Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.

1. Heard Sri Ramalakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, attached to the Office of the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents.

2. The petitioner, wife of the alleged detenu, namely, Ankem Raja, has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus directing release of the detenu and to set him free by declaring and setting aside the Order of Preventive Detention.

3. The District Collector/Magistrate passed an Order of Preventive Detention being Rc.C1(Magl)/126/2025, dated 08.12.2025 under Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) of A.P. Prevention Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short ‘Act 1986’). The Order was passed on three grounds, i.e., three criminal cases, which are;

                  1) Kovur Police Station: Crime No.160/2025, U/s.271, 272, 273 R/W 3(5) B.N.S., dated 09.06.2025;

                  2) Kovur Police Station: Crime No.246/2025, U/s.127 (2), 140 (3), 308 (5), 115 (2) r/w.3(5) B.N.S., dated 20.08.2025;

                  3) Kovur Police Station: Crime No.322/2025, under Sections 420, 386 r/w.34 IPC, dated 18.11.2025;

                  The Order recorded that the detenu was ‘Goonda’ under Section 2 (g) of the Act 1986 and the criminal cases registered against him fell under Chapter XVII and XXII of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’) and VI, XVII, XVIII and XIX of Bharathiya Nyaya Sanhitha (‘BNS’). He was habitually indulging in criminal activities in the manner prejudicial to the public order and in spite of enforcement of ordinary penal laws, the detenu could not be prevented from indulging in such brutal activities.

4. After the proceedings of the Advisory Board, the State Government/1st respondent confirmed the Order of Detention by G.O.Rt.No.211, dated 03.02.2026. Both the Orders are under challenge in the writ petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that,

                  (i) The Crime No.160/2025 under Sections 271, 272, 273 r/w. Section 3 (5) BNS 457 of Kovur Police Station under Ground No.1, corresponding to Sections 267, 268 & 269 IPC do not fall under Chapter XVII, XVIII or XXII of IPC (corresponding Chapters VI, XVII, XVIII and XIX of BNS). The detenu is therefore not ‘Goonda’ within its meaning under Section 2 (g) of the Act 1986. The Investigating Officer had also issued Section 35 (3) BNS notice to the detenu (Accused No.2 in the said crime number). He cooperated with the investigation. The Investigating Officer had filed the charge sheet and the case was pending for trial.

                  (ii) The Crime No.246/2025 under Sections 127 (2), 140 (3) 308 (5), 115 (2) r/w.3 (5) BNS in Ground No.2, related to a dispute with respect to purchase of a flat in an apartment in which O.S.No.269 of 2023 was pending between the detenu and the complainant. The complaint was filed in the year 2024, in which the detenu is Accused No.3. He was arrested on 20.08.2025 and was enlarged on regular bail on 15.09.2025. The bail order, though referred in the detention order, but the detaining authority did not consider the conditions of the bail Order. So, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is vitiated for non-consideration of the relevant material.

                  (iii) The Crime No.322 of 2025, under Sections 420, 386 r/w.34 IPC of Kovur Police Station in Ground No.3, relates to the incident which occurred on 18.11.2025 wherein there was dispute of the payment of some amount relating to some work between the complainant and Accused No.1 therein and the allegation made against the detenu (Accused No.3), was that he threatened to kill the complainant. The detenu was arrested on 23.11.2025. He was sent to the judicial custody and was granted regular bail. The District Collector in Ground No.3 only considered that the detenu was remanded to the judicial custody, but he did not consider the triple test as laid down in Champion R. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya ((2015) 16 SCC 253). The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is neither the subjective satisfaction nor is based on relevant considerations.

                  (iv) The preventive detention could not be used on stale or irrelevant grounds. There must be a real possibility of future conduct prejudicial to public order, whereas in the nature of the incidents, even if taken to be true, at best, it constituted a breach of law and order and not disturbing the public order. The Order of Detention was passed mechanically. The Order of Preventive Detention is illegal. It cannot be sustained and the detenu is entitled to be set free.

