Soumen Sen, C.J.

1. This writ petition is filed challenging the order of detention dated 8th May, 2026 passed against one Ratheesh M.P. (the detenu), under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, [‘PITNDPS’ Act, for brevity]. The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 3rd July, 2026 and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, on 27th March, 2026, the District Police Chief, Malappuram, submitted a proposal to the Government seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. The proposal was recommended and forwarded to the Government by the State Police Chief vide letter dated 4th April, 2026. Upon receipt of the proposal, the Government examined the materials and, on 22nd April, 2026, referred the matter to the Screening Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of the Law Secretary for its opinion. The Screening Committee considered the proposal in detail and, being satisfied that the statutory requirements for preventive detention were fulfilled, recommended the detention of the detenu. Thereafter, upon consideration of the recommendation and the materials placed on record, the Government passed the order of detention on 8th May, 2026.

3. The Detaining Authority has relied upon seven different cases registered under various provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity, ‘NDPS Act’). Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.677/2025 of Kolathur Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b) of the NDPS Act.

4. We heard Sri. Nireesh Mathew, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. Biju Meenattoor, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

5. The first ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the order of preventive detention has been snapped on account of the inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the detention order. It was contended that the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.677/2025 of Kolathur Police Station, which was registered on 20th December, 2025. However, the impugned order of detention came to be passed only on 8th May, 2026, after a lapse of about four months and seventeen days from the date of the last prejudicial activity. According to the petitioner, no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the sponsoring authority or the Detaining Authority for this substantial delay. It was, therefore, argued that the unexplained time gap has severed the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activity and the need for preventive detention, thereby vitiating the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

6. The second ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, although the proposal had been forwarded by the State Police Chief on 4th April, 2026, the matter was placed before the Screening Committee only on 22nd April, 2026. It was further submitted that, even after the Screening Committee made its recommendation, the order of detention came to be passed only after a further delay of 14 days. According to the petitioner, the unexplained delay at these stages belies the urgency ordinarily associated with preventive detention and demonstrates that the apprehension entertained by the Detaining Authority regarding the necessity of immediately detaining the detenu was not genuine.

7. The third ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was an unexplained delay in executing the detention order. It was submitted that, although the detention order was passed on 8th May, 2026, the detenu was arrested only on 13th May, 2026, after a delay of five days. According to the petitioner, if the Detaining Authority had genuinely entertained an imminent apprehension that the detenu would continue to engage in prejudicial activities, the order ought to have been executed without any delay. In support of the said contention, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura and others (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333) , wherein it was held that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in passing or executing a preventive detention order may render the order unsustainable by snapping the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention.

8. The fourth ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority had failed to consider the stringent bail conditions imposed upon the detenu in the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, it is submitted that, despite being enlarged on bail on 23rd February, 2026, till date of the detention order, i.e., 8th May, 2026, the detenu has not been involved in any further crimes. It was, therefore, argued that, the authority while passing the order, is in no way placed in a position to ascertain whether the present bail conditions will not deter the detenu in committing further offences.

9. Per contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor has referred to statement of facts filed on behalf of 1st and 2nd respondents and submitted that there was no undue or unexplained delay in initiating or completing the preventive detention proceedings. It was contended that the slight delay in submitting the proposal was occasioned by the time taken to collect the relevant records from the authorities concerned. It was pointed out that the detenu was arrested in the last prejudicial case on 20th December, 2025, remained in judicial custody, and that his bail application before this Court was withdrawn on 6th February, 2026. Thereafter, he was granted bail by the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act and NDPS Cases, Manjeri, on 23rd February, 2026.

