1. The case of petitioner is that he was initially appointed as a Driver on a daily wage basis in January 1993 at Bhainsa Depot, and his services were regularized on 01.08.1996. In May 2007, he is stated to have suffered kidney failure and was admitted to NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad, where one of his kidneys was removed. NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad issued Medical Certificate dated 18.07.2008 recommending that petitioner be provided with an alternative job other than that of Driver. Thereafter, the 4th respondent referred petitioner to Tarnaka Hospital, Hyderabad where the Superintendent and Chief Medical Officer, through Letter dated 21.07.2008, declared petitioner medically-unfit for the post of Driver due to single functioning kidney. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent, through Office Order dated 05.09.2008, appointed petitioner to the alternative post of Shramik, and he joined duty on 05.09.2008 at Bhainsa Depot.
1.1. Petitioner asserts that although Office Order dated 05.09.2008 specifically stated that there would be no change in his pay upon appointment to the post of Shramik, respondents failed to protect the pay scale attached to the post of Driver and failed to extend the service benefits attached to the said post. He was not paid salary from the date he was declared medically- unfit for the post of Driver until his appointment to the alternative post of Shramik, and the said interregnum period was not treated as duty for the purpose of leave and annual increments. It is alleged that non-protection of the Driver pay scale resulted in financial loss, as employees appointed along with him are drawing a basic pay of Rs. 23,230/-, whereas he is drawing only Rs. 20,820/- as basic pay. Petitioner further states that he was denied 12 years Special Grade which became due in 2008, and 20 years Special Grade which became due in August 2016, and that his service as Driver was not reckoned for determining seniority for promotion to the post of Assistant Depot Clerk. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to all these service benefits under Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act , 1995 (Act 1 of 1996) and alleges that similarly-situated employees provided alternative employment have been granted protection of the Driver pay scale and corresponding service benefits. Petitioner states that he repeatedly approached respondents and submitted grievances through the Recognized Union, but no action was taken.
2. Per contra, respondents filed counter along with vacate petition denying the material allegations made in the writ petition. It is stated, based on the medical report, petitioner was appointed as Shramik vide Office Order dated 05.09.2008 in terms of Circular Nos. PD-60/2005 dated 14.12.2005 and PD-16/2008 dated 25.02.2008, and he joined duty as Shramik with effect from 05.09.2008. Respondents contend that the disability acquired by petitioner, namely ‘Single Functioning of Kidney’, does not fall within the definition of disability under Section 2(i) of Act 1 of 1996. It is specifically asserted that petitioner was not appointed as Shramik under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996, but purely in terms of administrative Circular Nos. PD-60/2005 and PD-16/2008.
2.1. Respondents contend that Section 2(i) of Act 1 of 1996 exhaustively defines ‘disability’ as: (i) Blindness, (ii) Low Vision, (iii) Leprosy-cured, (iv) Hearing Impairment, (v) Locomotor Disability, (vi) Mental Retardation, and (vii) Mental Illness. Every disability rendering an employee incapable of performing specific duties does not automatically entitle him to statutory protection under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996. To claim benefit under Section 47, an employee must satisfy the conditions prescribed under Section 2(i) and obtain a certificate from the competent medical authority as defined under Section 2(p) of the Act. Since ‘Single Functioning of Kidney’ is not an enumerated disability under Section 2(i), petitioner cannot claim benefits under Section 47.
2.2. Respondents further state that petitioner, knowing fully well of the terms governing his appointment as Shramik as a medically unfit Driver under Office Order dated 05.09.2008 and voluntarily accepted the appointment by joining duty at Bhainsa Depot without protest, he is estopped from claiming pay protection of the post of Driver, seniority, salary for the interregnum period, or other statutory benefits under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996. Furthermore, petitioner remained silent for about eight years without challenging the Office Order dated 05.09.2008, rendering the Writ Petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.
2.3. It is also stated, in identical matters, by order dated 29.01.2016, Writ Petition No. 36337 of 2012 and batch, was allowed; aggrieved thereby, the Corporation preferred Writ Appeals, including Writ Appeal No. 666 of 2016 and 1120 of 2015 and batch, which were dismissed by order dated 08.09.2016. Challenging the same, the Corporation preferred SLP (C) No. 32016 of 2016 and batch before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by order dated 23.02.2017, the said Appeals were allowed holding that the benefit of Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996 is available only to those persons whose disabilities are covered under Section 2(i) of the Act.
2.4. Respondents further state that aggrieved by the interim order dated 26.10.2016, they also filed Writ Appeal No. 1556 of 2017, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 25.10.2017 with liberty to file a vacate petition. In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.02.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017, the interim order dated 26.10.2016 is unsustainable and the writ petition itself is devoid of merit.