6. Learned Government Pleader referring to the counter affidavit supported the Order of Preventive Detention and he submitted that,

                  (i) the District Collector recorded its subjective satisfaction that the criminal activities in which the detenu was indulged were prejudicial to the public order and in spite of enforcement of ordinary penal laws, the detenu could not be prevented from indulging in such activities. Such satisfaction is based on material on record;

                  (ii) the detenu falls within the definition of ‘Goonda’ for the offences in Ground Nos.2 & 3, under Section 2 (g) of the Act 1986, even if the offences under Ground No.1, may not be falling under Chapter XVI, XVII & XXII of IPC. So, the preventive detention order has rightly been passed under the Act 1986.

7. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record.

8. It is not in dispute that the offences under Sections 271, 272, 273 r/w.3 (5) BNS 457 in Crime No.160 of 2025, Ground No.1, which correspond to Sections 267, 268 and 269 of IPC, fall in Chapter XV of IPC and not in Chapter XVI, XVII & XXII of IPC.

9. Section 2 (g) of the Act 1986, defines ‘Goonda’ as follows:

                  “2 (g) "goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code;”

10. In view of the definition of ‘goonda’, if the offences do not fall under the Chapters XVI, XVII or XXII of IPC, with respect to those offences the person cannot be termed as ‘goonda’. However, there is no dispute that the offences in Ground Nos.2 & 3 are punishable under Chapter XVI, XVII or XXII of IPC. Though the District Collector in the Preventive Detention Order has termed the detenu as ‘goonda’ in all the criminal cases under the Ground Nos.1 to 3, incorrectly, and though the offences in Ground No.1 do not fall under Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII of IPC, it cannot be said that the detenu is not ‘Goonda’ under Section 2 (g) of the Act 1986, in view of the offences in criminal cases in Ground Nos.2 & 3, which falls in Chapter XVI, XVII and XXII of IPC on which no dispute has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. So, it can also not be said that an Order of Preventive Detention could not be passed under Section 3 of the Act 1986 in view of Ground No.1, as the detenu would be covered within the definition of ‘Goonda’ under Section 2 (g) with respect to the offences under Sections 2 & 3. But, the Order of Preventive Detention terming the detenu as ‘Goonda’ in the criminal cases in Ground Nos.1 to 3 shows the non-application of mind to the correct factual position, which must have affected his satisfaction recorded for passing the Order of Preventive Detention against the detenu.

11. In Ground No.2, Crime No.246 of 2025 the incident is primarily a civil dispute between the detenu and the complainant for which O.S.No.269 of 2023 is pending. The detenu was enlarged on bail on 15.09.2025. The Order of Preventive Detention does not show the consideration of bail orders and in the light thereof, recording any satisfaction by the Detaining Authority as to why those bail conditions were not sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging into any further activities affecting the public order if he was not detained. Though the bail order has been referred, but it has only been referred as a fact and it has only been observed that the detenu is in judicial remand in another criminal case, Crime No.322 of 2025 under Ground No.3, but there is no consideration of the bail order to arrive at the subjective satisfaction.

12. In Buddiga Dhana Lakshmi v. State of A.P. (2026 SCC OnLine AP 2162) a Coordinate Bench of this Court set aside the preventive detention order and released the detenu observing that while passing the Order of Preventive Detention, the Detaining Authority has not considered the bail orders passed in favour of the detenu in other criminal cases. Paragraphs 14 & 15 of Buddiga Dhana Lakshmi (supra) are reproduced as under:

                  “14. In Ponnada Geetha (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court has held that when the detenu was already released on bail in a crime and when it was made basis for passing the order of preventive detention and when such order of bail was not placed before the detention authority, it vitiates the order of preventive detention. Paragraph Nos. (9) to (12) of Ponnada Geetha (supra) read as under:

                  “However, as per the settled law, the very fact that the order of bail granted to the detenu in Crime No. 219 of 2024 of Gopalapatnam Police Station for the offence under NDPS Act, was not placed before the detaining authority, while passing the impugned order of detention, by itself, is sufficient to hold that it vitiates the impugned order of detention. The legal position in this regard is fairly well settled.