10. It was further submitted that the sponsoring authority initiated the proposal under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act on 27th March, 2026. The proposal was subsequently recommended and forwarded to the State Police Chief through the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range, the Inspector General of Police, North Zone, Kozhikode and the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order). The State Police Chief, vide letter dated 4th April, 2026, recommended and forwarded the proposal to the Government. The Government, upon examining the proposal, referred the matter to the Screening Committee on 22nd April, 2026. The Screening Committee, after considering the proposal in detail, opined that the case was objectively and subjectively fit for invoking preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. Thereafter, the authenticated report of the Screening Committee was received by the Government on 4th May, 2026, following which the detention order was passed on 8th May, 2026. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, every stage of the proceedings was completed with due diligence and the delay, if any, stood satisfactorily explained.

11. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that the statutory requirements under the PITNDPS Act were scrupulously complied with. The detention order was communicated to the Central Government as required under Section 3(2) of the Act, the detenu was arrested on 13th May, 2026 and detained on 14th May, 2026, and the case was referred to the Advisory Board within the time prescribed under Section 9(b) of the Act. It was, therefore, contended that no constitutional or statutory safeguard had been violated.

12. It was lastly submitted that the detenu is a habitual drug offender involved in seven NDPS cases since 2020 and that the existing bail conditions were insufficient to prevent him from engaging in further narcotic offences. It was argued that the detenu had continued to indulge in similar criminal activities despite having been convicted in five earlier cases and even after his release from preventive detention under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act. In such circumstances, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor contended that the Detaining Authority had rightly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that preventive detention was necessary to prevent the detenu from engaging in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

13. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the parties and have perused the records produced in sealed cover.

14. The first issue for consideration before us is whether the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and order of detention has snapped on account of the inordinate and unexplained delay.

15. The question of delay in preventive detention matters is no longer res integra. It is trite as has been laid down in a catena of decisions that delay, by itself, is not a determinative factor in matters of preventive detention. What is relevant is whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether, by reason of such delay, the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the necessity for preventive detention has been snapped.

16. While dealing with the question of delay it is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala ((2014) 11 SCC 326) wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. Similarly, in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India, ((2006) 11 SCC 339) it was held as follows:

                  “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78: 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.A Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala4 had referred to the observations in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta ( (1974) 4 SCC 530) as follows:-

                  “10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

19. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions make it abundantly clear that delay, by itself, is not a determinative factor in matters of preventive detention. What is relevant is whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether, by reason of such delay, the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the necessity for preventive detention has been snapped.

20. It should always be kept in mind that mere passage of time by itself is not sufficient to invalidate an order of preventive detention. What is required is an examination of whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether the materials on record disclose a continuing necessity for detention.

21. In the case at hand, while considering the purported delay and the alleged snapping of live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention, it is to be noted that the said delay in submitting the proposal and passing the detention order is explained by the Detaining Authority as follows:-

                  “6. Sponsoring Authority informed that slight delay occurred in submitting proposal was due to the time taken in the process of collecting documents from the relevant authorities who had registered cases against the respondent. The last prejudicial activity was registered on 20.12.2025. He was arrested and sent into judicial custody. The respondent filed a bail application before the Hon'ble High Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 06.02.2026. Later, the respondent was granted bail by the Hon'ble Special Court for SC/SC (POA) Act & NDPS Act Cases, Manjeri as per Order dated 23.02.2026 in Crl (MP) No. 01/2026. The Sponsoring authority initiated the proposal for preventive detention u/s.3(1) of PITNDPS Act, 1988 as per letter dated 27.03.2026. The proposal was subsequently recommended and furnished to the State Police Chief through the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range; Inspector General of Police. North Zone, Kozhikode. Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order). The State Police Chief as per letter dated 04.04.2026 recommended and forwarded the proposal to the Government.