3. In reply, petitioner reiterated that Circular No. PD-16/2008 dated 25.02.2008 was issued to mitigate hardship and implement Act 1 of 1996. It is asserted, due to the strenuous nature of driving duties, he developed kidney ailments resulting in the removal of one kidney. Based on the Medical Certificate dated 18.07.2008 issued by NIMS Hospital and Letter dated 21.07.2008 issued by Tarnaka Hospital, he was accommodated as Shramik. Petitioner states that non-functioning of a kidney results in bladder disorder, which is included as a category of Locomotor Disability under Paragraph 7.8, Table-VIII of Annexure-A to G.O.Ms.No.31, Women Development, Child Welfare & Disabled Welfare (DW) Department, dated 01.12.2009. Petitioner therefore, contends that his condition constitutes an enumerated disability under Section 2(i) of Act 1 of 1996. Circular No. PD-60/2005 dated 14.12.2005 merely relates to obtaining approval of the Managing Director for filling up posts, and that respondents are estopped from denying statutory pay protection after accommodating him.
4. Heard Sri A.G. Satyanarayana Rao, learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation Sri U. Shanti Bhushan Rao.
5. The fundamental issue that arises for determination is whether an employee declared medically unfit for the post of Driver due to ‘Single Functioning of Kidney’ is entitled to the statutory protection of pay scale, seniority, and consequential service benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act. To evaluate the claim under Section 47, it is imperative to examine the statutory definitions provided under the Act. Section 2(i) defines ‘disability’ as follows:
'disability' means—
(i) blindness;
(ii) low vision;
(iii) leprosy-cured;
(iv) hearing impairment;
(v) locomotor disability;
(vi) mental retardation;
(vii) mental illness;"
6. Furthermore, Section 2(p) defines a ‘person with disability’ as a person suffering from not less than forty per cent of any disability as certified by a medical authority. Section 47(1) mandates that no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service. However, applicability of Section 47 is strictly contingent upon the employee suffering from one of the specific, enumerated disabilities under Section 2(i) of the Act.
7. The medical certificates relied upon by petitioner, including the Medical Certificate dated 18.07.2008 from NIMS Hospital and Letter dated 21.07.2008 from Tarnaka Hospital, unequivocally establish that petitioner was declared medically- unfit for the post of Driver solely on account of ‘Single Functioning of Kidney’. A plain reading of Section 2(i) demonstrates that renal failure or single functioning kidney is not an enumerated disability under Act 1 of 1996. The attempt made by petitioner to stretch the scope of ‘Locomotor Disability’ under Paragraph 7.8, Table-VIII of Annexure-A to G.O.Ms.No.31 dated 01.12.2009 to cover renal failure as a "bladder disorder" is legally-untenable. Administrative guidelines or executive orders issued under G.O.Ms.No.31 dated 01.12.2009 cannot expand, alter, or rewrite the exhaustive statutory definition contained in Section 2(i) of a Parliamentary enactment.
8. The legal issue framed herein is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017 and batch, by order dated 23.02.2017 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 32016 of 2016 and batch, reversing the judgment in Writ Appeal No. 1120 of 2015 and Writ Petition No. 36337 of 2012), authoritatively settled the law governing alternative employment in the Respondent Corporation. The Hon’ble Apex Court held, in unequivocal terms, that the protective umbrella of Section 47 extends exclusively to employees who suffer from one of the designated disabilities listed under Section 2(i) of the Act. Employees who are rendered medically unfit due to ailments or medical conditions not falling within Section 2(i) cannot claim statutory protection under Section 47 for pay protection, interregnum wages, or seniority in the original post as a matter of statutory right. Consequently, the accommodation provided to petitioner vide Office Order dated 05.09.2008 as Shramik was not under Section 47, but was done purely on compassionate and administrative grounds under the internal circulars of the Corporation, namely Circular dated 14.12.2005 and Circular dated 25.02.2008. The rights and pay scales of an employee accommodated under administrative circulars are governed strictly by the terms of those circulars and the appointment order itself, rather than the mandatory provisions of Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996.
9. In addition to lack of statutory entitlement, the Writ Petition is hit by unexplained delay and laches. Petitioner was appointed as Shramik vide Office Order dated 05.09.2008 and voluntarily joined duty on 05.09.2008 without registering any formal legal challenge to the terms of the appointment order. He accepted the alternative post and worked under those conditions for over eight years before filing the present Writ Petition in 2016. Having accepted the appointment order and acquiesced to its terms for eight years, he is estopped under law from belatedly challenging the pay scale or seeking statutory benefits under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996. Repeated administrative representations do not extend the period of limitation or condone extraordinary laches in invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. In view of the authoritative judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.02.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017, and given that petitioner's condition of "Single Functioning of Kidney" does not fall within the statutory definition of "disability" under Section 2(i) of Act 1 of 1996, petitioner is not entitled to protection of the Driver pay scale, salary for the interregnum period, reckoning of Driver seniority for Special Grade scales (12/20 years), or promotion to the post of Assistant Depot Clerk under Section 47 of the Act. The action of the Respondents is in accordance with law and does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional infirmity.
11. The judgment relied on by learned counsel for petitioner in Ch. Joseph v. The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Writ Petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed being devoid of merit.
12. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
13. Consequently, the interim order dated 26.10.2016 stands vacated.




