(Prayer: Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 438 r/w 442 of BNSS, to call for records connected with impugned order in Crl.MP.No.4226 of 2025 dated 26.12.2025 in C.C.No.16 of 2024 in CNR.No.TNCH01-010969-2025 on the file of Special Court No.I for trial of Criminal Cases related to Elected Members of Parliament and Members of Tamilnadu Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu, Chennai-600 001 and revise the same by setting it aside.)
1. This Criminal Revision Case has been filed challenging the order passed in Crl.M.P. No.4226 of 2025 dated 26.12.2025 in C.C. No.16 of 2024 on the file of the Special Court-I for Trial of Criminal Cases relating to Elected Members of Parliament and Members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Chennai – 600 001, whereby the petition filed by the petitioner seeking discharge from all the charges was dismissed.
2. The case of the prosecution is that the respondent registered a case in R.C. No.08(A)/2018/CBI/AC-III, New Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 7, 8, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”)
3. The above case was registered pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.19335 of 2017 dated 26.04.2018, whereby this Court directed the CBI to conduct an investigation into all aspects relating to the illegal manufacture, import, supply, distribution and sale of gutkha and other forms of chewable tobacco, which had been banned in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Puducherry. This Court further directed the CBI to take appropriate action against all persons involved in the offence, whether directly or indirectly, including those who aided or abetted the commission of the offence or were otherwise instrumental in facilitating its continuance.
4. Upon completion of investigation, the respondent filed a final report against six accused persons on 02.11.2018. Thereafter, further investigation was conducted, and a supplementary final report was filed on 09.11.2022, wherein the petitioner was arrayed as Accused No.12.
5. The charges against the petitioner as follows:
“ …………….. liii) Investigation revealed that consequent to an information vide AE1 No.456 dated 17.10.2013 generated by the Office of the Diretor General of Central Excise (Intelligence) Wing, New Delhi and its discreet verification, a team of Officers are deputed to carry out the search operation at certain premises including (i) NKC Electronic Weigh Bridge, Opposite Olympic Warehouse Pvt Ltd., Southupakkam Road, near Redhills Bus Stand, Thiruvallur and (ii) Shri Srinivasalu Rao, 3/9, Shreedharan Street, Aminjikarai, M.R.Hospital, Ayyanaidu Colony, Chennai-29 for alleged production of Gutkha (with tobacco). However, search operation was postponed without fixing a date in view of the a report dated 25.10.2013 by Shri Ravichandran, Senior Intelligence Officer, DGGEI (Hqrs), who was part of the team having generated the said information and conducted verification, that no activity was noticed at the premises of NKC Electronic Weigh Bridge, Opposite Olympic Warehouse Pvt Ltd., Southupakkam Road, near Red Hills, Bus Stand, Thiruvallur on 23.10.2013 and the manufacturing activity has been suspended by the firm.
liv) It is pertinent to mention here that the address of the premises of NKC Electronic Weigh Bridge, Opposite Olympic Warehouse Pvt Ltd., Southupakkam Road, near Red Hills, Bus Stand, Thiruvallur is the same that of M/s.Annamalai Industries, 3/38 B, Southupakkam Salai, Theerthakinyampattu, Redhills Chennai.
lv) Later, pursuant to a report dated 07.02.2014 by Shri R.Ravichandran, SIO that the manufacturing activity of MDM brand Gutkha has been resumed at the premises of NKC Electronic Weigh Bridge, Opposite Olympic Warehouse Pvt Ltd., Southupakkam Road, near Red Hills, Bus Stand, Thiruvallur in full swing and also at some other location, the intelligence was sent through Shri K.Ravichandran, SIO, who had verified the intelligence, vide Hqrs Letter No.F.No.587/CE/103/Pol/2013 dated 26.02.2014 signed by Dr.S.K.Sheoran, Assistant Director, DGCEI (liqrs) to its Chennai Zonal Unit, for execution and compliance report on the action taken.
lvi) Based on the above intelligence/input, Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12) the then Deputy Director, DGCEI, Chennai made surveillance through his sub-ordiante officers, namely Shri Parthasarathy, Shri N.Srinivasam and Shri Kannan alsong with aforesaid Shri R.Ravichandran on 28.02.2014 and 01.03.2014 and the surveillance team confirmed about the illegal manufacturing of Gutkha products at M/s.Annamalai Industries and recommended for conducting search. The search warrants were accordingly issued by the ADO, DGCEI, Chennai on 02.03.2014 for conducting search at concerned four premises. Searches were to be conducted on 03.03.2014 morning. One of the search warrants was to be executed by Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12), who was also supervising the entire process of intelligence in question.