                  7. The Government have constituted a Screening Committee under the chairmanship of Law Secretary. as per GO (Rt) No.5064/88/Home dated 06.10.1988, for screening the proposals submitted under PIT NDPS Act for preventive detention. The proposal for preventive detention under PITNDPS Act was submitted before the Government of Kerala by the Sponsoring Authority as per letter dated 27.03.2026 and the same was recommended and forwarded to Government by the State Police Chief vide the letter dated 04.04.2026. Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the chairmanship of Law Secretary on 22.04.2026. The Screening Committee examined the same in detail and opined that this is subjectively and objectively a fit case for issuing order of detention under section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act 1988. The report of the screening committee is enclosed with this order. Later the report of the Screening Committee Report was sent to the Screening Committee members and Sponsoring authority concerned for getting their authentication and the same was received back to the Government on 04.05.2026. The Detaining Authority further scrutinized the comprehensive proposal along with the recommendation of the Screening Committee to arrive at objective and subjective satisfaction. Slight delay happened in issuing the detention order was due to the time taken for the completion of above mentioned procedures.”

22. Thus, from the above it appears that the Detaining Authority has explained the delay occurred in initiating and processing the proposal and passing the detention order for preventive detention.

23. On a consideration of the rival submissions and the materials placed on record, we are of the view that the explanation offered by the Detaining Authority for the time taken in processing the proposal for preventive detention is satisfactory. The records disclose that the sponsoring authority required time to collect the relevant records pertaining to the adverse cases before submitting the proposal. Thereafter, the proposal was processed through the Deputy Inspector General of Police, the Inspector General of Police, the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order) and the State Police Chief before it was forwarded to the Government. Upon receipt of the proposal, the Government referred the matter to the Screening Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of the Law Secretary. The Screening Committee examined the proposal in detail and opined that the case was fit for invoking the provisions of Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. The report of the Screening Committee was thereafter circulated among its members and the sponsoring authority for authentication, and the authenticated report was received by the Government on 4th May, 2026. It was only thereafter that the Detaining Authority considered the proposal along with the recommendation of the Screening Committee and passed the order of detention on 8th May 2026. In such circumstances, we are satisfied that the time consumed at each stage of the proceedings has been adequately explained and cannot be regarded as an unexplained or unreasonable delay so as to vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

24. Now with regard to the execution of the detention order, it appears that the same was passed on 8th May, 2026 and was executed only on 13th May, 2026, resulting in a delay of only five days. Such a short interval, by itself, cannot be regarded as an unreasonable or unexplained delay so as to snap the live and proximate link between the order of detention and its purpose.

25. Apart from the aforesaid grounds of challenge, the learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged the detention on the ground that the Detaining Authority had failed to consider the stringent bail conditions imposed upon the detenu in the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, it is submitted that, despite being enlarged on bail on 23rd February, 2026, till date of the detention order, i.e., 8th May, 2026, the detenu has not been involved in any further crimes.

26. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Zulaikha C.H. v. State of Kerala & Others (Judgment dated 12 February 2026 in WP(Crl.) No. 202/2026) , held as follows:-

                  “8. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, that the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that no law precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated passing an order of detention should be reflected in the order itself.

9. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the cases registered against him is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is stated that the detenu has blatantly violated the stringent bail conditions imposed by the courts and is involved in cases one after another. Moreover, it is stated that normal preventive measures and the bail conditions are not sufficient to curb the detenu’s narcotic criminal activities. Likewise, in Ext.P1 order the conditions imposed by the court while granting bail are also extracted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act is vitiated in any manner. Resultantly, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

27. In adverting to the above and coming to the facts of the present case, it appears from the records that the bail conditions imposed upon the detenu were duly taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority while arriving at its subjective satisfaction. The detenu was granted bail in Crime No.677/2025 by the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act & NDPS Act Cases, Manjeri, by order dated 23rd February, 2026 in Crl.M.P. No. 01/2026, subject to, inter alia, the following conditions:

                   “1. Petitioner shall execute a bond for Rs.3,00,000/-(Rupees Three Lakhs) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum.

                  2. Petitioner shall not leave Indian territory without prior permission from the court.

                  3. Petitioner shall not commit similar offenses while on bail.

                  4. Petitioner shall not interfere with investigation, influence or intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence.

                  5. Petitioner shall submit his passport before this Court and if he doesn't hold a passport, he shall file an affidavit to that effect.

