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CDJ 2026 MHC 5761 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Case No : SA. (MD). No. 422 of 2017
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE T.V. THAMILSELVI
Parties : L. Jegannathan Versus T.L. Narasimman @ Narasimma Iyer (Died) & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: M/s. M. Karunanithi, Advocate. For the Respondents: R2 to R5, A. Azhageson, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 30-07-2026
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code - Section 100 -
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 CPC, to set aside the judgment and decreetal order passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Thanjavur, dated 25.03.2014 made in A.S.No.24 of 2013, confirming the judgment and decreetal order passed by the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru, in O.S.No.140 of 2007 dated 29.01.2013 and allow the second appeal.)

1. Challenging the concurrent findings, the appellant/plaintiff preferred this Second Appeal.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.

3. According to the plaintiff, his father was a tenant in respect of the suit property from 27.04.1964 to the year 1982, and thereafter vacated and handed over the vacant possession of the suit property in the year 1982. The plaintiff further averred that the first defendant had agreed to sell the suit property to him on 01.09.1982, and the sale consideration was orally fixed at Rs.10,000/-. The plaintiff further averred that the entire sale consideration was paid to the first defendant; however, no receipt was issued by the first defendant acknowledging the receipt of the said amount. The plaintiff further averred that the first defendant had agreed to execute the sale deed on or about 01.10.1982. Believing the said representation, the plaintiff paid the entire sale consideration to the first defendant. However, thereafter, the first defendant failed and refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff had forcibly entered into the suit property by breaking open the lock and occupied the same without the consent of the first defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff has been in unlawful possession of the suit property from 01.11.1982 onwards. Pursuant to the refusal of the first defendant to hand over possession of the suit property, the plaintiff had instituted a suit in O.S.No.135 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Papanasam, seeking the relief of declaration and consequential injunction against the first defendant. Due to his inability to prosecute the said suit, the plaintiff was unable to proceed further, and consequently, the suit came to be dismissed for default in the year 1999. Thereafter, the first defendant once again approached the plaintiff and demanded an additional amount in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff refused to pay the additional amount demanded by the first defendant. Consequently, the first defendant attempted once again to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff from the suit property. The plaintiff apprehended that the first defendant, being an influential person in the locality, might at any time attempt to interfere with his possession and dispossess him from the suit property by using force and unlawful means. Hence, the plaintiff was constrained to institute the present suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs.

4. The defendant resisted the suit by filing a detailed written statement contending that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable, as the plaintiff's claim, if any, was only against the first defendant, who died during the pendency of the suit. It was contended that, once the claim against the first defendant had abated, no independent claim could thereafter be maintained against his legal representatives. Since the suit is one for bare injunction, the cause of action does not survive against the legal representatives of the deceased defendant. Consequently, the suit is not maintainable as against them. It was further contended that the plaintiff had earlier instituted a suit for declaration against the first defendant, which came to be dismissed. Therefore, the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata.

5. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiff one witness was examined as P.W.1 and 18 documents were marked as Ex.A1 to Ex.A18. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.3 were examined and 6 documents were marked as Ex.B1 to Ex.B6.

Decision of the trial Court and the first appellate Court:

6. The trial Court, on consideration of the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties, dismissed the suit on 29.01.2013, as against which, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.24 of 2013, before the Principal Subordinate Court, Thanjavur, which was also dismissed, confirming the findings of the trial Court.

7. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the first appellate Court, the plaintiff filed the present second appeal raising the following substantial questions of law:

                   “(a)Whether the Courts below are correct in holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration of title over the suit property by prescription adverse possession without properly considering and appreciating the principles of law of adverse possession?

                   (b)Whether the trial Court below is correct in coming to the conclusion that the suit in O.S.No.140 of 2007 is barred under Order 9 Rule 9 of C.P.C?

                   (c)Whether the Courts below is correct in entirely shifting the burden of proof on the shoulders of plaintiff without adhering to the Sections 101 & 102 of the Evidence Act?”

8. The Second Appeal is yet to be admitted. However, by consent, the second appeal has been taken up for final hearing.

9. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent.

10. By order dated 10.07.2026, this Court passed the following order:

                   “Challenging the concurrent findings of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, the plaintiff preferred this appeal.

                   2. Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration and other consequential reliefs against the original defendant. Upon the death of the original defendant, his legal heirs were brought on record and contested the suit.

                   3. After considering the pleadings and evidence, the Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the first defendant had already instituted R.C.O.P. proceedings against the plaintiff and his brother, and that an earlier suit in O.S. No.135 of 1996 had also been filed. The Trial Court found that there was no fresh cause of action for instituting the present suit. It further held that, having withdrawn the earlier suit without obtaining the leave of the Court to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, the plaintiff was barred from maintaining the present suit. The Trial Court also observed that the plaintiff had failed to establish his right and title over the suit property.

                   4. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S. No.24 of 2013. The First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the evidence and the findings of the Trial Court, concurred with its conclusions and dismissed the appeal, thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.

                   5.Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiff one witness was examined as P.W.1 and 18 documents were marked as Ex.A1 to Ex.A18. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.3 were examined and 6 documents were marked as Ex.B1 to Ex.B6.

                   6.The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondents have already taken delivery of the suit property pursuant to the decree passed in R.C.O.P. No.10 of 2005, dated 29.01.2013. In support of the said contention, he produced the records in R.C.O.P. No.10 of 2005 and E.P. No.35 of 2016. It was further submitted that, based on the delivery certificate issued by the executing Court on 25.11.2025, possession of the property was delivered to the respondents through due process of law, in the presence of the Village Administrative Officer.

                   7. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present Second Appeal. He would contend that the respondents have already taken delivery of the suit property through due process of law in execution of the decree passed by the competent Court. Therefore, according to him, the Second Appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.

                   8. The appellant is directed to get instructions. Post the matter “for orders” on 30.07.2026.”

11. Today when the matter is taken up for hearing, there is no representation on the side of the appellant.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the respondents/defendants had already taken possession of the suit property through due process of law, as had also been recorded by this Court in its order dated 10.07.2026.

13. This Court has carefully perused the entire materials available on record, including the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. It is evident that the respondents/defendants have already taken possession of the suit property through due process of law. The said factual position has also been recorded by this Court in its earlier order dated 10.07.2026. The appellant has neither chosen to appear before this Court nor placed any material to dislodge the concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below. This Court finds no perversity, illegality, or infirmity in the findings recorded by the Courts below warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, this Court finds that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises for consideration in the present Second Appeal. Hence, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed.

14. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

 
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