Lvii) Investigation revealed that the securities were, however, not conducted on 03.03.2014 despite search warrants having been issued and in this regard, Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12) submitted to note mentioning that the surveillance was kept on the premises where manufacturing activities were going on and it was informed by Shri.L.Parthasarathy and Shri Ravichandran that no manufacturing activities were prima facie noticed during the intervening night and proposed that the search operation be postponed.
lviii) On 14.06.2014, Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12) recorded a note in the file mentioning that the surveillance team of Shri.L.Parthasarathy, Senior Intelligence Officer and Shri Kannan, Staff Car Driver submitted a report that no activities were noticed and the premises was found locked. In this regard, Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A12) also placed a note in the file mentioning that as per instructions, surveillance was kept by Shri.L.Parthasarathy and Shri Kannan to oversee the activity taking place in the premises and during the surveillance conducted on 03.05.2014, 23.05.2014, 13.06.2014 and 14.06.2014, no activity was noticed and it was also found locked on 05.06.2014, 06.06.2014, 07.06.2014 and 08.06.2014. He also mentioned that the surveillance note was forwarded to DGCEI(Hqrs) New Delhi.
lix) As per the above note, Shri.L.Parthasarathy and Shri Kannan who had reportedly conducted the surveillance on 03.05.2014, 23.05.2014, 03.06.2014 and 14.06.2014 were examined. They denied from having conducted any surveillance on the said dates and also never submitted any report of Shri B.Senthilvalavan(A-12) in the above regard. It is pertinent to mention that on 07.06.2014, a godown was handed over to the local police and the same was in the custody of the local police till 11.06.2014. Thus, the date of surveillance claimed in the unsigned note by Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12) are totally incorrect. Further, from the dispatch register of the O/o Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12), it is apparent that no such note/letter was sent to the DGCEI Hqrs. No such letter/surveillance note was found even in the concerned filed at DGCEI (HQ), New Delhi. Dr.S.K.Sheoran, Dy Director, DGCEI, New Delhi has stated that the note regarding surveillance conducted by Shri.L.Parthasarathy and Shri Kannan on 03.05.2014, 23.05.2014, 03.06.2014, 05.06.2014, 06.06.2014, 07.06.2014, 08.06.2014, 13.06.2014 and 14.06.2014 was not there in the Hqrs file. As such, the notes made by Shri.Senthilvelavan, (A 12) regarding the dates and outcome of the surveillance as well as sending the surveillance note to the DGCEI Hqrs is false/incorrect which show malafides on the part of Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A 12)
lx) Investigation revealed that Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A-12) was responsible for execution of intelligence, to conduct timely surveillance of the concerned premises and to organize search operation. The decision for not conducting search on 03.03.2014 and postponing the search was taken by him. The searches were postponed/called off by him in spite of the search warrant already issued. He created false note on surveillance and for sending the surveillance note/letter to the DGCEI Hqrs. He, with a malafide intention and without conducting physical surveillance on the factory premises of M/s.Annamalai Industries, created false document stating that he had conducted verification and sent false report to the DGCEI, New Delhi vide letter dated 15.05.2015 mentioning that there was no manufacturing activities in the premises of gutkha manufacturer, and allowed the Gutkah manufacturers to run their business without any hindrance till June, 2016.
lxi) Shri B.Senthilvelavan (A 12) further kept the above said surveillance file pending with him until his transfer from DGCEI, Chennai in 2016, without taking any appropriate action.
