1. The above writ petition is filed seeking to quash Ext.P6 and for a consequential direction commanding the 3rd respondent to reconsider Ext.P2, waiving the three-month period and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement, treating the application forwarded by the Headmaster as valid and sufficient.

2. The petitioner is working as a Lower Primary School Teacher. The earlier Manager passed away on 22.08.2024, and the process of completing the statutory and administrative formalities for the appointment and approval of a new Manager is still underway, and there is no approved Manager for the School. The petitioner has rendered 28 years of service, and she is due to retire on 31.10.2030. However, owing to advanced age and deteriorating physical health, the petitioner found it difficult to effectively discharge her official duties. Thereupon, the petitioner opted to avail imminent voluntary retirement and filed Ext.P2 application in this regard on 22.06.2026. As there was no approved Manager for the School, the Headmaster, being the officer-in-charge of the day-to-day administration of the School, forwarded the petitioner's application to the 3rd respondent for necessary action, as per Ext.P3. The 3rd respondent-Assistant Educational Officer is the pension sanctioning authority of LPST. The petitioner submits that there are no liabilities or monetary dues against the petitioner and also no disciplinary proceedings are pending against her. Therefore, along with Ext.P3 application, the Headmaster forwarded Ext.P4 Non-liability Certificate and also Ext.P5 certificate intimating that there are no disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner. Having far exceeded the minimum qualifying service of 20 years required under the Rules, the petitioner is fully eligible to seek voluntary retirement. Instead of processing the application in accordance with law, the 3rd respondent rejected the same as per Ext.P6 endorsement on the application for voluntary retirement stating that until and unless the request of voluntary retirement is accepted by the Manager, no further action could be taken on the application by the authorities. It is aggrieved by the same that the petitioner has approached this Court.

3. The learned Government Pleader, upon instructions, submitted that the application could be submitted only through the Manager and it cannot be routed through the Headmaster and in the said circumstances, the application seeking voluntary retirement was returned. Further, it is stated that the application for voluntary retirement is to be submitted three months prior to the proposed date for voluntary retirement and in the present case, the application has been filed only one month before the scheduled date of voluntary retirement, and therefore, the claim of the petitioner cannot be granted.

4. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides.

5. Admittedly, the petitioner is undergoing serious health issues as evident from Ext.P1 Medical Certificate. Further, the petitioner has the minimum qualifying service of 20 years required under the Rules, and therefore, she is fully eligible to seek voluntary retirement. It is true that there is no approved Manager for the School. Therefore, the application was forwarded to the Assistant Educational Officer, who is the pension sanctioning authority, through the Headmaster of the School. The Headmaster has also submitted Ext.P4 Non-liability Certificate evidencing that there are no liabilities against the petitioner and also Ext.P5, stating that no disciplinary action by the department, Police or Vigilance is pending against the petitioner. The only impediment now as evident from Ext.P6 is that the request for voluntary retirement is not approved by the Manager. The only question to be decided is as to whether in a situation where there is no approved Manager, the request for voluntary retirement could be considered, without the approval of the Manager.

6. Rule 56 of Part-III KSR deals with voluntary retirement, the relevant portion of which is required to adjudicate the issue involved in this writ petition, reads as follows:

                  56. A retiring pension is granted to an employee who retires voluntarily after 20 years of qualifying service subject to the following conditions:-

                  (i) He shall give notice in writing to the appointing authority or the pension sanctioning authority of his intention to retire at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire:

                  [Provided that the employee may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of less than three months giving reasons therefore. On receipt of such request the appointing authority may consider it for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three months.]

                  ……………………………………………………………………..

                  (v) Permission to retire shall be given in all cases except those in which disciplinary proceedings are pending for imposition of a major penalty or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case is of the view that the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from service would be warranted or in which prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of Law against the officer;

                  (vi) Cases in which permission cannot be given by the appointing authority shall be referred to Government intimating the fact to the person concerned, before the date specified in the notice as the date on which the employee desires to retire.

                  The said Rule provides that a retiring pension is granted to an employee who retires voluntarily after 20 years of qualifying service subject to conditions. Rule 56(i) provides that he shall give notice in writing to the appointing authority or the pension sanctioning authority of his intention to retire at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire. It is further provided in the Rules that the employee may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of less than three months, giving reasons thereof and on receipt of such request, the appointing authority may consider the request for such curtailment of the period of notice of three months on its merits, if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience. It is further provided in Rule 56 that permission to retire shall be given in all cases except those in which disciplinary proceedings are pending for imposition of a major penalty or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the cases is of the view that the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from service would be warranted or in which prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of Law against the

officer and cases in which permission cannot be given by the appointing authority, such cases shall be referred to the Government intimating the fact to the person concerned before the date specified in the notice as the date on which the employee desires to retire.

7. As stated above, the reason given in Ext.P6 to return the request made by the petitioner is that the same cannot be considered until and unless it is approved by the Manager. An important aspect to be noted is that, going by Rule 56(i), the notice intimating voluntary retirement could be given either to the appointing authority, the Manager or the pension sanctioning authority, the Assistant Educational Officer, the 3rd respondent. In the present case, since there was no approved Manager, the application has been routed through the Headmaster as per Ext.P3, in which Ext.P4 Non-liability Certificate and also Ext.P5 Certificate stating that no disciplinary proceedings are initiated/pending against the petitioner, is also attached. Therefore, I am of the view that the request for voluntary retirement of the petitioner on genuine grounds cannot be rejected solely for the reason that there is no approved Manager, inasmuch as such an application could be submitted even before the pension sanctioning authority as per Rule 56(i), Part-III of KSR.