                  6. Petitioner shall appear before the court without fail till the conclusion of the trial.

                  7. It is specifically made clear that the sureties shall produce the original title deeds of their properties, accompanied with photo copies and the original will be returned after comparison with the photo copies.

                  8. Violation of any of the condition will be a ground for cancellation of bail.”

28. The aforesaid stringent bail conditions were duly taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority before arriving at its subjective satisfaction. The Detaining Authority also recorded that the existing bail conditions were not sufficient to curb the detenu's narcotic-related criminal activities, having regard to the fact that he had repeatedly indulged in similar offences even after being convicted in five earlier cases. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Detaining Authority had failed to consider the efficacy of the bail conditions or that its subjective satisfaction suffered from non-application of mind.

29. Before parting with, we would like to refer to the decision in the case of Aaliya Ashraf v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2026 SCC OnLine Ker 4053), wherein it was held as follows:

                  “25. Drug abuse, even in small quantities, poses significant challenges to families and society, invariably resulting in catastrophic consequences. Within families, substance abuse can lead to emotional distress, financial strain, and the breakdown of trust and relationships. It has far more dangerous repercussions on the society, contributing to very high crime rates, breakdown in law and order, challenges to public safety, increasing healthcare costs and loss of productivity, among various other deleterious consequences. Individuals with dependence on drugs and other substances face severe constraints in social functioning and create a burden on the society. Drug use and abuse lead to severe psychiatric conditions, disability and even death as a result of accidents or diseases caused or worsened by them and even high rates of suicidality.

                  26. The costs associated with uncontrolled and unrestrained substance abuse is staggering, creating huge loads on the public healthcare system and consequent economic burden.”

                  27. Even when we view as afore, it is not lost on us that, in many cases, addiction and drug abuse are not merely moral issues, but conditions with significant physiological and psychological ramifications. With continued use, an individual's nervous system becomes conditioned to the substance, leading to withdrawal symptoms, cravings, sleep disruption, anxiety, depression, violent behavior, and impaired judgment, each of which has a deep societal impact and is not merely an individual concern. Recidivist tendencies – to say, a person repeatedly involving in offences – cannot be regarded as casual, even though the quantity involved in each instance may be small as per the statutory prescription. Rather, such conduct must be viewed as an indication requiring urgent intervention and decisive action.

                  28. The societal expression of the slightest amount of tolerance to use or abuse of drugs – even in small quantities and for personal use-would be catastrophic, particularly when such substances, seemingly appear to be rather freely available. The approach of the society to this menace requires to be one of zero tolerance and non-negotiability; and even a trace of acceptance would be to push societies into chasms of irreparable consequences.”

30. We also refer to the decision in the case of Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade (2025 SCC OnLine SC 3049) , wherein it was held as follows:

                  “8. This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twenty-first century, affecting every country worldwide, as drug trafficking and addiction have become pervasive. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its 2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million people worldwide had used drugs in the past year, representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of drug use.”

9. In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects individuals, families, and communities but also undermines various aspects of health including physical, social, political, cultural foundations, and mental well-being. (See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S, Grover A, Saleem SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among the Indian youth – it's time for action. Indian J Community Med 2025;50: S9-12, published on 17-4-2025”)”

31. Coming to the facts of the present case, it appears that the detenu is a habitual offender, continuously indulging in the sale and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Even after his conviction in five earlier cases, he was allegedly involved in two more offences registered under the NDPS Act. It was in the backdrop of these repeated involvements that the Detaining Authority considered the effect of the bail conditions imposed in the last prejudicial case and arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the existing bail conditions would not constitute a sufficient deterrent to prevent the detenu from engaging in similar activities.

32. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find that none of the grounds urged by the petitioner merits acceptance. The impugned order of detention does not suffer from any illegality, procedural infirmity, or violation of the constitutional or statutory safeguards warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

33. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. The records produced in sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor forthwith.