6. Upon receipt of the supplementary final report, the Trial Court took cognizance of the offences and numbered the case as C.C. No.16 of 2024. While the matter was pending for framing of charges, the petitioner filed a petition seeking discharge from all the charges levelled against him. The said petition was dismissed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the present Criminal Revision Case has been filed.
7. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that that, as per the supplementary final report, the petitioner has been charged for the offences punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 7, 11, 12, 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988.
9. The learned counsel further submitted that, in order to sustain a charge under Section 120-B of the IPC, the prosecution must establish the existence of an agreement between the accused persons either to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. In the absence of material demonstrating a meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators with a common object of committing the alleged illegal act, the petitioner cannot be held liable for the offence of criminal conspiracy. It was further contended that the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the materials collected during the course of investigation do not, in any manner, connect the petitioner with the alleged conspiracy. According to the learned counsel, the allegations against the petitioner are vague, bald, and devoid of specific particulars, as they neither identify the alleged conspirators nor disclose the nature, object, or manner of the alleged conspiracy. No prosecution witness has attributed any specific overt act to the petitioner in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. In the absence of any material establishing the petitioner's participation in the alleged agreement or any act in furtherance thereof, the charge under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code cannot, according to the learned counsel, be sustained against the petitioner.
10. It was further submitted that there is no allegation whatsoever that the petitioner demanded, accepted, or attempted to obtain any illegal gratification from any person. Equally, there is no allegation that any agent or any of the co-accused had offered or attempted to offer any illegal gratification to the petitioner. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the essential ingredients constituting the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act are conspicuously absent. In the absence of any material indicating a demand, acceptance, or attempt to obtain undue advantage or illegal gratification, the charge under Section 7 of the PC Act cannot be sustained against the petitioner.
11. Likewise, there is no allegation or averment to indicate that the petitioner obtained, or attempted to obtain, any undue advantage so as to attract the provisions of Section 11 of the PC Act. Further, there is neither oral nor documentary evidence on record to establish that the petitioner abetted the commission of any offence punishable under the PC Act, so as to attract Section 12 thereof. It is also submitted that there is no allegation that the petitioner abused or misused his official position with the intention of obtaining for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means. Significantly, even the charges framed against the petitioner do not attribute any such act or conduct to him. In the absence of any specific allegation or supporting material establishing the essential ingredients of the offences alleged under the PC Act, the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner, according to the learned counsel, is unsustainable in law.
12. It was further submitted that surveillance was conducted on 28.02.2014 and 01.03.2014, and the decision to conduct the search on 03.03.2014 was taken collectively with the approval of the superior authorities, namely, the Additional Director General (ADG) and the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI), Chennai. According to the learned counsel, there is absolutely no material to establish that the surveillance note was prepared by the petitioner or that he had any independent role in initiating or authorising the search. It was further contended that the file note dated 14.06.2014 prepared by the petitioner was intended only for the information and guidance of his subordinate officers and was never addressed or submitted directly to the higher authorities. The responsibility for placing the information before the competent higher authorities rested with the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) and the Assistant Director, particularly when the information had been received informally from an informer personally known to the SIO. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the preparation of the said file note by the petitioner cannot, by itself, be construed as establishing any culpable involvement or conspiracy on his part.
13. It was further submitted that, despite acknowledging receipt of the petitioner's communication dated 15.05.2015, the concerned officers failed to furnish any further information or inputs for a period exceeding thirteen months. No further information was received until the petitioner was relieved from the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI) on 21.01.2016. The learned counsel further submitted that the letters dated 03.03.2014 and 04.03.2014 addressed by the informer clearly demonstrate that the searches were conducted pursuant to the advice and inputs of the surveillance team, which comprised three Senior Intelligence Officers and a driver. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the decision to conduct the searches cannot be attributed solely to the petitioner.
