petitioners acted with reasonable diligence upon coming to know of the proceedings through account attachments. Their application contained clear justifications for the timeline and procedure being a handmaid of justice, the delay of around 249 days, in our considered opinion, was not intentional.

12. This Court finds that both cases relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent/bank are clearly distinguishable on facts:

                     (i) In Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), the school managing committee had full notice and knowledge of the writ proceedings, had appeared through counsel, gave explicit undertakings to comply with the court orders and received repeated statutory directives from the District Inspector of Schools. Despite complete knowledge, they deliberately failed to file an appeal for over 2,449 days and only moved the court when personal appearance orders were issued in contempt proceedings. Their explanation of "miscommunication between counsel" was found to be concocted and lacking in bona fides.

                     However, in the case at hand, the petitioners are third parties who were never served in the original credit facility proceedings. They had no notice until their bank accounts were attached in late 2022. Unlike the school committee, the petitioners acted with utmost dispatch upon learning of the attachment by filing writ proceedings in early 2023. There is neither deliberate inaction, nor lack of bona fides on their part.

                     (ii) In Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), the claimants/legal representatives sought to challenge a land acquisition reference award after an extraordinary, unexcused delay of 5,659 days. The legal heirs took no steps whatsoever to get substituted during the trial court proceedings, failed to seek procedural review, and slept over their rights while 15 other co-claimants accepted the award. The Supreme Court held that negligence and lack of due diligence were "writ large" and that stale/dead claims cannot be revived.

                     However, in the instant case, there is no abandonment of rights for decades. Once the mandatory statutory exclusions of Covid-19 pandemic period as per Supreme Court directives and the period days spent pursuing bona fide writ remedies before the High Court are applied, the period requiring justification reduces to roughly 249 days. A delay of 249 days, arising out of a third party discovering an ex-parte order through account attachment, can in no way be equated to an unexplained 5,659 days delay in a land reference.

13. In our considered opinion, the DRT rightly exercised its judicial discretion by condoning the delay subject to costs, ensuring that the respondent bank was adequately compensated for any procedural inconvenience. The DRAT erred in interfering with this reasonable exercise of discretion by adopting an overly rigid and arithmetic approach to the timeline.

14. As a sequel, these Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. Consequently, the common order dated 28.8.2025, passed by the DRAT is set aside. The order of the DRT condoning the delay is restored. The DRT is directed to take up the applications to set aside the ex parte proceedings and dispose of them strictly on their own merits, without being influenced by any observations made herein.

There shall be no order as to costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.