                  10. The Division Bench of the common High Court for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh had an occasion to elaborately deal with the said legal position in the case of Vasanthu Sumalatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 790 : (2016) 1 ALT 738 (DB). At para 44 of the said judgment, it is held as follows:

                  “44. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention, which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court. (Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [(1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361]; Jotha Viswanadh v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of A.P. [judgment in W.P. No. 10018 of 2012, dated 29-6-2012 (APHC) (DB)]. Where the detenu is released on bail, and is enjoying his freedom under the order of the court, the order of bail must be placed before the detaining authority, when the order of detention is passed, to enable him to reach a proper satisfaction. (Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 72 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 693]. If the detaining authority was unaware of the order of bail, the detention order is rendered invalid as the Court cannot attempt to assess in what manner, and to what extent, consideration of the order granting bail to the detenu would have effected the satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the order of preventive detention (Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite (42 supra); Rekha (5 supra); Jotha Viswanadh (44 supra).”

                  11. At para 42 of the said judgment, it is also held by the Division Bench of the common High Court that it is incumbent that all vital materials are placed before the detaining authority to enable him to arrive at the subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing an order of detention, as decided in M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India ((1990) 2 SCC 1 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 258 and State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini ((1988) 1 SCC 287 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 107 (2)). Therefore, it is held that the bail order is a vital material for consideration and if it is not considered, the satisfaction of the detaining authority would be impaired.

                  12. Thus, it is obvious from the analogy and the legal position decided in the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of the common High Court, which is binding on this Court, that when the detenu was already released on bail in a crime and when it was made basis for passing the order of preventive detention and when the said order of bail was not placed before the detaining authority, it vitiates the impugned order of preventive detention. Therefore, in view of the law enunciated in the above judgment, as the order of bail is admittedly not placed before the 2nd respondent when he has passed the impugned order of preventive detention, the impugned order of preventive detention is vitiated and, therefore, cannot be sustained.”

                  15. The aforesaid is the settled position in law. The bail order and the conditions of bail are relevant material to be considered to arrive at the satisfaction if the order of detention is yet to be passed.”

13. The Ground No.3 in which by the time the Order of Preventive Detention was passed the detenu was in judicial custody, as submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, we find that the detaining authority has not considered and applied the triple test to arrive at a subjective satisfaction to pass an Order of Preventive Detention with respect to the detenu when the detenu is in judicial custody.

14. The triple test as laid down in Champion R. Sangma (supra) are as under vide paragraphs Nos.9 to 11:

                  “9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order.

                  10. There are three such factors which were restated in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)

                  “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.”

                  11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as well. Some of which are as under:

                  (i) T.V. Sravanan v. State [T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC 664 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] ,

                  (ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N. [K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N., (2008) 9 SCC 89 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 679] ,

                  (iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 956] .”

15. It is true that a criminal case in which the accused is under judicial custody can be taken into consideration for passing the Order of Preventive Detention but at the same time, the Detaining Authority has to satisfy on the fulfillment of the above said triple test, which are missing in the present Preventive Detention Order.

16. Further, the detenu was granted bail in Ground No.3 offences, but there is no consideration of the bail order by the Authority confirming the detention order.

17. We are satisfied that the Order of Preventive Detention and the Order of Confirmation cannot be sustained on the aforesaid discussion. So, there is no need to discuss the other grounds of challenge.

18. The Writ Petition is allowed, setting aside the Order of Preventive Detention dated 08.12.2025 and the Order of Confirmation dated 03.02.2026. The Detenu shall be set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case. No order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.