14. It is further submitted that the prosecution relied upon the alleged surveillance note said to have been prepared by the petitioner. Since this document is the principal material relied upon for arraying the petitioner as an accused, its admissibility and evidentiary value are matters that can legitimately be considered even at the stage of discharge. Admittedly, the said surveillance note is unsigned. It was not annexed to the petitioner's communication dated 15.05.2015. In fact, the communication dated 15.05.2015 does not even refer to any enclosure, much less to the alleged surveillance note. The unsigned note appears to have been subsequently introduced solely for the purpose of implicating the petitioner as an accused. The communication dated 15.05.2015 is an independent document, whereas the alleged unsigned surveillance note is a separate sheet. Therefore, the alleged surveillance note cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as forming part of the communication dated 15.05.2015.
15. It was further submitted that surveillance operations were conducted during the nights of 28.02.2014, 01.03.2014, and 03.03.2014. However, no further intelligence inputs were received from the Senior Intelligence Officers thereafter until the issuance of the petitioner's communication dated 15.05.2015. According to the learned counsel, the status of the intelligence inputs and the absence of any further information were duly brought to the notice of the petitioner's superior officers from time to time. Taking into account the surveillance conducted on the three occasions, it was conveyed that there was no manufacturing activity at the unit. Thereafter, the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) did not furnish any further information to the Chennai Unit regarding any manufacturing activity after 03.03.2014. Therefore, having regard to the prolonged interval between 03.03.2014 and the petitioner's communication dated 15.05.2015, it was reported that there was no manufacturing activity during the intervening period.
16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent/CBI filed a counter affidavit and submitted that a criminal conspiracy is ordinarily hatched in secrecy and, therefore, direct evidence establishing the existence of such conspiracy is seldom available. It was contended that the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, the surrounding circumstances, and the sequence of events, when considered cumulatively, may disclose a common design or meeting of minds among the conspirators.
17. It was further submitted that the absence of direct evidence establishing an express agreement among the accused would not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution case, since a criminal conspiracy is ordinarily formed in secrecy and may be established through circumstantial evidence. At the stage of framing of charges, the Trial Court is only required to examine whether the materials available on record, when considered cumulatively, disclose a prima facie case and establish a nexus among the accused indicative of a coordinated course of conduct pursuant to a common design. At that stage, the Court is not required to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence or determine whether the prosecution would ultimately succeed at the trial.
18. The petitioner was served as Deputy Director, Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI), Chennai, from August 2012 to September 2014 and thereafter as Joint Director, DGCEI, Chennai, from September 2014 to June 2016. During his tenure as Deputy Director, surveillance was conducted through his subordinate officers, along with the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO), on 28.02.2014 and 01.03.2014. The surveillance team reportedly confirmed the illegal manufacture of gutkha products by M/s. Annamalai Enterprises, and it was recommended that search operations be conducted. Accordingly, search warrants were obtained, and searches were scheduled to be conducted on 03.03.2014.
19. It is further submitted that one of the search warrants was to be executed under the supervision of the petitioner, who was responsible for overseeing the intelligence operation. However, no search was conducted on 03.03.2014. Instead, the petitioner recorded a note stating that surveillance had been maintained over the premises where manufacturing activities were allegedly taking place and that, based on information received from the surveillance team, no manufacturing activity was primafacie noticed during the intervening night. On that basis, it was proposed that the search operation be postponed.
20. Thereafter, on 14.06.2014, the petitioner made a file note stating that the surveillance team, along with the Senior Intelligence Officer, had reported that no manufacturing activities were noticed and that the premises were found locked. He further recorded that, in accordance with the instructions issued, surveillance had been maintained on various dates to monitor the activities at the premises and that no manufacturing activity was noticed during such surveillance. The said note also recorded that the premises were found locked. The note was thereafter forwarded to the DGCEI Headquarters, New Delhi.
21. According to the prosecution, during the course of the investigation, the members of the surveillance team were examined and they categorically denied having conducted surveillance on the dates mentioned in the petitioner's note. They further denied having submitted any such report to the petitioner. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner, being the officer responsible for supervising the intelligence operation, conducting timely surveillance of the premises and organizing the search operations, deliberately postponed or called off the searches despite the issuance of valid search warrants. It is further alleged that the petitioner fabricated a false surveillance note with malafide intention and, without conducting any actual surveillance, created false records which were subsequently forwarded under his communication dated 15.05.2015.