8. Next objection raised by the respondents is that, as per Rule 56(i), the notice in writing of the intention of the employee to retire voluntarily shall be submitted at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire and the same has been violated in the present case. The said objection also cannot be sustained in the light of the 1st proviso to Rule 56(1), which gives ample power to the authorities to reduce the said notice period of three months. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that so as to bring a quietus to the issue, the petitioner is prepared to file a fresh application providing at least three months' time prior to the proposed date of voluntary retirement.

9. Applying for voluntary retirement is the right of an employee, of course, subject to the condition stipulated in Rule 56 of Chapter III KSR. The insistence now made by the educational authority to route it through the Manager for consideration of the application is compelling the petitioner to do an impossible act in as much as there is no approved Manager, that too when there is ample provision in the Rules itself to submit such notice of intention to retire voluntarily to the pension sanctioning authority also. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another [2011 KHC 4492] has considered the doctrines of impossibility as follows:

                  38. DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY: The Court has to consider and understand the scope of application of the doctrines of "lex non cogit ad impossibilia" (the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform); "impossibilium nulla obligatio est" (the law does not expect a party to do the impossible); and impotentia excusat legem in the qualified sense that there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law or to forbear the prohibitory. These maxims are akin to the maxim of Roman Law Nemo Tenetur ad Impossibilia (no one is bound to do an impossibility) which is derived from common sense and natural equity and has been adopted and applied in law from time immemorial. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like an act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. (Vide: Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and Others, AIR 1999 SC 3558; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others, AIR 2004 SC 3648; and Haryana Urban Development Authority and Another v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Another, AIR 2005 SC 1491).

                  39. Thus, where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any fault on his part, and has no control over it, the law will in general excuse him. Even in such a circumstance, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of the supervening impossibility caused therein.

10. This Court has also considered the said legal principle in Archana Varghese v. District Collector, Pathanamthitta [2015 (2) KHC 39] as follows:

                  12. When land was converted without obtaining permission, necessarily, the Collector ought to have exercised his power under Clause 7 of KLUO at the relevant point of time. Having failed to invoke the enabling power to prevent conversion, same power cannot be exercised as though a fetter is placed on land to prevent use of land for other purposes. The objective of the EC Act is only to secure production and distribution of food crops. The permission under Clause 6 would arise only when land is used for cultivation of food crops. The permission under this clause is not to unbind any burden on the land as noted above. The power vested with the Collector is to compel the holder of the land to use the land for cultivation. The mode of exercise of this power is referred in Clause 7. This power is to direct holder of the land to cultivate food crops which were in cultivation. If the paddy was in cultivation, the power can be exercised only to compel cultivation of paddy alone and not other food crops. When land becomes uncultivable for the paddy, the enabling power will become otiose. Law does not compel a person to do that which he cannot possibly perform Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impossibility also excuses a person from doing what is required by law - Impotentia excusat legem. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2005 KHC 888: 2005 (4) SCC 530: 2005 (2) KLT 876: AIR 2005 SC 2622: 2005 SCC (Cri) 961: 2005 (275) ITR 81: 2005 (125) Comp Cas 513 had occasion to consider the above two maxims and held in para 70 as follows:

                  "70. The maxim "lex non cogit ad impossibilia", like all maxims, only tells us that law does not contemplate something which cannot be done. The maxim applies, insofar as persuading the Court to hold that it is impossible to send a company to prison. The maxim by itself does not empower the Court to break up the section into convenient parts and apply them selectively. Nor does the maxim "impotentia excusat legem" apply here for the same reason. Au contraire, the application of these two maxims could equally persuade the Court to ignore the language of the statutory provision in the case of a juristic person, there being no warrant for dissecting the section and treating only one part as capable of implementation when the mandate of the section is to impose the whole of the prescribed punishment."

                  It is to be noted that the Division Bench of this Court in Aishabeevi v. Superintendent of Police, 2014 (3) KHC 678: 2014 (3) KLT 1078: 2014 (2) KLD 505: 2014 (4) KLJ 58 held that there is no provision in the land utilisation order that any paddy land which was converted continued to be presumed as an illegally converted land. Thus, in the light of the discussion as above, when the land has become unfit to produce paddy, the Collector cannot compel the land owner to cultivate paddy. The holder of land is free to use the land in accordance with law. Thus, I hold that in respect of paddy land which was converted prior to the enactment of the Act 28 of 2008 no permission is required in terms of Clause 6 of KLUO.

11. The appointment of the Manager is not something in which the petitioner has any role, and therefore, she cannot be compelled to route the application for voluntary retirement through the Manager, where admittedly there is no Manager for the School. Therefore, the writ petition is disposed of as follows:

                  The petitioner shall submit the necessary application as provided under Rule 56 of the KSR before the Headmaster of the School within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Headmaster shall forward the same to the 3rd respondent-Assistant Educational Officer for appropriate orders, along with Exts.P4 and P5 Certificates showing that there are no liabilities against the petitioner and that no disciplinary proceedings are pending against her. On receipt of the same, the 3rd respondent shall consider the request of the petitioner, if required, after verifying the service book to ascertain whether any disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner and shall consider the application submitted by the petitioner for voluntary retirement as provided under Rule 56, Part-III of the KSR. A decision in this regard shall be taken within a period of one month thereafter.