22. There are altogether 28 accused in the present case, and the petitioner has been arrayed as Accused No. 12. Pursuant to the registration of the case, the respondent completed the investigation and filed the final report against the accused persons. Subsequently, a supplementary final report was filed, in which the petitioner was implicated and arrayed as Accused No. 12.
23. Upon perusal of records placed before this Court, it is revealed that a regular case in R.C. No.08(A)/2018/CBI/AC-III, New Delhi, was registered by the CBI on 29.05.2018 for the offences punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC reas with Sections 7, 8, 12 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, against unknown officials of the Central Excise Department, unknown officials of the Government of Tamil Nadu, unknown officials of the Food Safety Department, other unknown public servants and unknown private persons. The case was registered pursuant to the order dated 26.04.2018 passed by this Court in W.P. No.19335 of 2017 (J. Anbazhagan v. Union of India and Others), whereby this Court directed the CBI to conduct an investigation into all aspects relating to the illegal manufacture, import, supply, distribution and sale of gutkha and other forms of chewable tobacco, which were banned in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Puducherry, including the identification of and appropriate action against all persons involved in the offence, whether directly or indirectly, by aiding or abetting the commission of the offence or by interfering with the efforts taken to curb such illegal activities.
24. In pursuant to the said directions, after registering FIR, the CBI filed the final report on 02.11.2018. Thereafter, on completion of further investigation, a supplementary final report was filed on 10.11.2022, wherein the petitioner was arrayed as Accused No.12.
25. Admittedly, the petitioner was neither named in the First Information Report nor arrayed as an accused in the original final report filed by the respondent. However, subsequently, in the supplementary final report, the petitioner was implicated and charged with the offences punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC read with Sections 7, 11, 12 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988, in addition to the substantive offences alleged thereunder.
26. Even according to the prosecution, the petitioner caused surveillance to be conducted through his subordinate officers on 28.02.2014 and 01.03.2014. According to the surveillance team, the said operation allegedly confirmed the illegal manufacture of gutkha products at M/s. Annamalai Industries, pursuant to which a recommendation was made for conducting search operations. Consequently, search warrants were issued in respect of four premises. Although the searches were initially scheduled to be conducted on 03.03.2014, the same were subsequently postponed on the ground that surveillance had been maintained over the premises where the alleged manufacturing activities were being carried on and that the members of the petitioner's team had informed him that no manufacturing activity was prima facie noticed during the intervening nights. In the absence of any oral or documentary evidence connecting the petitioner with the alleged agreement or meeting of minds, the prosecution has failed to place any material on record to substantiate the allegation of criminal conspiracy against the petitioner.
27. It is well settled that, to establish an offence under Section 120-B of the IPC, the prosecution must prove that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means. Although conspiracy is seldom capable of being proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such an inference can be drawn only where there is material to establish a meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators for achieving the common unlawful object. In the absence of any such material establishing the existence of an agreement or meeting of minds between the petitioner and the other alleged conspirators, it would be unsafe to hold the petitioner liable for the offence punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC.
28. A perusal of the original final report reveals that there is not even a whisper of any allegation against the petitioner regarding the alleged note stating that there was no manufacturing activity at the premises in respect of which the search warrants had been issued. Only after filing of the original final report, the prosecution sought to rely upon the said unsigned note. Even in the petitioner's communication, there is no reference whatsoever to the alleged note. Therefore, the materials available on record do not primafacie disclose the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 120- B of the IPC.
29. Further, except for the alleged unsigned note, there is no other material on record connecting the petitioner with the other accused persons or indicating his participation in the alleged criminal conspiracy. None of the prosecution witnesses has attributed any specific overt act to the petitioner so as to establish his involvement in the commission of any of the offences alleged against him. In the absence of any independent oral or documentary evidence linking the petitioner with the alleged conspiracy or the substantive offences, the materials on record do not disclose a prima facie case against him.
30. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Judgment in the case of Ram Sharan Chaturvedi Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 16 SCC 166. The relevant portion of the Judgment is extracted here under:
“26. Apart from the fact that the appellant by himself could not have operated the strongroom and the safe of the Bank without the presence of the officer who was in the custody of the other set of keys, it is also important to note that the prosecution completely failed in adducing any evidence to indicate the existence of any agreement between the appellant on the one hand and A-1 and A2 on the other. The link necessary for providing the charge of conspiracy is entirely missing.
27. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. The Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the appellant and A1 and A2.
28. In the decision of State of Kerala Vs.P.Sugathan, this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through some physical manifestation (SCC PP 211-12, Paras 12-13)
12. ………. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt … A fe bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy….
13. … The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the Court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient” (emphasis supplied)
29. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against the appellant must evidence explicit acts or conduct on his pat, manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common desing with A1 and A2. In state (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu, this Court held (SCC p 91 para 101)
101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to seethe acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and execution.
30. In accepting the story of the prosecution, the trial Court as well as the High Court, proceeded on the basis of mere suspicion against the appellant, which is precisely what this Court in Tanvieben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat had cautioned against (SCC P.185, Para 45)
“ 45. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so prove must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safety drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court must have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must besuch as to rule out a reasonsable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot. In any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes, unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainity and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental distance between “ may be true” and “ must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions (Jaharlal Das Vs. State of Orissa) (emphasis in Original and supplied)
31. It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and express agreement between the accused. However, an implied must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the majority opinion of Ram Narayan Popli Vs. CBI, this Court had hedl (SCC p.783 Para 354) 354. ...For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient.
31. The above judgment is squarely applicable to the case on hand. This Court finds that the prosecution has failed to produce any material whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior meeting of minds between the petitioner and the other accused persons. There is no tangible or physical manifestation of such concurrence that can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner, or any contemporaneous declarations. Consequently, the essential ingredient of an agreement to commit an illegal act, which is the foundation of the offence of criminal conspiracy, is conspicuously absent in the present case.
32. Further, none of the prosecution witnesses has stated that the petitioner demanded, obtained, or accepted any illegal gratification so as to attract the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act. Equally, there is no specific allegation that the petitioner demanded or attempted to obtain any undue advantage either for himself or for any other person. The prosecution has also failed to disclose the identity of the person from whom the petitioner is alleged to have demanded, obtained, or attempted to obtain such undue advantage in connection with the discharge of his official duties. In the absence of any specific allegation or material establishing demand, acceptance, or attempt to obtain undue advantage by the petitioner, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are not made out, even prima facie.
33. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Judgment in the case of Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani Vs. State of Gujarat and Others reported in MANU/SC/0273/2025. The relevant portion of the Judgment is extracted here under:
22. The only charge is with respect to misuse of authority which does not come under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and non of the ingredients regarding demand or obtaining or acceptance of bribe or any illegal gratification has come out. The accusation was only that the policy of the State required a tender process to be adopted but the Minister had sanctioned the grant of fishing rights on an upset price, which is alleged to be misuse of authority especially since the policy can be deviated from, only on orders of the Chief Minister or the Cabinet as per the policy document and the Rules and Business framed. The investigation report, as we observed, speaks only of an allegation of misuse of authority, without any allegation of demand and acceptance of bribe as against the Appellant. The presumption under Section20 of the Act is that, if there is a demand and acceptance of bribe, then there is a presumption that it is to dishonestly carry out some activity by a public servant, for which, first proof will have to be offered of the demand and acceptance It is not otherwise that, if there is a misuse of authority then there is always a presumption of a demand and acceptance of bribe, resulting in a valid allegation of corruption.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent also led us to the statements recorded, as coming out from the Investigation report, which are only with respect to such demands made by the Minister for State, the first accused and not as against the second accused. We accept the contention raised by the appellant that there is not even an iota of material available from the investigation report, the pre-charge statements recorded from the complainant or the police officers or even the statements of persons questioned by the investigation team, as available in the report, to attract the ingredients of the provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act. We are of the opinion that the discharge application of the Appellant ought to have been allowed by the Special Court especially since there is not even an allegation of demand and acceptance of bribe, by the second accused/appellant.
34. The above judgment is also squarely applicable to the facts of the present case insofar as the petitioner is concerned. There is no material on record to establish that the petitioner demanded, obtained, or accepted any illegal gratification or undue advantage from any person. Mere allegation of misuse of official authority, in the absence of the foundational facts constituting demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, cannot by itself attract the penal provisions of the PC Act.
35. At the stage of considering an application for discharge, the Court is not required to determine whether the trial would ultimately result in conviction or acquittal. The expression "there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" occurring in Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that the Trial Court is not merely a post office for mechanically framing charges at the behest of the prosecution. The Court is required to apply its judicial mind to the facts and materials available on record and determine whether a case for proceeding against the accused has been made out. While undertaking such an exercise, the Trial Court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of the evidence, weigh the evidence as though conducting a full-fledged trial, or undertake an elaborate examination of the pros and cons of the prosecution case. Such appreciation and balancing of the evidentiary probabilities are matters to be undertaken during the course of the trial. Therefore, in the absence of material giving rise to a grave suspicion regarding the petitioner's involvement in the alleged offences, the petitioner is entitled to be discharged.
36. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Judgment in the case of P.Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala and another reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398. The relevant portion of the Judgment is extracted here under:
10. Before considering the merits of the claim of both the parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of Cr.P.C, 1973 which reads as under:
“227” Discharge:- If upon, consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing:
If two views are possible and one of them gives raise to suspension that as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Court will be empowered to discharge the accused at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused is defined under Section 227 of Cr.P.C clearly shows that the trial Court is not a mere Post Office to from the charge at the behest of prosecution, but, has to exercise his judicial minds to the facts of the case in order to detriment whether the case for trial has been made out by the prosecution in assessing the fact it is not necessary for the trial court to enter into the Pros and Cons of the matter or into weaving and balancing of evidence probabilities which really function of the Court and the trial starts.
11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so to frame a charge against him.
24. In so far as the admissibility or acceptability of the extra judicial confession in the form of counter affidavit made by the first accused before the High Court in he earlier proceedings are all matters to be considered at the time of trial, their probative value, admissibility, reliability etc., ae matters for evaluation after trial. As rightly pointed out by Mr.H.P.Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General, apart from the confessions, the statements of Vasu, CW6 Md.Hanifa CW 21; Mr.K.VelayudhanCW 31 and Mr.Mk Jayadevan CW 32 are very well available and cannot be ignored lightly, we are satisfied that all the above materials require sufficient scrutiny at the hands of the trial judge.
25. As discussed earlier, Section 227 of the new code confers special power on the judge to discharge an accused at the thresold if upon consideration of the records and documents, he finds that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words his consideration of the record and documents at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the Judge come to conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228, if not, he will discharge the accused. This provision was introduced in the Codeto avoid wastage of public time when a prima facie case was not disclosed and to save the accused from avoidable harassment and expenditure”.
The above principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment are directly applicable to the facts of the present case. If two views are possible and one of them gives raise to suspension that as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Court will be empowered to discharge the accused.
36. The materials placed by the prosecution do not disclose sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner, much less any material giving rise to a grave suspicion regarding his involvement in the alleged offences. The materials relied upon by the prosecution, even if taken at their face value, fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to be discharged under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
37. In view of the above discussions, the order passed in Crl.M.P. No.4226 of 2025 dated 26.12.2025 in C.C. No.16 of 2024 on the file of the Special Court-I for Trial of Criminal Cases relating to Elected Members of Parliament and Members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Chennai - 600 001, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
38. Accordingly, this Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The order dated 26.12.2025 passed in Crl.M.P. No.4226 of 2025 is set aside, and the petition filed by the petitioner seeking discharge is allowed. Consequently, the petitioner stands discharged from the charges under Section 120-B of the IPC read with Sections 7, 8, 12, 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988.
39. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial against the remaining accused persons, in accordance with law.
